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THE 


FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD, 


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Pe OO Cr Ye AON OM Et eC S@ RELY: 


BY 


i De MUGABE MDD: e1er, D,, 


PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, 


“In the praises of men, in the plaudits of the world, there is no joy like 
this—the secret satisfaction of having helped a single child of God out of his 
troubles of mind, or given a new light to his faith and heart and hope.” 


CINCINNATI: 
PUBLISHED BY HITCHCOCK & WALDEN, 
FOR THE AUTHOR, 

1878. 


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T \ URING a period of thirty years’ teaching I have 
D met with many earnest and gifted minds so 
confounded with the difficulties lying between human 
freedom and the divine foreknowledge that I was 
finally induced, actuated by the simple desire of 
relieving honest inquirers, to attempt some solution 
of this mystery of the ages. 

‘The main positions of a work may be impreg- 
nable,”’ says Dr. Whately, ‘‘and yet it will be 
strange, indeed, if some illustration, or some subor- 
dinate parts of it, will not admit of a plausible ob- 
jection. The sophist, in such a case, joins issue on 
one of these incidental questions, and then comes 
forward with his ‘Reply to the Work.’ But the 
other arguments remaining unrefuted, the conclusion 
may stand as firmly as if the answerer had urged 
nothing by way of refutation. For unanswerable 
arguments may be brought against that which is, 
nevertheless, true, and which is established by the 
greater probabilities.”’ 


Inspired only by a desire to contribute, so far as 
Ill 


IV PREFACE. 


I might be able, toward the removal of the difficul- 
ties that environ humanity and theology in connec- 
tion with this subject, I commit this volume to the 
public, with an earnest prayer that it may in some 
degree accomplish its purpose. If it has any value I 
desire that it may receive the candid attention of the- 
ologians and of all those inquiring after divine truth. 

It has been my aim to assume nothing that is 
not axiomatic to universal consciousness or admitted 
by theologians who accept the freedom of the will 
without at the same time embracing contradictory 
doctrines. If what I here present to the public shall 
be received without unreasonable prejudice, and can- 
didly considered under the controlling influence of a 
profound desire for the advancement of elevated 
thought and of a profounder love for God’s eternal 
truth and will, I can ask no more. Free discussion 
is not only the palladium of liberty, but also the 
necessary condition of progress. 

I am not in sympathy with those who discuss 
only for victory, or criticise without taking suffi- 
cient pains to comprehend the matter in hand; nor 
with those who insist on objections without paying 
due attention to counter objections, and who merely 
dogmatize; for who can convince a dogmatist that is 
controlled absolutely by authorities and has no con- 


fidence in his own deductions? 


PREFACE. Vv 


To any lover of sound doctrine in theology I 
would simply say, in the language of Job, ‘‘ That 
which I see not teach thou me.” ) 

Surely the writer’s unwavering devotion to every 
doctrine regarded essential by all orthodox branches 
of the Christian Church entitles him to be heard, if 
heard at all, without misrepresentation; and this may 
well be conceded to any one who tentatively pro- 
poses a solution of difficulties in what is now ac- 
knowledged to be the most perplexing subject in 
philosophy, namely, the conflict between freedom 
and necessity. 

After my manuscript was written, knowing from 
years of intimacy my friend, Rev. F. S. Hoyt, D. D., 
to be an accurate and varied scholar and an able 
theologian, I placed it in his hands for revision and 
criticism. When it passed into the hands of the 
publishers I also requested him to watch its passage 
through the press and guard it from mistakes and 
blemishes. With these requests he has most kindly 
and fraternally complied. I wish, therefore, here to 
acknowledge my great obligations to him, and, as 
strongly as words can, express my gratitude for his 


brotherly kindness and invaluable criticisms. 


L. D. M’CABE. 
DELAWARE, O., March 18, 1878. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

INTRODUCTION, + cece cs onde. Cee eel is Botte e tets 7 
CHAPTER I. 

PREPIMINARY: OBSERVATIONS, boa. « . che ke; 0) 6 stems ¢ tens 17 
GHAPETE RIT: 

PROPHECHS COMPAREDS WITH IVIIRACL RA” oe hen eh eile eo 20 


CHAPTERCIL,: 


THE HuMAN WILL ACIS UNDER Two LAWS, .°.....).°s 5. 32 


Ctl ee Ve 


THEEFOUR KINGDOMS; OF “GOD, ©... 60.0: Siebel rete oetroute 55 


(iB aa Wma Ceol 


HEA PPLICATION OF MTHESE. PRINCIPLES, t.. 60's ot en a. tines 0) 1-00: 


CHABTERIVE 


fPHEeCASE. OF) FLAZAEL CONSIDERED)... iis), estes of epee nS 


CHAPTER VII. 


(HES CASE OFS] UDAS*ISCARIOT CONSIDERED: 31 fel, of oye ones 99 


4 CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER Vill 


PAGE, 
VARIOUS OTHER SCRIPTURES CONSIDERED, . «. « « « « « « 440 


CHAE GIS, bcs 


GOp’s [ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES, « . . Sy) «' aes ee eee 


Chae LENE. 


BATALISHIC. TENDENCIES; cies. Os at oie .a pe eeddpeuedage ea 


CHAPTER XL 


WHERE Is THE NECESSITY FOR ABSOLUTE FOREKNOWLEDGE? 174 


CHAPTER» XII. 


PRINCIPLES ADMITTED BY ALL SCHOOLS OF THEOLOGY, .. 192 


CHAPTER XIII. 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS OF FOREKNOWLEDGE, .... 2... 197 


CHAPTER XIV. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE INCOMPREHENSIBLE, és ec lept sane genes eens 214 


CHAPTER XV. 


VIEWS. OF OTHERS, 4.5 33 17 hous faa) « oO 


CHAPTER XVI. 


IMPERFECT VIEWS OF OMNISCIENCE,. .......... 223 


CHAPTER XVII. 


THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, AND THE UNCONDITIONED IN 
RELATION TO THE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE,..... 262 


CONTENTS. 5 


CHAPTER XVIII. 


PAGE, 
INTRODUCTION OF MORAL EVIL INTO THE UNIVERSE,. . . 285 
CHAPTER XIX. 
FOREKNOWLEDGE ANNIHILATES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
CERTAINTY GAND: CONTINGENCY, 0% Jad v5 wate $s sete de tar seh 290 
CHAPTER XX. 
FOREKNOWLEDGE INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN FREEDOM, . 310 
CHAPTER XXII. 
FOREKNOWLEDGE ANNIHILATES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
FREEDOM AND ‘THE LAW OF CAUSE AND EFFECT,. . . 322 
CHAPTER XXII. 
Abed HINGS WILL BE AS “TREY WILL BE, . >: 4m ae ost 934. 
CHAPTER@=XXHT 
‘“‘THE RIGHTS OF CREATURE AND CREATOR GERMANE TO 
THES OURECI 4 votema nas serie «ie fi te tans Mee eM teas ory ae eS 5S 


CHAPTER. XXIV. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE MAKES GOD INCONSISTENT, . . - « «+ + « 359 


CHAPTER XXV. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE WOULD DETRACT FROM DIVINE BENEV- 
BOENCH Sy wet t 5.04). Pe', eM eae RO eo Pel! heaton ok SOL 


CHAPTER XXVI. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE WOULD PREVENT PROPER STATES OF 
PEELING IN THE INFINITE MIND, oc 2) 1) fe. ee eh 382 


6 CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER XX VIT, 


PAGH. 
DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTEL- 
LECTUAL PERFECTIONS OF GOD.) Ss ys toll ten 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
BELIEF IN DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE DEPRESSES THE ENER- 
GIES OP THE SOUL, 5% vel coves 8) ans en 399 


CHAPT ERGXXLX: 


THE DENIAL OF ABSOLUTE FOREKNOWLEDGE TENABLE, |, 0, Age 


CHAPTERI xx 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS, 42.5, 2 yt, orist s20 oe 430 


INTRODUCTION. 


OME books have their origin in a sudden impulse, 

and reach the public eye after only a hasty process 
of reflection and composition. Even the patient Goethe 
said a strong word to Eckermann in favor of this very 
species of literature, and claimed for it a merit which 
works of slower growth do not possess. But his own 
example, and the philosophy underlying his whole life, 
are sufficient rejoinder to his theory. The man who spent 
fifty years on ‘‘ Faust’? was hardly the one to offer a 
defense of sudden growths. In contrast with the large 
class of rapidly produced books, we find that smaller group 
of works which lie far back in the life and thought of the 
writers, and see the light only after tedious stages of 
reflection. The chisel of years chips off all ornamenta- 
tion. They come before us, often, like some of the calm 
thinkers in the medizval period, starting suddenly out 
of their long tarrying with their one thought, but, with all 
their baldness and gauntness, so intense and purposeful 
that their appeal is irresistible. There is a certain intensity © 
which is born of leisurely time. ‘The flame throws its 
glare on the opposite wall, but to drive out the frost there 
is need of the slow and steadily-burning coals. 

The following work belongs to the latter class. It is 
from the pen of a careful and collected thinker. He does 
not present his work for public judgment without having 
tested his opinions in the crucible of severe examination. 

7 


8 INTRODUCTION. 


In the ‘‘ Foreknowledge of God,” it will be seen that the 
cutting and setting are made subordinate to the stone 
itself. The author has been for an entire generation an 
honored member of the Faculty of the Ohio Wesleyan 
University: Fifteen years of this period he has filled the 
chair of Mathematics and Mechanical Philosophy, and 
during eighteen years he has had charge of the department 
of Metaphysics. There are men, now no longer young, 
all over the land, and even representing the American 
Church and Government in foreign countries, who have 
sat at his feet and received the double impress of his 
genius and his ever-fresh sympathies. The glow of his 
nature has passed into the life of these many hundreds, 
and, though still laboring with all the ardor of his lasting 
youth, he possesses the rich blessing that comes from a 
life of supreme happiness in heart and home, from thirty- 
three years of unbroken and congenial work in the lec- 
ture-hall, and from constant wrestling with the great 
question of God’s relation to the destiny of his child, 
Man. While the theological public are already acquainted 
with the author as an original and profound writer, the 
following work is the first to reveal the fundamental 
thought of his life. We find here the chief result of his 
long work as a thinker and student, and, as such, it will 
carry with it its own commendation as an embodiment 
of reverent dealing with one of the greatest questions 
which have engaged the thought of the Church ever 
since the third Christian century, and especially since 
Augustine made the remarkable declaration, that God 
does not know things because they are, but things are 
because God knows them.* There will be readers who 


*Ex quo occurrit animo quiddam mirum, sed tamen verum, 
quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset: Deo autem 
nisi notus esset, esse non posset. (August. L. C.) 


a 


INTRODUCTION. 9 


will differ with his conclusions, but there will be none to 
deny the keenness of his logic, his intimate acquaintance 
with the entire history of the doctrine of the divine fore- 
knowledge, and his candor and charity in dealing with 
men of opposite views. 

In complying with the request of the author to furnish 
an introductory statement, the undersigned does not regard 
it as coming within his province to give a formal indorse- 
ment of the conclusions of the work, but to place himself 
beside its readers, and to learn with them what a thought- 
ful man has to say upon the subject of the divine fore- 
knowledge. Our part shall be, first of all, to indicate the 
general position of the work in theological thought, and 
then to summarize the drift of the author’s argument in 
defense of his position. 

The feeling of the incompatibility between absolute 
divine foreknowledge and human freedom is as old as 
theological thought. Out of this feeling have arisen vari- 
ous and often conflicting suppositions relative to the broad 
question of foreknowledge. We say suppositions, and not 
theories, for a theory is an imaginary law that can afford 
a consistent explanation of all the facts involved in any 
subject. Chevalier Ramsey held the view that God 
chooses not to know future contingent events, implying 
that he could foreknow them if such were his preference. 
A large class of thinkers have held that the divine fore- 
knowledge must be so different from any thing of the 
kind among men as to afford no data whatever for any 
argument pro or con in regard to it. Gomarus held that 
a given event will happen under certain favorable circum- 
stances, and that a different event will happen under a 
different set of circumstances. This hypothesis of a con- 
ditional foreknowledge was adopted by some of the elder 
English divines. The great controversy upon the subject 


10 INTRODUCTION. 


has been between the two leading schools of theology, 
the Calvinistic and Arminian. The former, as represented 
by Jonathan Edwards, Chalmers, and many others, admit 
the impossibility of infallible foreknowledge of contingent 
events, and boldly deny that there is any such thing as 
contingency in the mind of God. With them all] events 
are certain because all are foreordained, and are therefore 
easily foreknown. But this involved the manifest contra- 
diction of asserting that a choice infallibly foreknown as 
certain to be only this, and not any other, could yet be 
free, and the author thereof responsible. This palpable 
inconsistency of certainty, or more strictly of necessity, 
with human freedom and responsibility is clearly shown 
by Dr. Whedon, the leader and _ best representative of 
Arminian thought upon this subject. He has proven that 
a free choice must necessarily be contingent. The hy- 
pothesis of Socinus—that ‘the foreknowledge of contin- 
gent events being in its own nature impossible because it 
implies a contradiction, it is necessary to deny that God 
has any such prescience”—has never been developed into 
a consistent and well-sustained theory. When the author 
of the present work approached the subject he found no 
consistent theories to aid him in his meditations, but 
simply the convictions, feelings, and hypotheses of 
thoughtful men. He found little, if any, literature di- 
rectly upon the subject, but he believed that the assump-* 
tion of infinity in the absolute sense as parallel to the 
mathematical conception of the Infinite, or to the tran- 
scendental cenceptions of the @ priort philosophers, not 
only leads to moral contradictions, by making the whole 
question of evil insoluble, but involves intellectual con- 
tradictions in itself, which, in many minds, result in the 
entire rejection of the very foundations of religion. For 
example, the ‘First Principles” of Herbert Spencer cease 


INTRODUCTION. II 


to be a bulwark of atheism the very moment it is ad- 
mitted that the divine may be in any degree subject to 
limitation, and, therefore, may come into relations with 
the finite, and be conceived of as personal. 

The position of the author, briefly stated, and apart 
from the opinions of others, is: that universal prescience 
is incompatible with human freedom; that there can be 
no tenable system of theology or of moral philosophy 
based upon that doctrine; but that the whole Christian 
system may be made consistent, defensible, and satisfac- 
tory by the denial of it; and that all the doctrines and 
prophecies of Scripture are plainly reconcilable with 
such denial. 

The work opens with a statement of the reasons for 
undertaking the present work, with the aims and objects 
that seemed desirable for the author to accomplish. We 
are then directed to instances of declared foreknowledge, 
as in the prophecies, which may be explained by the con- 
straint of the human will, in suspension or contradiction 
or counteraction of the law of liberty, as miracle is such 
suspension or counteraction of the law of matter. This 
is confirmed by showing, from the Scriptures, that the 
human will does, in many instances, for the accomplish- 
ment of God’s providential purposes, act under the law 
of cause and effect. These acts are foreknown because 
they are foreordained, and are brought to pass by a con- 
straint of the individual instruments. ‘These acts, how- 
ever, involve no moral character, and entail no endless 
destiny. ‘This point is also confirmed by showing that the 
kingdom of providence (with limitations) is the realm of 
foreordained, foreknown, and therefore constrained, acts. 
We are then furnished an illustration of these principles, 
as developed in the enigmatical case and character of St. 
Peter. This example shows that the Redeemer’s foreknowl- 


12 INTRODUCTION. 


edge and prophecy of the fall of his, at that time, foremost 
apostle arose from his purpose to allow Satan a little more 
control over him than is consistent with a fair trial, and 
thus, in this instance, to ‘‘ suffer him to be tempted above 
that. which he would be able to bear,” without lifting up 
a standard against him; and all in order to teach him 
indispensable lessons, and fit him for greater usefulness in 
his new kingdom. ‘The author next argues that the be- 
trayal and treachery of Judas were in no way essential to 
the great atonement; nor was it foreknowledge until Christ 
discovered its incipiency in the volitions of his free will; 
and that to Judas there is no reference in the prophecies 
of the Old Testament. We are then furnished with an 
explanation of various prophecies as based on the divine, 
or upon a knowledge of the existing causes of the acts 
foretold. God’s estimate of probabilities is a basis for 
accurate judgment of future contingencies in many cases, 
but is not a sufficient basis for universal and absolutely 
certain prescience. ‘The foreknowledge of future contin- 
gencies is, distributively, fatalistic in its tendency, and, 
further, is unnecessary. The notion that God’s govern- 
ment would otherwise be precarious reflects upon the 
divine perfections, by implying that God is not able to 
meet unforeseen exigencies, which even limited man can 
do, often organizing success out of unexpected disasters, 
But the Almighty must infallibly foresee every one of in- 
numerable millions of free choices, or he will be discon- 
certed, defeated, and his government overthrown. God 
acts towards all men precisely as he would act if he did 
not foreknow what they would choose to do. ‘This cer- 
tainly affords ground for the presumption that he does 
not. T’hose limit omniscience as much in affirming that, 
could there be such things as contingencies, omniscience 
could not foreknow them, as those who admit the exist- 


b) 


. " 


INTRODUCTION. 13 


ence of contingencies, but question the ability of omni- 
science to previse them. Those who deny all contin- 
gency, and teach that foreordination is indispensable to 
foreknowledge, have no reason or right to complain that 
the denial of foreknowledge limits. omniscience. And 
those who claim that God can not coerce a free act 
thereby clearly limit omnipotence. But neither denial is 
a real or superimposed limitation, but both are: self-im- 
posed, and are, therefore, not such as detract from the 
perfection of the attributes of God. In fact, there are 
many instances of self-imposed limitations, which reflect 
greater luster and glory upon the divine character. 

We now have presented the opinions of many eminent 
thinkers to the effect that foreknowledge is incomprehen- 
sible, and utterly irreconcilable with human. freedom. 
The origin of evil may be easily and naturally explained 
on the hypothesis of the non-prescience of the fall, as a 
fixed certainty, and is not ‘‘an inserutable mystery,” as 
Bledsoe and others have claimed. The author then shows 
that a foreknown choice must be certain, and therefore 
unavoidable, without breaking down divine foreknowl- 
edge and infracting the numberless subsequent plans and 
purposes of Jehovah, going forward, from everlasting to 
everlasting, and through one immensity after another. 
The argument then is, that foreknowledge would be det- 
rimental to men, because the belief of it would paralyze 
their spiritual energies by producing the conviction that 
their foreknown destiny is fixed, and unalterable by their 
own efforts; and embarrassing to God, by preventing 
proper efforts to save those who he foresees will be lost; 
and by producing in the divine mind most conflicting and 
painfully disturbing emotions. 

Foreknowledge would make God’s attitude toward pro- 


bationers disingenuous and inconsistent. Further, fore- 
2 


14 INTRODUCTION. 


knowledge would detract from the benevolence of God. 
Divine goodness requires the non-creation of an identical 
soul whose loss is foreseen as infallibly certain, and also 
the removal from probation of good men whose apostasy 
is foreseen. If the stronger probability is against universal 
prescience we ought to deny it. 

In the concluding chapters the author shows that a 
belief of absolute foreknowledge depresses the energies 
of the soul and weakens the sense of accountability, by 
producing the conviction that acts and destiny, to be fore- 
known, must be fore-fixed, and hence can not now be 
avoided by any exertion of our own. This belief, there- 
fore, discourages prayer, by making it appear to be 
useless; since neither my own exertions nor my prayers 
can make my character and destiny any different from 
what God foreknew they would be from all eternity. On 
the other hand, disbelief in foreknowledge encourages 
prayer and every other good word and work, since it 
gives the assurance that my prayers and exertions, by 
God’s grace, will make for me a character and destiny 
which I never could have attained without them, and 
that my character and destiny will be glorious just in 
proportion to the extent and intensity of my exertions. 

The oft-repeated statement that the foreknowledge of 
a choice has no influence on that choice is questioned 
even by those who insist upon it. This statement is false, 
because all belief affects, and must affect, conduct, and 
the belief in foreknowledge affects the conduct, and, 
therefore, affects the choices of the believer in the manner 
above shown. ‘The denial of absolute foreknowledge is 
tenable from the fact that there are no data, either in 
antecedent circumstances, or the character of the free 
agent, or the influences brought to bear upon him, for 
certain prescience of his free choices. For if these have 


INTRODUCTION. 15 


any causal power over his volitions, how can we account 
for our pungent sense of blame-worthiness for wrong 
actions, and how can we account for the frequent disap- 
pointment of our expectations of good and bad men? 
How, indeed, could we be free upon this hypothesis, 
which locates the incipiency of volitions outside of the 
will itself? But we are conscious of freedom—the best 
proof of it—and that neither our character nor our envi- - 
ronment has any controlling power over our volitions, and 
hence they furnish no data for certain prescience of them. 

We are quite sure that the author is not so sanguine 
as to expect to silence all objections to the ground which 
he occupies. The conflict will still go on. The vision 
of the writer of ‘‘ Locksley Hall” is as far from fulfill- 
ment in theology as in this stirring life about us: 


‘¢ J dipt into the future far as human eye could see, 
Saw the vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be; 
Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and the battle-flags were 
furled, 
In the parliament of man, the federation of the world.” 


The author, in developing his view of the Divine fore- 
knowledge, has not been prompted by any disposition to 
excite controversy, nor simply to add a new theory to 
those which already exist, but only by a spirit of investi- 
gation and of earnest inquiry after the truth. If he be 
thought by some to be venturesome, it must be remem- 
bered that theology, which is a progressive science, has. 
derived its chief enrichment from its bolder, but not less 
evangelical, devout, and humble, spirits. 
J. EF) HURST. 


DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, 
Madison, N. J., June 18, 1878. 


a a 


eo 


THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GoD.. 


GHAPT ER eL 


PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 


As KNOW not,” said the late Bishop Thomson, 

i “how to reconcile God’s sovereignty with 
man’s freedom, God’s justice with man’s proneness 
to sin, or God’s holiness with the introduction of 
moral evil into the universe. A cloud of mystery 
rests upon the whole horizon of our knowledge.” 
“All theory is against the freedom of the will, 
while all experience is in favor of it,” is the testi- 
mony of Dr. Samuel Johnson. How strange to hear 
Dr. R. Payne Smith, the present Dean of Canter- 
bury, say, ‘“‘I am not prepared to enter upon the 
question what the claims of God are, when looked 
at from above. When looked at from God’s side, 
they are probably unchanging, inevitable, and abso- 
lute. But the discussion would lead me into the 
mazes of the controversy, how man’s free will can 
co-exist with God’s omniscience. It is very easy to 
show that every thing must have been predestined 
from the beginning, and to be irrevocably fixed. 
And then, if you assume the absolute immutability 

17 


18 Tuk FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


of God, you will get an argument very difficult to 
overthrow, by which to prove that there is no such 
thing as the world having the disturbing elements of 
sin, repentance, prayer, and punishment. The moral 
freedom of man is certainly incompatible with man’s 
a priort notions of God’s foreknowledge. This is a 
sad predicament, of course, to all those who think 
that beings must be as they seem to be in the eye 
of human reason.”’ 

One of the ablest thinkers American Methodism 
has yet produced says: ‘‘The denial of absolute 
divine foreknowledge is the essential complement of 
the Methodist theology, without which its  philo- 
sophical incompleteness is defenseless against the 
logical consistency of Calvinism.”’ ‘‘Theology,”’ says 
Dr. Daniel Curry, ‘‘has very much to unlearn before 
it will be either reasonable or Scriptural.” © 

‘‘T have thought,” said Dr. Andrews, President of 


Denison University (Baptist), at Granville, Ohio, ‘‘all- 


the way from the top to the bottom of this subject, 
and I know that the absolute foreknowledge of the 
future choices of free beings acting under the law of 
liberty is an absurdity. I would say emphatically 
that either there is no contingency in human actions 
or else they can not be distributively foreknown. 
This is as clear to me as either of the three funda- 
mental axioms of logic: A is A; A is not non-A; 
A is either B or non-B.” 

Rev. Albert Barnes wrote: ‘‘On the subject of 
sin and suffering in the universe I confess, for one, 
that I feel these more sensibly and powerfully the 


more I look at them and the longer I live. J do not | 


PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 19 


understand these facts, and I make no advance 
towards understanding them. I do not know that I 
have a ray of light on this subject which I did not. 
have when it was first presented to my attention. 
I have read to some extent what wise and good 
men have written; I have looked at their theories 
and explanations; I have endeavored to weigh their 
arguments; for my whole soul pants for light and 
relief on these questions. But I get neither, and in 
the distress and anguish of my own spirit I confess 
that I see no light whatever. I see not one ray of 
light to disclose to me why sin came into the world; 
why the earth is strewn with the dying and the 
dead; and why men must suffer to all eternity. I 
have never seen a particle of light thrown upon 
these subjects that has given a moment’s ease to my 
tortured mind, nor have I any explanation to. offer, 
or a thought to suggest, which would be a relief to 
any one. When I look on a world of sinners and 
sufferers; upon death-bed scenes and grave-yards; on 
the world of woe filled with hosts to suffer forever; 
when I see my friends, my parents, my family, my 
people, my fellow pilgrims; when I look upon a 
whole race involved in this sin and danger; and 
when I see the great mass of them wholly uncon- 
cerned; and when I feel that God alone can save | 
them, and yet he does not do it, I am struck dumb. 
It is all dark, dark to my soul, and I can not 
disguise it.”’ 

These certainly are painful confessions to fall 
from the lips of those who are acknowledged to be 
men of great talents and great learning. Must great 


20 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


and holy men be thus overwhelmed with these diffi- 
culties on to the end of time? Can it be possible 
that God has given to us a revelation of himself, 
intending always to leave us in such suspense? I 
can not, I am free to say, discover any reason that 
could justify such a procedure on the part of infinite 
wisdom. The evil consequences that flow over the 
race from such conflicting views of divine revelation 
are many and very great, while all the advantages 
which they are claimed to confer are derived more 
impressively from various other considerations. If 
such humiliating confessions of inexplicable mystery, 
from princes in Israel, are ever to fall upon the itching 
ears of the advance guard of infidelity, can we won- 
der at the malignity of its opposition to the religion 
of Jesus Christ? 

“The. atmosphere of doubt,” says Henry Ward 
Beecher, ‘‘acts in a great many ways. He is but 
little conversant with what is going on in life; he 
knows little of the conversations and readings and 
thoughts of vigorous, enterprising men, who is not 
aware that there hangs over the whole subject of 
religion, and particularly over its dogmas, a great 
deal of doubt and irreverence, which in some moods 
reacts and goes back to the belief of childhood. 
There is prevailing a state of uncertainty and aber- 
ration of faith, which requires prayerful attention.” 

It is this state of uncertainty which is disturbing 
so many excellent minds, and which is so humiliating 
to theologians of all schools, that the writer desires, 
if possible, to do something to remove. Hence it is 
that I am humbly attempting to divest a solemn 


PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 21 


subject of unexplained difficulties, and yet to guard 
all the fundamental truths of the Christian religion 
and all the teachings of the Holy Scriptures. Theo- 
logians of all denominations are now, in some degree, - 
modifying their views, restating their principles and 
rediscussing their doctrines on points that do not 
involve the efficiency, the nature, or the purposes of 
the Gospel. In this way they are bringing them- 
selves, their tenets, and their adherents into a closer 
agreement and into greater accord with other modern 
thinkers. It is my aim to divest Arminianism_ of 
some of the difficulties which surround and depre- 
ciate it, and to commend it in more complete con- 
sistency, coherency and grandeur to the theological 
world. 

The great problems of sin, of suffering and _lia- 
bility to endless punishment, of human freedom and 
divine foreknowledge, do perplex the most thoughtful 
and the staunchest of Arminians. ‘‘Explain,’’ said 
an anxious inquirer to John Wesley, ‘‘how it is 
that God can foreknow with certainty the future 
choices of a free agent.” ‘‘I frankly confess I can 
offer no explanation,” was his humiliating reply. 
Sitting beneath the effulgence of so great a light as 
that which Mr. Wesley poured upon a= darkened 
theological world, and yet finding that he could 
furnish no explanation to the most torturing problem 
of my existence, has deeply moved me. In my 
mental distress I have. inquired, Is there no way to 
remove these great difficulties? Can not a theology 
be constructed that will remove such perplexities? 


Must we be compelled from age to age to grope our 
3 


22 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


way amid such uncertainties? And thus prompted I 
could but prayerfully resolve to seek a solution of 
these central mysteries. But I very well knew that to 
refute any long assumed dogma, unanswerable objec- 
tions to it must be presented—objections that would 
outweigh all those which might be suggested against 
the proposed substitute. A thoughtful study of the 
subject has convinced me that a denial of absolute 
divine foreknowledge would invalidate many of the 
objections of the infidel to Christian theology, and 
shed a clear light upon some of the deepest and 
most perplexing mysteries of that theology. 

A doctrine may be true, though there may be 
many passages of Scripture that seem at first sight 
to be in marked opposition thereto. for example, 
how many passages can be found in the writings 
of St. Paul that idid seem to teach the doctrimenon 
sovereign election and reprobation. Also how much 
study and scholarship and statement and restatement 
and discovery in Biblical literature, and skill in text- 
uai exegesis and time and patience have been em- 
ployed by many Arminians, in order to wrest those 
troublesome texts from the support of Calvinian 
tenets. They now fearlessly affirm that time has 
brought out all the needed explanations, so that 
every one of those passages has been interpreted in 
harmony with Arminian doctrines. Indeed, many of 
the Calvinistic interpreters themselves now concede 
that the peculiarities of Calvinism are not taught in 
many texts of Scripture, in which they were once 
deemed to be manifest to all unprejudiced readers. 
‘Calvinism is not in this text,” says Moses Stuart. 


PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. “ie 


‘It is not in that,” says Albert Barnes; and ‘‘it can 
not be found there,” says Dr. M’Knight. But how 
long the exegetes were in coming to these views and 
admissions! And from this fact we may learn that_ 
if a new tenet be advocated, some passages of Holy 
Writ very probably might be adduced in opposition 
to it, of which it might be difficult, impromptu, to 
originate a satisfactory interpretation. 

The doctrine of the absolute foreknowledge of 
God has occasioned more perplexity and intellectual 
torture than any other in all the departments of 
theology. It has given to infidelity stronger ram- 
parts on which to plant its fierce batteries against 
divine revelation than that wily foe has been able to 
find anywhere else. It has been made the excuse 
or the occasion for burying energy, enterprise, great 
endowments, and large possibilities in the grave of 
indifference. It has put fetters on thousands of im- 
mortals, or floated them as mere waifs into the gulfs 
of debasing indulgence. It has retarded the Gos- 
pel, taken power from the Church, brought upon 
her fearful eclipses, and set her down amid shad- 
ows in the pursuit of interminable and _profitless 
controversies. 

Notwithstanding the great proof of Christianity 
which a personal experience of religion always sup- | 
plies, almost every Christian believer fights a life-long 
battle with this most obtrusive and harassing dogma. 
How often, reader, has it not come with the blight 
of desolation over your own good intentions, your 
high resolves against besetting sins, your virtuous 
aspirations, secret prayers, and the reading of the 


24 Tuk FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Holy Scriptures! And if the theology of the 
instincts, of the intuitions, and of the heart were not 
‘often more sound than the theology of the intellect, 
the practical evils of this doctrine would be still more 
manifest and injurious. ‘‘I should have been a 
Christian long before I was,” said an intelligent 
young minister, ‘‘had it not been for the doctrines 
taught me in regard to the divine prescience.”” What 
a different world we should behold to-day had the 
doctrines of fatalism, of necessity, of foreordination, 
of foreknowledge, of the fallibility of the Holy 
Scriptures, and of the mere humanity of the world’s 
Redeemer, never been taught by accepted and revered 
evangelists who have 


‘¢Reasoned high 
Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate— 
Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute, 
And found no end in wandering mazes lost.” 


Nineteen hundred years since Jesus finished re- 
demption and ascended to the Father, receiving gifts 
for the children of men. Through all these years 
eternal death, everlasting life, the unspeakable con- 
descension of the Son of God, the rich provisions 
of the Gospel, and the inexpressible superiority of a 
holy over a worldly life, have all been faithfully 
proclaimed. But through all these years, the most 
erroneous and enervating doctrines have obscured 
the brightness and retarded the triumph of truth as 
it is in Jesus. For to teach the absolute contin- 
gency and yet absolute certainty of all the future 
choices of free beings, or the endless punishment 
of foreknown sins, or election and reprobation based 


PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 25 


on the absolute decrees of God, or that a Being of 
boundless benevolence would create an individual 
soul, whom he foreknew would certainly be damned 
and endlessly miserable, is to teach what offends the - 
common sense of men, begets deep resentment, and 
drives very many into the darkness of bald infidel- 
ity. ‘Think,’ indignantly exclaims James Mill, 
the father of John Stuart Mill, ‘‘think of a being 
who would make a hell, who would create the 
race with the infallible foreknowledge that the ma- 
jority of them were to be consigned to horrible and 
everlasting torment.” 

If the infidel could bring arguments equal in 
number, weight, and plausibility against divine reve- 
lation which can be brought against absolute divine 
foreknowledge, no one could wonder at him if tempted 
to reject its divine claims. 

Without question or investigation, the doctrine 
of absolute divine foreknowledge has been assumed 
to be true by orthodox theologians. Nevertheless, 
after the most patient honest inquiry, reading, think- 
ing, and conversing, I have not yet been able to 
discover any respectable proof of its validity. 


CHAPTER: [T, 
PROPHECY COMPARED WITH MIRACLE. 


HE modes of operation which are represented 
ole in the Scriptures are not the ordinary workings 
of God’s laws, or the ordinary methods of the divine 
procedure. Revelation from the infinite to the fallen, 
beclouded, finite mind is impossible without miracle, 
prophecy, and other mysteries that are unfathomable. 
Every thing connected with this revelation bestowed 
upon man is extraordinaty. Every thing about in- 
spiration, salvation, the incarnation, miracle, atone- 
ment, and the relations sustained by the persons of 
the Godhead during the period and process of hu- 
man redemption, is, and necessarily must be, extraor- 
dinary —departing widely from the ways and pro- 
cedures of God which obtain under the laws that 
he has established for the accomplishment of his 
ordinary plans and economies. 

From all these confessedly profound matters why 
must we exclude the extraordinary work of proph- 
ecy? Miracles, for example, are out of the usual 
course of law. They are necessarily extraordinary 
in their character. Without a suspension or control 
or counteraction of uniform, material laws, a miracle 
is impossible. Now, if this be undeniably true of 
one great branch of the evidences by which a divine 


revelation is to be authenticated to man, may we not 
26 


PROPHECY COMPARED WITH MIRACLE. 27 


safely conclude that the same is true of prophecy, the 
other great branch of Christian evidences? If the 
one be in violation of established material laws, what 
reason have we to suppose that the other does not. 
involve something equally extraordinary? We have, 
in fact, sufficient basis for the inference that in giving 
an extraordinary revelation there were, and must be, 
as marked violations of the law of freedom as there 
were of the laws of material nature. In the working 
of miracles there must be a supersedure of the laws 
of material forces; so in the giving of prophecy why 
must there not also be a supersedure of the law of 
freedom ? 

But if God foreknows all the future choices of 
free beings, there is nothing on the part of God, or 
so far as God is concerned, extraordinary in the mys- 
terious work of prophecy. Then all there is in that 
work is according to the usual mode of divine pro- 
cedure. There is nothing in it that exhibits to wit- 
nessing intelligences of other worlds any thing that is 
extraordinary or sovereign or overruling. But why 
should there be something extraordinary and over- 
ruling in one branch of the authentication of a divine 
revelation, and nothing extraordinary and overruling 
in the other? If in one we have the overruling of 
established laws, might we not also reasonably expect 
to see the same manifestations in the other? In 
miracles, the interferences with the laws of nature 
are addressed to the senses; but in foretelling future 
events the interference with the law of freedom is 
addressed to the higher faculty of reason. 

It is remarkable how constantly it is implied, or 


28 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


assumed, in the Scriptures, that God does not fore- 
know the choices of free beings while acting under 
the law of liberty. As for example, the words of 
Jehovah to Moses, ‘‘I1 am sure the King of Egypt 
will not let you go.” The angel of the Lord called 
to Abraham out of the heavens, and said, ‘‘ Lay not 
thou a hand on the Jad, neither do thou any thing 
to him; for zow I know that thou fearest God, seeing 
thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from 
me.” These words imply that up to that point God 
did not absolutely know what the final decision of 
Abraham would be. If he did foreknow it, a seem- 
ing falsity, or pretense, is assumed, and a deception 
practiced upon the reader. ‘‘ Now I know that thou 
fearest God.’’ Of Solomon God promised, saying, 
“T will be his father, and he shall be my son. But 
if he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the 


b 


rod of iron.”’ ‘‘He led thee these forty years in the 
wilderness, to humble thee, to prove thee, to know 
what was in thine heart, whether thou wouldst keep 
his commandments or no.”” And the Lord said, ‘‘It 
repenteth me that I have made man.’’ Moses said, 
“It repented the Lord that he had made man, and 
it grieved him at his heart.” These words seem to 
imply a heart-felt regret on the part of God, and that 
he had not foreknown with certainty the fall of man. 
For, if he had foreknown the wickedness of man, 
why did he grieve after its occurrence more than 
before? And if he grieved equally before he made 
Adam, at the sight of his future sinfulness, why 
did he not decline his creation? If he foreknew 
the fall, not merely as a contingent possibility, but 


Se eee 


PROPHECY COMPARED WITH MIRACLE. 29 


as an inevitable fact, then this mournful declaration 
makes him appear inconsistent. And then who can 
sympathize with him in his grief for having created 
man? Evidently, in this passage, God implicitly,. 
but clearly, assumes his non-foreknowledge of the 
certain future wickedness of man. And that assump- 
tion is necessary to give consistency to the divine 
conduct and statements, and to establish any claim 
on the sympathy of an intelligent universe in his 
great disappointment. But when the whole transac- 
action is considered in view of that assumption, a 
light, luminous with the most interesting suggestions, 
emanates from this troublesome text. 

But there are numerous passages in which is 
clearly found the assumption of the incapacity or 
inability of omniscience to foreknow—we use the 
word in its fullest, most absolute signification —the 
choices of beings endowed with the power of original 
volition and action, unless it should be through a 
violation of the law of human freedom. In miracles 
there is not the slightest intimation that the depart- 
ure from uniform law is the usual, established, 
heaven-preferred way of doing things. So in proph- 
ecy there is no intimation that foretelling the free 
acts of free beings is the usual mode in which God 
regards and treats the choices and determinations 
of free agents in his kingdom of free grace. If 
we have no right to infer that the transmutation of 
water into wine is the ordinary and usual ordering 
of the will of the Creator, then, certainly, we have 
no ground to infer that the foretelling of the future 
acts of free beings, as subjects of grace, is the 


30 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


ordinary, usual, and established mode of the divine 


procedure. 
God in prophecy, we infer, overrides the law of 


liberty, just as he overrides the law of material forces’ 


in miracles. What could be more unusual, unlooked- 
for, extraordinary, or more in violation of all natural 
laws and presumptions than the Scripture doctrine 
of the resurrection of the identical human body? 
The doctrine of the resurrection, as set forth by our 
standard authors, involves a discrimination and dis- 
tinct preservation of all the actual particles of the 
countless millions of human bodies that shall have 
lived and died upon this earth. The marked charac- 
teristics of the workings of God in the natural world 
are simplicity and obviousness. But the resurrection 
of the human body is so unusual, wonderful, and 
supernatural that it is continually set forth as not 
only miraculous, but most mysteriously miraculous. 
And why may not something of the same kind be 
assumed in regard to the extraordinary work of 
prophecy when there are so many analogies in favor 
of it,—especially if such an assumption would light 
us in some degree on our way to the solution of the 
greatest of all our difficulties in speculative divinity, 
and to a comprehension of the greatest mystery of 
all past times? 

A perception of the possibility and necessity of 
the violation of the law of human freedom, to make 
prophecy quadrate with miracles—which do involve 
suspensions or supernatural control of natural law— 
taken in connection with the unanswerable and 
logical difficulties which crowd around the great 


PROPHECY COMPARED WITH MIRACLE. 31 


question of the divine prescience of all the future 
acts of free beings, is certainly calculated to awaken 
in every mind a strong presumption against the 
old assumed dogma of absolute Divine Fore- 
knowledge. 


GEAPTHRe Ls 
THE IIUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER TWO LAWS. 


HEN God created man, he provided that a 

large part of his being should be under the 
laws which rule material forces. His physical frame, 
his providential condition, his intellectual and senst- 
tive natures, all were subjected to the great law of 
cause and effect. The world would be startled did 
it perceive how very large is the proportion of human 
volitions—included in the kingdom of providence and 
in that of uniform law—which occur according to this 
law of cause and effect. But there is one part of 
man’s nature, the will, the autocrat of the human soul, 
which God did not subject to that law. The law of 
cause and effect no more invades the freedom of the 
human will in the kingdom of grace than it does the 
divine freedom. Every event within the domain of 
that law is caused by some agency outside of itself. 
Physical causation and unconstrained voluntary action 
have nothing and can have nothing in common, 
either in reality or in conception. They differ as 
widely as matter differs from spirit. 

Human consciousness testifies to nothing more 
clearly than it does to the radical unlikeness be- 
tween physical causes and volitions, and to nothing 
more clearly than to the self-origination and free- 


dom of the latter. God made the human will high 
32 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER TWo LAWS. 33 


above the law of necessity. He impressed upon it 
the highest attributes of a dependent moral being. 
In short, he gave to man entire freedom of the will, 
and therefore entire freedom of choice. ‘The will is 
the capacity of electing, of originating from the spirit 
itself choices and acts. 

This noblest characteristic man lost in his foul 
revolt: as soon as he sinned his will lost its highest 
endowment, its complete freedom of action. If 
man’s nature be left to itself, the necessity of sin- 
ning ever after was the consequence of that great 
loss. After sinning once, man could of himself 
never will to be holy. Henceforth he must remain 
incapable, without help, of choosing the morally 
right. The motives that could influence him, ever 
after, could differ only in degree. They could no 
longer differ in kind. His will was thus shut up to 
a single kind of motives,—to motives that centered 
in self. All the high motives of right, holiness, uni- 
versal order, the well-being of the universe,—all 
those considerations that center in God,—were for- 
ever outside the range of its possible choice. Thus 
man lost his great distinguishing characteristic: the 
self-originating power to choose the right, influenced 
by motives that differed in kind as well as in degree, 
was forfeited. 

In the work of saving men it was essential that 
the Redeemer should free man from that dire neces- 
sity of sinning, should lift up the human will above 
the range of exclusively sinful motives, and restore 
to it its pristine freedom. Consequently, under the 
remedial dispensation man is able to choose, or to 


34 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


reject, holiness and obedience to God. . This was one 
of the wonderful achievements of the Son of God. 
Sin had despoiled man of this crown of glory: Jesus 
Christ came triumphant, and restored it. But if any 
accountable being pass his probation refusing to 
choose holiness, then among his eternal losses will 
be the loss of this purchased freedom to choose and 
to enjoy God. 

Satan, and all who followed him to defeat, lost 
this divine endowment, and are now immutable in 
their depravity and eternally fixed in their moral 
character. Their wills, like the wills of the demont- 
acally possessed, are now under the sway of motives 
that belong to the domain of sin exclusively. If 
they have any power of choice it is only within 
narrow limits, and under the influence of motives 
which center in self, and differing only in degree, 
not in essential character. 

To illustrate the full signification of freedom, let us 
use this diagram. Though spirit can not be imaged 
by form and outlines, el Tnteteetunheee 
it is nevertheless a sensitive holy 
something, an es- #4 attractions 
sence, a power which y= Tutallecthal Mane 
acts, whose might is sensitive unholy 
felt in us all. Let us attractions. 
represent this something by z. Now, if a being pos- 
sess a freedom, for the exercise of which he can 
justly be held accountable, he must be endowed 
with power to say to the holy attraction #, I will 
not yield to your holy influence, but I will yield to 
the unholy attractive influence y. And at the same 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER Two LAWS. 35 


moment that he can make this choice, freedom 
requires that he possess the power to say to the 
unholy attractive influence y I will not yield to your 
unholy influence, but I will yield to the holy attract-_ 
ive influence x. This is the true, full significance 
of freedom. If the will is the creator of moral char- 
acter, then its action must be wholly unlike and 
different from action under the law of constraint. 
The action of the law ruling mechanical forces can 
never originate character. The action on the will 
of the sensibilities must be according to the law of 
cause and effect, for the reason that the sensibilities 
and intellectualities know no other law, and are 
capable of no other law, either actively or passively. 
But the will does act and must act under some other 
law and through some other processes, or moral 
character and moral government are impossibilities. 
Now spirits that have sinned away their day of grace 
‘and are now in perdition, have lost the capability 
which was temporarily regained for them by Christ, of 
being influenced by motives that are holy. Sin incor- 
rigibly persevered in, has eliminated out of their souls 
every element upon which holy attractions could ever 
operate. They now can be influenced or attracted but 
by a single class of motives—the unholy and selfward. 
And for the lost, even these unholy influences or 
motives can differ only in degree, but never in kind. 

Temptations are addressed either to the reason or 
to the sensibilities. The law of duty, as well as the 
law of pleasure and pain, is the occasion of an 
influence directed to and bearing on the will. ‘‘The 
reasonable,’’ says Dr. Whedon, ‘‘is choosable, not 


36 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


because it is desirable, but because it is reasonable.”’ 
Temptations are meaningless if they neither influence 
the reason nor stir the sensibilities. If they do either, 
and, by stirring the sensibilities, are the occasion of 
an influence on the will, they then create the liability 
to wrong doing. If there be no such liability there 
is no arena on which to manifest loyalty. If there 
be no real ground on which one can display loy- 
alty, then there can be no consideration by which 
he can claim or justify endless rewards and punish- 
ments. These temptations, therefore, must be in- 
tense enough to create the liability and the peril of 
doing wrong and of incurring loss. They may be 
intensified indefinitely beyond that point; but the 
moment they are intensified beyond what is indis- 
pensable to the achievement of moral character and 
desert, that moment the probationary being has not 
a fair chance, an equitable trial. A special degree 
of intensity in the temptation is therefore necessary 
to the achievement of moral character. A less de- 
eree than that leaves the being destitute of the 
needed ground to claim or to merit endless rewards: 
a greater degree takes from the being his account- 
ability. For, if one is not to blame for not rising 
up when a mountain is upon him, neither can he be 
called to account for not achieving a moral character 
when temptational influences out of all due pro- 
portion to his resources of volitional energy were 
allowed to overpower him. 

The mind, being limited in all its faculties, is 
limited also in its power of will. The amount of 
motive influence must be measured, and carefully 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER Two LAWS. a7 


proportioned to the receptive and active capacities of 
the finite free agent. The moment divine or dia- 
bolical influences are brought to bear on an_ indi- 
vidual will, which are out of exact proportion to. 
its strength of resistance, the will loses its freedom, 
and comes under the power of the same law that 
rules material forces. True, the will requires occa- 
sions for its action. These occasions are reasons 
presented to the intellect, or motives presented to 
the sensibilities. These occasions of human volition, 
these influences, without which the will does not act; 
are, in the normal state of the soul, merely influential, 
but not causal: they are testing, but not controlling. 
But there are limits to our mental and moral forces, 
to our powers of endurance and of resistance, just 
as there are limits to our physical strength. Now, 
when these testing influences are out of proportion 
to the strength of the will, the will is simply over- 
powered, and its freedom of action, in that instance, 
is prevented; it acts under constraint, and its account- 
ability therefore is annihilated. These influences, in 
such cases, then cease to be merely testing or occa- 
sioning, and become causal. In these instances the 
reason of the will’s action is not in the will itself, 
but outside of itself in causal antecedents. 

Hosts of perplexities have arisen from a fail- 
ure to make this manifest and pregnant distinction. 
‘‘Because the will does sometimes act under con- 
straint, under the law of cause and effect, therefore 
it always acts under that law;” and ‘‘because the 
will does sometimes act under the law of liberty, 


therefore it always acts under that law,” are the hasty 
4 


38 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


conclusions which have sadly bewildered theolo- 
gians, especially in their interpretations of Holy 
Scripture. Doubtless both these kinds of causation, 
are found in the action of the human will. Some- 
times it acts freely from its own voluntary choice; 
sometimes consentingly, because objective influences 
overmaster its capacities of resistance or endurance. 
When the will acts freely, the incipiency of the volli- 
tion is in the will itself; that is, the incipiency of the 
volition is sadjectitve, and the will is active. When 
the will acts only consentingly, the incipiency of the 
volition is in the objective, and the will is not posi- 
tively active, but passive, rather. In the /vee action 
of the will, the occasions of its volitions are merely 
influential, merely afford the necessary test. In the 
consenting action of the will, the occasions of its voli- 
tions are causal, controlling, and necessary. 
Strikingly in harmony with this rigid teaching of 
philosophy, the inspired apostle declares, ‘“God is 
faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above 
that ye are able, but will with the temptation also 
make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear 
it.’ In this passage, God assumes that reasons, 
motives, influences, and occasions for disobedience 
do exert a testing influence upon a free agent in his 
choices. He assumes that without these influences 


there could be neither loyalty nor manifestation of 


character worthy of reward; that they are indispen- 
sable to test adherence to the right; that it is pos- 
sible to make a choice worthy of reward, or of pun- 
ishment, when these influences are in due proportion 
to the moral strength of the free agent; and that 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER TWO LAWS. 39 


the moment these influences are in excess of the 
strength of any person's will his free agency disap- 
pears, and his accountability for his choices ceases. 
He therefore pledges, in this passage, that on the 
arena of probation for eternity, in the actions involv- 
ing responsibility, these influences shall never be dis- 
proportionate to the strength of the free agent. The 
moment the choices of a being are not the choices 
Otmapiceeracenty they/become strictly. theveffects of 
causes ab extra, and can involve no moral character. 

Man is so constituted, that his will can be brought 
under the law of cause and effect, by bringing over- 
powering influences to act upon his reason and his 
sensibilities. God, therefore, can use him as an in- 
strument in his hands. He can make use of him as 
easily as he can make use of fire, water, light, air, 
sun, moon, or stars. To deny that God can place 
man in such circumstances that his choices would 
not have or involve any moral character, or to deny 
that God can. use man merely as an instrument, 
would be to limit Omnipotence, and prevent the pos- 
sibility of a superintending providence. God _ uses 
the material universe, the animal and vegetable king- 
doms, in carrying out his own various plans and 
purposes. He spake to Balaam through the mouth 
of a dumb beast, and. he commanded the stars in 
their courses to fight for his chosen ones. So in like 
manner he uses intelligent beings with the same wise 
and benign designs. When he wishes to accomplish 
any end through intelligent beings, he may bring such 
influences to bear upon them, or offer to them such 
suggestions, or mysteriously so lead them by some 


40 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


of the resources and instrumentalities within his 
almighty embrace, that the action of their wills shall 
be under the law of cause and effect. Such influences 
may be brought to bear upon them as to interfere 
with their free agency. 

In those acts of the will which involve moral 
character, there must be occasions for the action of 
the will in choosing. If upon such occasions there 
be nothing to exert an zzfluence over the choice, 
there could be neither test, character, nor reward. 
But if there be in them any thing to coerce the choice, 
then there could be neither freedom nor account- 
ability. The moment that degree of intensity is 
reached in the force of these occasions which deter- 
mines the choice, free agency and moral character 
disappear from the arena of human action. 

Hence, if God desired a certain providential work 
to be accomplished five hundred years hence, he 
could predict it with absolute certainty. All that— 
would be necessary would be to influence the will 
of some one then living with the requisite intensity 
to secure a consenting volition, or, as in many cases, 
an unconscious instrument.* The volitions of such 
an agent would be necessary and foreseen, because 
forefixed. They would not be free, but in viola- 
tion of the law of liberty. Or if God wished to 
punish his people, all that would be necessary would 
be, to place some man under circumstances where 
influences would be too potent for his resistance, or 


*But the eye of their God was upon the elders of the Jews, 
that they [Tatnai and Shethar-boznai] could not cause them to cease 
till the matter came to Darius. (Ez. v, 5.) 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER Two LAWS. 41 


where he would have no inclination to overcome 
them, or no repugnance to the special work assigned 
him. Or if God wished to use a wicked man, one 
who had sinned away his day of grace, to punish a_ 
wicked or. polytheistic people, all that would be 
needed would be to allow demoniacal spirits to exer- 
cise control over that man’s will. Or if God desired 
to teach one of his servants great lessons, indispen- 
sable for him to know, he might suffer him to be 
tempted above that he was able to bear, and not 
make for him a way of escape, that he might be able 
to bear it. When Satan should come in upon him 
like a flood, he might refuse to lift up a standard 
against him. All such future choices of free beings 
God could easily foresee. 

In reading the life of George Washington the 
reader is struck with the remarkable providences 
which developed him, mentally, morally, politically, 
and socially, for his special work and illustrious des- 
tiny. He studied here, mingled in societies and 
assemblies there, went upon a surveying expedition 
yonder, receiving meanwhile, from his brother John, 
the advantages of -—European culture and manners 
without subjecting his republican ideas and tenden- 
cies to the perverting influence of foreign associa- 
tions. In the reception of this preparatory training 
he followed the lead of circumstances, and thus un- 
consciously prepared himself for acting a distinguished 
part in the history of the world. » He did all this 
consentingly. He -thought he was choosing, but 
another was choosing for him. He builded grander 
than he knew. 


42 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Said a friend to Professor Morse, whose first 
message on the telegraph was, ‘‘ Behold what God 
hath wrought,” ‘‘Tell me,—is your invention any 
wonder now, or has the wonder worn off?” He re- 
plied: ‘‘The wonder is as great to me now as ever. 
I go into the telegraph offices and watch the opera- 
tors, and the wonder all comes back; it seems to be 
set above me. I can hardly realize that it is my 
work; it seems as if another had done it through 
me.” ‘‘This confession,” says Dr. Robert Collyer, 
‘‘was most honorable; for the reason of the electric 
telegraph, as of all great discoveries, dwells not in 
the seen, but in the unseen. It is the inner, subtle, 
divine influence, working through the delicate organ- 
ism of the child of genius, pulsating through him 
toward the great unfolding of the ages, watching for 
the full time.” Our progression in civilization is 
only because God is striving to make men work out 
his thought into the events of human life. God him- 
self is the inspirer of the artist who calls out thoughts 
chiming through the ages, and of the master of song 
who sets the world a-thrill by the power of his ma- 
jestic harmonies. 

When God desires or intends that a certain man 
shall perform a certain work, or illustrate to the world 
some doctrine or phase of religious or political or 
scientific truth, he can easily subject him to any dis- 
cipline, or by force of circumstances call him to the 
performance of any duties, which he may deem best 
calculated to accomplish his divine purpose. All he 
would need to do, even in an extreme case, would 
be to bring controlling influences to bear upon his 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER TWo LAWS. 43 


sensibilities, to put his will under the law of cause 
and effect, to make his choices certain, in order to 
foreknow with entire accuracy the whole process and 
final result. This view seems completely and satis- 
factorily to explain all the predictions of prophecy,. 
_all the teachings of Sacred Scripture, relative to or 
involving foreknowledge, and also all those other 
future events which God has determined shall cer- 
tainly be accomplished upon our globe. 

How beautifully and strongly is this theory illus- 
trated in the case of Cyrus. God says: ‘‘Thus saith 
the Lord thy Redeemer, I am the Lord that maketh 
Aliee edition eee FS  thateinistrateth, thertekensvot 
the liars, that maketh diviners mad; that turneth 
wise men backward, and maketh their knowledge 
foolish; that confirmeth the word of his servant, 
and performeth the counsel of his messengers; that 
saith to Jerusalem, Thou shalt be inhabited and 
to the cities of Judah, Ye shall be built, and I will 
raise up the decayed places thereof; that saith to the 
deep, Be dry, and [ will dry up thy rivers; that saith 
of Cyrus, He is my shepherd, and shall perform all 
my pleasure; even saying to Jerusalem, Thou shalt 
be built, and to the temple, Thy foundation shalt be 
laid. Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus, 
whose right hand I have holden to subdue nations 
before him; and I will loose the loins of kings 
to open before him the two-leaved gates; and the 
gates shall not be shut; I will go before thee and 
make the.crooked places straight: I-will break in 
pieces the gates of brass, and cut in sunder the bars 
of iron: and I will give thee the treasures of dark- 


44 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


ness, and hidden riches of secret places, that thou 
mayest know that I, the Lord, which call thee by thy 
name, am the God of Israel. For Jacob my servant's 
sake, and Israel mine elect, I have even called thee by 
thy name: I have surnamed thee, though thou hast 


not known me.’ 
eousness, and I will direct all his ways. He shall 


‘‘T have raised him up in right-, 


build my city, and he shall let go my captives, not 
for price nor reward, saith the Lord of hosts.” (Isa- 
iah xliv, 24-28; xlv, 1-4, 13.) Historians state that 
when the Jews showed to Cyrus the above prophecy 
he became deeply interested in the welfare of the 
Jewish nation. The prophecy in which he was per- 
sonally named was the preponderating influence upon 
his mind to accomplish the designs of God in re- 
building the city, refounding the temple, and liber- 
ating the captives without price or reward. 

This theory of prophecy is fully sustained by 
other passages of Holy Writ: ‘‘I am God, and there 
is none like me, declaring the end from the begin- 
ning, and from ancient times the things that are not 
yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will 
do all my pleasure: calling a:ravenous bird from the 
east, the man that executeth my counsel from a far 
country : yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to 
pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it.” (Isaiah 
xlvi, g-11.) It is said the Lord stirred up the spirit 
of Cyrus, so that he made a proclamation that he had 
been charged by the Lord God of heaven to ‘‘build 
the house of the Lord God of Israel, which is in 
Jerusalem.”’ (Ezra i, 1.) ‘‘ Blessed be the Lord God 
of our fathers, which hath put such a thing as this 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER TWo LAWS. 45 


in the king’s heart, to beautify the house of the 
Lord which is in Jerusalem.”” (Ezra vii, 27.) Cyrus 
proclaimed, ‘‘The Lord God of heaven hath given 
me all the kingdoms of the earth; and he hath 
charged me to build him a house at Jerusalem. Go 
ye up and build in Jerusalem the house of Jehovah, 
God of Israel. He is God.” ‘‘The king’s heart,” 
says Solomon, ‘‘is in the hands of the Lord, as the 
rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he will.” 
(Proverbs xxi, 1.) ‘‘He made the people to be 
pitied of all those who carried them away captive.’ 
(Psalm cvi, 40.) ‘‘God hath not forsaken us in our 
bondage, but hath extended unto us mercy in the 
sight of the kings of Persia.”” (Ezra ix, 9.) ‘‘ When 
seventy years are accomplished, I will punish the 
king of Babylon and that nation, saith the Lord, 
for their iniquity, and the land of the Chaldeans, 
and will make it perpetual desolations.” (Jer. xxv, 
12.) ‘I will visit you, and perform my good word 
toward you, in causing you to return to this place.” 
Oeics G)) i it Ovhouse: offelstaels s natt<vat 
what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and 
concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, 
and to destroy it; if that nation, against whom I have 
pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of 
the evil that I thought to do unto them.” (Jer. 
xvili, 6-8.) ‘‘Stand in the court of the Lord’s house, 
ale speak unto allthée cities:of;Judahs » gece if 
so be they will hearken, and turn every man from 
his evil way, that I may repent me of the evil, 
which I purpose to do unto them because of the 
evil of their doings’ (Jér. xxvi, 2, 3.) ‘‘It may be 
5 


46 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


that the house of Judah will hear all the evil which I 
purpose to do unto them, that they may return every 
man from his evil way.” (Jer. xxxvi, 3.) “Make 
bright the arrows; gather the shields; the Lord hath 
raised up the spirit of the kings of the Medes: for 
his device is against Babylon, to destroy it.” ‘For 
the Lord hath both devised and done that which he 
spake against the inhabitants of Babylon.” ‘‘Every 
purpose of the Lord shall be performed against Bab- 
ylon? »/VJerslip 11, 12,29) How clearly do these 
passages show that Cyrus was a consenting instru- 
ment in the hands of God, and that his will was 
brought under the law of cause and!.effect smathe 
reader will also remember that the angel said to 
Daniel: ‘The prince of the kingdom of Persia with- 
stood me one and twenty days: but, lo, Michael, one 
of the chief princes, came to help me.” ‘‘And now 
will I return to fight with the prince of Persia.” 
(Danvexses 3) 20. ) 

Historians tell us that when Alexander was ap- 
proaching Jerusalem, to besiege it, Jaddus, the high- 
priest, who had been warned in a dream how to avert 
the king’s anger, clothed in his priestly garments of 
hyacinth and gold, accompanied by the people ar- 
rayed in white robes, went forth to mect him. Alex- 
ander, seeing the impressive display, fell prostrate 
before Jaddus, and said, ‘‘ While I was in Macedonia, 
at Dium, a man appeared unto me in the same dress, 
who invited me to come into Asia, and promised to 
deliver the Persian Empire into my hands.” After 
this Alexander went to the temple, and offered sac- 
rifices under the direction of the high-priest. They 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER Two LAWS. 47 


then pointed out to him the prophecy of Daniel, in 
which it is said that a Grecian should come and de- 
stroy the Persians. This prophecy established him 
in the conviction that he himself was the individual. 
spoken of by the prophet. He therefore bestowed 
upon the Jews whatever favors they desired. He 
guaranteed to them in Babylon, as well as in Judea, 
the free observance of their laws, and every Sabbatical 
year exempted them from tribute. 

As Cyrus had been the providential representative 
of the East, so Alexander felt himself to be the prov- 
idential representative of the West. He sincerely 
believed that he was chosen by destiny for the great 
work of establishing not simply the supremacy of a 
single people, but of combining and equalizing, in a 
just union, the East with the West. His policy was, 
therefore, to weaken nationalities, as the great means 
of breaking down old religions. As Cyrus had de- 
veloped the idea of order, he aimed to develop the 
idea of independence. So deep was the impression 
of his policy that it was stamped upon his successors 
for a hundred and fifty years. In founding the city 
of Alexandria he brought about a direct interchange 
of thought and feeling between Greece, Egypt, and 
Judea. The rapidity of his victories, the large incor- 
poration of foreign elements into his armies, the 
terrible wars and varied fortunes of his successors, 
opened the way for larger conceptions of life and of 
faith than had ever been possible before. Paganism 
in none of its forms could survive transplanting. 
God thus overruled these instruments, inaugurating 
through one the consolidation of the Church, and 


48 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


through the other the distinctions of the sects. The 
wonderful influence of these mighty men upon the 
history of the world proves them to have been spe- 
cial instruments in the hands of divine providence. 

The view that the human will may be made to 
act consentingly under the law of cause and effect 
is sustained by Dr. Hamilton in his profound work 
on Autology. He asks the question (page 99), 
‘Can God inevitably convert a soul?’ His answer 
is, ‘Yes; if he sees fit so to do.”’ ‘This ispnotne 
he continues, ‘‘a question of liberty, but one of 
power. It refers to the affections, the reason, and 
the conscience, which are not the efficient but the 
occasional power of choice. God can inevitably 
carry his cause against the mere human power of the 
soul, by persuading it to yield to his wishes. This 
is not a question of liberty, but of persuasiveness, | 
where the soul has just the same liberty that God 
has, and exercises it to the last. God is too intel- 
lectual, persuasive, and talented, and hence can un- 
doubtedly gain his cause over the soul.” 

Had that writer clearly perceived what is evi- 
dently involved in this statement, that the laws of 
freedom may be violated, that the human will may 
act under two distinct laws—the law of liberty and 
the law of cause and effect—he certainly would not 
have made a statement that must strike every thinker 
as erroneous or incomprehensible—one, indeed, that 
must awaken the resentment of every adherent of Ar- 
minius. For all theologians of the Arminian school 
would ask, If God can inevitably convert one soul 
“Gf he sees fit to do so,” why does he not convert 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER TWo LAWS. 49 


all souls? And how can a volitional act have moral 
character and, at the same time, be a. coerced act? 
No act of the soul can be godly or wicked, that is 
not through the exercise of a free volition. Under 
the influence of extraneous power the human will 
may and does act; but the act, not being that of a 
free agent, can not be: held culpable, since, as we 
have before remarked, it is only when the will acts 
under the law of liberty, possessing its power of con- 
trary choice, that its acts can have moral character, 
or that its possessor can act as an accountable being. 
Every rational mind must perceive that the opposite 
proposition, namely, that a coerced act of the will 
has moral quality and merits reward or punishment, 
involves contradiction and absurdity, and that to 
govern an accountable being, in acts involving mo- 
rality, by constraint, or by the application of force, 
is as unreasonable as it would be to hold inert 
matter morally responsible for obeying the law of 
eravitation. 

Calvinists, while maintaining human _ freedom, 
have usually urged that God did in regeneration, in 
some mysterious way, control or constrain the human 
will. They surely can accept the proposition, that 
the human will is sometimes constrained, that it is 
sometimes made to act under the law of cause and 
effect. Arminians have always maintained that God 
does not control the will of man in acts involving 
responsibility and endless destiny; but, on the con- 
trary, that in such cases the will must be left to act 
freely under the law of liberty. They have never, 
however, asserted that it is in no case put under 


50 Tuk FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


restraining influences, that it is never overborne by 
influences too powerful for its strength of endur- 
ance. They need not, thereforé, hesitate to accept 
the proposition that the human will does, at different 
times, act under two laws, the law of liberty and the 
law of cause and effect—freely, under the former ; 
consentingly, under the latter. And why the human 
will may not be subjected to constraining influences 
when used as an instrument of Providence, no argu- 
ment, theological or psychological, is discoverable 
by the writer. ‘‘I girded thee,”’ says God, ‘‘though 
thou hast not known me.” | 

And surely this is a very reasonable theory of 
inspired prophecy. Indeed, we think that there can 
be no other which is not open to fatal objections. 
Weegscheider denies the possibility of prophecy 7 
tote, on the ground that a prediction of human 
events is destructive of human freedom. In this 
view he follows Emanuel Kant. ‘‘It is with Mr. 
Mansell,” says Dr. M’Cosh, ‘‘to show how general 
predictions could be uttered as to voluntary acts, if 
there be no causation operating in those acts.’’ Am- 
mon also affirms ‘‘that prophecies take away human 
freedom, favor fatalism, and are irreconcilable with 
divine perfection.’’ If God inspired men to utter 
prophecies, those prophecies must be fulfilled. But 
they may fail if the human will never operates con- 
sentingly under the laws of cause and effect. If 
the human will never acts otherwise than under 
the law of liberty, then any prophecies which re- 
quire human concurrence for their fulfillment are 
inconceivable. Prophecy would then be laid in the 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER Two LAWS. 51 


quicksands of contingencies. If God foretells that 
a certain man will perform a certain deed, then 
there can be no objective avoidability of his perform- 
ing that deed and bringing to pass that prophecy. 
But if a future act be unavoidable, it can not involve 
the quality of freedom. It is only under the suppo- 
sition that the human will does act consentingly (not 
freely) under the law of constraint, that prophecy is 
possible in itself and possible of explanation. 

If a future free being be accountable for his acts, 
then the decisive cause of those acts must reside 
wholly within his own will; and if so, then they are 
not under the control of causes now existing. There 
can be no inevitable nexus between any cause now 
existing and the act of a future free being. If man 
is free, his future conduct must be contingent, and 
God can not place that dependence on it which is 
indispensable to the fulfillment of the sure word of 
prophecy. In all God’s dealings and teachings in 
the kingdom of grace he assumes that man may dis- 
appoint his desires and his expectations. ‘‘When I 
say,’ says God, ‘‘unto the righteous, he shall surely 
live; if he trust to his own righteousness and commit 
iniquity, all his righteousnesses shall not be remem- 
bered; but for his iniquity he shall die for it.” How 
different is the phraseology in the Word of God 
relative to events which depend for their accomplish- » 
ment wholly upon the divine will and that relative 
to events dependent upon the human will. Of the 
former it is said, they-sza// come to pass; but the lan- 
guage used relative to events dependent upon man 
expresses or implies a condition. For example: ‘‘If 


52 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


ye seek me, I will be found of thee.’’ A short time 
before the taking of Jerusalem Jeremiah said to Zede- 
kiah, ‘‘Thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of 
Israel. If thou wilt assuredly go forth to the king 
of Babylon’s princes, then thy soul shall live and 
this city shall not be burned with fire, and thou shalt 
live and thine house; but if thou wilt not go forth to 
the king of Babylon’s princes, then shall this city 
be given unto the Chaldeans, and they shall burn 
it with fire and thou shalt not escape out of their 
hand.” (Jer. xxxvili, 17.) The taking of Jerusalem 
depended upon the free choice of Zedekiah. The 
city would not have been taken had he chosen other- 
wise. But in prophecy it is necessary that God 
should confidently rely upon the instruments, by 
which he intends to accomplish his purposes. 
Prophecies are certain; human actions, when free, 
are contingent. The reader, however, may reply 
that God foresees, with certainty, the future free ac- 
tions of his prophetic instruments. If this be so, 
it must be either by looking directly at the hu- 
man will or at the objective attractions, which may 
be presented to that will. But if you affirm that God 
foreknows future actions by knowing the objective 
attractions which may be presented to that. will, 
you annihilate at once the distinction between the 
law of liberty and the law of cause and effect. The 
moment a future act is perceived only through the 
objective, in lieu of the subjective; the moment its 
securative cause is discovered and located in the ob- 
jective surroundings, or in the motives addressed to 
either the reason or the sensibilities, in place of dis- 


THE HUMAN WILL ACTS UNDER TWO LAWS. 53 


covering and locating its incipiency in the subjective 
self, in the free causative will, that moment you in- 
evitably sink human freedom into necessity, and 
make man a mere creature of circumstances. Bor}: 
under such conditions, you are compelled to regard 
the will as acting under the constraint of the law of 
cause and effect, and not under the law of liberty; 
and you infer with certainty its action upon knowing 
merely the occasions of its acting. This mental pro- 
ceeding is inevitable in regard to all events in the 
realm of: material forces, of cause and effect. And 
this was precisely Jonathan Edwards’s procedure 
when he bound fast the human will under the strong- 
est motive. And after doing that, all the liberty he 
could claim for man was only the semblance of lib- 
erty, an irritating mockery of freedom—a will with 
the incipiency of all its volitions located in the object- 
ive. The uniform testimony of the philosophy of the 
current age supports our position. 

If it be possible for God to previse and to declare 
with certainty the future volitions of a free spirit, 
while acting under the law of liberty it can only be 
by looking not at the occasions of the will’s action, 
but at the source where alone its certainty can origi- 
nate; namely, at the human will itself. But the 
free will of a future free spirit has as yet no exist- 
ence whatever. Its future free choices are bound © 
up in no existing causes. No existing causes can 
now give the slightest indication of what those 
future choices will be. Every one of those possible 
choices—for example, the choice of holiness—is also 
now a nonentity. The choice of holiness being a 


54 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


nonentity, the specific self-acting cause of that choice, 
the free volition, is also now a nonentity. The will 
itself is also a nonentity. And if both the choice 
of holiness and the soul itself are now nonentities, 
the prevision of this choice must be impossible in 
the nature of things, and’ hence involve absurdity. 
To previse the effect of a cause, which has now no 
possible existence, is unthinkable. A nonentity, for 
whose future possibility there now exists no caus- 
ality, can not,therefore, be foreknowable. And so the 
only tenable theory of prophecy is this, that the will 
of the prophetic instrument can be made to act con- 
sentingly, uncontingently, unerringly under the action 
of the law of cause and effect. 


CHAPTER IV. 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 


op has four kingdoms: that of nature, in which 

he rules by uniform laws; of probation or 
grace, in which the law of liberty obtains; of glory, 
in which inexpressible delight in the will of God and 
harmony with the divine perfections reign; and of 
providence, in which God reigns emphatically by his 
own will. These four kingdoms are clearly recog- 
nized throughout the Scriptures. In the kingdom of 
nature the will of God is sovereign, and he governs 
through the agency of uniform laws, which he has 
established. In these laws (which are merely gener- 
alized facts), independent of the divine will, there 
exists no efficiency. As all the efficiency of these 
laws comes from the omnipotent energy of the omni- 
present God, they are always under his perfect con- 
trol. As it seems good unto him he makes worlds 
and peoples them, lays plans and inaugurates enter- 
prises of inconceivable magnificence. 

That God has a kingdom of nature in which 
uniform law obtains is demonstrated in every miracle. 
by which he accredits his messengers and teachers. 
Without a miracle we do not see how he could per- 
manently and authoritatively certify to a morally 
beclouded world even his own personality. Take 


away miracles from historic records, and human tend- 
+55 


56 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


ency to atheism would certainly be constant and 
powerful. ‘‘It may be questioned,” says Mark Hop- 
kins, ‘‘whether the common argument, from contri- 
vance, for the being of a personal God, would be 
valid in the absence of miracles. Miracles are God’s 
great seal, and if he should suffer his seal to be 
stolen, I see no possible way in which he could 
authenticate a communication to his creatures.”’ But 
miracles require a rigidly uniform course of nature. 
In all the miracles God has empowered men to work 
he assumes the uniformity of nature’s laws; since, un- 
less nature’s laws are uniform, a miracle is impossible. 

Providence is God’s care over sentient creatures 
upon this earth. It implies special impromptu divine 
acts and interpositions to meet the endless emergen- 
cies which are necessitated by the free choice of free 
beings during their probation. The great object and 
necessity of divine providence is to produce results 
which are indispensable to the welfare of sentient 
beings, and which could not naturally follow from 
God’s uniform modes of procedure in the operation 
of the general laws prevalent throughout Creation. 

And as in nature, so in providence, God works 
all things according to the counsel of his own will. 
Here, also, he is the sovereign ‘who giveth no 


account of his matters.” ‘He putteth down one. 


and setteth up another,” as he pleases. He dis- 
penses his providential favors as seems good to him 
alone, and as seems to him appropriate in order to 
accomplish his specific purposes. None dare in- 
quire, ‘‘ Why hast thou done thus?” or ‘* What doest 
thou?” or ‘*Why hast thou made and placed me 


—— es ee 


THE- FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 57 


thus?” or ‘‘Why hast thou made others superior to 
me in gifts, fortune, or earthly advantage?” In all 
such matters God does as he sovereignly chooses. 
All that God does is most assuredly right; but he 
does not do all he might do, and which, if done, 
would also be right. Should he make A handsome 
or homely, talented or dull, rich or poor, he would 
do right. For he ‘‘maketh poor and he maketh 
rich, he bringeth low and he lifteth up; he raiseth 
up the poor out of the dust, to set them among 
princes and to make them to inhabit the throne 
of glory; for by strength shall no man_prevail.”’ 
(ip sameciini7, 8408) mlthishGod {that seivethathe 
power to get wealth.” (Deut. viii, 18.) When 
God says, ‘‘Let his heart be changed from man’s, 
and let a beast’s heart be given unto him, and let 
seven times pass over him, to the intent that the 
living may know that the Most ‘High ruleth in the 
kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he 
will, and setteth up over it the basest of men,” he 
clearly teaches that he has a kingdom of providence, 
in which his own divine will is absolutely sovereign. 

God said to Solomon, by the mouth of David, 
‘Know the God of thy father, and serve him with 
a perfect heart and a willing mind; for the Lord 
searcheth all hearts and understandeth all the imagi- 
nations of the thoughts. If thou seek him he will be 
found of thee; but if thou forsake him he will cast 
thee off forever. Take heed now, for the Lord hath 
~chosen thee to build an house for the sanctuary ; 
be strong and do it, for God hath promised, I will 
establish his kingdom forever, if he be constant and 


58 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


strong to do my commandments and my judgments.” 
(1 Chron. xxviii, 9, 10.) When he inspired these 
messages he manifestly assumed that he has also a 
kingdom of free grace, in which the absolute free- 
dom of the human will is the great controlling prin- 
ciple. This divine language clearly implies freedom, 
contingency, and a free agent, capable of inaugu- 
rating choices and actions not possible in the nature 
of things to be preaffirmed. 

And when God declares that the great multitude 
which no man could number, who came up out of 
great tribulation, and washed their robes and made 
them white in the blood of the Lamb, are before the 
throne of God, and serve him day and night in his 
temple, the Lamb leading them forth to living fount- 
ains of water, he clearly assumes that he has a king- 
dom in which delight in, and affinities for, the divine 
perfections universally obtain and control. 

There are acknowledged impossibilities and ab- 
surdities in mathematics, in mechanics, in physics, in 
logic, and in metaphysics. Why, then, may there 
not be such in theology, and among them be classed 
‘the unerring prevision of future contingencies?” 
Certainly the process and rationale thereof are utterly 
inconceivable by the profoundest intellects that have 
ever considered the subject. With how much reason 
and force could Dr. Samuel Johnson declare: ‘‘I am 
much surer of my freedom than I am that the doc- 
trine of prescience is true. It certainly seems wiser 
to question the undue assumption in the case, which 
necessitates the admission of incomprehensibility and 
the abandonment of reason and the embrace of that 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 59 


which is manifestly self-contradictory.”? Why, in- 
deed, should we embrace a proposition which vio- 
lates all consecutive thought, and leaves the human. 
mind in hopeless incertitude? 

One of the great sources of error in theological 
reasonings has been the ascribing to God, in the 
management of his kingdom of grace, the same 
causation, control, and sovereignty which the Scrip- 
tures ascribe to-him in the kingdoms of nature and 
providence, and in the scheme of human redemption 
by his Son. Whenever we infer that, because nature 
is ruled by necessary and uniform law, therefore the 
human will is ruled by necessary and uniform law, 
or whenever we conclude that, because God uses 
men as the instruments of his overruling providence, 
therefore in like degree he controls the action of 
their free wills in the kingdom of free grace, we in- 
volve ourselves in conclusions which are wholly inex- 
plicable, and which greatly dishearten and depress us. 
It is only when we perceive distinctly the broad dis- 
tinctions between the four great kingdoms of God, 
and recognize the different principle of precedure 
regnant in each, that we can escape perplexity in 
our thinkings and confusion in our teachings’ in the 
science of theology. 

The freedom of the will is an intuitive truth. It 
is every-where admitted that men are often used by 
the Sovereign Ruler as the mere instruments of his 
overruling providence. Of this we find numerous 
instances recorded in the Holy Scriptures. The same 
experience has happened in the every day life of all 
‘men. For when a man is used as an instrument of 


60 _ DHE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


providence he is not conscious of constraint. He 
is conscious of acting consentingly. Now, from these 
three facts—that man is used as an instrument, that 
as an instrument he is not conscious that his will is 
under determination from without, and that liberty is 
a necessary truth—many theologians have been led to 
embrace the two contradictory propositions that the 
human will is free, and yet that it is determined by 
motives which are presented to it from without. But 
had they observed that the human will as an instru- 
ment of providence acts under unconscious con- 
straint, and as a subject of the kingdom of grace it 
acts freely and sovereignly,—in the former case sim- 
ply subserving divine purposes, and in the latter case 
achieving for itself moral character, merit, rewarda- 
bility, and eternal glory,—they would have escaped 
the innumerable inconsistencies which have baffled 
and always distressed them. 

David Hume makes the impressive remark that 
though man in truth is a necessary agent, having all 
his acts fixed and determined by immutable laws, 
yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the 
conviction of being a free agent. This remark, so 
far as man is used as an instrument of providence, 
is emphatically true. But the supernatural law of 
liberty obtains in the kingdom of grace. 

While it is true that no child of Adam can begin 
the work of repentance and of holy living without 
a sufficiency of the prevenient grace of God to aid 
him, not only in the incipiency of his moral reforma- 
tion, but at every moment throughout the entire pro- 
cess thereof, still so perfect is man’s freedom, and so 


THE FouUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 61 


perfectly free is the power of moral causation which is 
bestowed upon him through the redemption wrought 
for him by Christ, that notwithstanding all this pre- 
venient and assisting grace he is himself emphatic- 
ally a causal agent in his own salvation. All the 
earnest and prolonged efforts of God to save souls 
do utterly fail in thousands of cases. If salvation 
depended simply on the will of God, all would be 
saved this moment and forever. But the divine 
will alone—apart from my free volitions, my. causal 


agency—can not produce in my soul rewardability or 
punishability or moral character. Notwithstanding 
all the moral evils entailed upon me as the child of 
sinful parents, and notwithstanding all the wonders 
of redeeming grace that go before and enable me to 
obey divine injunctions, still I am myself a causal 
agent in effecting, and therefore a responsible agent 
for the effecting of my own salvation. If ona burning 
vessel, I could escape through the strength of nerve, 
muscle, and vision furnished me by my Creator. But 
should I refuse to employ these God-given powers I 
surely would be the cause of my own destruction. 
And in like manner if I chose to employ my capa- 
bilities of locomotion I should be the cause of my 
own salvation. Though without Christ I can do 
nothing, and yet with him strengthening me can do 
all things needful for my salvation, I may in the 
exercise of my freedom misuse or refuse all his grace, 
receive it all in vain, reject him, die in my sins, and 
perish forever. I therefore am the responsible cause 
of my damnation, if lost, or of my salvation, if saved. 


The principle, therefore, that controls in the king- 
6 


62 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


dom of grace is radically different from that which 
obtains in the kingdoms of nature, providence, and 
elory. In the former of these kingdoms we gladly 
affirm that the will of God is sublimely sovereign. 
But when we ascend to the high realms of free grace 
and human freedom, and accountability for eternal 
destinies, a new factor is forced upon us, and will not 
disappear from our vision, however incoherent our 
reasonings and blinding our prejudices. This new 
factor, the god-like liberty of the self-moving human 
will, is capable of thwarting, and, in uncounted in- 
stances, does thwart the divine will, and compel the 
great I Am to modify his actions, his purposes, and 
his plans in the treatment of individuals and of com- 
munities. In making the provisions of grace, in insti- 
tuting the conditions of pardon, spiritual growth, and 
eternal life, God works all things according to the 
counsels of his own will. But the acceptance of 
those provisions by his creatures, and their compli- 
ance therewith, their obedience, efficiency, success, 
and eternal destiny, all, he permits free human beings 
to determine for themselves. True, he affords them 
all the light, impulse, and strength needed for their 
salvation, so that they will be forever without excuse 
if they fail. But he does not bestow so much divine 
influence upon them as radically to damage the nature 
of their free choices or interfere with their freedom. 
At this point God waits for the decision of his crea- 
ture. But if he foreknows his decision he does not 
wait for it. 

To accomplish his purposes in the realm of prov- 
idence, God has recourse to material forces, to good 


THE Four KINGDOMS OF Gop. 63 


men and good angels, to bad men and bad angels. He 
uses bad angels, not thereby doing evil that good may 
come, but bringing good out of the evil. For, while 
they think they are working out their own unholy en-- 
terprises, God is overruling them for the accomplish- 
ment of his purposes. He uses good angels; and 
they, being not on probation, implicitly obey all 
God's wishes. He uses good men; for they are his 
servants, under the guidance of his Spirit, and obe- 
dient to his will. He uses bad men by overruling 
their evil conduct, and by allowing their wills to 
come under the law of constraint through diabolical 
or strongly persuasive influences. He could say to 
Moses, ‘‘I am sure the king of Egypt will not let 
you go.” For as Pharaoh had sinned away his day 
of grace, God could easily cause his will to come 
under the law of cause and effect, by permitting 
Satan and evil spirits to come in upon him “like a 
flood,” as a prophet expresses it. He could there- 
fore foresee just what the king would do, even if the 
dogma of absolute divine foreknowledge be not the 
true doctrine. 

A visible Church of God on earth is impossible 
without miracle, prophecy, providence, and the exist- 
ence of nations and human governments. God can 
foresee all the events which have been foretold in 
prophecy, of kingdoms, nations, empires, and_ his 
visible Church, because he resolves to bring them to 
pass, and does actually possess the needed resources 
to do so, without in the least interfering with those 
choices and acts of human beings which involve 
moral character and entail eternal destiny. To ac- 


64 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


complish, then, all the inflexible and specific arrange- 
ments of divine providence, the absolute foreknowl- 
edge of all the free choices of free beings when 
acting under the law of liberty does not seem to be 
at all necessary. 

But it may be asked, How can God have a prov- 
idential plan for any man, if he does not foresee his 
future free choices? God’s specific plans for free 
men are flexible. They are conditioned on the con- 
duct of men.. God's promises and threats are made 
on specified conditions. Many of the prophecies were 
also uttered conditionally. Many of them were never 
fulfilled. God sent, for example, Isaiah to say to 
Hezekiah, ‘‘Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die, 


ue} 


and not live.” This prophecy, uttered by the Prophet 
Isaiah, was modified by the humiliation, prayer, and 
faith of Hezekiah, and the Lord sent his prophet to 
say to him, ‘‘I have seen thy tears; I have heard 
thy prayers; and, behold, I will add unto thy days 
fifteen years.”” The conduct of men perpetually 
changes God's feelings and modifies his treatment of 
them. ‘‘Then came the word of the Lord to Sam- 
uel, saying, It repenteth me that I have set up Saul 
to be king, for he is turned back from following me, 
and hath not performed my commandments.” 

As, upon the hypothesis of this treatise, God can 
not foreknow, except conditionally or contingently, 
what the conduct of men will be in the kingdom of 
grace, he can not foreknow with greater certainty 
the result of his plans for them. The fulfillment of 
God’s plans for free men, as a general thing, and 
saving in exceptional cases, is as contingent and 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 65 


uncertain in the divine mind as their free choices are 
contingent and uncertain. The foreknowledge of the 
free choices of a free being is not therefore necessary 
toa divine plan for him, as it regards his spiritual and 
eternal interests, upon the supposition of his obed’- 
ence. And had not man sinned, God’s plan for his 
spiritual development would have been completely 
consummated. But in consequence of disobedience 
it became indispensable for God to modify it. 

It is the height of folly to affirm that Adam, asa 
subject of the spiritual kingdom, acted as God de- 
sired or designed. If God desired or planned that 
man should violate his laws, then his nature can not: 
be holy. No consideration could justify God in de- 
siring that man should fall into transgression. It 
matters not what the motive might be—whether to 
illustrate his grace, or magnify his perfections, or 
bring into view attributes never before revealed to 
the universe of intelligent beings; for nothing could 
justify man’s Creator and Moral Governor in desiring 
that his accountable creatures should violate his just 
and holy law. The seemingly reverent, but really 
blasphemous, statement, that God planned, purposed, 
or desired the fall of man for his own glory, awakens 
the displeasure of all who take the trouble candidly to 
meditate upon its profound folly. For if God’s law 
means any thing; if it be a real, earnest, significant, . 
inflexible rule of conduct; if it be not a mere shifting 
device, that may be contemned under any plausible 
pretense; if, on the contrary, it is as immutable as 
God himself, then to affirm that God planned the 
violation of that holy law by a deathless soul is to utter 


66 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


not only the greatest but the profanest of absurdities. 
But if Adam did not do as God desired and designed ; 
if he failed to accomplish his designs; if he failed in 
the many particulars God had specifically arranged 
for him, then God was compelled to modify his con- 
templated treatment of him, and was also compelled 
immediately to modify all his spiritual relations to 
himself. Man’s future well-being, work, and mission 
were all widely and variously affected by his disobe- 
dience. The special work God had forecast for him, 
in the interests of otlers and of the moral universe, 
he had either to abandon, or to accomplish through 
other instrumentalities, or to perform himself through 
the exercise of his own almighty power. 

Now, if the plan of God, which embraced those 
spiritual and eternal benefits that man was designed 
to effect, required modification in consequence of his 
disobedience, why may not God’s providential plan, 
which embraced those temporal purposes which man 
was manifestly designed to accomplish, be also in- 
stantly and materially modified? If, in consequence 
of sin, the one plan required readjustment, why should 
not the other? If sin affected man’s endless destiny 
and influence—as no one will question—why should 
it not affect his providential destiny and influence? 
We are thus forced to the conclusion that God’s prov- 
idential plan for man, embracing his earthly career, 
required readjustment after the violation of the divine 
law. And if the first sin forced a readjustment of that 
plan, why should not every subsequent sin compel a 
somewhat modified method of procedure, suited to 
the special emergency produced by that sin? 


ee sO 


eS ee 


titi te 


Te ee 


SS 


~ 
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THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 67 


God’s providential plans, in some particulars rel- 
ative to individuals and to nations, are modified every 
hour by the free choices of men acting under the 
law of liberty. And it is only in accordance with | 
the dictates of the plainest common sense to affirm 
that God’s providential plans for nations and for indi- 
viduals would all be changed, and be subjected to 
unnumbered and to us inconceivable readjustments, 
if all men would only do that which God inexpress- 


ibly desires they should do—namely, obey instantly 
and constantly his holy law. Every man knows that 
he himself has not met the requirements of the divine 
law; that actually he has come very far short of his 
imperative duty; that he is by no means the man he 
ought to be; and that he has not accomplished the 
sood results God designed him to accomplish. And 
what is true of one man is true of every man, and 
therefore true of the entire human race. This being 
conceded, let us suppose that all the free agents on 
earth should from this hour choose to obey God. 
Then how speedily would all the plans of God, and 
the dealings of God relative to men and to nations, 
be modified and glorified! Men and nations, as we 
now observe them, are perpetually disobeying the 
divine law, and consequently the dealings of God 
require perpetual modifications and readjustments. 
To affirm that God designed and brought about the 
dreadful state of wrong, injustice, deception, rapine, 
and murder, that now desolates the earth, is not only 
absurd, but it must be considered exceedingly blas- 
phemous. ‘‘A man on the way to the gallows is 
on the way to his highest development,” is the 


68 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


utterance of a great but mistaken intellect. We are 
therefore forced to admit that God’s providential 
plans and purposes for free agents have been de- 
feated, are hourly defeated, in numberless instances, 
and that, as a consequence of this, other plans have 
been resorted to by an all-wise, all-powerful, all- 
benevolent Ruler. 

For every man God has a providential plan, pur- 
pose, and desire, upon the conditions of his obedi- 
ence to the divine law and faithfulness in the king- 
dom of grace. The glories of that plan no one 
can ever, know till with spirit eyes he gazes on eter- 
nal verities. But, as we have remarked, this plan 
and purpose he is often compelled to modify by 
man’s own free, sinful choices. The Scriptures sus- 
tain this position: ‘‘The fear of the Lord,” says the 
Psalmist, ‘‘prolongeth days, but the years of the 
wicked shall be shortened.” ‘‘Be thou not over- 
much wicked, neither be thou foolish: why shouldst 
thou die before thy time? Bloody and deceitful men 
shall not live out half their days.” Job says, ‘‘ Hast 
thou marked the old way which wicked men have 
trodden, who are cut down out of time, and whose 
foundation was overflown with the flood?” .In, God’s 
arrangement a certain number of days were allotted 
to men. According to St. Paul God ‘‘hath deter- 
mined the times before appointed and the bounds of 
their habitation.”’ But while God has had a definite 
plan for men, he has often been compelled to modify 
that plan in many particulars, and call them to an 
account before their appointed days had expired. 
Now, apply this principle to individuals, and then 


co oe Soe 


4 
t 4 ae 
ee ee ee 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 69 


apply it to whole nations, and we see that God is 
constantly modifying his plans in consequence of 
the free choices of free agents. 

Individuals may, in many particulars, fail to ac- 
complish providentially the ends God designed them 
to accomplish. It is so with nations also. God's 
plan, I think, was for the Jewish nation to become 
the ideal nation which Bishop Butler portrays, and 
then to absorb all other nations and governments. 
And yet God’s primary purpose relative to a nation 
can be more frequently and more perfectly carried 
out than can the one which relates to a single indi- 
vidual, because God can fix upon the special ends to 
be effected by a nation without fixing absolutely 
upon the individual agencies, through which they are 
to be accomplished. He may assign a certain mis- 
sion to a certain nation, and he may arrange that 
some one individual thereof shall have the duty, 
honor, and reward of leadership in the work of its 
accomplishment. But if ‘that person refuses, or by 
his free choices disqualifies himself for such providen- 
tial work, God can resort to some other instrument; 
though, of course, in using that other instrument, 
ie would in so far need to modify the purposes 
which he had previously formed in relation to him. 
But this modification would not be difficult for a 
being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipres- 
ent; and it would be justified by the greater and 
more desirable end to be accomplished in his provi- 
dence. But God does often persist in using immoral 
instruments, in order to bring to a successful issue 
his plans relative to individuals, nations, the varied 

7 


70 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


developments of earth and the splendid scenes to be 
enacted thereon. And all this is necessarily implied 
in God's government of the moral universe, if moral 
eovernment has any significance. The free choices 
of free beings require prompt treatment and interpo- 
sition on the part of the Ruler, if government means 
any thing. David said to the men of Benjamin and 
Judah, ‘‘If ye be come peaceably unto me to help 
me, mine heart shall be knit unto you; but if ye 
be come to betray me to mine enemies, seeing there 
is no wrong in my hands, the God of our fathers 
look thereon and rebuke ‘it,’ ,(1 Chron, xij age 
Here David recognizes God’s unceasing wakeful- 
ness to defeat the wrong doing of men and of 
communities. 

In harmony with the foregoing is the following 
from the pen of Moses Stuart. He inquires, ‘‘Is it 
true, that where great events are predicted—yea, the 
ereatest that ever took place on this earth, even the 
incarnation and suffering of.the Son of God—that the 
time when they should happen is revealed? Swzely 
not. All these were generally announced, without 
any designation of the time w/ez of their fulfillment. 
The prophets did not know the time when the things 
they foretold would take place. Most of all those 
ereat events that concerned the Jewish nation are 
predicted without any designation of the specific 
time. And the period, too, of the Man of Sin, of 
the beast, and of the false prophet, are nowhere 
definitely limited or pointed out.”” How perfectly 
these explicit statements harmonize with the views 
we have expressed in regard to God’s plans relative 


\ 
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ae ee eee ee ae 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 71 


to individuals and to nations. Not only does he 
modify, but he even defers them, from time to 
time, till the arrival of the auspicious hour for the 
‘ fulfillment of purposes which he has determined 
shall ultimately be accomplished upon our globe. In 
studying those plans we find that, if an individual 
or nation obey the divine law, God has for such 
elorious purposes. If either of these disobey and 
continue to disobey, then he will do the next best 
thing for each; and so on, until all the claims of 
mercy are exhausted, and all hope of utilizing any 
remaining value finally expires. He is then com- 
pelled to punish, perhaps even to destroy, and to 
employ other instruments. 

Keeping in mind that in the kingdom of provi- 
dence, God exercises freely his own choice—though 
always choosing only what is right and best—we see - 
how it is possible for him to keep the volitions of 
men, when acting consentingiy—that is, when acting 
simply as instruments in carrying out his providen- 
tial plans and purposes—wholly distinct from those 
volitions which they put forth in the sphere of free- 
dom. Inasmuch as God has providential plans for 
every man, to one he gives an aptitude for trade; to 
another, for mechanics; to others, for science, poetry, 
art, or one of the various learned professions. ‘‘I 
took Abraham,” says God, ‘‘from beyond the flood, 
and led him throughout all the land of Canaan.’ In 
this proceeding Abraham was a providential instru- 
ment: God prompted him to leave the land of idol- 
atry. Had not God influenced him to go, he would 
not have left the land of his nativity. God could 


72 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


determine that a man should serve society and con- 
tribute to the carrying out of his providential plans 
under constraining motives, without any reference at 
all to his free choices within the sphere of religion. 
Many of our endowments are bestowed upon us di- 
rectly by the will of God, and many of them are 
hereditary; for different men have different inclina- 
tions, owing to anterior aptitudes and_ peculiarities. 
Heredity, indeed, is fast becoming a science in itself. 


Now, whether a man will be obedient to the 


perfect law of liberty in the kingdom of grace, or 
whether he will subserve God’s providential pur- 
poses, and fulfill his earthly designs, are questions 
which God does not, and which we need not, con- 
found. Uncertainty as to the first may exist, without 
affecting certainly as to the second. A man may, as 
Cyrus, Alexander, and Napoleon did, meet the exi- 
gencies of the providential kingdom, without meeting 
any of the claims of the higher kingdom, the moral 
and the spiritual. God might foresee that a man 
would well serve his will as a mechanic, without 
any foreknowledge of his free choices in the kingdom 
of grace. In regard to the great body of men, God 
determines that such and such shall be the end and 
design of their existence here upon earth, as the 
subjects of his providential government, and as instru- 
ments to accomplish his varied purposes relative to 
this world. True, his. providential plans as to individ- 
uals are often interfered with by the perversity of the 
individuals themselves, by the persistent perversity of 
others, and by the unaccountable bad actions of oth- 
erwise good men. But this only makes it necessary 


a Se ee 


a) 


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THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. VR 


for God to modify these plans, and to use these indi- 
viduals in some other way. And this he continues 
to do, until he has exhausted every capacity and 
element of good in them. When he has done this 
he is compelled to transfer them to a kingdom where 
power and force hold its subjects ‘‘under everlasting 
chains unto the judgment of the great day.” But 
these modifications are not made until the free 
choices, exercised under the law of liberty, render 
them indispensable. 

It is often the case, however, as we view the 
matter, that God so puts individuals under constraint 
that he foreknows just what they will accomplish, 
whatever may be their moral character or disobe- 
dience to moral law. God, in his providence, then 
has a class of instruments that he definitely ar- 
ranges shall accomplish, or be permitted to accom- 
plish, under the influence of circumstances or mo- 
tives to which they consent, certain ends, whatever 
may be their choices in the high realm of free moral 
agency. For example: Christ says to Pilate (John 
xix, 11): ‘‘Thou couldst have no power at all against 
me, except it were given thee from above.’’ The 
opportunities and power to crucify Jesus had been 
given him, without his seeking them, by an unseen 
says God, ‘‘to 
whom it seemeth meet unto me.” (Jer. xxvii, 5.) 


”’ 


Handsiesd shave wiven.ethenearth; 


‘‘He removeth kings and setteth up kings.’”’ (Dan. 
ii, 27.) ‘He looseth the bonds of kings and girdeth 
their loins with a girdle.” (Job~xii, 18.) ‘He 
raiseth up the poor out of the dust, and lifteth up 
the beggar from the dunghill, to set them among 


74 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


princes, and make them inherit the throne of glory: 
for the pillars of the earth are the Lord’s, and he 
hath set the world upon them. He will keep the 
feet of his saints, and the wicked shall be silent in 
darkness; for by strength shall no man _ prevail.” 
(1 Sam. ii, 8.) ‘‘He hath put down the mighty 
from their seats and exalted them of low degree.”’ 
(Luke i, 52.) Providence bows before free will, 
but uniformity reigns in the laws of nature. God 
will not make use of miracles save on important 
occasions. He will not even promote good things 
and desirable ends by miracles to the detriment of 
natural and mental forces. 

“The idivine “use of.men) of genius,” saysedor 
Daniel Wise, ‘‘is one of the grandest facts in the 
government of God. It shows us how he accom- 
plishes his will without infringing on that freedom, 
which is the sublimest fact in man’s character. Na- 


poleon came on the stage of action just when the 


old political and ecclesiastical institutions of Conti- - 


nental Europe were thoroughly corrupt and rotten. 
The ruling classes were cruel, despotic, sensual, 
and wholly given to pleasure. The priesthood was 
mostly given over to indolent self-indulgence or eccle- 
siastical ambition. The people were trodden under 
foot, ignorant and hopeless. An iron hand was 
needed to break up this stagnation, to destroy the 
unity of the governing classes, to startle the masses 
from their state of dogged despair, and to make a way 
for the introduction of new ideas, new forms of gov- 
ernment, and new men. That iron hand was given to 
Napoleon in the form of a genius for war, more 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. vist 


brilliant, perhaps, than that of any preceding con- 
queror. Here then was the power to break in pieces; 
and he exercised it without pity, until every sove- 
reign in Europe, England’s monarch alone excepted, 
did homage to his throne. Then a restorer was re- 
quired, a legislator who could be to France directly, 
and to Europe by example, what Moses was to 
Israel. Here Napoleon partially failed. He had 
perceptive powers to create a government suited to 
elevate the people, as the Code Napoleon amply 
proves, but he proudly resolved to be sole ruler of 
France and dictator of all Europe. That ambition 
destroyed him, and it postponed the time for the full 
deliverance of the people from their old bondage. 
Still the work of their deliverance was begun, and 
it has probably progressed as rapidly as the divine 
wisdom saw to be possible.’’ Now, in all this, Na- 
poleon, though unconsciously doing God's work, 
was as free with respect to his motives and aims as 
was the humblest conscript in his ranks. He chose 
to make his own personal glory and elevation the 
end of his military and civil plans. He might have 
made the elevation of France and the good of 
Europe the aims of his life. Here, then, he was 
free; and yet, while in the exercise of that freedom, 
he actually performed a mighty part in the plans of 
God, who girded him for his work, though he did not 
know it. The political conditions of empires, the 
moral conditions of peoples, his own great powers of 
thought, of combination, and of fascination, and 
yielding consentingly, almost blindly, to the extraor- 
dinary circumstances of his times, and his own won- 


76 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


derful successes gave to him the clear and firm con- 
viction which never left him, that he was the child 
of destiny, or the instrument of invisible powers. 
The explanation of all those cases in which persons 
strongly feel that they have missions to perform in the 
earth is found in the simple fact that they are moved 
onward consentingly as instruments of Providence. 
This will explain the impression so many have en- 
tertained in all ages, that they were children of a 
strange, unavoidable destiny. | 

Now, in all cases, when God has definitely de- 
termined that certain individuals shall accomplish 
particular things, he can foresee that they will do 
all that he intends that they shall do as_provi- 
dential instruments, without foreknowing what their 
choices will be on the arena of moral freed6m. 
He has predetermined what they shall accomplish, 
and he foreknows it, because he has foreordained it. 
These constrained choices and actions in no way de- 
termine the moral character of the agent—although, 
in general, they harmonize with it—for the reason 
that they are providentially constrained. God says 
in prophecy to Cyrus, ‘‘Thou hast not known me, 
but I girded thee. I made thee to rule over kings, 
and gave them as the dust to thy sword.”’ 

Not thus distinguishing the kingdom of grace in 
which man is perfectly free, from the kingdom of 
Providence, in which God is all-sovereign, many 
thinkers fall into paralogisms, which induce erro- 
-neous conclusions in regard to other vital questions. 
‘‘Confessedly God does as he pleases in the kingdom 
of providence, therefore, he does as he pleases in 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. viet 


the kingdom of grace,” is one of those unsound 
inferences which so widely mislead theologians. But, 
in the kingdom of providence, the volition is co- 
ercive in its character, and its incipiency is to be 

found in the Sovereign; whereas in the kingdom of | 
grace the volition is non-coercive in character, and 
its incipiency is to be found in the subject. This 
is a distinction as clear and essential as that be- 
tween freedom and fatality. No one can question 
that there is a kingdom of providence, in which, rel- 
ative to all particulars, God does as he sovereignly 
wills; and also that there is a kingdom of free grace, 
in which his acts are varied according to the volun- 
tary obedience or disobedience of the subjects of that 
kingdom. And as these two kingdoms, of prov- 
idence and grace, are to all intelligent minds man- 
ifestly distinct, why is it not possible for God to 
keep the choices of men in his kingdom of prov- 
idence distinct from their choices in the kingdom of 
free grace? And to say that God can not keep 
these two distinct kingdoms distinct in his plans and 
governmental scheme is to limit his perfections. It 
does not involve contradiction to affirm that his 
absolute foreknowledge of the one is possible, and of 
the other impossible. The first choices are knowable, 
because they result from the sovereign determination 
of God: the second are unknowable, because re- 
sulting from the free, independent, self-deciding will 
of a free agent. But because we can not see how it 
is that God can always distinguish these two clearly 
distinct things and keep them unconfused and dis- 


78 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


tinct in his mind, we ought not, therofore, to as- 
sume a position that necessitates all the acknow- 
ledged contradictions, mists, and mazes that are 
involved in the doctrine of the perfect divine fore- 
knowledge of all the free choices of free spirits. 

That there is a kingdom of nature, in which uni- 
form law reigns, and that there is a kingdom of 
Providence, in which the divine will sovereignly 
reigns, and that these two kingdoms can be, and 
are, kept entirely separate, no one will question. 
How easily God keeps his kingdom of providence 
distinct from the kingdom of grace, the following 
striking passage from the gifted Dr. Whedon force- 
fully illustrates: 

‘“Let us’ suppose; says“he, “‘that«a -pertecthy 
good and wise earthly prince, absolute in authority, 
rules over as many tribes and nations as Persian 
Xerxes, the large share of whom are hostile to each 
other and desperately depraved. His plan is not to 
destroy nor to interfere with their personal freedom, 
but so to arrange their relations to each other as 
that he may make them mutual checks upon each 
other’s wickedness; that the ambition of one may 
opportunely chastise the outrage of another, that 
those wrongs which will exist may be limited and 
overruled, and that even the crimes which they will 
commit may further his plans of reformation, grad- 
ual perfectibility, and the highest sum total of good. 
If it is seen that 4. traitor will assassinate; be “he 
victim in his way one whose death will be a public 
benefit. If brothers (as Joseph’s) will envy their 


a 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 79 


brother, let their victim thereby so conduct himself 
as that he shall be the savior of great nations. Ifa 
proud prince will wanton in his pride, so nerve him 
up, vitally and intellectively, as that his wantonness _ 
shall spread great truths through the tribes of the 
empire. If a warlike king will conquer, let the 
nation exposed to his invasions be one whose chas- 
tisement will be a lesson to the world. If a numer- 
ous tribe is bent on devastating the earth, let their 
hordes so ravage as that future civilization shall 
spring from the desolations they make. So after 
long years his scheme of development may work out 
its results. . . . He would so collocate men and 
things into a whole plan that their mutual play 
wouldsnworkieout- the best? results: #77. PF We 
should then in vision behold all beings, however 
free, spontaneously, uncompulsorily, without com- 
mand or decree, moving on in harmony with his 
outlines of event,” etc. (The Freedom of the Will, 
page 204.) 

But the kingdom of providence is constantly lay- 
ing the kingdom of nature under contribution, in 
meeting the wants of a. sensient universe. How 
perfectly easy it is for infinite wisdom to keep these 
two kingdoms of nature and providence entirely 
distinct. And the same is true as to the kingdoms 
of providence and free grace. Free agents are con- — 
stantly violating the laws of the kingdom of free 
erace, and colliding against, and in many cases de- 
feating, at least temporarily, if not wholly, the plans 
of providence; and God is constantly making use of 
his kingdom of providence to aid and advance the 


80 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF Gob. 


* 


kingdom of grace, and yet his infinite discernment 
can keep distinct all free choices from necessary or 
constrained choices.* 

“It was not you,” said Joseph to his brethren, 
“that sent me hither, but God sent me, to preserve 
you a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives 
by a great deliverance.” (Gen. xlv, 7) oN 
thought evil against me; but the Lord meant it unto 
good, to bring it to pass, as it is this day, to save 
much people alive.” (Gen. ], 20.) These passages, 
while they show how definite are God’s providential 
plans, involve a principle and a procedure of the 
divine administration different from that of simply 
constraining innocent human volitions. God often 
uses the deeds of free agents in accomplishing his 
purposes. These acts of free agents flow not from 


*Calvinism, distinctively such, is truly found in the Bible. The 
same is equally true of Arminianism. But the Calvinism of the 
Bible refers exclusively to the kingdom of providence; while the 
Arminianism refers exclusively to the kingdom of free grace. A 
clear discrimination between the kingdoms of providence and free 
grace will not only reconcile, but bring into perfect harmony these 
long opposing systems of theology. The many seemingly conflict- 
ing and inconsistent statements of the Scriptures on the issues be- 
tween these two systems have never heen satisfactorily explained, 
And how these seeming inconsistencies can he susceptible of ex- 
plication on any theory of interpretation heretofore advanced does 
not appear. But the discrimination above suggested between the 
teachings of the Scriptures as to the kingdom of providence and 
their teachings as to the kingdom of free grace furnishes, it seems 
to me, a satisfactory explanation of them all; and, what is most 
gratifying, it furnishes a basis of agreement and harmony, of fra. 
-ternity of feeling and unity of effort, in evangelizing the world be- 
tween the adherents of Calvin and Arminius—‘‘ Ephraim need no 
longer vex Judah, nor Judah envy Ephraim;” for both, we think, 
have been right, and both have been wrong, 


el 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 81 


his will or predetermination, but from the unneces- 
sitated choice of the creature. God seems to delight 
in overruling for good actions which were intended 
for evil. This is seen in all his dealings .with in- 
dividuals and nations. And so skillfully does he 
manage the case that many have thought that the 
wicked acts connected therewith were the ordained 
means to accomplish the result. For example, the 
falsehoods, treachery, and wicked advice of Rebecca 
to Jacob must have been odious to God. Neverthe- 
less, he showed his wisdom and power in using them 
in the working out of his great plans of mercy and 
redemption for a lost world. And again, on account 
of the wickedness of Solomon, God determined and 
declared that he would dismember the Jewish na- 
tions “(12 Kings*xxt)-xii, and” xiii.) But to™ effect 
this settled purpose he made use of the foolish and 
wicked advice of the young men to Rehoboam. 
They advised him to bind more grievous burdens 
upon the people. (2 Chron. x, 10.) Now this di- 
vine purpose of rupturing the Jewish nation God 
would have effected by other and more direct means 
had no such evil advice been urged upon the king. 
But how much more suggestive and impressive was 
the event by its coming to pass through the wicked- 
ness of bad and foolish men outraging human rights 
and inaugurating thereby a revolution. ‘‘ The king 
hearkened not unto the people, for the cause was 
of God, that the Lord might perform his word, 
which he spake by the hand of Ahijah.”” This prin- 
ciple of divine conduct also explains the otherwise 
troublesome words of Joseph: ‘‘ You meant it for 


82 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


harm, but God meant it for good.” God intended 
to send him to Egypt, and would have done so in 
some sinless, pacific, and providential manner; but 
seeing their envy and hatred he overruled them, 
and pressed them immediately into his service in car- 
rying out his providential purposes as to Joseph 
himself and the entire family of Jacob. 

The general belief that God foreknows whatsoever 
comes to pass, and has his own crystallized plans, 
embracing the free choices of free beings, from which 
there can be no variation on his own part or on that 
of free human agents, and according to which he is 
ever moving steadily on to the accomplishment of 
his desires, purposes, and plans, without the slightest 
change in his predetermined method of procedure, 
notwithstanding the numberless successes and dam- 
aging enterprises of depraved men, does more to 
repress the energies of individuals, Churches, and 
nations than any other generally adopted opinion. 
No other delusion is more paralyzing upon Christians. 

God has declared that the Gospel of Christ’s 
kingdom shall be preached in all the world, and that 
the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as 
the waters cover the great deep. But when that 
day shall come, no man, no angel, not even the Son 
himself, can tell. We shall have a fearful conflict 
with Catholicism, with infidelity, with rationalism, 
and with heathenism. Our national crimes, com- 
mercial corruption, political dishonesty, irreverence 
for the Sabbath and the Word of God, intemperance, 
licentiousness, avarice, love of display, and formal, 
unspiritual, worldly Christianity, all clearly indicate 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD, 83 


great and dreadful struggles in the early future. 
How do we know that Catholicism will not quench 
the fires of liberty, and expel the spirit of free- 
dom from the country of Abraham Lincoln and 
George Washington? that the deluge of intemper- 
ance will not soon hide from our sight the only 
remaining cities of refuge? that our wide-spread licen- 
tiousness is not now calling for the indignant thun- 
derbolts. of offended purity? that our European and 
- American civilizations are not now sinking helpless 
and crushed under the weight of their own alarming 
vices? We know not how fearful the battles that are 
certainly before us. Splendid victories and brilliant 
ages may be succeeded by signal defeats and long 
periods of barbarity. Terrible experiences may 
await the Church of God. All hell, the majority of 
earth, anda large part of the Church itself, are arrayed 
in malignant opposition to its triumphs. It is every- 
where admitted that rationalism, naturalism, materi- 
alism, secularism, and atheism are all just now on 
the alarming increase. 

God’s plan is for men to save this world, to cor- 
rect hoary wrongs, to conquer diabolical foes, to 
sweep error from the globe, and illuminate it with 
the light of truth and of heaven. All this men 
must do through divine co-operation; and yet, if 
men are free agents, they may for ages defeat the 
realization of divine plans and desires. Men's free 
choices have defeated and retarded the plans of God 
in the past; why not in the future? Beyond this 
ereat general plan of saving and conquering by hu- 
man instrumentality, I can not suppose that God has 


84 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


such an infinite number of definite and specific plans 
as is generally supposed. His instruments in this 
holy work, for the practical redemption of a lost world, 
are free agents, agents who can not: be coerced in 
things pertaining to the kingdom of grace without a 
surrender of their accountability. And it is a mourn- 
ful fact that they do refuse every hour in the day to 
obey him in spiritual matters, and to accomplish the 
spiritual work which he assigns to them. Every 
man is conscious that he has in numberless instances 
disobeyed the commands of his Maker, thereby dis- 
regarding his desires and expectations, disturbing his 
general plans, and thwarting his special purposes. 

I know that it is the tendency of sin to destroy 
the nature in which it resides; that sin can never 
obtain or realize any substantial good; that a free 
being can not sin without becoming a subject of ter- 
rible punishment. But I also know that created 
wills, during probation, may at any time turn away 
from God. No human will can be secured against 
sin and consequent ruin, apart from its own decis- 
ions. And I know that the human will is capable 
of an incalculable self-degradation in wickedness. 
And all this evil and ruin are in opposition to the 
designs of God concerning men, are in despite of 
his beneficent purposes. 

Would any one dare be so blasphemous as to 
affirm that the conversion of the world and the sal- 
vation of souls progress as rapidly as God desires? 
Many are the dumb messengers, the unreliable agents, 
the vacillating friends, and deserting soldiers who ob- 
struct God’s purposes to win and lead a fallen world 


THE FOUR KINGDOMS OF GOD. 85 


to righteousness and heaven. Human agencies re- 
spond too feebly to the divine command, ‘‘Go ye 
into all the world; and they will continue to do so 
until Christian men dismiss all enervating delusions 
about the plans of God, and his bringing things 
about ‘‘in his own good time and way,’’ and enter 
most heartily into the great battle with sin, under 
the strong conviction that otherwise the momentous 
designs in respect to which we stand forth, before 
men, angels, and God, as responsible actors and 
agents may after all be disastrous and overwhelming 
failures. 

Much of the indifference, the casting off of per- 
sonal responsibility, and the non-development of 
latent spiritual power, that have so sadly character- 
ized and paralyzed the Church, is, in our opinion, 
chargeable to the belief of the dogma of universal and 
absolute prescience. ‘The old view of the divine fore- 
knowledge—involving the fixed certainty of all future 
events—has ever been most enervating and repress- 
ing. It has made pigmies of those who might have 
been giants, and mere glimmering lights of many 
pulpits which should have sent a powerful and sav- 
ing radiance far across the moral darkness of this 
world. 


@GuHAPTPER' VV: 


THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. 


y an application of the principles previously 
B stated, every passage in the Scriptures can 
easily and naturally be interpreted in perfect har- 
mony with a denial of the divine foreknowledge of 
those choices of free beings on which depends their 
eternal destiny. Take as an illustration the case of 
the Apostle Peter. Jesus says to his disciples, sat 
ye shall be offended because of me this night: for 
it is written, I will smite the Shepherd, and the 
sheep of the flock shall be scattered abroad. But 
after I am risen again, I will go before you into 
Galilee. But Peter said unto him, Although all 
shall be offended because of thee, yet will not I. 
And Jesus saith unto him, Verily I say unto thee, 
That this day, even in this night, before the cock 
crow twice, thou shalt dény me thrice. But Peter 
spake the more vehemently, If I should die with 
thee, I will not deny thee in any wise.” (Mark xiv, 
27-31.) The Lord had previously, in the same con- 
versation, said to Peter, ‘‘Simon, Simon, Satan hath 
desired to have you [or, rather, hath desired and ob- 
tained you], that he may sift you as wheat; but I 
have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and 
when thou art converted strengthen thy brethren.” 


Luke xxii, 31, 32.) Peter was designed to be one 
86 


APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. 87 


of the master spirits in the Gospel Church. Amid 
the many responsibilities and the great honors which 
were soon to be bestowed upon him, he needed, 
more than Paul ever needed, a thorn in the flesh. 
He was truly a good and noble man, but he had 
serious defects of character. He was too self-confi- 
dent, too impulsive and opinionated. In him the 
active temperament was disproportioned to the med- 
itative. Now,-all these qualities, if held in due sub- 
jection, were indispensable to one who was to be a 
great reformer,.one who was destined to meet so 
signally the opposition of the Jews, and to be the 
first of the Abrahamic race to disregard the exclu- 
siveness of Judaism, and publish to the Gentiles the 
offer of eternal life. 

But these qualities were then in excess. They 
needed to be moderated and disciplined, lest some- 
times they might betray him into extravagancies, 
inconsistencies, and other mistakes, which would be 
seriously detrimental to the momentous interests 
which were about to be intrusted to him. He was, 
therefore, as we think, allowed, under demoniacal 
influences, to do that which would prove an efficient 
restraint and control over his objectionable charac- 
teristics, and bring into full activity all the requisite 
and noble qualities of a great reformer. He was 
allowed to do that which, to the latest hours of his 
life, taught him humility, and largely prepared him 
to be the consistent and sagacious apostle, the 
dauntless moral hero, which he afterward became. 
The remembrance of that deed of denial inspired 
him with invincible zeal, courage, and _ fortitude 


88 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


through all the privations and persecutions of his 
illustrious career as a minister of the Gospei of his 
thrice denied, but forgiving, Lord. The recollection 
of that mysterious hour of unfaithfulness sent him 
patiently and modestly through the most trying vicis- 
situdes. ‘‘Weall know,” says ‘‘Ecce Deus,” ‘‘what 
a strong man Peter became after his restoration; how 
he excelled all the New Testament writers in rich- 
ness of pathos, and how he rivaled even Paul in labor 
and catholicity. How could any other conceivable 
experience have done so much to correct his consti- 
tutional defects, to keep him constantly on his guard, 
and to prepare him for the fiery trials, desertion, 
hate, and misrepresentations he must encounter?” 
On that memorable occasion the Savior made a per- 
sonal address which was calculated to draw from 
Peter strong declarations of loyalty, fidelity, and 
heroism. It seems as if Christ were pondering a 
needed lesson and discipline, which he desired to fix 
indelibly in the heart of his most ardent apostle. 
He saw it necessary to allow the will of Peter to be 
so tempted by demoniacal spirits that he could not 
withstand their assaults. With the best and most 
benign ends in view, he suffered him then to be 
‘‘tempted above that he was able to bear.’’ Christ 
allows Satan to tempt to a certain degree all his fol- 
lowers, and it may be his procedure in many cases 
to allow him to tempt his chosen instruments as he 
allowed him to tempt the Apostle Peter. 

In that temptation, so soon to come upon Peter, 
Christ, as we view the transaction, did not make a 
way of escape, that he might be able to bear it. The 


APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. 89 


Omniscient Savior beheld in him thoughts, feelings, 
aspirations, and purposes indicative of much carnal- 
ity, and wholly inconsistent with his divinely ap- 
pointed life-work. Peter did not know himself as 
well as his Divine Master knew him. He thought 
he was true; he knew he wanted to be true and 
loyal and heroic. It is probable that his conception 
of the malignity of Satan and of his own entire help- 
lessness was not sufficiently vivid and permanent. 
His Divine Master saw that, after all he had done for 
him, there was a great discrepancy between his na- 
ture and the standard of the divine law. He also 
saw, what Peter could not see, the assaults which 
Satan then purposed to make upon him. Satan had 
ample reasons for supposing that Peter was to be a 
chosen instrument in the spiritual movement which 
Jesus was then so thoughtfully and anxiously inau- 
gurating. He therefore singled him out for special 
and varied temptations, resolving to do, as the Savior 
had declared he would do—sift him as wheat. By 
the defection of Peter and Judas, and still more by 
the crucifixion of Jesus, he hoped to break the grand 
center of the great religious movement then begin- 
ning to attract public attention. It was, as we have 
already suggested, to teach Peter lessons never to be 
forgotten, that Satanic influences were allowed to 
come in upon him like a flood, and that the AI- 
mighty Deliverer, who alone could raise up a stand- 
ard against the foe, declined, up to a certain point, 
to interpose in behalf of his chosen apostle. Christ 
could foreknow and foretell the act of denial, because 
he knew that Peter’s will would be so overborne by 


go THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


temptational influences that it would move as it was 
moved upon, and thus act, though consentingly, 
under unconscious constraint. 

But that act of denial, though objectively so 
heinous, was subjectively no more sinful than the 
sinful tempers, purposes, and affinities which Jesus 
then saw struggling for victory in the regenerated, but 
yet unsanctified, soul of Peter. Moreover, if Peter's 
nature was really as wicked, debased, unreliable, and 
ungrateful as his denial of Christ, accompanied with 
cursing, swearing, and lying, and preceded by such 
vehement protestations of personal bravery, sacrifice, 
and devotion, would seem to indicate, then he was 
wholly unqualified for the spiritual work, the holy 
mission, upon which he was so soon to enter. A 
nature so vile as Peter’s denial, objectively consid- 
ered, would suggest and necessitate, could have had 
no affinities for the precepts, the high spiritualities 
and purposes, of the new kingdom of righteousness, 
which in no sense was to be of this world. But it 
is preposterous to affirm that Peter’s moral nature 
was as hard, as impervious to divine light, as indif- 
ferent to the wishes of the Redeemer, and as obliv- 
ious to all the high motives and objects of the Gos- 
pel of salvation, as that act of betrayal, objectively 
considered, implies, If such was his real nature, he 
certainly was, morally, the most unfit instrument 
conceivable for apostleship and leadership in the 
holiest and grandest movement of the entire moral 
universe. We are driven, then, to suppose that his 
nature and moral condition were really better than 
his denial and profanity and duplicity would naturally 


APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. gt 


indicate. And if his soul was less wicked and de- 
based than his conduct suggests, then that denial of 
his Master must have been under such an undue 
amount of Satanic influence, under such mitigating 
circumstances, as essentially lessened the heinous- 
ness of its moral character in the eyes of him who 
sees all things as they really are. 

Dr. Goulburn, one of the most spiritual of liv- 
ing divines in the Church of England, referring to 
the case of Peter, says, ‘‘It was merely a tornado 
of temptation, that for a moment shook his stead- 
fastness. It was not a deliberate, maliceful sin. And 
out of Peter’s relapse God brought a burst of pen- 
itent love and persistent zeal which gave him a pow- 
erful forward impulse in his glorious mission for 
life.” It was very soon after this occasion that Pe- 
ter threw himself into the water, and waded to the 
shore to meet his Divine Master. After that im- 
pressive interview, the particulars of which it would 
be so interesting to know, Jesus thrice repeated his 
inquiry, ‘‘Lovest thou me?” How meekly and con- 
siderately does he, who but recently had been so 
bold and vehement, reply, ‘‘Thou knowest that I 
love thee.” ‘‘Peter,’’ says Dr. Woolsey, ‘‘was not 
destined to be cut off by his deplorable sin, but, in- 
stead thereof, to be converted anew.’’ Charnock 
says, ‘‘Christ knew in what measure he would let 
loose Satan upon Peter, and how far he would leave 
the reins in Peter’s own hands, and the issue there- 
fore might be easily foreknown.”’ And if Peter was 
under an undue amount of Satanic suggestion and 
influence, then the Savior could foreknow his act, as 


g2 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


taking place consentingly, indeed, but under the law 
of constraint. The marked incongruity between the 
character of Peter, as estimated from his lying, pro- 
fanity, cowardice, and recreancy to all the great . 
issues then trembling in the balance, and the saintly 
work of preaching the Gospel of the grace of God 
for the purification of sinful souls, can not be ac- 
counted for, I think, save upon the theory here sug- 
gested. But the theory here advanced affords an ex- 
planation that is natural, reasonable, and profitable to 
contemplate. For, really, this case merely requires 
only a little more of that same temptational influ- 
ence, which Satan is actually allowed by God to 
bring to bear upon the souls of all men, in order to 
test their loyalty, instruct their faith and confirm 
their character in moral excellence. 

As the above explanation of the case of Peter 
may possibly collide with the reader’s prejudices and 
preconceptions, he may start objections thereto. 
But let him consider that we are compelled to furnish 
- such explanations of the facts recorded in the Holy 
Scriptures as will in no objectionable sense, morally 
or logically, make God the author or cause of sin, 
and such as will not compel us to locate the incipi- 
ency of disobedience and iniquity in his infinitely 
holy heart. But whatever objection to this explana- 
tion of Christ’s prevision of the fall of Peter may 
occur to any reader, it must at least be regarded as 
unobjectionable and as plausible in itself, as the fol- 
lowing statement found upon the pages of unerring 
inspiration: ‘‘I saw the Lord sitting on his throne, 
and all the host of heaven standing by him, on his 


APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. 93 


right hand and on his left. And the Lord said, 
Who shall persuade, or who shall deceive Ahab, 
that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead? And 
one said on this manner, and another said on that 
manner. And there came forth a spirit, and stood 
before the Lord, and said, I will persuade or deceive 
him. And the Lord said unto him, Wherewith? 
I will go forth and I will be a lying spirit in the 
mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt 
persuade him and prevail also. Go forth and do so. 
Now, therefore, behold the Lord hath put a lying 
spirit into the mouth of all these thy prophets, and 
the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee.”’ 

We find in the history of Job another chapter on 
the divine use of Satan, in the education of spiritual 
teachers for the race. Job stands forth in the Scrip- 
tures as a great example, for all times, of patience 
and confiding trust. And that he might .be such an 
example, the Lord gave to Satan full permission to 
blast and destroy all his possessions, explicitly, how- 
ever, restricting him as to assaults upon his person, 
and invasion of his spirit. ‘‘ All that Job hath is in 
thy power, only upon himself put not forth thine 
hands s 
‘‘God sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and 
the men of Shechem, and they dealt treacherously 
with Abimelech.” (Judg. ix, 23.) ‘‘The spirit of 
the Lord departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from 
thewLotdstermined him: -» (1 cam), xvi,.14;)> 7An 
evil spirit came from God upon Saul, and he prophe- 
Sletdeen (lm oa exVill, 10.) “lhe evil spirityicom 
the Lord was upon Saul, as he sat in his house with 

9 


94 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


his javelin in his hands.” (1 Sam. xix, 9.) “And 
his servants said unto him, Behold an evil spirit from 
God troubleth thee.’’ Such passages of Scripture 
become easily comprehensible in the light of the 
theory here suggested, specially when we remem- 
ber that Job declares that both ‘the deceived, and 
the deceivers are the Lord’s.”’ By the deceivers 
“he maketh judges fools, and leadeth counsellors 
away spoiled.” ‘‘The counsel of Ahithophel was as 
if a man had inquired at the oracle of God.” But 
“Absalom declared that the counsel of Hushai is 
better than the counsel of Abhithophel.” ‘‘But this 
was because the Lord had appointed to defeat the 
good counsel of Ahithophel to the intent that the 
Lord might bring evil upon Absalom.”” How mani- 
fest it is that human wills are, at times, placed under 
the law of constraint, and are used as instruments 
in the hands of God in carrying on his providential 
government. 


CAPER RNY 


THE CASE OF HAZAEL CONSIDERED. 


NE of the standing promises made to the Jews 
©) was temporal prosperity, as a reward for obe- 
dience. They were uniformly prosperous when they 
obeyed, and uniformly not prosperous when they 
disobeyed. In no instance did God dissolve the 
connection between obedience and temporal pros- 
perity, and between disobedience and national ad- 
versity. Though this providence is not true under 
the Gospel, it was true under the theocracy. When- 
ever, under that method of government, the people 
of God disobeyed, they were punished by temporal 
calamities. And for their signal: punishment it was 
necessary that instruments be used to do the provi- 
dential work of correction. 

In the tenth chapter of Second Kings we read: 
‘‘Jehu took no heed to walk in the way of the Lord 
God of Israel, with all his heart; for he departed not 
from the sins of Jeroboam which made Israel to sin. 
In those days the Lord began to cut Israel short 
[that is, as the margin reads, ‘Zo cut off the ends’|; 
and Hazael smote them in all the coasts of Israel; 
from Jordan eastward, all the land of Gilead, the 
Gadites, the Reubenites, and the Manassites; from 
Aroer, which is by the river Arnon, even Gilead and 
Bashan.” Here we have recorded the fulfillment of 

95 


96 TH FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


words previously uttered because of the signal dis- 
obedience of God’s people. That disobedience mer- 
ited severe punishment, and Hazael had been se- 
lected as the instrument for its infliction. Turning 
back to the eighth chapter we find that when Elisha 
met him, the prophet ‘‘settled his countenance 
steadfastly’? upon him and wept. “Why weepeth 
my lord?” inquired Hazael. ‘‘Because I know the 
evil thou shalt do unto the children of Israel. Their 
strongholds wilt thou set on fire, and their young 
men wilt thou slay with the sword,” etc. And Ha- 
zael said, ‘‘ But what, is thy servant a dog, that he 
should do this great thing.”” Elisha’s mind was fixed 
on the calamities so soon to come upon his brethren, 
the children of Israel, and the divine judgments so 
soon to fall on the whole Jewish Church. Ass he con- 
templated the desolations coming upon Zion he 
wept. He wept because the people of God had been 
so disobedient as to require so great a measure of 
the divine displeasure and of retribution. Had his 
mind been fixed upon the doings of Hazael, as origt- 
nating in his own perversity, there could have been 
no desire to weep. For a manly man to weep under 
such circumstances seems unnatural and_ unlikely. 
He would have felt, as would all great souls, indig- 
nation, an instinctive horror and condemnation in the 
presence of one whose nature would allow him to 
perpetrate such inhuman cruelties as the prophet 
foretold. While we do not doubt that, however 
wicked and mean may have been the nature of Ha- 
zael, he really thought himself utterly incapable of 
the barbarities enumerated by the prophet, and that 


THE CASE OF HAZAEL CONSIDERED. 97 


the very supposition that he could perpetrate such 
deeds outraged his self-esteem. Elisha, enlight- 
ened by the Spirit of God, saw his true nature and 
its tendencies better than he did himself. The 
prophet was thus enabled to comprehend his ambi- 
tious spirit, his feelings and purposes toward his 
Sovereign, his ability to execute them; also the con- 
ditions of power and of opportunity to gratify his 
ambition, into which his elevation to the throne would 
bring him; and, knowing these, could as well fore- 
know what he would do as we may know what a 
robber and a would-be murderer will do, with untold 
treasure luring him to crime. Hazael may have 
needed no constraint on the part of God, angel, or 
demon, but only the opportunity and the power to 
perpetrate all the horrors which were spoken of by 
the prophet. For aught we know, too, it may have 
been partly Hazael’s punishment for previous wick- 
edness that he should now be put in circumstances 
that would prompt or permit him to commit heinous 
offenses, barbarous cruelties, against a neighboring 
people. God used him as an instrument to do the 
needed work of chastisement. He used him just as 
he is using men to-day, in numberless instances, as 
the instruments of correction and instruction to the 
disobedient. The cruelties which he inflicted, bar- 
barous as they were, were perhaps not greater than 
the awful wickedness of Israel had provoked, and 
were due to his own nature and that of his people, 
but in no sense to the fact that God used him as an 
instrument of punishment. 

As to God’s mode of providential correction, 


98 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


confirmatory of the above teaching, Isaiah exclaims 
(x, 5): ‘‘O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and 
the staff in their hand is mine indignation. I will 
send him against a hypocritical nation, and against 
the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to 
take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread 
them down like the mire of the streets. Howbeit 
he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so.” 
And Jeremiah proclaims (li, 20), ‘‘Thou art my 
battle-ax and weapons of war: for with thee will I 
break in pieces the nations, and with thee will I de- 
stroy kingdoms, and render unto them all the evil 
they have done.”’ 

It is apparent, we think, that the dogma of fore- 
knowledge is not necessary to furnish a satisfactory 
explication of Elisha’s prophecy relative to Hazael’s 
future conduct. 


CHAPTER VII. 
THE CASE OF JUDAS ISCARIOT CONSIDERED. 


upas Iscariot, by his transgression, lost his un- 

speakable honor and privilege in the ministry 
and apostleship to which he had been called by Jesus 
Christ. In good faith the Lord put him into the 
Gospel ministry. He chose him because such was the 
character he then possessed that he promised a career 
of usefulness. The distinguished Mr. De Quincey 
says, ‘‘Christ chose Judas Iscariot because of his 
superior simplicity and unworldliness.”” In harmony 
with this view of the moral nature of Judas are the 
opinions of Dean Alford and of Neander, both of 
whom say that Judas became attached to our Lord 
with much the same views and feelings as the other 
apostles. And if his nature was in truth as accepta- 
ble and as richly endowed as was that of most of the 
apostles at the time he was chosen, it must have 
deteriorated subsequently. 

To affirm that Christ did not see in him a moral 
nature that would be likely to render him a success- 
ful herald of his new kingdom, is to charge upon 
him the doing of evil that good might come. In- 
deed, such a view would authorize his Church, by 
his example, to place unholy men in the Christian 
‘ministry. We can not, without impeaching the char- 
acter of Christ, assert that he selected Judas as one 

ee 


100 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


of his chosen disciples, bestowed upon him a dispen- 
sation of the ministry of the Word of Life, ordained 
him into the most sacred order of the apostles, and 
commissioned him as the herald of the divinest of 
messages, when at the same moment he knew that 
his nature was vile, and in no way fitted for that 
exalted station. 

If Christ had not sufficient grounds to hope and 
to expect that Judas would be a pious and success- 
ful minister; if he knew beforehand that Judas would 
certainly betray him—be it said with the profoundest 
reverence—then most assuredly, according to every 
rule given in the New Testament for the guidance of 
the Church in regard to putting men into the minis- 
try, he ought not to have chosen him; and, more- 
over, he did what no wise man ever would do: he 
selected an instrument, for a holy work, whom he 
knew to be utterly unworthy and thoroughly unpre- 
pared therefor. If he foresaw the conduct of Judas 
before he selected him as one of his disciples, the 
selection must be judged as inconsistent with frank- 
ness, candor, magnanimity, and benevolence. Indeed, 
if there be moral axioms, then it is morally axiomatic 
that our Lord ought not to have selected Judas, if 
he foreknew that he would certainly develop into the 
character and reach the ignominious end that he 
finally did. How in that case is it possible to im- 
agine that Jesus could suppose Judas would subserve 
the benign purpose which he himself had in view in 
selecting his apostles, namely, the carrying of the 
news of salvation to the ends of the earth? To say 
that the Redeemer selected him on purpose to do the 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED, 101 


infamous work of treachery and betrayal is not only 
blasphemous, but shocking to all our moral suscepti- 
bilities and repugnant to our intuitive sense of justice, 
wisdom, and fair dealing. It is easier and more rev- 
erential to deny that Jesus Christ then foreknew who 
would be the individual agent of his betrayal than to 
believe this monstrous proposition, that he selected 
Judas Iscariot to be one of his disciples, that he gave 
to him the most elevated and responsible calling ever 
bestowed upon any man, when at the same time he 
knew that the inmost nature of the man was depraved 
and devilish, that he would disgrace the ministry, 
defeat all plans for his usefulness, and make his name 
forever the synonym of meanness and treachery. 

But there was in truth no need of this betrayal 
which Judas perpetrated. It certainly was not nec- 
essary for the completeness of the atonement. It 
was not required by any of the exigencies of that 
momentous event. After the sin of Adam, the death 
of Christ was foreordained to come to pass. The 
Old Testament Scriptures abound in prophecies which 
had their fulfillment in his sufferings and death. 
These prophecies are frequently referred to by the 
New Testament writers. But the betrayal of our 
Lord by Judas Iscariot was never foretold in any of 
those ancient prophecies. 

It is very evident it was foreknown that the Mes- 
siah was to suffer, and to suffer violently, in mysteri- 
ous agony. But as Isaac was the type of Jesus, so 
Abraham was the type of God the Father. And 
could not the offering up of his dear Son, in agony 
and death, by the Father, for the sins of the whole 


102 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


world, meet all the requirements of a perfect atone- 
ment for human guilt? Could not this be accom- 
plished without the necessary co-operation of wicked 
men? Ifa violent death of the Messiah should be 
proved from the Scriptures to be necessary, could not 
the Redeemer, in his boundless resources, arrange for 
that death without involving an accountable creature 
in crimes in view of which we might well say, It 
were good for him not to have been born? All 
Scripture can be interpreted in consonance with the hy- 
pothesis that Jesus should die for the world, but that 
he should die because of an intolerable burden of an- 
guish. It is very evident that a few hours more of 
such dreadful suffering as he endured in Gethsemane 
would have resulted in his death. Neither Christ 
personally, nor the great atonement, needed the cru- 
elties of a heathen cross for their perfection or con- 
summation. The heinousness of sin might have ap- 
peared much more striking had it been allowed to do 
its own legitimate work on the life and body of the 
Son of God. The agonies of the crucifixion, produced 
by the bolts, the spikes, the crown of thorns, and the 
jeers of maddened enemies, did not illustrate, but 
they did obscure, the fathomless wickedness of. sin. 
Had the divine law, without any co-operation of 
wicked hands and of human depravity, been allowed to 
execute its sentence upon the sinless sufferer, to pros- 
trate him to the ground by that unspeakable agony, 
by that infinite mental anguish, which he necessarily 
must endure who is made an offering for the sin of 
the whole world; to protract that suffering until con- 
vulsions should seize the expiatory victim, grind his 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 103 


muscles, crush his nerves, overwhelm and derange all 
his bodily functions until his heart should actually 
break and burst, in illustration of the divine grief of 
the Almighty Father over the introduction of sin 
into his universe, and in divine sympathy for a lost 
and ruined. race, then how much darker would the 
nature of sin have appeared to unfallen intelligences, 
and how much more indispensable that an atonement 
should be made therefor, and how much more visible 
and impressive would have been the hand of God in 
offering up his son, as prefigured by Abraham at the 
proposed sacrifice of his son Isaac on Mt. Moriah! 
Why may it not have been God’s plan to offer up 
Jesus for the sins of the world himself? .Why may 
not his plan have been to allow the agonies con- 
sequent upon bearing the iniquity of the race to 
rupture the heart of the Redeemer, or to cause his 
blood to gush forth through all the pores of his 
sacred body, and thereby make ‘‘full and sufficient 
satisfaction and oblation for the sins of the whole 
world?’ These were the many things Christ had to 
suffer. ‘‘It is written of the Son of Man that he 
must suffer many things and be set at naught.”’ 
(Mark ix, 12.) 

The divine plan and arrangement may have been 
greatly interfered with by wicked men. ‘‘Thus it is 
written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer and 
toeenter into histelonal Wi(lukei xxiv.) to Por 
him hath God the Father sealed”’ and ‘‘sanctified.”’ 
(John vi, 27; x, 36.) ‘All things that are written by 
the prophets concerning the Son of Man shall be ac- 
complished.” 4 (Luke xviii, -31.).Said ‘Peter, “‘ Him 


104 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


being delivered by the determinate [that is, by the 
limiting or restricting] counsel and foreknowledge of 
God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have cru- 
cified and slain.’’ ‘‘Delivered,’’ but delivered unto 
what? Certainly not delivered to the cruelties of 
wicked men, but delivered up to die, not by cruci- 
fixion or execution of any kind at the hands of mur- 
derers, but to die according to the divinely purposed 
plan—a great offering for the sins of the whole world. 
“‘God hath glorified his son Jesus, whom ye deliv- 
ered up and denied in the presence of Pilate, when 
he was determined to let him go. But ye denied 
the: HolyOne .°... .\ and »killedsthe Princemer 
Life. :. 1°... “Butt theses things aithesesaagmamsas 
things which are essential to the atonement] which 
God before had showed by the mouth of all his 
prophets that Christ should suffer, he hath so ful- 
filled.”” (Acts iii, 13-18.) 

All those definite things which God had specifi- 
cally determined upon, as to the sufferings of Christ 
for sin, all those many things the Son of Man must suf- 
fer, he ‘‘so fulfilled;” fulfilled while allowing wicked 
men to take Christ, and to put him to ignominious 
death upon the Roman cross. In this way he over- 
ruled the wrath and wickedness of men, accomplish- 
ing, despite their malice, his great purpose of human 
redemption. They fulfilled the prophecies in con- 
demning Christ, when they fulfilled all that was spe- 
cifically written of him and to be accomplished 
by him in making atonement. (Acts xiii, 27, 29.) 
Dean Alford says, on Acts ii, 23, that the words 
‘determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God” 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 105 


must not be joined to the word delivered ‘as agents,” 
(as if the counsel and foreknowledge of God were 
coagents with wicked men in the crucifixion of 
Christ), because the dative case in which those words 
appear expresses the idea of accordance and appowt- 
ment, not of agency. The death of Christ was sol- 
emnly foreordained and fixed, but the instruments 
by whom he finally was put to death were by no 
means predestined. The expiatory victim was pre- 
pared and furnished in accordance with the deter- 
minate counsel and foreknowledge of God. Christ 
was delivered to die for the world, not by wicked 
men but according to the fore-appointment of God. 
But contrary to God’s purposes and desires, wicked 
men shamefully and wickedly nailed him to a Roman 
cross. 

Peter says (Acts iv, 27), ‘‘Of a truth, against thy 
holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both 
Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the 
people of Israel, were gathered together to do what- 
soever [as many things, as much as] thy hand [thy 
power] and thy counsel [thy wisdom] determined 
[marked out] before to be done.’”” God had _pro- 
vided a Savior to die for the world; wicked men, in 
their malice, accomplished his death. 

If God determined beforehand that these par- 
ticular persons should murder his son, how great the 
inconsistency of Christ, pouring out with his dying 
breath, ‘Father, forgive them, they know not what 
they do.” They were in that case only doing what 
they were set to do. St. Paul.openly alleges, from 
the Scriptures, that Christ must needs have suffered 


106 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


and-risen again. (Acts xvii, 3.) Moses and Elias 
‘‘appeared in glory, and spake of his decease which 
he should accomplish at Jerusalem.”’ (Luke ix, 31.) 
How clearly do these passages teach that the wicked- 
ness of the crucifixion, the way he did actually die, 
had not been predetermined by the Father. 

It is hard, indeed, to consider how any thing 
could be made more explicit. But you inquire, Do 
we not find definite prophecies made by Christ 
himself concerning the circumstances of his death? 
Yes; but they do not at all conflict with the denial 
of the foreknowledge of the free choices of account- 
able beings. It is said, for example, ‘‘He shall be 
delivered unto the Gentiles, and shall be mocked and 
spitefully entreated and spitted upon, and they shall 
scourge him and put him to death, and the third day 
he shall rise again.” (Luke xviii, 34.) ‘‘He taught 
his disciples, and said unto them, The Son of man 
is delivered into the hands of men, and they shall 
kill him.” (Mark ix, 31.) ‘‘While they abode in 
Galilee, Jesus said unto them, the Son of man shall 
be betrayed into the hands of men; and they shall 
kill him, and the third day he shall be raised again.” 
(Matt. xvii, 22.) ‘‘From that time forth began Jesus 
to show unto his disciples how that he must go unto 
Jerusalem, and suffer many things of the elders and 
chief priests and scribes, and be killed and be raised 
again the third day.”” (Matt. xvi, 21.) ‘‘And Jesus 
going up to Jerusalem took the twelve disciples apart 
in the way, and said unto them, Behold we go up to 
Jerusalem, and the -Son of man shall be betrayed 
unto the chief priests and unto the scribes, and they 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 107 


shall condemn him ¢o death, and shali deliver him to 
the Gentiles to mock and to scourge and to crucify 
him.” (Matt. xx, 17.) ‘‘ And they were in the way 
going up to Jerusalem, and Jesus went before them, 
and they were amazed, and as they followed they 
were afraid. And he took again the twelve, and 
began to tell them what things should happen unto 
him, saying, Behold we go up to Jerusalem, and the 
Son of man shall be delivered unto the chief priests 
and unto the scribes, and they shall condemn him to 
death, and sliall deliver him to the Gentiles, and they 
shall mock him and shall scourge him and shall spit 
upon him and shall kill him, and the third day he 
shall rise again.” (Mark x, 32.) The two men 
in shining garments at the sepulcher said to the dis- 
ciples, “‘He is not hére, he is risen; remember how 
he spake unto you when he was yet in Galilee, 
saying, The Son of man must be delivered into the 
hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and the third 
day rise again.” (Luke xxiv, 6.) 

Now, if any of these things had been mentioned 
or hinted in the Hebrew Scriptures, it is marvelous 
‘that none of the apostles had any idea of what 
Christ meant by these solemn and impressive declara- 
tions. They had acquaintance with the Old Testa- 
ment Scriptures; but not one of them, not even 
Peter, knew any thing of what Christ meant by these 
utterances. Luke expressly says, ‘‘They understood 
‘not this saying, and it was hid from them, that they 
‘perceived it not; and they feared to ask him of that 
tsaying.”’ (ix, 45; .also, : Mark~ ix, :32:) ~All these 
-utterances seemed deeply to affect Christ, and to be 


108 Tite FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


so made by him, as if to himself they were new, and 
unexpected and alarming developments. 

From the time of the promise of a Redeemer, 
Satan had been apprehensive of damage to his king- 
dom, whenever the long promised deliverer should 
appear. He seems always, therefore, to have watchea 
with anxiety any remarkable personage who appeared 
on the arena of Hebrew history. His diabolical 
plan, as is indicated, was first to induce every such 
being to commit some heinous sin, and if he suc- 
ceeded in that—as he did in the case of David—he 
could safely infer that he need not apprehend very 
much loss to his kingdom through the instrumen- 
tality of that one. But if all machinations to per- 
suade the individual in question to commit some great 
sin failed, the next plan appeats to have been to kill 
him, and thus to put him out of the way. Satan 
exemplified this in his treatment of Joseph. First, 
he tried hard to drive him to commit sin; and failing 
in that, he next tried to kill him. How hard also he 
tried, when Jesus had been forty days and nights 
fasting in the wilderness, to induce him to perpetrate 
some act of disobedience need not here be re- 
counted. But failing, signally, in all his diabolical 
attempts to lure Christ into sin, his next recourse, 
according to his custom, was to plot for his death. 
Jesus knew the past history of Satan’s enterprises, 
and was well acquainted with all his oblique tactics, 
even when turning himself into an ‘‘angel of light.” 
He saw his dark and settled purposes. He saw him 
mustering his malignant forces, and laying out his 
various and ingenious plans. He knew his great 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 10g 


influence over priests, scribes, rulers, and Gentiles. 
And from the marked signs of the times, from indi- 
cations too manifest to be misread or misinterpreted, 
he could easily determine what Satan and his earthly 
emissaries were at that time contemplating; what 
they had in their hearts and were arranging to do 
relative to himself. When, therefore, it is said that 
the Son of Man must be delivered into the hands of 
wicked men and be crucified, it means that God 
would thus permit the modification of his own plan 
as to what kind of a death his son should die for 
the consummation of the long promised atonement. 
The event which was then pending, and which must 
be brought about, was the accomplishment of a uni- 
versal atonement by the suffering of the Son of God. 
The peculiar mode and circumstances of his suffering 
were matters purely contingent and non-essential. 
God merely did in this case as he has done times 
without number, and is now doing in many _ in- 
stances: he turned the great wickedness of men 
and the diabolical designs of Satan to the carrying 
out of his own great purposes of redeeming mercy. 
He readjusted his own plan for the accomplishment 
of the atonement in order to overrule the wicked 
choices and violence of depraved men and of lost 
spirits. He determined to allow sinful men to have 
their own way with his own dearSon; to yield him 
up to their wicked purposes, and yet to safeguard all 
the essentials of the scheme of atonement. Christ 
saw the purposes which free spirits had formed in 
their malignity, and to these purposes he calmly sub- 


mitted himself. ‘‘I lay down my life of myself, no 
10 


110 TH FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


man taketh it from me. I have power to lay it down, 
and I have power to take it again.” 

But was there no avoidability on the part of the 
Jews and of the Gentiles in this great wickedness, 
which finally culminated in the crucifixion of the 
Son of God? Most assuredly. All those wicked 
men could have changed their wicked way of think- 
ing, feeling, speaking, and acting, and they could 
have embraced Christ the Savior, as easily as wicked 
men can do the same things to-day, and just as easily 
as did the penitent thief on the cross in his expir- 
ing moments. Many who were engaged in the 
diabolical plot, no doubt did repent, did withdraw, 
and thus saved themselves from eternal death. But 
where then, you inquire, would have been all those 
prophecies which Christ utterec as to his final cruct- 
fixion in the particulars of his humiliation? My an- 
swer is ready: Just where the prophecies of God 
were as to the destruction of the city of Nineveh. 

“Arise,” said God to Jonah, ‘‘and go unto Nin- 
eveh, that great city, and preach unto it the preach- 
ing I bid thee,” namely, ‘‘ Yet forty days and Nin- 
eveh shall be overthrown.” No prophecy could be 
more explicit, the event is specified and the time is 
fixed. But Nineveh was not overthrown. There- 
fore God foreknew that it would not be overthrown, 
if foreknowledge be true. But God did make Jonah 
believe that it was his settled determination to destroy 
that city in forty days, and that they who wished 
to save their lives must speedily forsake the doomed 
place, and that those who desired the salvation of the 
Lord must immediately repent of their sins. But 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. Ill 


if God made such impressions and wrought such 
convictions in the mind of Jonah, were these false 
as to his purposes, and was there double dealing in 
his conduct toward an accountable creature? To 
affirm this is to be guilty of blasphemous imputa- 
tions against the moral character of God. 

In order, therefore, to avoid such troublesome 
consequences, we are compelled to admit that it was 
really the determination of God to overthrow that 
wicked city within forty days. This fact he fully 
revealed, that all who would might save themselves 
from destruction. But this settled purpose was 
actually changed in view of the faith, repentance, 
and humiliation of all the inhabitants. ‘‘ When God 
saw their works, when he saw them, from the great- 
est of them even to the least of them, from the king 
down to the humblest subject, the whole city sitting 
in sackcloth and in ashes, fasting and crying mightily 
unto God in prayer, and every one turning from his 
evil way, and from the violence that was in his 
hands, he repented of the evil that in good faith he 
had said he would do unto them, and he did it not.” 
The inspired prediction of the prophet Jonah was 
not fulfilled. This fact greatly displeased Jonah, 
and he urged in the presence of the Lord that his 
previous disobedience to the heavenly visions and 
instructions, and his flight toward Tarshish, were 
grounded in his apprehension that his prediction 
would ultimately fail of its fulfillment. ‘I know,” 
he exclaims, ‘‘thou art a gracious God, and merciful 
and slow to anger, and of great kindness, and re- 
pentest thee of evil. Take, therefore, I beseech 


112 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


thee, my life from me, for it is better for me to die 


ie] 


than to live.”’ But with what condescending tender- 
ness did God expostulate with him: ‘‘ Thou hast had 
pity on the gourd, for which thou hast not labored, 
neither madest it grow; which came up ina night, 
and perished in a night: and should not I spare 
Nineveh, that great city, wherein are sixscore thou- 
sand persons, that can not discern between their 
right and their left hand, and also much cattle ?” 
That is, do not the circumstances justify me in 
changing my purposes as to that city? Thus this 
remarkable prophecy relative to Nineveh failed to be 
fulfilled. And, in like manner, why may not the 
prophecies spoken by Jesus have failed if wicked 
men had as sincerely repented of their murderous 
purposes toward him? So also all the predictions 
of God’s prophets were real predictions, but in many 
cases they could be averted by repentance, prayer, 
and faith. And why might not the prophecies of 
Christ, as to the incidents of his betrayal and subse- 
quent treatment, have also been recalled had wicked 
men repented of their wicked purposes and turned 
from their wickedness? Surely, such an event was 
not only possible in itself, but one which Christ did 
most earnestly desire; for he has not pleasure, but 
sorrow only, over the violation of God’s law, over. 
sinful practices and unholy lives. The betrayal of 
Christ could not, then, have been in the original plan 
of God in making the atonement for sin. 

The Savior said of himself (Matt. xxvi, 24), ‘“The 
Son of man goeth as it is written of him [or, as Luke 
expresses it, ‘‘as it was determined of him” |; but 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 1178 


woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is 
betrayed! it had been good for that man if he had 
not been born.”’ Now, consider the bearing of this 
last declaration of the Savior concerning his betrayal, 
in the light of the theory that the treachery of Judas 
was necessary to the death of Jesus and the consum- 
mation of the atonement. The death of Jesus being 
not only foreknown but foreordained, then, if the 
betrayal by Judas was necessary to that death, that 
betrayal itself must have been foreordained likewise. 
How, then, could it have been better for Judas never 
to have been born? That could be true for no other 
possible reason than that by his betraying: his Lord 
he incurred the divine displeasure and condemnation. 
But if that act was necessary to the consummation 
of the atonement, and was therefore foreordained, we 
are driven to the blasphemous conclusion that God 
holds a man guilty and damnable for an act that was 
foreordained as necessary to the fulfillment of his 
own purposes. We thus demonstrate that the instru- 
ments of the Savior’s death, the wicked human agen- 
cies involved therein, were all needless. Their doings 
were all as completely contingent and avoidable as 
any sins ever were.’ The theory that the betrayal 
was in the original plan involves the supposition that 
God can do evil that good may come, that Christ 
was hypocritical in his treatment of Judas and in his 
utterances to and concerning him. This supposition 
is so monstrous that any theory which involves it 
must be repugnant to the moral consciousness of 
mankind. 

‘©The words that I speak unto you are spirit and 


[14 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


are life. But there are some of you that believe not. 
For Jesus knew from the beginning who they were 
that believed not, and who should betray him.” 
(John vi, 63, 64.) Was the unbelief of those indi- 
viduals foreordained? Certainly not. Their unbe- 
lief was through their own volitions. It is not said 
_ that Jesus knew from the beginning who they were 
that would not believe, but ‘‘who they were that 
believed not.”? But the words, ‘‘who they were who 


b) 


would not in the future believe,” are required for 
this text, in order to make it lend support to the 
theory of absolute divine foreknowledge. The be- 
ginning spoken of in the text could only date back 
to the incipiency of the unbelief in the minds of 
his disciples. The term ‘‘beginning’’ must have a 
definite signification, and in that connection this is 
the only pertinent signification. In speaking of 
divorces Christ said, ‘‘From the beginning it was 


” 


not so;”? meaning from the beginning of the mar- 
riage institution. ‘‘They who were eye-witnesses 
from the beginning delivered unto us,’”’ says Luke. 
And so Christ knew the unbelief of the persons re- 
ferred to from the beginning—as soon as they began 
to doubt, or failed to believe, but not before. And if 
he knew from the beginning who believed not, who 
received not the life and spirit of his teachings, in 
like manner he knew who of the number should be- 
tray him: he knew him as soon as the conception of 
the crime was first entertained. He discovered the 
treachery in its incipiency. The betrayal did not 
proceed from foreordination, nor from a constraint to 
fulfill prophecy, but from an immediately preceding 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 115 


unbelief, vitiating the character, corrupting the na- 
ture, weakening the will, and preparing it for that 
fearful deed. Such rapid demoralization of a once 
noble nature, going on in full view of Christ, was am- 
ple ground for inferential knowledge respecting that 
particular individual among the small number of the 
disciples who should betray him. Jesus was a dis- 
cerner of all hearts and the intents of all hearts. The 
act of Judas was, we claim, neither foretold nor fore- 
known prior to the formation of his purpose to 
betray his Divine Master. When that purpose was 
forming in the heart of Judas the Omniscient Savior 
discerned it, and when it was actually formed he 
both knew and foretold its consummation, but not 
before. If Christ knew all the time, from the mo- 
ment that he commissioned Judas, that he was going 
to betray him to his foes, might we not suppose that 
he would have given some slight intimation of it to 
some of his friends much earlier than he did; and 
that he would also have provided himself against 
such a catastrophe according to the instinctive laws 
of self-preservation? And why did he not magnani- 
-mously rescue a poor erring mortal from temptations 
he knew he would certainly succumb to? -Luke says 
(Acts i, 25) ‘‘that Judas lost his ministry and apos- 
tleship by transgression.”’ In good faith he had been 
put into the ministry by Jesus Christ. ‘‘He was 
numbered with us, and obtained part of this minis- 
inves eesayoobéters: & Lite disciples prayedsit “bhou, 
who knowest the hearts of all men, show whether of 
these two thou hast chosen, that he may take part 
of this apostleship, from which Judas by transgres- 


116 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


sion fell.”’ We conclude, from a careful study of the 
subject, that Christ chose Judas because at the time 
of choosing him the prospect was flattering that he 
would prove himself to be a successful man in dis- 
seminating the pure doctrines of his everlasting 
Gospel. 

When Jesus said, ‘‘ Will ye also go away?” and 
when Peter replied, ‘‘ We are sure thou art the Son 
of the living God,” Jesus answered, ‘‘ Have not I 
chosen you twelve, and one of you Is a devil ?” 
(John vi, 70.) This evidently is the language and 
exclamation of great surprise. And this implies that 
Christ. chose Judas in good faith, supposing him to 
be a good man. But Judas became a devil after his 
appointment as a disciple. For if Christ knew Judas 
to be a devil at the time he selected him to be one 
of his intimate friends and great embassadors, or if 
he then knew that he would certainly become a devil, 
Peter could have inquired, and pertinently enough, 
“Why, then, did you choose so unworthy an instru- 
ment, so ungenuine a man?” But Dean Alford re- 
marks on this passage that the translation of dzadbolos 
is much stronger than the facts will warrant; and 
this seems to be worthy of consideration, as this 
word is defined adversary, accuser, slanderer. In I 
Timothy iii, 11, it is translated slanderer, and in 2 
Timothy iii, 3, and Titus ii, 3, simply false accuser. 

A collation of the reports of the Last Supper 
shows the varied efforts of Jesus to deter Judas from 
the perpetration of his contemplated crime. And 
no Arminian, at least, can doubt that, up to the last 
moment in the tragedy, Christ did most sincerely 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED, 117 


desire that Judas should desist, and that Judas himself 
could have repented, changed his purpose, abandoned 
his folly, and snatched himself from eternal infamy. 
But if Christ knew from eternity that Judas would be- 
tray him, where was the consistency or the propriety 
of his earnest efforts to rescue him? ‘‘Even honest 
men,’’ says Cicero, ‘‘do not give their friends notice 
of impending misfortunes whicly they can not avoid 
or avert.”’ The prediction of an evil is only beneficial 
when we can point out some means of avoiding it. 

‘‘‘VhedPharisees) went ¢out,. and? held a-couneil 
against him, how they might destroy him. But when 
Jesus knew it he withdrew himself from thence.” 
(Matt. xii, 14.) This implies that Jesus did not know 
of this meeting before it was actually planned. We 
read (Matt. xxvi, 14-16): ‘‘Then one of the twelve, 
called Judas Iscariot, went unto the chief priests, and 
said unto them, What will ye give me, and I will de- 
liver him unto you? And they covenanted with him 
for thirty pieces of silver. And from that time he 


b) 


sought opportunity to betray him.”’ The chief priests 
and scribes and elders had consulted how that they 
might take Jesus by subtlety and kill him. ‘‘ Then 
entered Satan into Judas, surnamed Iscariot, being 
one of the twelve. And he went his way, and com- 
muned with the chief priests and captains, how he 
might betray him unto them. . . . And he prom- 
ised and sought opportunity to betray him unto them 
in the absence of the multitude.” (Luke xxii, 3, 4, 6.) 

And immediately after this Jesus announced to 
his disciples the sad and astounding fact that one 


of their brethren and fellow-apostles was about to 
IT 


118 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


betray him. ‘One of you,”’ said he, ‘‘who eateth 
with me, shall betray me.” ‘‘The hand of him who 
betrayeth me is with me on the table.” ‘‘ He that 
dippeth his hand with me in the dish, he shall betray 
me.’ That is, one of you has formed a purpose to 
betray me into the hands of my enemies. ‘And, 
supper being ended [rather, having begun], and the 
devil having now put it into the heart of Judas Iscar- 
jot, Simon’s son, to betray him,’ we are told that 
“Jesus was troubled in spirit, and testified and said, 
Verily, verily, I say unto you that one of you shall 
betray me.” (John xiii, 2, 21.) He then gave the 
sop to Judas, and ‘‘after the sop Satan entered into 
him.” Judas had voluntarily cherished the thought 
suggested to him by an evil spirit, and this had 


) 


paved the way for Satan to ‘‘enter into him:’’ other- 
wise the fiend never could have gained such an en- 
trance. He then deliberately went away to the chief 
priests, pondering that heartless and frightful villainy, 
and proposed to them to betray into their hands his 
Divine Lord and Master. He then planned how he 
might do it conveniently and successfully, in the 
absence of the people. 

This betrayal is the blackest spot on the blackest 
page of all human history. It is the most inexplicable 
of all historic problems. But there was no necessity 
for Judas to betray Christ.. He might have desisted 
from the treacherous deed had he so willed. Jesus did 
most earnestly deprecate the course he was then con- 
templating. He announced in various impressive forms 
the amazing fact that one of his chosen friends and 
associates was about to betray him: ‘‘Woe to that 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 11g 


man by whom the Son of man is betrayed.” ‘‘ Be- 
hold the hand of him that betrayeth me is with me on 
the table.” ‘‘Betrayest thou the Son of man with 
a kiss?” How could Christ pronounce these most 
solemn words, and put forth these earnest efforts to 
rescue Judas, in good faith, if at the same moment 
he was infallibly certain that he would, after all, 
basely betray him? To select a frail man, full of 
weaknesses and inherited moral imbecilities, for a 
mission for which he was wholly unfitted, and then 
to subject him to temptations which he knew he 
would not, as a matter of fact, manfully withstand, 
and yet to pursue him with earnest efforts to rescue 
him from the commission of the deed, seems to be 
so unnatural and shocking that it is almost unpar- 
donable to allude to it even as a possibility. 

The words so frequently used in the Scriptures, 
‘that it might be fulfilled,’ very often signify that 
we have here only another illustration of something 
uttered on a different occasion; or that the language 
of Scripture here finds a pertinent application; as we 
often say, in like cases, ‘‘The words of Shakespeare 
are thus fulfilled,’ or, ‘‘Here is another illustration 
of the saying so common among us,’ —recognizing 
at the same time that the event referred to is a mere 
coincidence. Dr. Nathaniel West writes: ‘‘Every- 
where through the Scriptures the catastrophes of 
later date are described in symbolical language drawn 
from the literal facts of earlier times. For example, 
Jeremiah describes the ruins of the Jewish state, 
under Nebuchadnezzar, in terms of Chaos: ‘I be- 
held, and, lo, the earth was without form and void, 


120 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


and the heavens, they had no light.’ Isaiah de- 
scribes it in terms of the Deluge: ‘The waters shall 
overflow your hiding-place.’ The language that 
describes the judgment on Jerusalem portrays the 
end of the present dispensation.’ Albert Barnes says 
that the phrase, ‘‘that it might be fulfilled,” some- 
times means, not that the passage was intended to 
apply to the particular thing or event spoken of, 
but that the words do aptly and appropriately ex- 
press the thing referred to, and may be applied to 
it. Dr. S. T. Bloomfield says that ‘‘ this Scriptural 
expression sometimes means that such a thing so 
happened that this or that passage would appear 
quite suitable or applicable to it.” Moses Stuart 
says that ‘‘the New Testament writers often use 
Old Testament phraseology, which originally was 
applied in a very different connection. And they 
do this because such phraseology expresses, in an 
apt and forcible manner, the thought which they 
desired. therf to convey.” 

We cite the following illustrative examples: 
Isaiah says, ‘‘And he said, Go and tell this people, 
Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye in- 
deed, but perceive not. Make the heart of this 
people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut 
their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear 
with their ears, and understand with their hearts, 
and convert, and be healed.” ‘‘This noted proph- 
ecy,” Observes Mr. Stuart, ‘‘about the blindness 
and obduracy of the Jews, had a true fulfillment be- 
fore the Babylonish captivity, but it was again ful- 
filled in the times of our Savior. But though he had 


) 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 127 


done,” says John (xii, 37-40), ‘‘so many miracles be- 
fore them, yet they believed not on him; that the say- 
ing of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled which he 
spake, Lord who hath believed our report? j 
Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias 
said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened 
their hearts; that they should not see with their 
eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be con- 
verted and I should heal them.’’ They believed not 
on the Savior, and the consequent blindness and 
obduracy, brought upon them as a punishment for 
(or as a result of) disobedience to known duty and 
truth, furnished’ but. another ilhistration ‘of that 
memorable case of divine displeasure spoken of by 
Isaiah, and with which the Jews were so familiar. 
And this instance of retributive blindness and hard- 
ness would be rendered the more impressive by 
associating it with an earlier and memorable example 
of the judgment of an offended deity coming upon 
a disobedient people. That is, what the prophet 
had said of the Jews of his day, Christ considered 
as applicable to them in his own times. ‘‘From 
the wicked,’’ says Job, ‘‘their light is withholden;”’ 
and ‘‘ For thou hast hid their heart from understand- 
ing.’ Light persistently rejected darkens the mind 
and lessens its susceptibility thereto. 7 
Scholars no longer question the frequent use, in an 
ecbatic sense, of the particle translated that; and, there- 
fore they very often translate the phrase under con- 
sideration ‘‘so was fulfilled,’’ or ‘‘thus was fulfilled.”’ 
This Greek particle often means so that or that merely. 
It is frequently used not as expressive of design or 


122 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


purpose, even when it refers to the most explicit of 
the prophecies. And therefore in Matt. ii, 23, we 
shouldfireadsa“iAnd he came and dwelt in a city 
called Nazareth, so that it was fulfilled which was 
spoken by the prophet, He shall be called a Naz- 
arene.” Matthew (ii, 14) says that Joseph ‘‘took 
the young child and his mother by night, and de- 
parted into Egypt; and was there until the death of 
Herod, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken 
of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Out of Egypt 
have I called my son.” But the Scripture to which 
Matthew here refers and quotes, has no reference 
whatever to Christ. Hosea (xi, 1) speaks simply 
of God calling his son out of Egypt. The end pro- 
posed by Joseph and the end accomplished by stay- 
ing in Egypt, were not the fulfillment of these 
words of Hosea, ‘‘When Israel was a child then I 
loved him and called my son out of Egypt.”’ 

Dr. Edward Robinson (Greek Lexicon of New 
Testament) says that this frequent phrase or a sim- 
ilar one is used as a formal quotation, and implies 
“that something took place, not 2 order that a 
prophecy might be fulfilled, but so chat it was ful- 
filled; not in order to make the event correspond to 
the prophecy, but so that the event would and did 
correspond to that prophecy. The phrase is often 
used to express historical or typical parallelisms.”’ 
He then gives a long list of passages in which this 
phrase must be so construed. For example, (cf 
I had not done among them the works which none 
other man did, they had not had sin; but now 
have they both seen and hated both me and my 


LHE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 122 


Father. But this cometh to pass that the word 
might be fulfilled that is written in their law, They 
hated? mer, without ay. causes 2 uC) ohntxvye249h254) 
But the Scripture to which reference is here made 
is Psalm xxxv, 19: ‘‘Neither let them wink with 
the eye that hate me without a cause.” Again 
(John xix, 36): ‘‘These things were done that the 
Scripture should be fulfilled, A bone of him shall not 
be broken.’’ The reference here is to Psalm xxxiv, 
I9, 20. ‘‘Many are the afflictions of the righteous, 
but the Lord delivereth him out of them all. He 
keepeth all his bones, not one of them is broken.” 
Again, ‘‘That the saying of Jesus might be fulfilled, 
which he spake, signifying what death he should 
die.”’ The reference here is to Matt. xx, 18. ‘‘ Be- 
hold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of man 
shall be betrayed unto the chief priests, and unto 
the scribes, and they shall condemn him to death 
and shall deliver him to the Gentiles to’ mock, and 
to scourge, and to crucify him.” And hence, John 
XViii, 32, cited above, should be rendered ‘‘so that 
was fulfilled the saying of Jesus.”’ 

After giving this list of quotations Dr. Robinson 
says that such passages place the ecbatic use of the 
phrase in question ‘‘ beyond any reasonable doubt.” 
He affirms too that ‘‘those Biblical critics, who in- 
sist on the telic sense of the word rendered that (wa) 
in all cases—that is, those who maintain that the 
later event was fixed and predestined and foreor- 
dained by the prophecy, to which reference was 
made—not only introduce a new element of inter- 
pretation, but also destroy the force of the language.”’ 


124 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


The zelc use of this word marks the final end or 
purpose, Zo the end that ox in order that. ‘The ecbatic 
use marks simply the event, the result, or upshot 
of an action, as expressed by the words so that or 
so as that. The telic use implies purpose, deter- 
mination, prediction, and foreordination, while the 
ecbatic use implies only consequence, parallelism, 
application, or mere illustration. The telic use of 
this particle corresponds exactly with the theory 
suggested in this book; namely, that the minds 
of prophets in uttering prophecy and the minds 
of instruments in fulfilling prophecies are placed, 
through supernatural agency, under the action of 
the law of cause and effect. When, therefore, the 
connection in the Scriptures requires the telic sense 
or force, then the phrase in question is to be trans- 
lated ‘‘in order that it might be fulfilled,” but not 
otherwise. 

This well established rule of interpretation helps 
to explain many Bible texts which have occasioned 
creat perplexity and incertitude to exegetical writers. 
Take, for example, the passage, ‘‘I know whom I 
have chosen: but that the Scripture may be fulfilled, 
He that eateth bread with me hath lifted up his 
heel against me.”” (John xiii, 18.) The Scripture to 
which reference is here made is Psalm xli, 9: ‘‘ Yea, 
mine own familiar friend, in whom I trusted, which 
did eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against 
me.”’ Christ here applies to Judas that which David 
had applied to Absalom. The case is so manifest 
that the particle in question, ¢#az, is not here used 
in a telic sense that Albert Barnes says, ‘‘It is diffi- 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 125 


cult to tell whether the text has any reference what- 
ever to Judas Iscariot. Dr. Robinson says that the 
particle translated ¢hat in this passage must evi- 
dently be taken in the ecbatic sense. And if the 
words ‘‘that it might be fulfilled,” in Matthew ii, 15, 
as already shown, refer to a text of Scripture, which 
undeniably and confessedly has no reference at all to 
Jesus Christ, we are allowed to assume, there being 
no reason to the contrary, also that in this text they 
refer to a passage of Holy Writ which may contain no 
prophetic reference to Judas Iscariot. The applica- 
tion of these words by the inspired writer to Judas, 
is no proof that he was referred to in the prophecy. 

Again, in the passage John xvii, 12, ‘‘ None of 
them is lost save the son of perdition, that the Scrip- 
tures might be fulfilled.”’ The phrase, ‘‘the son of 
perdition,’’ means one who has been given over to de- 
struction. The Scripture to which reference is here 
made is probably Psalm cix, 8, ‘‘ Let his days be few, 
and let another take his office”? Adam Clarke trans- 
lates the text under consideration, ‘‘The Scripture 
is thus fulfilled.” He also translates John xii, 38: 
‘“Thus the word of the Lord was fulfilled.” He 
says the Scripture thus fulfilled was spoken of the 
treachery of Ahithophel (Psalm xli, 9,) and the re- 
bellion of Absalom was illustrated in the treachery 
of Judas, and that ‘‘these Scriptures, though spoken 
of others, may be appropriately and forcibly applied 
-to him.” 
Jndas was not the effect of prediction, for the said 


He also remarks that ‘‘the treachery of 


prediction related to a different case; but as this 
instance was of the same nature with that of the 


126 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


other, to it the same Scriptures were applicable, and 
therefore were so applied.”” Dean Alford says, that 
‘‘these words were in the plural number, and referred 
to all the enemies of God and of righteousness, but 
were here applied to Judas Iscariot, he being of such 
a character in an eminent sense and degree. But 
the change here from the plural number to the sin- 
gular proves that John used the quotation in the 
ecbatic sense and not in the telic. John xiii, 18, 
therefore, in the light of this criticism, would read, 
if our English idiom be substituted for that of the 
Hebrew, ‘‘I speak not of you all; I know whom I 
have chosen; but thus is the Scripture fulfilled, He 
that eateth bread with me hath lifted up his heel 
against .me. i) sAnd (4Johir eewinalit2y would ges 
‘“‘Those thou. gavest me I have kept, and none 
of them is lost save the son of perdition. Thus 
the Scripture is fulfilled [or, again, illustrated]. Let 
his days be few, and let another take his office.”’ 

Again, take Matthew xxvii, g: ‘‘Then was ful- 
filled that which was spoken by Jeremy the prophet, 
saying, And they took thirty pieces of silver, the 
price of him that was valued, whom they of the 
children of Israel did value, and gave them for 
the potter’s field, as the Lord appointed me.’’* 


*The quotation here is from Zechariah (xi, 12, 13) and not 
from Jeremiah. But Meade, Bishop Kidder, and Hengstenberg 
think that Zechariah borrowed this statement from some prophecy 
that was current among the Jews, as being an original prediction 
of Jeremiah. The error of this reference to Jeremiah instead of 
Zechariah, Albert Barnes and Dr. Whedon think, was a mistake 
in transcribing. The custom was, in quoting an author, to put 
down in writing only a few of the first letters of the name of the 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 127 


“‘This quotation,” says Dean Alford, ‘‘is very dif- 
ferent from the Septuagint, and not much more like or 
in harmony with the Hebrew text.” ‘‘ For,” he says, 
“the principal point stated by Matthew—namely, the 
casting down of the money—is wanting in Zechariah, 
and Zechariah does not admit the subjoined state- 
ments made by Matthew.” Olshausen freely admits 
that ‘‘the immediate reference of this text is not in 
the least traceable to the person of the Messiah, and 
that there is only a very remote similarity between 
the two passages.’’ Albert Barnes says, that ‘‘the 
passage in Zechariah is not quoted literally, and by 
its being ‘fulfilled,’ can only be meant that the lan- 
suage used by Zechariah, on a somewhat similar 
occasion, would be applicable to and express very 
appropriately the events here narrated.”” We thus 
see that this passage of Holy Writ may naturally and 
fairly be interpreted to denote that the event described 
by Matthew was in accord with an Old Testament 
occurrence, and is thus interpreted in entire harmony 
with the theory respecting divine foreknowledge advo- 
cated in this book. And this interpretation has the 
support of the very best exegetical authority. 

Let us now examine another passage: ‘‘ They 
[the soldiers] said, therefore, among themselves, Let 
us not rend it [his ‘coat’], but cast lots whose it shall 


prophet referred to and in these two names in Greek, the first four 
letters are the same with the exception of the initial letters, and 
hence the mistake in transcribing would have been most easily 
made. Dr. R. Payne Smith, the present learned Dean of Canter- 
bury says, that Jeremiah’s name is here used as equivalent to the 
whole circle of the prophets, on account of the prominence as- 
cribed by the Jews to him among the prophets. 


128 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


be; that the Scripture might be fulfilled, which saith, 
They parted my garments among them, and for my 
vesture they did cast lots.” (John xix, .24.) The 
best commentators, says Dr. Bloomfield, are of 
opinion that the words in this text rendered, ‘‘ that 
the Scripture might be fulfilled,’’ mean, thus was ful- 
filled the Scripture; but they are not agreed, he adds, 
whether in Psalm xxii, 18, the clauses ‘‘they part 
my garments among them, and cast lots upon my. 
vesture,’’ were originally intended to refer to Christ 
or not. He says, ‘‘Most of the recent commenta- 
tors, however, think they were not so zztended, and 
they take these words to relate solely to King David 
and to events in the rebellion of his son Absalom. 
They think that they are only introduced here by 
way of application or accommodation to the present 
purpose.”” Adam Clarke remarks that ‘‘the thing 
so fell out that such a Scripture was exactly appli- 
cable to it.’’ ‘‘A secret disposal of Providence,” 
says Joseph Benson, ‘‘led them to a remarkable cor- 
respondence to the divine oracle.”’ ‘‘In the twenty- 
second Psalm, where this text is found,” says Dr. 
Tholuck, ‘‘David speaks ozly of his own sorrows.”’ 
De Wette regards the words as purely historical and 
not all prophetical. The subject of this Psalm, 
says Dr. J. W. Alexander, ‘‘is the deliverance of a 
righteous sufferer from his enemies, and is applicable 
to any of the class described. The speaker is an 
ideal person, but his words may be appropriated by 
any suffering believer, and by the whole suffering 
Church as they have been in all ages.” 

The passage in Psalm xxii, 16, ‘‘They pierced 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 129 


my hands and my feet,’? Dr. Alexander translates 
thus: ‘‘they surround my hands and my feet [that 
is, the instruments of my defense or of my flight] as a 
lion would; or they have wounded my hands and my 
feet as a lion would.”” He concedes that there is no 
sacred or classical evidence whatever that it was the 
custom in crucifying to nail the hands and feet both. 
None of the evangelists quote the words, ‘‘they 
pierced my hands and my feet.’’ Lange says that 
‘in the Orient the dogs, which were half wild, roved 
around in troops, and attacked travelers; and it is 
characteristic of them, that they are accustomed to 
first gnaw off the flesh of the hands, feet, and head.” 
Alford says, ‘‘By law the garments of the executed 
were the perquisites of the soldiers on duty.” We 
thus see that the best critics deny to this Psalm any 
prophetic allusion to the events of the crucifixion. 
But the text of Scripture which, at first sight, 
seems most inconsistent with the theory here pre- 
sented respecting the foreknowledge of God is found 
in Acts i, 16: ‘‘Men and brethren, this Scripture 
must needs have been fulfilled, which the Holy 
Spirit, by the mouth of David, spake before con- 
cerning Judas, who was guide to them that took 
Jesus.” The Scriptures to which he refers as being 
fulfilled are found in the twentieth verse: ‘‘Let his 
habitation be desolate, and let no man dwell therein; 
and his bishopric let another take.”’ These Scriptures 
are quoted from Psalm Ixix, 25: ‘‘Let their habita- 
tion be desolate; and let none dwell in their tents;” 
and from Psalm cix, 8: ‘‘Let his days be few, and 
let another take his office.”” Now there is not the 


130 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


slightest indication in the Old Testament that these 
passages were originally spoken of Judas, or that they 
had any reference to him., Matthew says, ‘‘ They 
were in Egypt till the death of Herod, that it might 
be fulfilled which was spoken by the Lord, saying: 
“Out of Egypt have I called my son.” We have 
shown that the Scripture to which Matthew here re- 
fers had no reference to Jesus Christ, and there is no 
more evidence that these texts quoted by Peter in the 
passage before us had original reference to Judas Is- 
cariot. Lange says, ‘‘ Peter does not assert that Da- 
vid distinctly or consciously referred to Judas in these 
Psalms.’’ The second verse preceding the one Peter 
here cites (Psalm Ixix, 23), Paul quotes (Romans xi, 
10,) as applicable to the unbelieving Jews in general: 
‘“‘Let their eyes be darkened, that they may not 
see.”’ Peter, in his quotation, changes that which 
had been spoken in the plural number of the enemies 
of God in general into the singular number, thus ap- 
plying to a particular case that statement which had 
been made relative to many or to a specified class. 
Dr. Bloomfield says that ‘‘most of the recent 
commentators decide, that what is here quoted 
from David, and which was spoken by’ him of his 
treacherous companions, is applied by Peter to Ju- 
das by way of accommodation, on account of the 
marked coincidences between the two cases.”’ ‘‘ They 
therefore think,” he says, ‘‘that the words ‘must 
needs: be fulfilled’ should be construed with the 
words ‘concerning Judas’’’—that is, the Scripture 
spoken by David must be fulfilled in regard to Judas. 
The Greek word, which in the text before us is 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 131 


rendered szust needs, is translated in a large majority 
of passages by the single word must. For example, 
“Tl must abide in thy house;” ‘‘Thou szust be brought 
before Cesar; ‘‘He must increase; ‘‘Ye must be 
born again;” ‘‘We must through tribulation enter ;”’ 
~The multitude must come together; ‘‘The things 
he must suffer for my sake; ‘‘The passover must be 
killed; ‘‘A bishop must be the husband of one 
wife.”” We thus see that the English word needs 
ought to be dropped from the translation of the text 
now under consideration, there being nothing in the 
original answering to it. The preposition rendered 
‘‘concerning”’ (zep:) is often translated in relation 
to, in reference to, as to, in -respect! of, or, in’ the 
case of. If, then, we adopt one of these render- 
ings in the passage under examination, and if we 


y 


drop the superfluous word ‘‘needs,’”’ and complete 
the paragraph without bringing in the parenthesis 
contained in the eighteenth and nineteenth verses— 
which the best expositors agree, says Dr. Bloom- 
field, was introduced by Luke, and not spoken by 
Peter—we have the following translation of this pas- 
sage: ‘‘Men and brethren, this Scripture, which the 
Holy Ghost spake before, by the mouth of David, 
must have been fulfilled in the case of Judas, who was 
euide to those that took Jesus, because he was num- 
bered with us and had obtained part of this min- 
istry. For it is written, in the Book of Psalms, Let 
his habitation be desolate, let no man dwell therein, 
and his bishopric let another take.’’ Peter here 
means, that these Holy Scriptures, with which those 
whom he addressed had been so familiar from their 


132 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


youth, were illustrated and fulfilled or acted out, in 
the treachery of Judas Iscariot. That is, as Judas had 
proved himself to be unworthy the Gospel ministry, 
and of the holy apostleship, and had illustrated the 
terrible punishment certain to follow disobedience, 
and the abuse of distinguished privileges, and had 
now, by suicide, gone to his own place, it was now 
the solemn duty of the remaining eleven to select 
some one to take that part of this ministry which 
had been so graciously proffered to their once cher- 
ished but now fallen brother. The inspired Psalmist 
spoke of the enemies of God in general, and of the 
jadgments which God’s providence was certain to 
bring upon them—especially upon those who were 
pre-eminent in their enmity and wickedness. Judas 
was of this number. The Scripture cited was espe- 
cially applicable to him: it was aimed at men of his 
type. It was needful, therefore, that that Scripture 
should have complete fulfillment in his history, and 
in the proceedings of the Church in reference to him. 

This exegesis relieves this troublesome text of 
all the absurdities which King James’s translation 
logically suggests, and gives to it not only consist- 
ency and sound sense, but likewise marked ap- 
propriateness to the case in hand. Moreover this 
exegesis is pronounced to be correct and amply 
sustained by the original Greek by our highest acces- 
sible living authorities. We thus fail to find a single 
prophetic utterance that predicts the treachery of 
Judas Iscariot, or that makes any allusion to him, as 
being the one who would eventually betray into the 
hands of wicked men to be crucified the long prom- 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 133 


ised Redeemer. And there is no evidence that Jesus 
himself recognized any prediction in the Old Testa- 
ment, of the wickedness of any one upon whom he had 
so solemnly conferred the divine right of apostleship. 

In Gethsemane Jesus fell upon the ground, and 
prayed, if possible, that that hour might pass from 
him. «“*Q my Father,)’ he exclaimed, “‘if iti be: pos- 
sible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless, not 
asi irwall,)but-as® thou’ wilt./25\¢*Abba;! Father, ‘all 
things are possible unto thee; take away this cup 
from me: nevertheless, not what I will, but what 
thou wilt.” ‘‘O my Father, if this cup may not pass 
away from me, except I drink it, thy will be done.” 

Of these supplications, of these mysterious prayers, 
poured forth by our suffering Lord in the garden, no 
explanation has ever been presented that does not 
strike every thinker as unsatisfactory. The explana- 
tions have suggested greater difficulties than the 
mystery to be elucidated. Nor does it appear how 
these supplications of our Lord can be explained, or 
even justified, save on the hypothesis that the mode 
of his death, as originally arranged, had been inter- 
fered with by wicked men, and given up. In these 
prayers Christ had something definitely before his 
mind, something appallingly dreadful. That he 
prayed to be excused, or rescued from going on to 
make an atonement for the world, is impossible. 
Even though his sorrows were greater than his 
strength, even though they did open up before him, 
as Dr. Whedon concludes, a true and just fear of 
complete catastrophe and failure, he could not desire 


relief from the hour, the scene, the tragedy, which 
12 


134 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


realized the grand purpose of conspiring providences 
and of conspiring centuries. However narrow the 
pass of danger through which he trod on his way to 
the achievement of human redemption, he could not 
pray for the slightest variation from any thing that 
was essential in the programme which God had pub- 
lished and pledged to a deeply interested moral uni- 
verse. All prophecies must be falsified should he 
fail to die for the race. All beholders in heavenly 
worlds would have been filled with astonishment at 
such a spectacle. Millions had been saved under 
the departing dispensation, through faith in a prom- 
ised Redeemer, and had passed up to their inherit- 
ance through the merit of that atonement which 
Jesus was then about actually to consummate, And 
that he should falter in this climax of responsibility 
and in this crisis of redemption, or that he should 
pray for permission to withdraw from the dreaded 
conflict with the powers of darkness, or to be released 
from making the great atonement for mankind, are 
all suppositions too derogatory to the character of 
Jesus the Christ for a moment’s consideration. 

We must distinguish between the possibility of 
the Redeemer’s failure in the work of redeeming the 
world, and a desire or even a willingness on his part 
for such failure, so unsearchable in its results. And 
we must ever bear in mind that without the con- 
sciousness of a possibility of sinning temptation 1s 
meaningless; and without temptation Jesus would not 
have been man. For what, then, could he have 
prayed? Paul charged upon the Jews that ‘they 
killed the Lord Jesus.”’ (1 Thess. ii, 15.) Peter said 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 135 


to them (Acts ili, 14, 15; v, 30): ‘‘Ye denied the 
Holy One and the Just, and desired a murderer to 
be granted unto you; and killed the Prince of life.” 
‘“The God of our fathers raised up Jesus, whom ye 
slew and hanged onatree.’’ Stephen said, ‘Of whom 
[the Just One] ye have been now the betrayers and 
murderers.’’ And Jesus himself said to those very 
priests who finally murdered him, ‘‘This is your 
hour, and the power of darkness.” These texts 
clearly favor the inference that the crucifixion was 
no part of the divinely conceived plan for the offer- 
ing up of the great sacrifice. And if this be so, 
then Jesus could properly and consistently enough 
pray for deliverence from subjection to the power 
and triumph of Satan and of human adversaries, and 
from the ignominy and tortures of the crucifixion; 
and all without in the least wavering in his fidelity 
or in his devotion to his voluntarily assumed obliga- 
tion of self-sacrifice for the sins of the world. He 
could pray for relief from all those sufferings which 
were not essential to the completion of the atone- 
ment; from all that array of demons, all that black- 
ness and darkness, and all those additional savage 
cruelties which he saw wicked men then contem- 
plating for him. This was the cup from which he so 
earnestly prayed for deliverance. 

What precisely had been the divinely contem- 
plated plan or mode of the final offering up of the 
sacrifice of the Son of God, we are nowhere informed. 
But doubtless it would have been entirely appropriate 
to the close of such a life, to the consummation of 
such a work, and in its details most suggestive and 


136 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


x, 


most impressive; and Christ must have often con- 
templated it with profoundest interest. Christ's in- 
troduction into the prophetic office occurred while 
standing, with Peter, James, and John, under the 
heavens opening over the memorable mount of trans- 
figuration, communing audibly with the illustrious 
dead, his face shining as the sun and his raiment 
white as the light. A voice out of that bright cloud 
that overshadowed them announced: ‘‘ This is my 
beloved Son. Hear ye him.” Christ’s entrance upon 
the regal office was heralded by the triumphs of his 
resurrection from the dead and his illustrious ascen- 
sion to heaven through rifted clouds, ‘‘spoiling prin- 
cipalities and powers, triumphing openly over them, 
leading captivity captive, and bestowing gifts upon 
And in like manner his induction into the 


) 


men. 
office of the everlasting priesthood would doubtless 
have been marked by such sublime manifestations as 
would have forever clicited the admiration of all 
obedient and devout minds. From all this he was 
snatched away, being basely and igrominiously cru- 
cified by wicked men upon a Roman cross. 

In support of this view, Paul says that none of 
the princes of this world knew the hidden wisdom, 
‘Cwhich God ordained before the world unto our 
glory; for had they known it, they would not have 
crucified the Lord of glory.” (1 Cor. ii, 7.) Sup- 
pose they had perceived that hidden wisdom, that 
hidden spiritual truth and power which God designed 
to bestow on the race through Jesus Christ; suppose 
they had gained some glimpses into the awful signif 
icance of that reality embodied and voiced in the 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 137 


atonement; suppose they had repented of their 
meditated wickedness, and halted in their murderous 
designs,— would the divine scheme of atonement 
have failed? Surely, the repentance of wicked men 
could not have prevented the consummation of the 
work of redemption. The crucifixion, therefore, 
could in no way be essential to the atonement, and 
hence no part of the original, divinely appointed 
plan for the offering up of the great sacrifice. That 
surely needed not the intervention of wicked hands 
and savage hearts for its consummation. Again, 
Paul says, ‘‘He became obedient unto death, even 
the death of the cross.’”’ (Phil. ii, 8.) To the atone- 
ment death was a necessity, and to this he willingly 
submitted himself. He even submitted himself to 
the humiliating and torturing death of the cross, to 
a death by terrible cruelties, and to a death insti- 
gated by his personal and malignant foes. 

Jesus calmly, fearlessly said to the Jews, revealing 
to them that he was then in possession of their pro- 
found secret to put him to death, ‘‘When ye have 
lifted up the Son of man, then ye shall know that I 
am he, and that I do nothing of myself, but as my 
father hath taught me I speak these things.’’ (John 
vill, 28.) Subsequently he exclaimed to the amazed 
multitude, ‘‘ Now shall the prince of this world be 
cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, 
will draw all men unto me. This he said signifying 
what death he should die.” And in John xviii, 32, 
we read, ‘‘ That the saying of Jesus might be fulfilled 
which he spake signifying what death he should die.”’ 
How clearly do these words imply the necessity of 


138 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


the death of Jesus as essential to the great atonement! 
But they imply just as strongly that the precise 
manner of that death was not essential to that satis- 
faction and oblation. They also demonstrate that 
the mode of offering up the great sacrifice, though 
definitely and gloriously planned, had not been z7vevo- 
cably determined upon. The form of expression “‘if 


’ 


I be lifted up I will draw all men unto me,”’ implies 
that a contingency still existed as to the mode of 
his death, dependent upon the free choices of free 
agents. The mode of the offering up of the great sac- 
rifice must have originally contemplated something of 
the temple and altar service. For there is no analogy 
whatever in the offering up of a lamb upon a holy, 
consecrated altar and a crucifixion upon a Roman 
cross. The change of mode in the divine plan for 
the great sacrifice was an inexpressible grief to Jesus.. 
And to this grief must be added the shrinkings of 
humanity from needless cruelties inflicted by malig- 
nant enemies. 

Having shown that the betrayal of Christ was no 
part of the foreordained work of atonement, and 
that no allusion is made in the Old Testament to 
Judas Iscariot, we submit that there is nothing in his 
case that is not in perfect harmony with a denial of 
universal prescience. But even if all the events of 
the betrayal by Judas and of the crucifixion by the 
Jews had been actually foretold as many believe 
they were, still the theory presented in these pages 
of God’s mode of governing wicked men and fallen 
angels would furnish an explanation, well-nigh as 
complete as the one which has just been presented 


THE CASE OF JUDAS CONSIDERED. 139 


for the consideration of theologians, and, in our judg- 
ment, a far more satisfactory one than is furnished 
by the generally received theory, that these events 
occurred without the exercise of any constraint by 
Divine Providence, and yet according to God’s abso- 
lute foreknowledge of them. And it is much easier 
for any unprejudiced mind to accept common sense 
interpretations of a book which was meant for the 
simple minded, and which ought to be taken and 
interpreted in the most simple and natural way, than 
it is to embrace assumptions that necessitate absurd- 
ities relative to eternity and moral government, that 
involve contradictory ideas of God and make the 
sublime institution of prayer either an inexplica- 
ble, disheartening mystery or a mere unprofitable 
ceremony. 


GHAPTER Vel? 


VARIOUS OTHER SCRIPTURES CONSIDERED. 


+ should ever be borne in mind that the scholars 
I who translated the Bible under King James were 
strongly Calvinistic. Their deep convictions of the 
truth of foreordination wrought an unconscious, but 
marked, influence upon their translations. ‘They, 
therefore, give in many cases a Calvinistic turn to 
their renderings, which the original, whether Greek 
or Hebrew, does not warrant. For example, we read 
in Acts ii, 47, ‘‘The Lord added to the Church 
daily such as should be saved.” The true rendering © 
is, The Lord added to the Church daily such as were 
being saved. ‘The translators uniformly translate ado- 
kimos by the word reprobate, intending to express the 
opposite of their notion of the term elect ; that is, to 
denote one who had been sovereignly passed by in the 
eternal decrees. But when Paul says (1 Cor. ix, 27), 
“T keep under my body and bring it into subjection, 
lest by any means, when I have preached to others, 


’ 


I myself should become adokimos,” they are careful 
to depart from their usual. custom in rendering this 
word. They evidently thought it impossible that 
Paul could be a reprobate in the sense which they 
had assigned to that term, and therefore, in this in- 
stance, translated it castaway. They translated He- 
brews vi, 4, ‘‘If they shall fall away, | aS athe 
140 


VARIOUS OTHER SCRIPTURES CONSIDERED. 141 


original word were in the future tense, whereas it is 
the aorist, and ought to be translated ‘‘have fallen 
away.” ‘“In- ascore of texts,’’\'says, Dr. Whedon, 
‘‘the future is translated shall in lieu of will.’’ But 
while no scholar will deny the statement here made, 
we admit that the translators were honest in the dis- 
charge of their responsible duties. The fact here 
adverted to should, however, never be overlooked in 
seeking the meaning intended by the Holy Ghost to 
be expressed in the sacred oracles. This point is 
especially important in a discussion so fundamental 
as the one now before us. For what believer in the 
freedom of the will has not been perplexed by the 
manifest teachings of our English translation, that 
the wickedness and treachery of Judas had all been 
foretold long before he had an existence, and that his 
deeds of darkness were but the fulfillment of ancient 
inspired prophecies? 

But how, it may be inquired, did Jesus foreknow 
that they would deliver his disciples up to the coun- 
cils, and scourge them in the synagogues? He fore- 
knew it because these outrages were then clearly 
conceived and determined upon by those in authority. 
‘“‘Ve shall be brought before governors and kings for 
my sake, for a testimony against them and the Gen- 
tiles.” (Matt. x, 18.) On the other hand, God may 
have determined that one of the numerous ways by 
which he would publish and vindicate his most impor- 
tant truth, should be the publicity of legal proceed- 
ings before his pronounced enemies. And to bring 
about any thing of this kind it would be only neces- 


sary to put the will of some of his inveterate 
oa 


142 - Tuk FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


opposers under the law of constraint, and at once th 
desired object would be accomplished. But whatever 
may be our.conclusions on this point, we can not 
doubt that the powers of evil, human and diabolic, 
would assuredly not fail to put the organized forces 
at their command in stern array against the Gospel 
of Christ and its heralds. Jesus said, ‘‘I came to 
send a sword upon the earth, not peace’’—that is, 
the utter repugnance of this world to my kingdom 
shall be exhibited, in the disregard of the strongest 
ties of instinctive affection. Even the unbelieving 
brother will deliver the believing brother to death, 
and the father his child. Could any thing exhibit 
more impressively than this the malignity of human 
depravity towards the ineffable doctrines and high 
spirituality of the religion of Jesus? By no other 
affirmation, perhaps, could he so deeply impress on 
the public mind the fact of the inveterate hostility 
and persecuting spirit of the unregenerate heart to- 
wards his person, his truth, and his followers. ‘The 
spirit of Jesus is as much of a sword on the earth as 
ever it was. 

“Know of a certainty that thy seed shall be a 
stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve 
them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years, 
and also that nation whom they shall serve will I 
judge; and afterwards shall they come out with great 
(Gen. xv, 13.) This prediction refers 
to nations and God’s providential purposes respect- 


a 


substance. 


ing them. Through nations God often illustrates 


moral and religious truth, with a view to impress it 
on the conscience of the world. For this reason, 


VARIOUS OTHER SCRIPTURES CONSIDERED. 143 


nations are often subjected to very varied experiences 
and vicissitudes. God desires that each nation and 
each individual that he brings into prominence should 
furnish the world some special lesson, and therefore he 
subjects them to adversity or bestows prosperity, as 
may be needful to the fulfillment of his plans. All 
this he can determine and bring about without fore- 
knowing the free choices of free beings acting under 
the law of liberty. The need and the benefit of dis- 
cipline by trial and suffering are by all admitted. 
“Tt is good for me that I have been afflicted,” says 
David. Temptation is essential to moral goodness 
and moral character. Nations, no less than individ- 
uals, need discipline and correction and punishment. 
And as God often uses one individual to test, de- 
velop, or punish another, so he has often used one 
nation to discipline and instruct another nation. In 
the kingdom of providence, as we have seen, God 
works all things after the counsel of his own will, 
and uses instruments of his own selection to accom- 
plish his plans. He has a just and perfect right to 
use both individuals and nations as he may deem best 
to subserve his providential designs. In order to do 
this the wills of the agents needed to accomplish 
his purposes are unconsciously led, or even, at 
times, put under the law of cause and effect, when 
he finds that to be necessary in order to secure the 
desired co-operation. If a nation becomes wicked 
he can justly use it effectually, even to its own in- 
jury and overthrow, in developing those qualities of 
character in another nation which are necessary to 
fit it to accomplish his providential designs. 


144 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE’ OF GOD. 


And this view of the subject throws much light 
on those passages of Scripture which, upon the hy- 
pothesis that the human will always acts under the 
law of freedom, are full of distressing perplexities. 
‘‘Thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not 
theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict 
them four hundred years.” (Gen. xv, 13.) ‘‘He 
turned their heart to hate his people, to deal subtilely 
with his servants.’ (Psalm cv, 25.) ‘‘I will stretch 
out my hand, and smite Egypt with all my won- 
ders which I will do in the midst thereof; and after 
that he will let you go. And I will give this people 
favor in the sight of the Egyptians; and it shall come 
to pass that when ye go, ye shall not go empty.” 
(Ex. iii, 20, 21.) ‘‘See that thou do all those wonders 
before Pharaoh, which I have put in thine hand; but 
I will harden his heart that he shall not let the people 
go.” (Ex. iv, 21.) ‘But Pharaoh shall not hearken 
unto you, that I may lay my hand upon Egypt, and 
bring forth mine armies, and my people the children 
of Israel, out of the land of Egypt by great judg- 
ments) (EX. ovVii,~ 4.),j:) 5 And .1in + very deco mags 
this cause have I raised thee up, for to shew in thee 
my power; and that my name may be declared 
throughout. all: the. earth.”’. (Ex. ix, 16.) “Ford 
have hardened his heart and the heart of his serv- 
ants, that I might show these my signs before him.” 
(Ex. x, 1.) ‘‘And the Lord hardened Pharaoh’s 
heart, so that he would not let the children of Israel 
go out of his land.” (Ex. xi, 10.) ‘‘The Lord 
showed signs and wonders, great and sore, upon 
Egypt, upon Pharaoh, and upon all his house- 


VARIOUS OTHER SCRIPTURES CONSIDERED, 145 


hold.”” (Deut. vi, 22.) ‘‘The Lord gave the people 
favor in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they 
lent them such things as they required.” (Ex. xii, 
36.) ‘‘But Sihon, king of Heshbon, would not let 
us pass by him: for the Lord thy God hardened his 
spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might 
deliver him into thy hand.” (Deut. ii, 30.) ‘‘Joshua 
made war a long time upon all those kings.”’ (Josh. 
xi, 18.) ‘‘For it was of the Lord to harden their 
hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, 
that he might destroy them utterly, and that they 
might have no favor.” (Josh. xi, 20) God took 
these methods to teach the world needful lessons 
concerning himself; such, for example, as that HE Is; 
that he is a rewarder of those who serve him; that 
he is a covenant-keeping God; that all may be 
taught by his dealings to discern between the right- 
eous and the wicked, between him that serveth God 
and him that serveth him not; and that no nation 
can be unjust with impunity. We can not divine 
all the particular lessons he may have designed to 
teach the world by these sovereign acts of provi- 
dence. We know not the measure of the wicked- 
ness of the people to whom he subjected his chosen 
race for their needed discipline, nor indeed are we. 
able to estimate with precision the wickedness and 
corruption of that race itself. We know that nations 
as well as individuals must be punished for sins, and 
as nations are not immortal they must be punished 
here. But all these Scriptures, which have been so 
harassing to Bible readers, seem easy of explanation 
the moment it is admitted that the human will may 


146 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


be placed under the law of cause and effect, and thus 
become a consenting instrument in the hands of God 
to accomplish his providential purposes. 

“Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Beth- 
saida! for if the mighty works which were done in 
you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would 
have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.”’ 
(Matt. xi, 21.) The question arises, Why were not 
these mighty works wrought also in Tyre and Sidon? 
Unless they would have been destructive of the free 
agency of the inhabitants of those cities, we think they 
would have been. For it seems evident to us that if 
these same works had been wrought there which 
were wrought for the Jews, the influences thereby 
brought to bear upon their sensibilities would have 
been out of proportion to the strength of their voli- 
tional powers, and the degree of self-determining 
force needed in a fair test of loyalty. And this 
would have defeated for them the very object of 
probation, which is, the manifestation of character, 
through unconstrained free choices, put forth under 
such temptations or limitations of perceptions as to 
test loyalty. But had those overpowering influences 
been exerted upon the people of Tyre and Sidon, 
putting their wills under the law of cause and effect, 
then Christ could be certain, and could speak with 
certainty, concerning the result; namely, their repent- 
ance in sackcloth and ashes. But what appeal could 
have been so stirring and rousing to the cities of 
Bethsaida and Chorazin as this: ‘‘Had the appeals 
which I make to you been made to Tyre and Sidon, 
they would have yielded and repented long since. 


i 


VARIOUS OTHER SCRIPTURES CONSIDERED. 147 


You are more perverse than they, and greater will 
be your punishment !”’ 

The expressions, ‘‘The Lamb slain from the 
foundation of the world”’ (Rev. xiii, 8), and ‘‘Ac- 
cording as he has chosen us [or as he chose us for 
himself | in him, before the foundation of the world” 
(Eph. i, 4), may by some be thought inconsistent 
with the views concerning foreknowledge which are 
here suggested. In 1 Peter i, 20, it is said concern- 
ing Christ, ‘‘ Who verily was foreknown [not, ‘was 
foreordained,”’ as in our English version] before the 
foundation of the world.” Christ as a Redeemer 
was, in God’s plan, without doubt foreknown from 
the very beginning of the universe. Without an 
arrangement for a Savior able to meet all possible 
future necessities God, in his goodness, could not 
consistently have created a race of free moral beings 
such as man. For, while man’s rewardableness is 
contingent upon his accountability, his accountability 
involves the possibility of his sinning; and that pos- 
sibility requires that a scheme of salvation, a SAVIOR, 
be provided in the divine plan. In contemplating 
the plan for this world, all future contingencies and 
possibilities were spread out before the divine mind. 
It was fitting, therefore, that God should make, and 
he did make, a complete scheme of salvation for all 
of the human race who might ever need it. With 
such a provision in his plan he made the world, and 
made man, even though the doing of this might cost 
what it has cost. The atonement for sin, through 
his Son, was provided for from the beginning, though 
not consummated until the ‘‘fullness of time” in the 


148 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


completion of the ages. When, to meet all contin- 
gencies, God arranged a scheme of salvation, he also 
“chose for himself’? all who through all the ages 
should be saved by it. We thus see that the ex- 
pression, ‘‘From before the foundation of the world,” 
as marking the time—though indefinitely—when the 
scheme of salvation was arranged in the divine mind, 
harmonizes readily and naturally with our views of 
the divine foreknowledge. 

“T know him [Abraham] that he will command 
his children and his household after him, and they 
shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and 
judgment; that the Lord may bring upon Abraham 
that which he hath spoken of him.”’ (Gen. xviii, 19.) 
This passage is properly translated thus: ‘‘And Je- 
hovah said, I have known Abraham [that is, I have 
come into intimate acquaintanceship with him] in 
order that he may command his sons and his house 
after him, and that they may keep the way of Jeho- 
vah, to do justice and judgment, in order that 
Jehovah may bring on Abraham what he spake in 
regard to him.” ‘‘ Known unto God are all his 
works, from the beginning of the world.” (Acts xv, 
18.) Most of these words are an interpolation, and 
do not belong to the Scriptures. Dean Alford, the 
representative of more modern criticism, declares 
them spurious, and retains only, as inspired, the 
words, ‘‘known from the beginning.’’ These few 
words should be joined to the preceding verse, thus: 
‘‘Saith the Lord who doeth all these things known 


> 


from the beginning’’—the things pertaining to the 


admission of the Gentiles to Gospel privileges. 


VARIOUS OTHER SCRIPTURES CONSIDERED. 149 


But, says one, does not Moses say (Deut. xxxi, 
29): ‘‘I know that after my death ye will utterly 
corrupt yourselves, and turn aside from the way 
which I have commanded you: and evil will befall 
you in the latter days; because ye will do evil in the 
sight of the Lord, to provoke him to anger through 
the work of your hands?” The Hebrew word which 
is here translated know is translated in other passages 
to look into, to examine, to consider, to mark, to un- 
derstand, to discover. The primary meaning of this 
Hebrew word is, to see with the eye; and the sec- 
ondary meaning is, to see mentally. By the olive 
leaf Noah ‘‘knew,’’ discovered, ‘‘that the waters 
had abated.” When he who appeared unto Manoah 
‘‘ascended in the flames from the altar,’”’ Manoah 
‘knew,’ discovered, that he was the angel of the 
Lord. When Saul cast a javelin at David, Jonathan 
‘knew,’ discovered, that it was determined by his 
father to kill David. ‘‘The Lord will send thunder 
and rain, that ye may perceive your great wicked- 
ness in asking a king.”’ ‘‘Thou shalt also consider 
in thy heart that, as a man chasteneth his son, so the 
Lord thy God chasteneth thee.”’ All the stupidity, 
perverseness, rebellion, and tendency to idolatry of 
which the Israelites had been guilty, rose up vividly 
before the mind of Moses. Their pertinacity in 
backsliding and wickedness, through all the terrible 
judgments of -heaven in the wilderness, created in 
his mind most painful impressions and gloomy fore- 
bodings. And as he was about to leave them he 
says to them, ‘‘I know thy rebellion and thy stiff 
neck; behold, while I am yet alive with you this day 


150 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


ye have been rebellious against the Lord, and how 
much more after my death?’ ‘‘I know [I perceive, 
there is no ground for doubt] that after my death ye 
will utterly corrupt yourselves.”” ‘‘I call heaven and 
earth to record this day against you that I have set 
before you life and death, blessing and cursing; 
therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed 
may live; . . . that thou mayest dwell in the 
land which the Lord swear unto thy fathers.” 

Moses was a man of great ability and compre- 
hensive views. He knew his people well, and, even 
unassisted by inspiration, he could judge accurately 
from the data in his possession that those who were 
so habituated to idolatry and rebellion would continue 
to be so inclined after his death. But he had also 
the light of inspiration, revealing to him more facts 
than he otherwise could have known, as the basis of 
his inference. From these manifest indications he 
could discover the strong probability of their con- 
tinued unfaithfulness, and of their punishments in 
consequence. Their future wickedness was cither 
determined by God or was to be the result of their 
own free choices. If their wickedness was fore- 
ordained, Moses was too wise and kind to distress 
them needlessly with predestined fatality. But if 
their wickedness was to be the result of their own 
free choices, they might stop at any point of their 
disobedience as easily as any sinner can stop at any — 
point on his way to the commission of crime. 

Christ, knowing his circumstances, the religious 
revolution he was inaugurating, and the feelings and 
purposes of his foes, foretold their disposition of him. 


VARIOUS OTHER SCRIPTURES CONSIDERED. 151 


But his enemies might have halted at any point in 
the tragedy, and at any step on the way to Calvary, 
and repented of their diabolism. Moses, knowing 
that the future of the children of Israel was not then 
a certainty, highly probable though it seemed, desired 
and labored to make that future what it ought to be, 
by showing them that it would be wholly within 
their own free choices; also by impressing upon them 
their own sinful affinities and rebellious tendencies, 
and by foretelling the terrible calamities certain to 
follow their free choice of wickedness. In this way 
he intended and hoped to preserve them in obedi- 
ence, and prevent those catastrophes which then to 
him seemed inevitable. His farewell address was 
designed and every way fitted to arrest their atten- 
tion, and to exert a restraining influence over their 
conduct. 

The prediction of hanging the baker and restor- 
ing the butler by Pharaoh (Gen. xl, 8); the predic- 
tion of the destruction of the altar of Jeroboam by 
Josiah, the son of Manasseh (1 Kings xiii, 2); and 
all those unfulfilled predictions which are contained 
in Scripture, are susceptible of an easy explanation 
on the theory of the divine purpose to bring those | 
predicted events to pass by putting human wills 
under the constraint of the law of cause and effect. 
Indeed, how it would be possible for God to carry 
on his overruling providence, guard and_ prosper 
his kingdom of free grace, how he could accom- 
plish his numerous and complicated purposes of 
instruction and punishment, how he could defeat all 
the diabolical plans and efforts of wicked men and 


152 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


fallen angels, and how he could make all kingdoms 
subservient to the kingdom of Jesus Christ from 
age to age, without frequently placing human wills 
under the law of constraint by means of motives or 
circumstances which they would not resist, is an in- 
explicable mystery. In no other way could he man- 
age the race, or preserve his Church, in a world so 
full of wickedness and diabolism. The wickedness 
of any city could at any hour submerge all its virtue 
and good order in promiscuous ruin, did not the 
Sovereign Ruler incessantly place human wills under 
the constraint of necessity in order to preserve his 
control and to accomplish his conservative purposes 
therein. 


CHAPTER IX. 


GOD’S ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 


S in prophecy, one of the indispensable evidences 
A of divine revelation, many particulars must be 
stated to which the actual history, when it has trans- 
pired, can be referred with undoubted certainty, it is 
necessary that many incidents involving the action 
of intelligent beings should be embraced within its 
scope and plan. To fulfill these prophetic specifi- 
cations God has at least three worlds of intelligent 
creatures from which to select instruments. But this 
work of prophecy, so very extraordinary in its nature, 
must have involved some method of procedure dif- 
ferent from that which usually obtains in his govern: 
ment of free agents in the kingdom of free grace. 
And, therefore, no general conclusions can be drawn 
from the correspondence between these prophecies 
and their minute fulfillment, concerning the divine 
foresight of the ordinary conduct and future choices 
of free agents while acting under the law of liberty. 

But while we maintain that it is impossible for 
Omniscience to foresee with definite and absolute 
certainty the choices of free agents when they act 
under the law of liberty, we nevertheless believe that 
God can in multitudes of cases, perhaps in most, 
judge very accurately as to what is most likely to 
take place, in given contemplated circumstances. 

153 


154 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


The more any being knows of the mind and nature 
of a man, and the particular temptations to which he 
may be exposed, the more safely can he calculate: 
as to the choices he will be likely to make. Even 
among men, he who best comprehends human nature 
can best judge, as a general rule, what men will do 
under given circumstances. His judgments will be 
correct oftener than will those of less sagacious per- 
sons. So true is this that it is a rule universally 
acted upon that men are likely to act in accordance 
with their nature, their habits, their surroundings, 
and the appeals made upon their sensuous natures 
from without. And yet this general rule can not be 
infallibly relied upon. For so very frequently, in- 
deed, among men, is this rule untrustworthy and 
productive of serious mistakes that it can hardly be 
styled a rule at all. It is only a basis for presump- 
tive judgments as to human conduct; for the decision 
which has been uniform for ninety-nine times, at the 
hundreth may change its character. When Satan 
was created with his superb endowments, and placed 
on his probation, every finite mind beholding him 
would have inferred that such were his nature, his 
character, his endowments, his interests, and his ap- 
parent destiny, that it would be exceedingly improb- 
able, and almost morally impossible, that he would 
yield to temptation and sin. And yet he did sin will- 
fully and awfully—so ruinously that he never yet has 
found or sought a place of repentance or of forgiveness. 

This significant fact demonstrates that prepon- 
derance of presumptions as to the future choices 
of free agents, in any specified case, can never 


GoD'S ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 155 


be relied upon without some danger of deception 
and mistake. Jude speaks of angels who kept not 
their first estate. Now had any contemporary be- 
ings been interrogated as to the probability of the 
fall of these angels, they would have replied, that, 
judging from their holy nature, habits, and sur- 
roundings, and from the fact that there could be no 
objective motives, no motives in the nature of the 
case, why they should disobey the great moral law 
of the universe, we are compelled to think that they 
never will forfeit their bright habitations by sinning 
against God. But notwithstanding all this, those an- 
gels did sin, and did forfeit their first estate. They 
surrendered their holiness, disregarded the motives to 
obedience, the superlatively grand reasons for main- 
taining their moral purity, and voluntarily revolted 
against the government and administration of God.* 

These facts prove that while something may be 
estimated as to the future choices of free beings from 
their nature, habits, history, and surroundings, abso- 
lute certainty as to those choices can never be predi- 
cated. ‘Our calculation of future choices,” says 
‘President Tappan, ‘‘can never be attended with abso- 


*Mr. Watson teaches that Satan will be punished for what 
he is now doing. But I reply that the alternate of right and 
wrong, sin and holiness, is not now before Satan. He can not now 
choose the right and reject the wrong. He can not be actuated 
by motives that differ in kind as well as in degree. Nevertheless 
‘he is ‘‘reserved in everlasting chains unto the judgment of the last 
day,” and ‘will be punished,” says Mr. Watson, ‘for the wrongs 


> He is punishable for these misdeeds, 


that he is now perpetrating.’ 
because he might easily have foreseen them, just as an inebriate is 
deserving of punishment for crimes committed by him in a state of 


intoxication, of which his seared conscience gave him neither pre- 


156 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


lute certainty, because the will, being contingent, has 
the power of disappointing calculations which are 
made upon the longest observed uniformity.” And 
this is what we see repeated again and again in hu- 
man society. How often have men of the fairest 
record and the highest rectitude astonished the world 
with volitions and conduct wholly at variance with 
their established habits, nature, and character, and 
their scrutinized history for many years. Character 
is made by the will and not the will by the char- 
acter. If the will is contingent so must the char- 
acter be contingent. During probation the will is al- 
ways independent and never perfectly formed; for a 
wrong choice may arise at any moment of probation. 
Therefore, no probationer can ever be so firmly set- 
tled in goodness that his morality is forever sure. 
The noblest and the best have done wrong and still 
may do wrong. True, habit tends to stability of 
character. The oftener the will chooses the right the 
easier and the more likely it is so to choose, but 
habits do not control the determinations of the will. 
However much trust we may have in a man it can 
never rise to indubitable assurance. Hence the rule 
of inferring what men will do from their nature, 
vious warning nor subsequent pangs. Ile will be punished as 
Pharaoh was punished for the foreseen crimes committed by him 
under demoniacal influences, after having sinned away his day of 
gracious visitation and wasted out of his soul all his power of better 
deeds. God is often forced to leave men to strong delusions, to be- 
lieve lies which insure their final ruin, because they have rejected 
his offers of life, refuse to acknowledge his truth, and take pleasure 
in unrighteousness. In this way they bring upon themselves judi- 


cial blindness and go forth to deeds of wickedness for which they 
will be punished. 


GOD'S ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 157 


habits, motives, surroundings, and temptations, ought 
never to be trusted, where vital interests are involved 
or life-long and comprehensive calamities may be a 
possible result. It is only in matters of compara- 
tively small import that men ought to be confided in 
fully, since no one knows what may be in the heart 
of another, and no man knows what his own will will 
choose to do. . Within that limited range, however, 
trust, founded on one’s nature and habits, is essential 
to the perfection of social intercourse and the con- 
duct of business affairs. For though even within 
that range we are very aften deceived, after our most 
careful examination of the motives for doing right 
that would likely influence the conduct of men, yet 
only comparatively small injuries can result from 
trust and confidence where so little is hazarded; while 
the advantages resulting from confidence, generous 
friendship, fellowship, and successful commerce are 
very decided. And all these benefits grow out of 
our prevalent custom of inferring what a man’s fu- 
ture actions will be from the data furnished by his 
nature, habits, surroundings, and temptations, and 
of then governing ourselves in accordance with that 
inference. 

And this is proof that it was the design of God we 
should apply this rule, of conjecturing what the future 
choices of our fellow-men will be, only in matters 
of comparatively small import. Therefore, when se- 
rious damages may come to ourselves, or to those 
dependent upon us, from inferring from premises so 
variant and so little known the future choices of free 
men, this rule should never, but from necessity, be 

14 


158 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


implicitly depended upon. The rule for success in 
business is a careful and comprehensive survey in 
general and in particular of the probabilities involved 
ins each case. 

It is quite safe, as a general rule, to predict that 
any sinner, who has repeatedly and for a long period 
broken solemn vows of amendment, will never, in 
future, do any thing better than to break his vows. 
And yet we do not know that he will not. For if 
we did we should cease our efforts for his salvation. 
Neither God, angels, nor men cease effort to rescue 
the lost, while there remains one presumption of 
success to thousands of presumptions of utter failure. 
The probability that men are more likely than not to 
determine and to act in accordance with their na- 
tures and surroundings is reason sufficient for the 
most strenuous presentation of motives and appeals. 
The facts of celestial history above cited show the 
impossibility of the most richly endowed of created 
intelligences foreseeing with certainty the acts of free 
agents which involve moral character and are per- 
formed during the period of their probation. And 
as finite intelligences are created in the image and 
likeness of the infinite intelligence, and as the, future 
acts of a free will can never be certainly foreknown 
by finite minds, is it not reasonable to infer that such 
knowledge lies outside the categories of all certain 
knowledge? 

God could, we can see, estimate approximately 
what are likely to be the choices of free agents in 
the early future. And this estimate of probabilities 
may be so nearly indubitable, in many cases, as to 


GOD'S ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 159 


resemble prescience itself. It might, perhaps, be 
termed a modified foreknowledge—a foreknowledge, 
however, that could be relied upon only to a very 
limited extent by the divine administration in the 
kingdom of free grace or freedom; a foreknowledge, 
too, that is widely different from absolute certainty. 
This estimate of probabilities on the part of God, 
though clothed with the highest degree of probabil- 
ity, would still be liable to modifications. And so 
far is the doctrine of probabilities this side certainty 
that an authority no less than Professor Goldwin 
Smith denies to free actions the susceptibility of any 
calculation of probabilities at all. He denies this 
upon the ground that no certain antecedent to the 
will can ever be determined upon. ‘‘The science 
of history,’”’ he therefore boldly declares, ‘‘is laid in 
the mere quicksands of free will.”’ 

But however true it may be that the will may or 
may not determine in view of any recognized or con- 
ceived motives, and however much its choices might 
disappoint the most sagacious calculations of proba- 
bilities, based on the ordinary influence of such mo- 
tives, still there does remain the important doctrine 
of probability, which, as we have before indicated, 
proves oftener trustworthy than deceptive, and, as we 
have learned from observation, is indispensable to the 
regulation and harmonious working of human society- 
The number of chances, the number of presump- 
tions in favor of any future event, is therefore ground 
of probability, but not of certainty of its coming to 
pass. I can judge with great probability how a man 
will act in any case; still it would be folly to deny 


160 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


that he may resist all the motives I may conceive as 
acting upon him, and disappoint all my expectations 
and defeat all the plans I had made dependent on his 
decisions. 

As future free choices are self-originated, Goldwin 
Smith no doubt perceived that the foreknowledge of 
them involved self-contradiction. But he failed to 
see that the basis of the law of probabilities, as to 
future free choices, was not to be sought for in the 
causative action of the will, but in the habits, tem- 
perament, dispositions, and temptations of the free 
agent. These circumstances do not act supernatu- 
rally upon the will to constrain it, but they act nat- 
urally along the lines of cause and effect. Their influ- 
ence may therefore be so approximatively calculated 
as to enable one who knows them to form a judg- 
ment as to the result; but this judgment or opinion 
never rises to absolute certainty while the freedom 
of the choosing agent remains. 

Some writers have represented the human will 
under the figure of a balance, the scales of which 
rise or fall as different sized weights are thrown 
upon them. They therefore locate the incipiency of 
human actions in the objective, in the appeals to the 
reason and the sensibilities; that is, in the action of 
the law of cause and effect. ‘‘God foresaw,” says 
Charnock, ‘‘that Adam would fall freely; for he saw 
the whole circle of means and causes whereby such 
and such actions should be produced. He saw all 
the causes leading to such events in their order, and 
how the will would comply. He knew just as well 
as an attificer knows the motions of his watch, and 


God's ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 161 


how far the spring will let down the cord in an 
But those who hold firmly to the freedom 
of the will do not regard those reasons and motives 


) 


hour. 


which are presented to man as occasions of his 
actions or of his refusal to act, as regulating or oper- 
ating the will as a machine is regulated or worked, 
but as considerations, in view of which the mind 
itself considers, decides, determines, and acts, and 
all of which it may stubbornly resist. But whenever 
they defend absolute divine foreknowledge, they 
generally slide from the side of freedom to that of 
fatalism. For example, Mr. Watson teaches that 
‘the divine prescience can dart through all the 
workings of the human mind, all its comparisons of 
things in the judgment, all the influences of the mo- 
tives on the affections, and the hesitancies and _halt- 
ings of the will to its final choice.” But it is only 
when writers of the latter class deny foreknowledge 
that they can be severely logical. The first fatal 
assumption that underlies this statement of Mr. Wat- 
son is that there is no difference in the nature of the 
action of a mechanical force, or of a constrained 
force, and the action of a self-moving, self-originating 
free will. But the action of the law of cause and 
effect is inexorably shut up to the producing of a 
single result; and the action of a will under the con- 
straint of a superior power can produce nothing but 
the identical result purposed by the constrainer. 
Whereas, the free will can of itself choose to produce 
either one of two distinct results, or one of many 
results, or no result at all. The distinction between 
the action of a will and the action of cause and effect 


162 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


is profound, fundamental, and evident. The second 
_undue assumption in Watson’s statement is that, in 
the determination of the free will, influences ad extra 
seize hold of the will, and drag it on asa captive after 
them; whereas it is the will itself, from the citadel 
of its power, that sends forth from within its sover- 
eign resolves and mandates. He overlooks the grand 
fact that an action that can originate moral character, 
rewardability, and punishability, must neccessarily be 
a process essentially and fundamentally different from 
the action of a mechanical force, or the law of over- 
powering constraint. While, therefore, there is, as is 
learned from observation, some considerable basis for 
the doctrine of the calculation of probabilities as to 
the future choices of a free being, so utterly inex- 
plicable is the action of a free will acting under the 
law of liberty, so utterly unlike is it to any other 
process revealed by consciousness, that there is no 
eround or basis whatever for absolute certainty, even 
in the mind of the Infinite. 

The next reason, and about the only one, urged 
by Mr. Watson in favor of foreknowledge, is that 
contingent actions for which men have been held 
accountable have been foretold. But this objection 
is easily overcome by the ease and frequency with 
which God puts human wills under the law of cause 
and effect, in order to accomplish his many purposes, 
whether those purposes have in view the correction 
of his erring but struggling people, the punishment 
of incorrigible sinners, or the warning and _ instruc- 
tion of witnessing nations. 

An application of some one of the various prin- 


GOD'S ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 163 


ciples, advocated and involved in the theory here 
suggested, furnishes an easy explanation of what 
is said in the Bible in reference to Joseph, Josiah, 
Jotham, Micaiah; also of all the predictions against 
the house of Eli, concerning the family troubles of 
King David, and the destruction of Jerusalem by the 
king of Babylon, and by the Romans. 

““The Bible contains,’’ says Mr. Watson, ‘‘the- 
rise and fall of several kingdoms.” Daniel prophe- 
sies of the rise, progress, various fortunes, and final 
fall of the kingdoms of antiquity. ‘‘These,” he 
says, ‘‘were carried through the various stages of ad- 
vance and decline by the virtues and vices of men.” 
Now all this could have been conceived, planned, 
determined, and finally carried out, without fore- 
knowing a single future choice of a free spirit, while 
acting under the law of liberty. For example, God 
determined in his providence that he would disregard, 
in the case of Esau and Jacob, the prevalent custom 
of requiring the younger to serve the elder, or of 
making the younger less prominent and authoritative 
than the elder. This purpose of making the elder 
serve the younger he would have carried out accord- 
ing to his forefixed plan, even if Rebekah had been 
impartial and equally loving to both of her sons. 
But as a matter of fact he did bring about his deter- 
mined plan through the selfish and unjustifiable con- | 
duct of a designing and an unscrupulous woman. 
He did this either through or in spite of the repre- 
hensible conduct of the mother. And his procedure 
in one instance may be his procedure in millions 
of instances. This simple explanation throws light 


164 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


upon a numerous class of events recorded in Scrip- 
ture history. 

Could any one command adequate resources he 
could lay all his plans even to the minutia of build- 
ing a thousand miles of railway within the next 
decade of years through different sections of our 
country. He would be able to know that he could 
bring the wills of laborers under the powerful law 
of cause and effect, sufficiently to accomplish all his 
enterprises without foreknowing any of those choices 
which would involve moral character or entail endless 
destiny. And should any of his workmen act wick- 
edly he would be able, with his vast resources, so to 
overrule their crimes as to further his interests in a 
marked manner, and to work out his settled purposes. 

It is the mark of genius and true greatness so 
to overrule adverse circumstances as to cause them 
to contribute to the accomplishment of specific de- 
signs. To do this was the great ambition of Napo- 
leon I. This-will illustrate how easy it is for the 
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent One to ac- 
complish all his providential plans without foreknow- 
ing the future choices of free spirits, while acting 
under the law of liberty. The midnight revel of the 
Babylonian monarch (to which Mr. Watson refers) 
may have been actually foreknown, because from va- 
rious causes and national crimes, that monarch’s. will 
may have been so placed under the law of cause and 
effect, that he was led ‘‘captive by the devil at his 


will.’ For this discipline and judgment so deeply 
affecting the monarch, those dependent upon him, the 


city itself, and the world, God may have had reasons, 


GoD's ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 165 


many of which it would not have been possible for 
us to divine. Mr. Watson claims that ‘‘the conduct 
of the Jews in provoking the war that resulted in 
the predicted destruction of Jerusalem was contin- 
gent in its nature.’’ But he has no right to assume 
this, as the Jews may have sinned away their day of 
grace in rejecting the Son of God, and been given 
up ‘‘to work out their own damnation with greedi- 
ness,’’ as a part of their merited punishment for their 
heaven-daring crimes—thus furnishing an impressive 
spectacle for the warning of observing nations. And 
the Roman Senate, generals, and soldiers may -all 
have been chosen providential instruments signally 
to punish a nation for its marked displays of wicked- 
ness. Sucha procedure would only be a counterpart 
of those doings by which God has, unquestion- 
ably, very often punished wicked nations and com- 
munities, and taught important lessons to a heedless 
and sin-loving world. 

Mr. Watson says, that the fifty-third chapter of 
Isaiah predicts that the Messiah should be taken 
away by a violent death, inflicted by wicked men, in 
defiance of all the principles of justice. But there 
is no satisfactory evidence of the truth of this state- 
ment. The chapter is susceptible of an interpreta- 
tion that will exclude the necessity for any violent 
participation by wicked men in the great work of 
human redemption. We read in this chapter that 
the Lord hath put him to grief; it pleased the Lord 
to bruise him; the Lord hath laid on him the 
iniquity of us all; he was stricken for the trans- 


eressions of the people; he was bruised for our 
15 


166 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


iniquities; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, 
as a lamb to the sacrifice; when God shall make 
his soul an offering for sin, he shall see of the 
travail of his soul and be satisfied. Now, for the 
accomplishment of all that is contemplated here, 
surely the conspiracies and treacheries of wicked 
men are by no means indispensable. And _ then 
there is something so incongruous between a cruci- 
fixion on a heathen cross and the solemn offering 
up by the Father upon some consecrated altar of the 
lamb slain from the foundation of the world. But 
even admitting that God foresaw that Christ should 
die a violent death, by the hands of wicked.men, even 
that would be conceivable without necessitating the 
admission of absolute prescience. God’s knowledge 
of the repugnancy of the human heart to moral 
truth—especially such truths as his son would as- 
tonish and humble the world with—was so perfect, 
that he could accurately prophesy that men would 
be enraged at his son and put him to death. Every 
spiritual truth warring with man’s depravity, and 
every truly spiritual man, meets with hellish hostility 
on earth. Unreasoning men are wedded to the cus- 
tomary and the established, and hate those who dis- 
turb them in their quietudes. 

In the realms of theology there would be mul 
tiplied discoveries of precious truth, truth needed 
for the development of the ages, if students of the 
Bible did not shrink from persecution and martyr- 
dom for the utterance of newly discovered principles 
and for the showing of newly unearthed diamonds of 
truth. It is and ever will be true that the children 


GOD'S ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 167 


of the bondwoman, will persecute him that is born 
after the spirit. God, therefore, could safely proph- 
esy that men would be enraged and filled with mur- 
der, under the teachings of the immaculate morality 
of his son. The Jews were wedded to their institu- 
tions, their ceremonial observances, their form of 
government, the offices and perquisites of which 
afforded positions of influence and ease to large 
classes of men—elders, scribes, priests, and others. 
These institutions were all divinely appointed, and 
the Jews believed that their forms of worship should 
remain unmodified; and if to these considerations 
we add the record of their past history to which 
Christ alludes, when he says (Luke xi, 50, 51), that 
‘‘the blood of all the prophets, which was shed from 
the foundation of the world, may be required of 
this generation; from the blood of Abel unto the 
blood of Zacharias, which perished between the altar 
and the temple,” it would be morally certain—even to 
a finite intelligence acquainted with the facts, and 
knowing that the mission of the Son of God was to 
preach new doctrines subversive of old forms, to 
denounce corruption, to make war on established 
customs and beliefs, and to put an end to the Jewish 
nation forever—that the fury of the Jews would be 
roused against him, and that they would lay violent 
hands upon him and put him to death. 

It might, therefore, be certain to the infinite 
mind that Christ would die a violent death at the 
hands of wicked men, without involving such absolute 
prescience on his part as is commonly included in the 
doctrine of divine foreknowledge. All this would be 


168 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


possible without foreknowing or foreappointing any 
of the specific agents in the tragedy. ‘This leaves the 
particular agents of such crucifixion all free and un- 
trammeled by the foreknowledge of their free choices 
and actions in the drama of all drafnas. It was, 
therefore, neither foreordained nor foreknown that 
Judas would betray his master, nor that Christ knew 
at the time he selected him that he would betray 
him, and that he deliberately picked him out for that 
especial purpose and service. And, we believe, no 
theory of the atonement can be tenable that involves 
the doctrine that it was foreknown that Judas would 
betray Christ. 

But all that is claimed in this discussion is the 
absence of absolute certainty in the mind of God, as 
to what will be the future choices—those choices 
upon which eternal salvation or ruin depends—of free 
beings, beings acting under the law of freedom, 
Admit that proposition, and unnumbered intellectual 
reliefs rush at once to our rescue. But convince us 
of absolute divine foreknowledge, and you at once 
envelop us with that darkness which has beclouded 
and overwhelmed all students of these mysteries 
since time commenced. It is difficult, we know, be- 
cause of long-continued instruction, to surrender a 
belief in absolute divine foreknowledge. But how 
much greater is the difficulty of embracing the nu- 
merous contradictions and absurdities, which the 
admission of absolute prescience confessedly necessi- 
tates. Reason, experience, and revelation, all unite 
in powerfully convincing us that the consequence of 
persistent, incorrigible sinfulness is endless separation 


GOD'S ESTIMATE OF PROBABILITIES. 169 


from God, in a state of conscious existence. And 
surely it is far preferable to believe that the future 
choices of free beings are unknowable things, and 
that their foreknowledge involves a contradiction in 
thought, ratlfer than to believe that God made an 
individual spirit who, at the time of his creation, he 
foreknew would be sinful, degraded, and, by conse- 
quence, inconceivably miserable forever. 


CHAPTER X. 


FATALISTIC TENDENCIES. 


ATALISM, in all its demoralizing power, has main- 
EF tained almost universal sway over not only all 
degraded peoples, but also over the most enlightened 
of heathen nations. Hence conceptions of fatalism 
find expression in the literature extant in those most 
perfected and marvelous languages, the Greek, the 
Latin, and the Sanskrit. All our scholars have en- 
countered in heathen mythologies and philosophies 
fatalistic ideas. They have felt the force of such 
sentiments, so detrimental to all moral character, 
while, at the same time, so flattering to the human 
intellect. They have realized their unsettling influ- 
‘ences about the foundations of their morality, re- 
ligion, and views of a future life. For the most 
thoughtful of the heathen believed and taught that 
no man could escape impending evils, however inno- 
cent he might be. 

Fatalistic notions crept stealthily into the formal 
statements of Christian doctrine, and in a few instances 
into the translation of the Holy Scriptures made 
_ under King James. In religion, philosophy, and po- 
_ litical science terms were introduced which were 
tinged with their enervating influences. For example, 
our word motive would never have been introduced 


into the discussions of the human will, had it not 
170 


FATALISTIC TENDENCIES. ee 


been for the unconscious influence impressed on the 
Christian consciousness by the subtle ideas of fatal- 
ism. The term, motive, is from the Latin sotwm (from 
movere, to move). Here we have the clear idea of 
a force, having in itself an element of coerciveness, — 
that which may constrain the will. And therefore 
it was that Dr. Jonathan Edwards, a master in the- 
ology, the Plato of the New World, under the un- 
conscious influence of fatalistic associations derived 
from his studies of antiquity, defined motive to be 
‘that which moves the mind to volition.”” Whereas, 
the free will is not a passive thing, which is deter- 
mined or moved necessarily by pleasure or pain, or 
any consideration ad extra. Now, such definitions 
of motive carry in them the latent influences and 
implications of fatalism. What has been said of 
motive might also be said of many other words | 
of frequent use in theological and philosophical 
discussions. 

‘““As God knew,”’ says Charnock, ‘‘of what tem- 
per the faculties were with which he had endowed 
man, and how far they were able to endure the 
assaults of temptation, so also he foreknew the grand 
subtlety of Satan; how he would lay his mine, and 
at what point he would drive his temptations; how 
he would propose and manage them, and direct his 
battery against the sensitive appetite and assault the 
weakest part of the fort, might he not foresee that 
the efficacy of the temptation would exceed the meas- 
ure of resistance? Can not God know how far the 
malice of Satan would extend, what shots he would 
use, how far he would charge his temptations without 


172 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. | 


his powerful restraint, as well as an engineer can 
judge how many shots of cannon will make a breach 
in a tower, or how many casks of powder will blow 
up a fortress, who never yet built the one or founded 
the other? God could not be deceived in his judg- 
ment of the issue and event, since he knew how far 
he would let Satan loose, and how far he would per- 
mit man to act. He therefore foresaw that Adam 
would sink under the allurements of the temptation.” 

How manifestly that great man here applies to 
moral subjects and free volitions the constraint or 
necessity that controls material forces. But his rare 
discrimination was beclouded by the influence of the 
fatalistic ideas of his times. The deep depravity of 
our nature strongly inclines us to practical atheism. 
Many of our race, like Bonaparte, this hour give 
themselves up to some most inexcusable and inde- 
fensible course of wickedness, under the strange hal- 
lucination that it is simply their destiny, and from 
it there can be no escape: ‘‘I am that which I am 
made, and I can not be or do otherwise.””? And thus 
they are drifting, drifting on the waste of waters, 
without any of the qualities and prerogatives of indi- 
viduality, having no conception of the vast capacities 
of freedom with which the human will is endowed. 
They do not seem to realize that they have the high 
prerogative of free volition, and therefore are thor- 
oughly responsible. Although few persons deny, 
yet almost none recognize the fullness of moral lib- 
erty, the initiatory, active freedom of the human 
mind. To the millions in China liberty is obscured 
by their civil laws, and in all India it is made posi- 


FATALISTIC TENDENCIES. by. 


tively sinful to entertain a desire for such freedom. 
A belief in fatalism, in election and reprobation, in 
absolute divine foreknowledge and foreordination, 
tends logically and powerfully to hold men fast in 
the delusion that they have no liberty and little or 
no responsibility. These beliefs tend to eliminate 
from men the natural sense of right, justice, and 
accountability in respect to implicit obedience and 
high moral aspirations. While, therefore, we should 
earnestly vindicate and most profoundly revere the 
sovereignty of Jehovah, we should not say nor do nor 
assume any thing that must inevitably lessen our esti- 
mation of the independence, the accountability, the 
grandeur, or the vast capabilities of the human will. 
He certainly does not do honor to his Maker who 
depreciates man to a condition of moral imbecility. 


CHAPTER XI. 


WHERE IS THE NECESSITY FOR ABSOLUTE FORE- 
KNOWLEDGE? 


ur wherein is found a logical necessity for the 

doctrine that God foreknows? In what lies the 
necessity that God should previse all the free choices 
of free agents while in their probation? What pos- 
sible danger or loss or evil could it be to his creatures 
for him not to foreknow contingencies other than as 
contingencies or possibilities? Suppose that he did 
not foreknow, what imperfection could that be to his 
mind, or his heart, or attributes, or government? 
What advantage could it be to him in his control 
and management of free agents to foreknow, or what 
motive could he have for desiring such foreknowl- 
edge? What end or beneficent purpose could be 
accomplished thereby, which could not be accom- 
plished equally well without it? 

‘‘God’s government of the world would be pre- 
carious,’’ says Doctor Hodge, ‘‘if he does not fore- 
see all fu:ure choices.” This surely is a severe thrust 
at God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipres- 
ence. God very well knows that he never can have 
_any thing to fear from any rivals. Could any thing 
ever occur in any part of Jehovah’s dominions dis- 
proportionate to his infinite attributes and_perfec- 
tions? Where, then, is the ground, or the reason, 

174 


FOREKNOWLEDGE NOT NECESSARY, 175 


for the apprehension of precariousness in the divine 
government if future free choices should not be per- 
ceived as immutably certain? God is fully able to 
meet any and every emergency, no matter how great, 
how sudden, or how complicated, that can arise 
anywhere in infinite space or endless duration. Is 
not God every-where present? Is not the efficiency 
of all laws and all forces momentarily due to him? 
Is not every thing in nature and in providence the 
result of his immediate, special will and energy? 
Who believes that there is any efficiency in general 
laws aside from the immediate power of the infinite 
mind, the great fountain of all force? Did not the 
great Agassiz tell us that he met ‘‘the presence, 
wisdom, design, and energy of a personal Deity at 
every step in all his inquiries, through all materiality, 
and down among the very lowest forms of life, or- 
ganism, and intelligence?’ ‘‘ Have we not here,” 
he exclaimed, ‘‘the most palpable demonstration of 
the existence of a personal God, the author of all 
things, the ruler of the universe and dispenser of 
all good 2” | 

‘Tf all the free acts of men were before unknown 
to God,” says Charnock, ‘‘such contingencies may 
happen as to perplex his affairs, put him upon new 
counsels and methods for obtaining his ends. Things 
may happen so suddenly as to give a check to his 
intentions and scheme of government. Unless God’s 
foreknowledge is as great as the resolves of men are 
inconstant, he would be continually altering his 
methods of government. He must wait to see the 
choices of men before he can see how to deal with 


176 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


them.”’ But I reply, in the language of inspiration, 
God knows at all moments how ‘‘to deliver the 
godly out of temptations.’?’ He knows equally well 
how, instantly and summarily, to punish the dis- 
obedient. 

A ruler ought to wait to see how the subject 
conducts himself before he determines how or in 
what degree he shall be punished or rewarded. 
Moreover, if a choice be accountable—that is, if it is 
to be rewarded if good, or punished if evil—then it 
must be perfectly free: the being who makes that 
choice is its sole author. And if this be so, then 
God is in no way and in no sense the cause of it; 
and if God is in no sense the cause of a choice, 
then he must at some time determine what he will 
do in reference to said choice when it may be put 
forth. And as he must determine at all times, as in 
the present, what he will do on the occurrence of 
said choice, it is most natural and reasonable that he 
should determine it, at the very moment of its occur- 
rence, in the very exigency of affairs. For there is 
neither necessity nor reason nor propriety in his 
determining what he will do, on the transpiring of 
a free event, millions of ages prior to its coming to 
pass. Future free events, however innumerable, 
various, complicated, or alarming, can never tran- 
scend the capacities of omnipotence, omnipresence, 
and omniscience, instantaneously to manage, thwart, 
control, or utilize, as it may seem best to infinite 
wisdom, goodness, and justice. 

Is not God omniscient in respect to all knowable 
things, to all free choices as soon as they are put 


FOREKNOWLEDGE NOT NECESSARY. LT? 


forth? And is he not omnipotent? Where, then, is 
the necessity of the prescience of all the future re- 
solves and choices of free beings? Those attributes 
of Jehovah could overcome all difficulties and pro- 
vide for all hazards, and turn to best account all 
developments that may be made in all the boundless 
universe and throughout eternity. 

Captain John Smith’s head lay on a block by the 
free choice of a wicked spirit; God sent Pocahontas 
to save his life. It was as easy for him to devise 
this expedient for Captain Smith’s salvation im- 
promptu and extempore, as it would have been to 
design it from all eternity. And to do it impromptu 
(if he did so do it) was very much more natural and 
reasonable, more life-like and interesting to God him- 
self and to unseen witnesses, than if he had devised 
and determined upon that plan of rescue from eter- 
nity past. 

Unless all of God’s thoughts are as eternal as 
himself (which will soon, I think, be shown to be 
absurd and involving contradictions), there must 
have been a moment, when the thought of human 
redemption originated in the divine mind. Now 
when was that moment? The only proper and rea- 
sonable response that can be given to this inquiry is, 
that that moment was the instant when the awful 
exigency arose in the moral administration of God. 
What was true and proper and natural as to the great 
expedient of redemption is true and proper of lesser 
expedients in the management of free agents. 

Jonathan Edwards says, ‘‘It follows if foreknowl- 
edge be untrue, that God is liable to be repenting what 


178 Tuk FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


he has done, changing his purposes, altering his 
measures, forming new schemes and putting his sys- 
tem to rights as it gets out of order, and that it 
is in the power of the creature man to disappoint 
him, to break his measures, and to make him con- 
tinually change his mind.’’ Now all these conse- 
quences are fully and freely admitted by every Ar- 
minian. He admits them, because it is impossible 
to deny them, while he maintains freedom, contin- 
gency, accountability, and punishability. Moreover 
all this is exemplified in the case of the message 
brought by the man of God to Eli, informing him of 
the great change in God's purposes. ‘Wherefore 
the Lord God of Israel saith [to Eli], I said indeed 
that thy house and the house of thy father should 
walk before me forever: but now the Lord saith, Be 
it far from me; for them that honor me I will honor, 
and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed. 
Behold the days come that I will cut off thine arm 
and the arm of thy father’s house, that there shall not 
be an old man in thine house.”’ (1 Sam. ii, 30.) If 
these words do not evince a change in God’s feelings, 
purposes, and measures, then language is simply 
meaningless. And, again, in 1 Samuel’ xv, 10, we 
read, ‘‘Then came the word of the Lord unto Sam- 
uel, saying, It repenteth me that I have set up Saul 
to be king; for he is turned back from foilowing me 
and hath not performed my commandments.” On 
this text Dr. Whedon says, that ‘‘God sorrows over 
the sin of Saul, because of its consequences and be- 
cause it shows that Saul could ho longer be trusted. 
God’s repentance is a change of feeling and purpose, 


FOREKNOWLEDGE NoT NECESSARY. 179 


God sorrowed, and Samuel sorrows in sympathy with 
God’s sorrow.”? And John Calvin remarks on the 
same passage, ‘‘God is hurt no less by the atrocious 
sins of men, than if they pierced his heart with mortal 
anguish.” 

The Scriptures indicate that God has two kinds 
of plans relative to this world and its inhabitants, — 
one sovereign, the other contingent. His sovereign 
plans are determined upon absolutely. They will be 
accomplished by one set of means or by another, 
ordinary or extraordinary. For example, it was 
one part of his sovereign plan so to conduct the 
children of Israel from Egypt to Canaan as to impress 
religious truth upon heathen nations. In carrying 
this major purpose into execution, he resorted to 
many contingent plans. He selected Moses as the 
leader of his host. But Moses parleyed with God 
until he lost much of his power, greatness, and hap- 
piness. God, through the free choices of Moses, 
was compelled to modify his design in reference to 
him personally and to call his brother Aaron to share 
the glory and reward of the great enterprise. In 
sight of his long sought destination, looking over 
upon the blooming valleys and goodly mountains, 
Moses earnestly besought God for the privilege of 
leading the Israelitish hosts into thé promised land. 
God declined this entreaty, bade him trouble him no 
more in reference to the matter, and referring him to 
‘the great reason why this honor and privilege was 
“wrested from him, reminded him of his sin at the 
waters of Meribah, where he spoiled the symbol, 


180 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


says Mr. Brawn, by smiting the rock twice.* That 
free choice of Moses at Meribah compelled God to 
modify his plan and give to Joshua the renown of 
introducing and planting his chosen people in their 
long promised inheritance. This same lesson is 
taught us in many passages of the Bible—for ex- 
ample, in Judges viie But in addition to this class 
of sovereign plans there is another class in which 
God fixes upon some great object, which he designs 
shall be accomplished, and determines in his mind 
the identical agent through whom it shall finally 
be brought about. But if any body could make 
evident the necessity of absolute divine foreknowl- 
edge, that man was Thomas Chalmers. 

He says: ‘‘Should there be introduced into the 
world of mind that liberty by which human volitions 
would be regarded as having no antecedent influence 
in which they have originated and had their cause; 
should the operation of the will be referred to no 
moving forces which are directed by God; should 
the action of the will form an exception to the doc- 
trine that God hath ordained the mechanism of the 
spiritual world, and- presides over all the evolutions 
thereof and worketh all in all, then by far the most 
dignified and interesting of all his creations is wrested 
from the dominion of him who gave it birth. If it 
is essential to the constitution of the mind that it 
shall be left to its own fitful and undirected wayward- 
ness, and so to wander without the limits of God’s 
power and prescience, then is it abandoned to the 


*Christ was smitten but once. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE NOT NECESSARY. 181 


misrule of an anarchy the most wild, wanton, and 
wavering. Things grow up in it from the dark 
womb of nonentity which omnipotence did not 
summon into being, and which omniscience could 
not foretell, and in the most emphatic sense of the 
term it might be said that there is a universe without 
a Lord, and an empire without an imperial sovereign 
to overrule its destinies. 

‘«This question involves both the power and pre- 
science of God. It seems strange that the universe 
which proceeded from the hands of God should have 
been so constituted in any of its departments as to 
have an independent history of its own. But so 
it would be on the hypothesis of a self-determining 
power in any of the creatures. Their movements 
would proceed at random, because under the domin- : 
ion of a wild and lawless contingency omnipotence 
and omniscience would be misnamed, or have no 
place in the nature of God; for God could not be 
said to have all power and all knowledge amid mill- 
ions of volitions, springing up every day in the 
world of intelligent beings; and of which no other 
account can be given than that they originated in 
veriest caprice and waywardness, incapable from their 
very nature of being traced any further back in the 
order of causation than to an inherent and independ- 
ent power in man himself. 

‘“Who does not see that, on this supposition, 
there would be wrested from the grasp and govern- 
ance of the Almighty far the most dignified and in- 
teresting portion of his works? He would be the 


Almighty no longer, and, whatever sovereignty re- 
16 


182 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


mained to him over other territories in nature, the 
moral world, at the mercy of a whole host of petty 
but yet spontaneous and self regulating forces, would 
drift uncontrollably away from him. The world would 
drift away from God if human volitions are contin- 
gent. Abandoned to its own spontaneous evolutions 
and placed beyond the reach of him who alone can 
control it, the creation would relapse into an inex- 
tricable chaos. All would be anarchy and wild mis- 
rule, and the Lord would be a helpless looker-on in 
the midst of these self-directing elements which he 
himself had summoned into being. And to avert 
this conclusion all volitions must be determinate, 
under the absolute control of him who made and 
upholds all. A denial of this would limit the power 
and the sovereignty of the Most High, dividing 
thereby his moral empire between himself and a host 
of innumerable agencies, each being the primary 
fountain-head of its own operations. If the doctrine 
of necessity were not true, a random contingency 
might break forth, setting at defiance all the reckon- 
ing of human sagacity. If volitions are not caused 
by some prior antecedent, exterior to the will, then 
they come forth unlooked for by him whose intelli- 
gence can penetrate all other futurity but this, 
springing up from the depths of contingency the 
monsters of our universe.” 

Is it not marvelous that this distinguished man 
could not see that in all this burst of eloquent dec- 
lamation there was neither wisdom nor reason? His 
eloquence is really directed more against the doctrine 
of contingency in human volitions than against the 


FOREKNOWLEDGE NOT NECESSARY. 183 


evils that would result from non-prescience. How 
clearly perceivable is his deep conviction that freedom 
of will necessitates a state of things which it is im- 
possible for God to foreknow! However great may 
be the evils of non-prescience, if any such can be 
shown, the majority of thinkers would prefer to 
admit and welcome them all, rather than to sur- 
render the doctrine of the selfdetermining power of 


y 


the will. ‘It is wiser to deny -prescience,”’ said 
President Tappan, ‘‘than to give up the contingent 
nature of human volitions. Deny the contingency 
of human volitions, and all in rational theology worth 
contending for is lost.”” ‘‘There is then nothing left,” 
says Dugald Stewart, ‘“‘that it is worth while to con- 
tend for. All moral and theological interests at once 
vanish away.’’ Under this denial, existence, human 
life, human destiny, and Holy Scripture, all become 
distressing enigmas. 

The evils which Doctor Chalmers portrays as re- 
sulting from the contingency of human volitions are, 
however, mere figments of his brilliant and discur- 
sive imagination. But they are not a whit more 
insignificant than are the bad results which he fancies 
would be occasioned by divine non-prescience. If 
God is all-powerful and all-knowing and every-where 
present, why can he not instantaneously manage 
every emergency that can possibly arise in the brief 
experience of a world which is less than a speck in 
the boundlessness of his dominions, and the period 
of whose history is but a point in comparison with 
endless duration? If the evil influence of rebels to 
his authority could not be counteracted; if rebels 


184 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


could escape his power to chain and to imprison and 
to punish; if rebellion could dethrone Deity; or 
if any part of his creation could drift beyond the 
sweep of his arm, or the power of his wrath, or the 
glance of his eye,—then there might be some ground 
for the gloomy apprehensions of Doctor Chalmers. 
God has a kingdom: where absolute force obtains, 
and there he controls, restrains, and subjugates to his 
authority the incorrigibles that finally reject his 
offers of grace. And has not a large portion of this 
wicked world drifted almost to a returnless distance 
from God? 

We know that there is misrule, and that there is 
anarchy among free beings; but God is every-where 
present, and equal to all developments and all emer- 
gencies. If a human soul can not make for itself an 
independent history, then freedom and accountability 
are unpardonable misnomers. Suppose the move- 
ments of free spirits are at ‘‘random.” Is not God 
ready for all random movements? He has proved 
himself equal to every occasion, thus far, in the 
kingdom of responsible agents. Because free agents 
will become fiends and devils, neither the power nor 
the empire of Deity either lessens or trembles. 
Would it not imply imperfection in a ruler to admit 
that he must foreknow how each subject will deport 
himself? It certainly exhibits and requires greater 
perfections to be able to manage all exigencies as 
- they actually arise or unfold to an observing universe. 
Thus to operate gives a wakefulness, a vividness, and 
an immediateness which absolute foreknowledge must 
quite dispense with. 


. 
‘ 


FOREKNOWLEDGE Nov NECESSARY. 18 
5 


» 


Among men it is considered a mark of wisdom 
and greatness for one to be able to adapt himself to 
circumstances, to be ready to meet unforeseen con- 
tingencies when they arise. This is true of men in 
every department of human life. He is considered 
the ablest business man who so manages his affairs 
that no unforeseen financial disaster or general mon- 
etary crisis can result in his financial ruin. “And that 
general who is ever equal to any occasion, always 
able to recover from a surprise or an attack from an 
unexpected quarter, having the ability promptly to 
mass his forces and push his columns against an 
unlooked-for foe, and the personal resources of skill, 
bravery, and self-possession to meet all disasters that 
occur in battle and in the campaign, is justly consid- 
ered the greatest genius and the best master of his 
profession. Human greatness is greatest when seen 
overmastering unforeseen adversities. But if unex- 
pected developments are necessary for the display 
of the greatest abilities of men, and if to be always 
equal to such exigencies is evidence of superior 
human skill and wisdom, why should we deny to 
God any similar arena for the display of his infinite 
perfections and for the exercise of his boundless re- 
sources of wisdom, skill, power, goodness, and expe- 
diency? And how can it detract from the divine 
perfections to affirm that God has the opportunity 
and is able to meet and overrule for good all catas- 
trophes that may occur, and as they occur, in his 
moral and providential administration over the human 
family—a family that is a very little one among 
the uncounted thousands of his vast universe? And 


186 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE. OF GOD. 


does it not detract from his infinite perfections to say 
that he must foreknow, from eternity to eternity, 
every event that may transpire and every act of every 
individual, in order to be able to maintain his govern- 
ment and prevent confusion to his plans and defeat 
to his purposes from unforeseen enemies and emer- 
gencies? ‘There is, then, no perceivable necessity, in 
the nature of things, why God should foreknow all 
the future choices of free beings, since the moral 
universe will be just as well cared for, managed, and 
governed, and God’s character and sovereignty will 
be as perfectly vindicated, without absolute fore- 
knowledge as with it. The developments and emer- 
gencies resulting from the unforeknown conduct of a 
universe of free moral agents would be a most mag- 
nificent theater for the exercise of the unfathomed 
resources of Jehovah. They would afford a_ far 
grander opportunity for the display of his perfections, 
as it seems to us, than could be possible were he 
possessed of absolute foreknowledge. 

But while universal preseience is necessary neither 
to the attributes of God nor to the perfection of his 
government, it is positively inconsistent with his 
character and office as the moral governor of the 
moral universe. A real trial, a trial that is not a 
mere delusive semblance, requires that God’s feelings 
and his conduct toward an accountable spirit should 
be constantly changing and varying with the ever- 
varying volitions which that spirit puts forth in the 
exercise of his endowment of freedom. But this can 
only be possible on the supposition of God's non- 
prescience of those volitions. To affirm that God's 


FOREKNOWLEDGE NoT NECESSAR i 187 


feelings, purposes, and conduct can change just as 
the free volitions of the subject do actually change, 
when he has perfect foreknowledge of all the future 
volitions of that free subject, is to assert a manifest 
impossibility. It is not possible, in the nature of 
things, for any being to foreknow all the doings of 
others, and to foreread in all particulars their charac- 
ter and conduct for ages to come, and yet change in 
his own feelings and thoughts and purposes toward 
them, as in process of time they come actually to put 
forth those accountable volitions seriatim. 

What more is needed for the government of the 
moral universe than is needed in the many things 
which are unquestionably and confessedly implied in 
divine providence and in the institution of prayer? 
If God is every-where present to observe the fall of 
every sparrow, in his unintelligent sensitive creation, 
and every-where present to listen to the sigh and 
prayer of every penitent soul, in the kingdom of his 
intelligent sensitive creation, what more can be nec- 
essary to manage the unknown developments of a 
world of free beings? No emergency in the divine 
government could ever demand more wonderful or 
more prompt resources than are constantly employed 
by an all-superintending providence, whose adminis. 
tration not only supervises all beings and all events, 
but gives efficacy to prayer. And it is in harmony 
-with this view that Inspiration declares “the eyes 
of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil 
and the good.” ‘The eyes of the Lord run to and 
fro through the earth, to show himself strong in be- 
half of him whose heart is perfect towards him.” 


188 THkE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


“The ways of a man are before the Lord, he pon- 
dereth all his goings.” Does it not perfectly com- 
port with the divine character and attributes to say 
that God knows all things whatever, in the past, in 
the present, and in the future, which have acquired 
such an existence as to be the subjects of knowledge; 
that he is the sovereign of all the universe, constantly 
beholding all his creatures, and governing all in 
righteousness and mercy by his infinite wisdom and 
power, and that as a benign sovereign he regards all 
the cries and exigencies of his subjects, is affected 
by them, answers them, treats and blesses them ac- 
cording to all their diversified necessities? In this 
view there is no danger that God will ever be con- 
founded, or his government overturned, for the lack 
of any foreknowledge that our view does not con- 
cede. God’s government may be just as perfect 
without such foreknowledge as with it, over a world 
so limited as this. Limited creatures require very 
limited and fixed plans. But an infinite being may 
accomplish his designs without predetermining the 
details of his operations. And therefore he says 
(Jer. xvii, LO) staal search the heart, and give to every 
man according to his way;” that is, as man obeys 
or disobeys, God modifies his feelings and treatment 
of him. 

If it be any conceivable advantage for an infinite 
being to previse all the future choices of a compara- 
tively small number of accountable creatures, it has 
eluded the most careful scrutiny of the writer. Such 
doctrines as the divinity of our Lord, the necessity of 
a final and universal atonement, justification through 


FOREKNOWLEDGE NoT NECESSARY. 189 


faith alone in the Lord Jesus Christ, the plenary in- 
spiration of the infallible Scriptures, and sanctifica- 
tion through the belief of the truth, are all necessary 
to the success of the Gospel and to the acomplish- 
inent of its gracious and grand designs. All, there- 
fore, should be wary in praposing any new doctrine 
which could disturb public confidence in teachings 
so indispensable to the salvation of the race and the 
progress of the kingdom of Christ. But if the world 
moves, as mutter the irrepressible Galileos, then there 
must be progression in thought, and there may be 
progress in thought without disturbing those the- 
ological foundations which have been laid by the 
wisdom, learning, and piety of past ages. The 
Princeton Review for June, 1877, page 29, says: 
‘‘The Bible is not a field whose treasures have been 
exhausted, for they are inexhaustible. As in the past 
holy men have found among these treasures jewels 
of priceless value—Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, 
Luther, and Calvin have derived therefrom new 
doctrines that have given shape, not only to the 
Church, but to the world—so it is not too much to 
expect that others may go forth from their retire- 
ment, where they have been alone in their com- 
munion with God through his Word, holding up 
before the world some new doctrine freshly derived 
from the ancient writings, which, although hitherto 
overlooked, will prove to be the necessary comple- 
ment of all the previous knowledge of the Church, 
and, indeed, no less essential to its life, growth, and 
progress, than the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity, 


the Augustinian doctrine of sin, or the Protestant 
17 


190 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


doctrine of justification through faith.” But what 
doctrine of faith or of duty taught in the Gospel 
is affected in the slightest degree by the negation of 
universal divine foreknowledge? Not one, as is every- 
where confessed. 

«A general providence,” says Mr. Wesley, “ im- 
plies a special providence, and without the special 
there can be no general.” But the real distinction 
between general and special providence needs to be 
more exactly stated than it has been. A ceneral 
providence embraces those plans or purposes which 
God has sovereignly determined upon in his arrange- 
ments and provisions for the sensitive creatures under 
his care, and which he will carry forward and accom- 
plish irrespective of the choices of men in his king- 
dom of free grace. The accomplishment of these 
creat purposes and plans he effects in part, at least, 
through the instrumentalities of finite wills; and ac- 
cordingly he puts them under the action of the law 
of cause and effect. But by the special providence 
of God we are to understand all that great series of 
special interpositions, reliefs, modifications, and de- 
liverances which are dependent and consequent upon, 
and necessitated by, the free choices of free beings 
while acting under the law of liberty. The temporal 
condition of men is continually modified by their re- 
solves in respect to morals and religion. ‘‘ Eye hath 
not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered 
into the heart of man” to conceive the wonderful 
influence of prayer in the kingdom of special provi- 
dence. And God’s entire government and manage- 
ment of a race of free agents can never require 


FOREKNOWLEDGE NOT NECESSARY. Ig 


greater knowledge, wisdom, power, ubiquity, and 
instantaneous expedients than are indispensable in 
meeting the innumerable exigencies of his kingdom 
of special providence and in answering the countless 
supplications of the suffering and the devout. In 
what, then, do we see the necessity for universal pres- 
cience? And till that necessity receives a more 
plausible setting forth than has ever yet been given 
to it, we must still decline its acceptance among ad- 
mitted truths. 


CHAPTER XLT. 


PRINCIPLES ADMITTED BY ALL SCHOOLS OF 
‘THEOLOGY. 


HEOLOGIANS of all schools, who entertain widely 

different views on other points, agree that God's 
whole government of moral agents is just what it 
would be if he did not previse those choices of 
free beings which entail endless destiny. All ac- 
knowledge that our activities are to be aroused and 
put forth in every particular, as if God did not 
foreknow. All confess that our influence, energy, 
responsibility, and final destiny will be as if God did 
not foresee all the realities that await us and all the 
disclosures of the future. Neither the capacities nor 
the obligations on which his treatment and discipline 
are founded are, in any way, affected by the divine 
foreknowledge. He has made me feel that he thinks 
there is now within my power an unquestioned avoid- 
ability of sin and its consequences. He has made all 
men feel with an equal depth and strength of impres- 
sion that, with them, hell is now an avoidability. 
For, ‘He is the light that enlighteneth every man 
that cometh into the world.” ‘‘The grace of God 
that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, 
teaching that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, 
we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in 


this present world.”” Nothing could be more evident 
192 


— oe 


ADMITTED PRINCIPLES. 193 


than that God does, in the teachings of his Word 
and in the dealings of his spirit, treat accountable 
free beings as though he did not foreknow their 
future free choices. He seems to assume for himself 
a non-prescience of their final determinations and of 
the moral character and condition which will result 
therefrom. What evil can follow from assuming a 
proposition supported by presumptions so many and 
ereat? What detriment can arise from rejecting a 
proposition for whose truth there is, we think, little 
proof, ifany, and for whose admission there is no 
logical necessity? Why should one embrace a dogma 
when all the developments of the future will be as 
if it were entirely false? If while guarding human 
freedom and giving to it some logical significance 
and force, we at the same time hold firmly to all the 
teachings and prophecies of the Bible, and do not 
sacrifice any prized truth either of reason, of common 
sense, or of divine revelation, how is it possible that 
a denial of the absolute foreknowledge of all future 
as has been asserted—unsettle 


contingencies should 
any thing that is essential to either a sound theology 
or an efficient practical Christianity? The great and 
the real problem in theology that is now demanding 
solution is, how to substantiate the infinite benevo- 
lence of God without disturbing the Christian’s con- 
fidence in any other teachings of divine revelation. . 
One system of theology affirms that there can be 
no such things as contingencies in the power, con- 
duct, and destiny of men. And if, indeed, such con- 
tingencies were possible, it declares that it would be 
impossible for omniscience ever to foreknow them. 


194 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


“This system,” says Goldwin Smith, ‘‘is negatived 
by the natural interests and intuitions of the hu- 
man heart.” Our age most certainly has outgrown 
this system of doctrine ‘‘in its angular form.” ‘‘The 
old angular Calvinism,” says President Woolsey, ‘‘is 
now gone out of date, and even the ministers who 
stickle most for it, use it less to build up their people 
than they do to try their brethren by.” Certainly 
the great currents of modern thought, science, gov- 
ernment, and universal consciousness lie athwart its 
peculiar dogmas in ‘‘their rigid forms.” 

On the other hand, Arminianism, the other great 
system ‘of theology, affirms that there are such things 
as real contingencies in the power, conduct, and des- 
tiny of man. But relative to such contingencies it 
affirms that there are now no uncertainties. It de- 
clares that man is a really free and accountable be- 
ing; but it also affirms that his conduct and destiny, 
as foreknown from all eternity, are now absolutely 
inevitable. It bases these affirmations on its doc- 
trine of the infallible divine foreknowledge. It 
affirms the certainty and the unavoidableness of fore- 
known conduct and destiny as absolutely and as 
firmly as does the most rigid Calvinism. One sys- 
tem affirms that there can be no such things as con- 
tingencies in the doings and career of free beings; 
the other declares that there are unquestioned con- 
tingencies, but there can be no such things as uncer- 
tainties—that there is liberty in the conduct of man, 
but that there is no avoidability in his now foreknown 
destiny. But, in the name of humanity, as well as 
common sense, I ask, can not a theology be con- 


ADMITTED PRINCIPLES. 195 


structed that will better satisfy the desires of the 
devout, the necessities of logic and the reasonable 
demands of an inquiring world? Certainly, if either 
of these systems has adopted an error, it is now 
expedient to detect and reject it. 

To say, on the one hand, that God, from all eter- 
nity, foreordained that A B should be eternally 
damned; or, on the other hand, to declare that from 
all eternity God foresaw that A B would certainly 
be eternally damned, is about equally to reflect upon 
the infinite goodness, kindness, and sympathy of 
Deity. All such teachings do seem to slander Chris- 
tianity and raise doubts as to the perfect benevolence 
of him ‘‘who is glorious in holiness and awful in 
praises.”’ But if we affirm that it is impossible, in 
the nature of things, for God to foreknow the future 


) 


choices of free beings, when acting under the law of 
liberty, what doctrines of Christianity does it invali- 
date, or what evangelistic enterprise can it paralyze 
or in any way depreciate? What principle of mo- 
rality can it unsettle, or what energy of the Gospel 
can it in any way lessen? How can such an affirma- 
tion in the least darken any mind or weaken the 
energies of any will, or lessen the faith, reverence, or 
love of any child of God? 

There can be no necessity for God to act upon a 
false assumption. If, therefore, he treats us as 
though he did not foreknow, no logical imperfection 
or moral censure or mental weakness could certainly 
be justly attributed to us should we infer that, in 
fact, the reality corresponds to the manifest seeming. 
But to affirm that God treats us a’ though he did 


196 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


not foreknow, when he ceftainly does foreknow, is 
surely to charge the divine character with at least a 
semblance of inconsistency. And this would be a 
weighty excuse, if not a justification, of oblique tac- 
tics in the conduct of limited mortals. If, then, God 
practically assumes that he does not foreknow, it is 
dangerous for us to assume that he does foreknow. 
Dangers thicken on our way, inconsistencies invade 
our systems of doctrine, difficulties multiply all 
through the pages of Divine Revelation, vantage 
ground is thrown up from which Satan may success- 
fully attack and worry probationers, and we ourselves 
are much more liable to miss the great purposes of 
our creation and fail in the realization of our highest 
possibilities the very moment we assume that God 
does foreknow all the future choices of free beings. 
The dogma of foreknowledge certainly cuts the sin- 
ews of responsibility, dims the great truths that 
should ever thoroughly possess us, and serves to 
quiet our conscience, ‘‘while condemning ourselves, 
in the thing that we allow.” 


CHAPTER NW DE 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS OF FOREKNOWLEDGE, 


ALVINISTIC divines deny that there can be such 
C things as contingent events. They declare 
that all events are foreordained, predetermined, 
and therefore foreknown. ‘‘ Foreknowledge could 
not exist,” said Jonathan Edwards, ‘‘ without de- 
cree.” ‘‘God’s foreknowledge,” says the Autol- 
ogy, ‘‘is derived from the events and the entities 
which he determines shall exist.”” ‘‘It must be de- 
termined,” says Dr. Fiske (Bibliotheca Sacra, 1862), 
‘(what events will be, or there can be no foreknowl- 
edge of them.” The only way a thing can be fore- 
known is that it be foreordained or predetermined. 
‘‘God’s knowing who would be saved,” says Finney, 
“must have been subsequent to his determination to 
save them.” If there could be contingent events, it 
is boldly affirmed, it would be impossible for omni- 
science to foreknow them. Dr. Jamieson asserts: 
‘‘No intelligent being, whether it be God, angel, 
or man, can certainly foreknow a future act of his 
own will. God can not foreknow what his own 
choice or determination will be until he has chosen 
or determined. Acts of the will must, in the nature 
of things, be prior to a knowledge of them. A 
knowledge of volitions, therefore, can never precede 
their existence. An undoubted certainty as to the 

197 


198 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


permanency and stability of the will of him on whom 
the event depends is the only ground for any certain 
foreknowledge of that event. But this certainty as 
to the permanency and stability of will in a free 
agent can never be found anywhere but in God. In 
a creature there can be nothing which could be the 
ground of absolute divine foreknowledge; for cer- 
tain and immutable foreknowledge can be founded 
only on a certain and immutable cause. But such 
certain and immutable cause can be found nowhere 
but in the divine will. Therefore, before God can 
foreknow future events he must determine them.”’ 
Dr. Charles Hodge, in his new and great work on 
theology, says that ‘‘contingency is just as incon- 
sistent with divine foreknowledge as it is inconsistent — 
with foreordination; for what is foreknown must be 
just as certain as what is foreordained. Foreknowl- 
edge is just as inconsistent with liberty and freedom 
as foreordination.”’ He declares that ‘‘there is no 
certainty, there can be no certainty, which does not 
» eT here: catia 
no event which is suspended on a condition which is 


depend upon the divine purpose.’ 


undetermined by God himself.” ‘‘No reason can 
be given,’ says Charnock, ‘‘why God knows a thine 
to be but because he infallibly wills it.”’ ‘‘ Future 
events,” says Dr. John Dick, ‘‘can not be foreseen 
unless they are certain. But they can not be cer- 
tain unless God has determined to bring them to 
pass. If things be contingent, God can not fore- 
know them. Without the will of God decreeing a 
thing to come to pass, it is impossible for him to 
know that it will infallibly come to pass.” Mr. 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS. 199 


Watson says, that ‘‘Socinus and his followers, all 
the supralapsarian Calvinists and a few Arminians 
affirm that, the foreknowledge of future contingent 
events being utterly impossible and implying a 
contradiction, it does not dishonor the Divine Be- 
ing to say that of such events he has and can 
have no prescience whatever.’”’ Calvinistic writers of 
the past and the present generally unite in saying 
that Omniscience could not possibly foreknow events 
that are contingent; that it is not certain and can not 
be certain, as Dr. Hodge says, ‘‘how men will act 
under certain conditions, if their conduct be not pre- 
determined.” Now this unanimity of belief, in a 
body of divines so discriminating and candid, must 
be regarded as a- strong presumption against the 
truth of absolute divine foreknowledge by those who 
do believe that the choices of the human will are 
really contingent events, and who maintain that 
genuine contingencies do occur under the divine 
administration. 

Now to affirm that there can be no such things 
as contingencies, on the definite ground and for the 
simple reason that if any such things should ever 
come to pass, it would be impossible for God to fore- 
know them, is just as much a limitation, and just as 
much a reflection o1. Omniscience, as it would be to 
admit the possible existence of such future contingen- 
cies, but yet to deny the possibility of Omniscience 
foreknowing them. Contingent events are impossible 
say those writers, because Omniscience could not 
foreknow them. They are right in affirming that it 
is impossible for God to foreknow future contingent 


200 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


events, but they are in error when they infer that 
there are, therefore, no such things as future contin- 
gent events; for the denial of possible and actual 
contingencies in the moral administration of God 
plunges us into a sea of glaring absurdities, from 
which no intellectual ingenuity has ever been able to 
rescue devout inquirers. Dr. Hodge and others of 
the same school agree with the writer in denying 
that it is possible for Omniscience absolutely to fore- 
know future contingent events. And if the writer 
thereby limits and reflects upon Omniscience, so do 
they. The only objection, therefore, that can be 
urged with any force against the denial of the uni- 


versal prescience of future contingencies—namely, 
that it limits Omniscience—is thus completely and 
triumphantly silenced for one portion of the theo- 
logical world. 

But the opposition to all such conceptions of the 
Divine Being as imply some limitation of his attri- 
butes, is unjustifiable and directly traceable to false the- 
ological teaching and radical misapprehension of the 
character of Ged, the modes of the divine existence, 
and the economy of his administration. God is nota 
lawless being. He exists and acts under laws, some of 
which are super-imposed and some are self-imposed. 
That is, he acts under laws, some of which are not 
dependent on God for their existence and authority, 
and some of which are dependent on him for their 
origin, authority, and efficiency. Right and justice, 
for example, have their origin, not in the will or 
edict of God, but in the eternal fitness of things. 
‘Fitness or unfitness in moral action,” says Bishop 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS. 201 


Butler, ‘‘is prior to all will whatever, and determines 
the divine conduct.” The same may be affirmed 
of certain principles in physics, in metaphysics, and 
in mathematics. That two and two are four, and not 
five; that the three angles of a triangle are equal to 
two right angles and not three, is essentially, un- 
changeably, and eternally true. That certain acts are 
just and right, and that certain other acts are unjust 
and wrong, are equally certain, and would be certain 
if theism were false and atheism were true. These 
principles and the laws which govern them are not 
dependent upon God for their existence and verity, 
and he can not change them. Four units can never 
be five, and right can never be wrong anywhere in 
the universe, or at any period of duration. Under 
these laws God exists. They are as eternal as his 
own essence, and he can not but act in harmony 
with them. They are super-imposed. 

But it does not follow that God is thereby limited 
in any such a sense as would imply imperfection in 
his nature. It is the crowning excellence and glory 
of his nature that he never does and never will violate 
a single principle of right, justice, goodness, or truth. 
All this would be equally true, if there were not a 
single intelligence in the universe besides God. But 
when God had created the race of human beings, 
laws adapted to their constitution and circumstances 
became necessary for their. government; and the 
establishment of those laws imposes certain obliga- 
tions upon himself as well as upon them. They are 
bound to obey his laws. He is equally bound to act in 
harmony with them and the modes of administration 


202 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


which they require. Men, being fallible, may violate 
their obligations; God, being infallible, never will. 
Having created mankind under the law of liberty, he 
can not himself violate that law in his government 
over them in any single proceeding involving their 
moral character and destiny. Having created them 
free and made them responsible for the use of their 
moral freedom, he can not constrain a single act or 
volition involving moral character. He wishes—he 
intensely desires—that they may do right. But he. 
can not force them to obedience, because a forced 
obedience is no obedience at all, morally. 

This will be said to be a limitation of omnipo- 
tence. It is a self-imposed limitation. But this self- 
imposed limitation does not imply any imperfection 
in his attribute of omnipotence. On the contrary, it 
argues greater power in God, that he could create a 
being with such wonderful endowments and marvel- 
ous powers as man, free and capable of unconstrained 
volition and action, and so of achieving a moral 
character and a glorious destiny. It simply affirms 
that God is law-abiding, that he will be true to the 
law which he had imposed upon himself and man- 
kind, and which he had announced as the basis of 
his moral government. It merely affirms that he will 
not constrain those acts of free beings, for which he 
holds them accountable and responsible. It does 
not detract from the perfection of omnipotence that 
he can not violate the law of human freedom which 
he has himself established. 

Now just as the establishment of the law of lib- 
erty, just as the condition of human responsibility 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS. 203 


limits God to its observance, and places it beyond 
his power to constrain a responsible volition or act 
(except for the purpose of retribution, as before 
mentioned), so his creation of human beings endowed 
with the power of original volition and action limits 
his omniscience, and makes it impossible for him to 
foreknow absolutely (that is, except as contingencies, 
as possibilities) the free choices of those beings. 
In both cases there is a_ self-imposed limitation 
which, instead of detracting from, reflects greater 
luster and glory upon the divine character. Does it 
not imply greater wisdom and knowledge,.as well 
as power, in God to be able to create a being whose 
acts he can not foreknow, and who, by his very con- 
stitution, limits omniscience, than it would to create 
a being whose future choices and destiny are all em- 
braced within the divine prescience with as much cer- 
tainty as the movements of a machine are foreknown 
by an inventor? Certainly the being who could do 
the former would be immeasurably greater than the 
one who could only do the latter. Should an artif- 
icer make a chronometer that for years should accu- 
rately mark the pulsations of his wrist, and should 
be able to foretell its movements for months to come, 
he would give evidence of great mechanical genius. 
But suppose that he could make an instrument with 
the power of contrary choice, able to select for itself 
any one of the various ways possible to it; then how 
much more marvelous would be his wisdom and cre- 
ative genius! How much grander then the Creator, 
who can make a being whose future choices could not 
be foreknown even by himself! There is, then, no 


204 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


foundation for the unreasoning opposition and preju- 
dice against the doctrine of the non-foreknowledge 
of God, as implying a limitation of his omniscience, 
since such a limitation must necessarily be self- 
imposed. It does not detract from, but greatly 
enhances, the splendor of the divine perfections for 
God to be able to make such a being as would, by 
the necessary laws of his constitution prevent the 
foreknowledge of his future resolves.. God limits 
his omnipotence in making the human will capable 
of withstanding it. And every free moral agent is 
endowed with this capacity of withstanding omnipo- 
“tence, if liberty be a reality and not a delusion. In 
like manner God limits his omniscience in creating 
beings capable of choices and volitions which it is 
impossible to previse. The latter no more implies an 
imperfection in the Deity than the former. These 
two are among the moet glorious of the manifesta- 
tions of the Almighty in the vast realm of pure 
contingency. 

The truth is, so long as we follow Schleiermacher, 
and confound with each other God’s being, knowing, 
willing, and working; or so long as we follow a mul- 
titude of thinkers, and refine God away into an 
unknowable abstraction, full of all manner of contra- 
dictions; or so long as we reduce him to a simple 
durationless unity exclusive of all succession and 
differences, we never can construct an intelligible 
theology. No thoughtful man will question the 
necessity for a reasonable theology. But the indis- 
pensable condition of obtaining such a theology is to 
conceive of God as an infinite person. With such a 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS. 205 


conception of him the necessity for various self-limita- 
tions in his nature promptly and powerfully forces 
itself upon us. 

A being, indeed, can not possess the essential 
prerogatives of a person without this power of self- 
limitation. God, though infinite, being a person, 
does in various ways limit himself. In order to pre- 
serve the perfect and consistent harmony of his 
ineffable attributes, he limits his freedom. He limits 
his power by the restraints his benevolence imposes 
upon its exercise. His goodness holds with a steady 
hand his omnipotence. His omnipotence does not 
impose upon him the necessity of doing all that it is 
potentially possible for him to do. He always acts 
and creates freely, not necessarily. If he acts freely 
he might create beings more or fewer in number 
than, and different from, those he has brought into 
existence. In all his creatings absolute freedom 
characterizes his procedures; he voluntarily limits the 
full realization of his infinite power. If he had not 
so done, he could not have created beings endowed 
with selfdecision. When he created a being so en- 
dowed, so independent as to be in himself capable 
of withstanding his will and of deciding adversely to 
his wishes, he deliberately placed a limitation upon 
his omnipotence. The revelation which God has 
given us suggests how premeditated was this act of 
creation, and how deep were his emotions in the 
contemplation of such a being as man. For after, 
with a single fiat, creating earth and sea with all the 
vegetable and animal kingdoms, the firmament, the 


sun, moon, and stars, with evident thoughtfulness 
18 


206 THE: FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


and profound interest, if not appzehension, he ap- 
proached the creation of an immortal being. How 
solemn and impressive were his words and manner, 
“Tet us make man in our own image and after our 
likeness. So God created man in his own image, in 
the image of God created he him.” No wonder he 
lamented so profoundly his fall and ruin. 

If, in some way, God could not limit his will, and 
so could not create a being possessing a self-deter- 
mining will, there could have been no free will in 
the universe external to the divine will. But such 
a self-limitation in Deity furnishes a basis and a 
scope for the exercise of the human will. And if 
freedom of the will means any thing, it means that 
the will is master of its own actions. God recog- 
nizes this, for after man had decided against him, he 
said, ‘‘Behold the man is become as one of us, to 
know good and evil’’—has exercised the prerogative 
of his free will, not only to decide for himself, and in- 
dependently of, but also against, the will of his maker, 
and has thereby come into the knowedge, the expe- 
rience of evil, as well as of good. God had limited 
the freedom of his own omnipotence in order to 
‘make possible the freedom of the creature. Without 
this limitation, as we have said, he could not have 
created a being who could resemble him in his own 
glorious attribute of liberty. A spirit determining 
itself by means of its freedom, must be the acme of . 
creation and the glory of the finite moral Universe. 

God limits himself relatively to moral good. He 
desires goodness with all the conceivable preference 
of his nature. Nevertheless he simply requires it 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS. 207 


of his accountable creatures. In love and wisdom 
he created beings so independent that they have the 
power to decide against him, against his moral na- 
ture, law, and government. He requires obedience 
to moral law; but he will not accept it unless it comes 
freely from a free will. He wills that moral good 
should proceed from that freedom, and this involves 
the possibility of realizing moral evil. Holiness im- 
plies free selfdetermination on the part of every one 
who realizes it. God’s will may be addressed to a 
soul, by way of illumination, entreaty, warning, or 
command, but never by way of causative determina- 
tion relative to choices involving morality. A com- 
mand itself implies the prerogative of choice and the 
possibility of disobedience. 

God limits himself in refusing to bring about by 
force that which he has commanded. He reserves to 
his creatures to decide matters which he has left 
wholly undecided. The realization of God’s great 
world-aim can only be attained through the instru- 
mentality of free beings. True, all power must be 
from God. He sustains the free being in existence 
while exercising free will. The power to put forth 
volition is every moment the gift of God. Still, in 
virtue of the endowment of liberty, man is capable 
of volitionating that which is odious in the sight of 
God, and subversive of his own rectitude and well- 
being. And we pause here to note that this capa- 
bility shows the greatness of the being in whom it 
resides; that it proves the necessity of such a being 
in order to the realization of the highest ideal of 
creation and the highest ideal of a divine Creator, 


208 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


For, without freedom in the human soul, how could 
we ever conceive of freedom in the Infinite? 

God limits himself in not arbitrarily excluding 
moral evil from his universe. His holiness abhors/ 
the introduction of iniquity. He desires, as no words 
can indicate, an unpolluted universe. The moral 
attributes of his nature stand pledged to prevent the 
realization of wickedness, so far as it is possible con- 
sistently with the greatest perfection and highest 
happiness of his creation. And yet he limits him- 
self by not preventing that unspeakable catastrophe. 
On the confines of human liberty he halts, restrains 
all the glowing attributes of the Godhead, and waits 
with inexpressible solicitude the result of man’s free 
decisions. The terrific reality of sin could come into 
the universe only through a creature will in its inde- 
pendent action, through a free will acting adversely 
to that of God. Though God had the positive power 
to prevent the entrance of evil, he did not exclude 
it, because this could not be done without infracting 
that ‘law of freedom on which creation’s highest per- 
fection depends. ‘‘The highest declarative glory of 
God,” says Dr. Whedon, ‘‘consists in the existence 
of his retributive moral government. But the exist- 
ence of this government requires of God the con- 
cession to his creature of a power which in its course 
of action he will neither violate nor annihilate; leav- 
ing the capability, but not the necessity, of freedom 
to guilt, which is judicable, or of freedom to good 
desert, which is rewardable, and of free ‘holiness, 
worship, honor, and glorification of God, which are 
the highest results of a moral kingdom.” 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS. 209 


God limits himself in desiring ends which he 
never attains. We all know many instances in which 
the Father of the universe has completely failed in 
the realization cf his desires. He infinitely desires 
the holiness and happiness of all mankind. And yet 
he beholds the utter failure, ruin, and misery of un- 
counted millions, made in his own image, and for 
whom Christ, the Lord of glory, died. 

God limits himself in respect to the work and re- 
sults to be accomplished in perfecting his universe. 
Once he was the sole worker in all his vast creation. 
But he concluded to limit himself by creating other 
independent, responsible workers, to be co-workers 
with him in preserving moral order and achieving 
mental and moral greatness. 

God limits his mercy, If he did not, his justice 
would be overthrown, and ground sufficient would 
be given for the apprehension that moral evil might 
in the process of time invade and blight all realms. 

If God limits his omnipotence, in creating a be- 
ing whose willfulness can withstand his Creator and 
defeat his purposes, this limitation only shows how 
illimitable and perfect is his power of causation. And 
in like manner God demonstrates his greater great- 
ness, by creating a being whose future choices could 
not be absolutely foreknown, but should lie as much 
out of the range of omniscience as they unquestion- 
ably will lie beyond the control of his omnipotence. 
Arbitrariness in a free spirit, in its power to with- 
stand God, as far transcends omnipotence as the 
foreknowledge of pure contingencies transcends om- 
niscience. Arbitrariness as much depreciates omnip- 


210 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


otence as the incognoscibility of pure contingencies 
can possibly depreciate omniscience. 

But the truth is, this arbitrariness and this non- 
knowability of contingencies depreciate neither the 
one nor the other of these divine attributes. On the 
contrary, these two things, in the most perfect way, 
illustrate both of them. Without creature freedom, 
Creator freedom could have neither a representative 
nor an illustration nor a conception amid all the 
wonders of creation. This would prevent the highest 
ideal and the highest efficiency and the greatest re- 
joicing in the moral universe. How imperfect would 
that universe be without a single illustration of the 
absolute freedom of the Godhead and the modes of 
the divine existence, and without a single created 
being capable of comprehending that freedom. 

But, on the other hand, how many imperfections 
and limitations crowd into our conceptions of Deity 
the moment we assume universal prescience. If 
absolute foreknowledge be true, then it is impossible 
that God should experience any more changes in 
thought and feeling, that he should feel any more 
interest, solicitude, expectancy, or anticipation, rela- 
tive to countless immortal souls who are on their 
probation for an endless destiny of happiness or of 
misery, than he does over the brilliant orbs with 
which he adorns the sky above us, or the flowers he 
sprinkles beneath our feet. For foreknowledge ne- 
cessitates that God’s consciousness should be eter- 
nally unchangeable. Every thought, feeling, pur- 
pose, and act of the Godhead is immovably fixed in 
a single position and a changeless relation. From 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS. 211 


eternity to eternity his infinite consciousness must 
be absolutely unchangeable. A consciousness that 
is ever one and the same would be no more real or 
realized than a sound which is ever one and the 
same could be audible. Such limitations upon God 
are so shocking that they give way of themselves. 
God does repudiate them all in his sublime, varied, 
and endless meditations. Better far strive to grasp 
in a single hand all the blessed beams as they pour 
out over creation from the bosom of the Suny tian 
to concentrate into a changeless unity all the infi- 
nitely varied and ever-changing thoughts, feelings, 
purposes, involved in the eternal consciousness of 
him who is from everlasting unto everlasting. How 
the dogma of foreknowledge degrades the great 
I Am! 

Indeed, if God now foreknows every thing that 
will ever come to pass, then every thing in the future 
will come to pass as he now foreknows it. Then, 
logically, he can not do any thing in the future dif- 
ferent from what he now foreknows he will do. Tf 
this be so, his will is restricted to the acting, ina 
specified case, in a single way only. If his will shall 
always be shut up to a single course of action in all 
cases, then he can have but a single choice in any 
specified instance. And if his will be forever shut. 
up to, and only capable of, such single choice, then 
his will is fettered by a logical necessity over which he 
has no volition. But this sweeps freedom, in all its 
reality, naturalness, and spontaneity, from the fath- 
omless depths and heights of the Infinite Mind. Fore- 
knowledge, therefore, destroys the freedom of God, 


212 THE FORERNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


and denies to him all action but the mechanical 
action of an automaton. 

But one may reply, God sees all future events 
from eternity, he sees all the results of the ever- 
changing choices of contingent, accountable beings, 
and he sees all the necessities involved therein ; and 
hence his decision~from eternity is identical with 
what would be an impromptu decision under the act- 
ual occurrence of events. Still, in reply, let it be said 
that you can never escape the tremendous facts that 
in the decision made from eternity there is no option, 
no choice, no deliberation, no special examination of 
the case as it actually occurs, no feeling of interest 
or grief or apprehension appropriate in a merciful 
creator over the ruin of his immortal child, occuring 
in actual history before him. He is destitute of 
those qualities that would be appropriate in a ruler 
over free agents. The qualities appropriate in a 
ruler over accountable beings differ widely from those 
which would be appropriate in a ruler over a universe 
Of material things. If God’s resolves are made for 
him, fatalism is true. But if he originates his re- 
solves relative to accountable beings, it is essential 
to their validity that they be not originated until the 
exigency in his government arises. For a ruler to 
originate a decision relative to a free agent millions 
of years prior to his creation is to do it in the ab- 
sence of functions and factors essential to the char- 
acter of the ruler and to the justness of his decision. 
The acme of feeling is in the actual occurrence of 
events. To see Gabriel. do this hour a deed that 
would ruin his moral nature forever would produce 


CALVINISTIC VIEWS. 25a 


greater grief in the divine mind than to foreknow 
such an event as taking place somewhere far on in 
the eternal ages. The sensibility growing out of 
actual occurrences and the untrammeled freedom of 
choice are essential to the perfection of decisions 
made by a ruler over accountable beings. And such 
is the uniform representation of this subject in the 
Holy Scriptures. 

The highest of our mere intellectual faculties are 
abstraction and generalization. By these powers we 
construct hypotheses, theories, general ideas, all the 
predicables, genera, species, differentia, properties, 
and accidents. All these general ideas we create 
unconcreted and unrealized in any actual existence. 
And is God to be denied this highest of all the mere 
intellectual powers of the human mind? Has he no 
power to construct general ideas, to generalize, to 
classify, to conceive of formule, of indefinite and 
undetermined quantities? Can he not decide upon 
general plans in the abstract, without descending 
to particulars or to individuals? Can he not deter- 
mine that many undetermined things in his vast 
plans shall be determined by his personal creatures? 
Can he not wait for the realizations of his plans, wait 
for the free beings who are to realize them, to appear 
upon the stage? Those ideas of the world, which 
constitute the divine ideal for an actual world in time 
and space, ought not certainly to be denied to him 
who is infinite in all his intellectual perfections. It is 
then indispensable that God should know the future, 
in part, as contingent and undetermined. 

19 


CHAPTER VG 


FOREKNOWLEDGE INCOMPREHENSIBLE, 


HE most acute of the speculative divines of all 
ap the past, who have maintained foreknowledge, 
affirm that it is utterly inconceivable how it is posst- 
ble for God to foreknow the future choices of free 
agents save through a series of necessary causes. 
This is the affirmation of Dr. Samuel Clarke, distin- 
guished for his power of subtle discrimination. And 
Richard Watson says, ‘‘The manner in which the 
Divine Being foreknows the free choices of free 
agents is inconceivable even to the greatest minds 
that have ever studied the subject.” ‘‘How God 
came by this foreknowledge is the real difficulty,” 
says Dr. Whedon, ‘‘and there we leave it as for- 
ever insoluble.” ‘‘It would puzzle the greatest phi- 
losopher that ever was,’’ says Tillotson, ‘‘to give 
any tolerable account how any knowledge whatever 
can certainly foresee an event through uncertain and 
contingent causes.”” What right, then, I ask, have 
they to affirm so confidently that omniscience can 
foreknow contingent choices and events? 

True, it is impossible. for us to conceive how it is 
possible for God to be omnipresent; but the admis- 
sion of omnipresence is demanded by many consid- 
erations that make it a logical necessity. And its 
affirmation is attended with no shocking sequences, 

214 


LOREKNOWLEDGE INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 215 


and involves no impossibilities and absurdities. It 
does not, like foreknowledge, overwhelm us with 
difficulties, lose us among mysteries, and appall us 
with perplexities. We have, therefore, no reasons 
for rejecting omnipresence, however incomprehen- 
sible it may be. But no one has any foundation or 
data whatever for his inference that omniscience can 
foresee the future choices of free beings, while acting 
under the law of liberty. A sagacious writer has 
said, ‘‘A future free act is, previous to its existence, 
a nothing,” and ‘‘the knowing of a nothing is a bald 
contradiction.”’ If an act be free, it must be contin- 
gent. If contingent, it may or may not happen, or 
it may be one of many possibles. And if it may be 
one of many possibles, it must be uncertain; and if 
uncertain, it must be unknowable. There is no con- 
sideration that makes divine foreknowledge a neces- 
sity. And if we are nowhere taught in revelation, 
and if it be also incomprehensible how this divine 
foreknowledge is possible, the inference ought to be 
adverse to the doctrine of prescience. But if it were 
possible for omniscience to foreknow ages before- 
hand my choices, on which my eternal destiny de- 
pends, is it not highly probable that the manner, 
the how, and the process of such foreknowledge, 
would be discoverable? A thousand necessities plead 
earnestly that we should know through what means 
it is that God can foreknow the future free choices and 
actions of free agents. No evil could result to any one 
from our knowing how such knowledge can be pos- 
sible; multitudes of perplexities would vanish the 
moment the mysterious process should be revealed 


1) 


216 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


to the race. Explanation on this point would relieve 
all inquiring minds. The fact that such explanation 
never has been vouchsafed is certainly a presumption 
that such knowledge is not necessary to the perfec- 
tion of the Deity. 

“A future free choice of a free spirit’ was pro- 
nounced ‘fan unknowable thing’? by Benedict Spi- 
noza, one of a dozen of the most profound minds 
that ever reigned in the republic of thought. And 
as omnipotence is limited by the posszble, so omni- 
science is limited by the kuowable. ‘The cases are 
absolutely similar. As this limitation of omnipo- 
tence does not render God imperfect, so also this 
limitation of omniscience does not render him less 
than perfect. The limitation in both cases rests on 
the same ground; namely, the law of self-consistency, 
the law that obtains against self-contradiction. We 
do not limit omnipotence by denying its power to do 
impossible or self-contradictory things. Neither do 
we limit omniscience by denying its power to fore- 
know unknowable things. 

The burden of proof surely rests on those who 
affirm that divine prescience includes a knowledge of - 
all future creature volitions. They must show a 
possible logical connection between God’s_ present 
knowledge and the future volitions of imperfect 
creatures, or they must stand in the unenviable pre- 
dicament of those who hold opinions for which they 
can assign neither argument nor analogy nor neces- 
sity. They must relegate this whole subject to the 
labyrinth of mystery, and say, with Dr. Whedon: 
“The great difficulty is to tell how God came by 


FOREKNOWLEDGE INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 21 7 


this knowledge.” ‘“‘Foreknowing an act does not 
prove the necessity of the act, but the inexplicable 
character of its origin.” It certainly is unreasonable 
to ask a man who will reason to believe in absolute 
divine foreknowledge, without giving to him a single 
text of Holy Writ that teaches it, or a single proof 
of its reality, or an argument for its necessityrorea 
reason for it suggested in the operations of necessary 
thought, or even a principle in the analogy of faith 
that requires its admission. Until the advocates of 
universal prescience can present something besides 
dogmatic assertion in its support, the writer must 
remain standing respectfully before them in the atti- 
tude of a perplexed but devout questioner. If they 
claim its solution to be impossible, they ought surely 
to demonstrate its necessity, if they would win for it 
any adherents. 


CHAPTER XV: 
VIEWS OF OTHERS. 


oi HE Socinians and the Remonstrants against 

Supralapsarian Calvinists deny,” says Dr. 
Hodge, ‘‘that future free acts can be foreknown.”’ 
“There is a large class of thinkers,” says Dr. Whe- 
don, ‘‘who deny foreknowledge, and contemplate 
the field of free events as spreading out unconceived 
by any anterior prescience.”’ Dr. Adam Clarke has 
written a short paragraph on what he calls the awful 
subject of the foreknowledge of God. He was, I 
think, unfortunate in some of his statements, though 
clearly perceiving and fearlessly indorsing the nega- 
tive of this question. But some of his utterances 
are surely worthy of the most careful consideration. 
He says: ‘If God has made a thing absolutely cer- 
tain, it is absurd for any one to say that he fore- 
knows that thing to be contingent.”” ‘‘It is equally 
absurd to say that God foreknows a thing to be ab- 
solutely certain which in his own eternal counsel and 
purpose he has made and resolved shall be absolutely 
contingent.” ‘A denial of the contingency of human 
actions involves a concatenation of the most glaring 


” 


and ruinous absurdities. ‘“‘An admission of the 
contingency of human actions makes every intelligent 
creature responsible. And an admission that every 


accountable creature is accountable for his own works, 
218 


VIEWS OF OTHERS. 219 


in order to be consistent, requires the admission that 
God foresees nothing as absolutely and inevitably 
certain which he has made contingent, and made 
contingent because he desired and intended that it 
should be contingent. He can not therefore know it 
as absolutely and inevitably certain.” 

It is to be regretted that a man of such powers 
and acquisitions did not give more time to the eluci- 
dation of this important subject, and that he did not 
search after the argument in favor of a doctrine the 
truth and the necessity of which he so clearly appre- 
hended. From the large volume of his thoughts he took 
this sibylline leaf and gave it to the onward breeze.* 
Had he analyzed the subject more perfectly he might 
have demonstrated that a foreknowledge of those acts 
of free agents which imply moral character involves 
absurdity. Such contingencies lie outside all legiti- 
mate knowledge, and transcend all legitimate think- 
ing and perceiving, even for a supreme intelligence 
that is infinite in its capacities. But he denies fore- 
knowledge on the ground of God’s voluntary choice, 
affirming that God is as free in the volitions of his 
knowledge as he is in the volitions of his power. 
He says that ‘‘omnipotence, though it implies the 
power to do all things, does not imply that God 


* But we may safely consider the opinion of a man so great 
and learned, upon a subject to which he had given patient thought, 
a presumption in favor of his view sufficiently strong to merit our 
attention and devout prayer for light. And surely he who em- 
braces and enforces the view of universal prescience which is pre- 
sented by Dr. A. Clarke ought not to be covered with epithets by 
a people whose theological opinions and popular convictions have 
been formed by him more than by any other man, living or dead. 


220 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


actually does do all things. And so, though God is 
omniscient, and can know all things, it does not fol- 
low that he does know all things.” Thus, without 
proper carefulness in his statements, he brought his 
proposition into disrepute and general rejec-ion. He 
supported his proposition with a fallacy so unpar- 
donable that it has occasioned abundant mirth for 
after critics. And the contempt appropriate to his 
argument has also been extended to his proposition. 
How often it happens that a fallacious argument does 
serious damage to most important truths! 

Richard Rothe, Professor of Theology in Heidel- 
berg University, is thus characterized by Dr. Schaff: 
‘(He holds the very first place among the speculative 
divines of the present day. He surpasses Nitzsch, 
Miiller, Dorner, Bauer, Martensen; and in grasp and 
independence of thought he is hardly inferior to 
Schleiermacher. His ‘System of Theological Ethics’ 
is the greatest work on speculative divinity which has 
appeared since Schleiermacher’s ‘Dogmatics.’ It is 
full of power, boldness, and originality. The several 
stones of the ethical system are reared up here in 
the strength and beauty of a Gothic cathedral, under 
the hand of a skillful architect. He is exceedingly 
popular as,a teacher, and enjoys the respect and ad- 
miration of all who know him personally, as a man 
and a Christian.”’ This distinguished man wrote a 
work denying the foreknowledge of God, which was 
vehemently, but by no means vigorously, attacked 
by Julius Miller. But Prof. Rothe replied to all 
his arguments, and affirmed that all his great antag- 
onist had written upon the subject, had only con- 


VIEWS OF OTHERS. 221 


firmed him in the views which he had previously 
presented.“ Rothe. also ..quotes... Lotze,.. Weiss;;.and 
Martensen, as supporting his side of the question. 
He concludes his rejoinder to Miiller with the fol- 
lowing impressive words: ‘‘The very religious interest 
itself drives us imperatively to the view of non- 
prescience on the part of God of the free actions 
of imperfect moral beings. In any other view, 
prayer becomes nonsense and even a religiously inex- 
cusable absurdity. The pious mind, in its absolute 
certainty in the reality of true prayer, will and must, 
despite all seemingly good reasons for the contrary, 
boldly and unhesitatingly reject as worthless any and 
every conception of the divine moral government 
which admits of a play-ground for prayer; that is, 
which does not admit of any really determining 
influence of prayer, on our part, on the will of God.” 
This is the utterance of one who is pronounced to 
be the greatest ethical writer in the world, of one 
whom Hubner styles the greatest philosopher ever at 
Weimar.* 

Martensen affirms that whatever can be an ob- 
ject of eternal foreknowledge, must be grounded in 
a law of eternal necessity; and the great Socinus 
boldly denied ‘the dogma of foreknowledge. One of 
the most distinguished divines of the West, a pro- 
found metaphysician and confessedly a sound theo- 
logian, who has written much and well on the 


*But Rothe’s fuller discussions of this subject were inaccessible 
to the writer. He learns, however, that he was hampered in his 
theory with notions of predestination, and by his utter inability to 
safeguard the prophecies of Scripture. 


222 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


deepest themes, says, ‘‘There is no determining a 
consistent theology or constructing an acceptable the- 
odicy, without a denial of the foreknowledge of the 
future free choices of free agents.’”’ And John Mil- 
ton, one of England’s devoutest spirits, must have 
rejected, in his private meditations, the doctrines of 
absolute prescience, for he represents God as saying, 

«So without least impulse or shadow of fate, 

Or aught by me immutably foreseen, 

They trespass, authors to themselves in all 

Both what they judge and what they choose, for so 
I formed them free, and free they must remain 
Till they enthrall themselves.” 

The array of highly gifted intellects that prefer 
to question universal prescience, rather than worry 
with, and invent apologies for, the logical contradic- 
tions which it necessitates, is certainly far too impos- 
ing to be ridiculed either into oblivion or into silence. 


CHAPTER XVI. 


IMPERFECT VIEWS OF OMNISCIENCE. 


AN’S unwillingness to acknowledge that God 
M can not do every thing, and does not foreknow 
every thing in the illimitable future, has prevented 
any consistent and satisfying science or presentation 
of the divine mind. Many prefer to contemplate 
God as a being without emotions, and as incapable 
of any sympathy with the sensitive spirits who have 
failed in the great object of their creation. They 
regard the Infinite One as forever conscious of every 
being, of every thing, every particle of matter, and 
every event; as eternally conscious of all things, —of 
even the down upon every insect’s wing, every note 
in the melody of birds, every drop of water in all 
the oceans that ever have existed, or ever shall exist. 
They believe that all this vast entirety dwells ever in 
the divine mind, and is ever present to the divine 
consciousness, and not a point, or a feather, or a 
ray is for a moment out of his thought. Dr. Jamie- 
son says, ‘‘God’s volitions act on objects infinite in 
number and variety, and yet the act is immutably 
one and the same. Even two volitions in succession 
would destroy the simplicity of the divine essence. 
There can be no distinction in the divine will, and 
‘no succession of thoughts in the divine mind.” Mr. 


Wesley says, ‘‘God does not know one thing before 
228 


224 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


another, or one thing after another. All eternity is 
present to him at once, he sees all things at once in 
one point of view, from everlasting to everlasting.” 
‘“To us,’’ says Finney, ‘‘eternity means past, present, 
and future; but to God eternity means only now.”’ 

But is there any reason why this should be so? 
There is no desirable end to be accomplished by 
holding this infinitude of particulars in endless con- 
sciousness. All that God accomplishes he could 
accomplish without such unlimited obtrusions upon 
his attention. A million years from to-day he might 
make an ocean somewhere in boundless space many 
times larger than the Atlantic. But where is the 
present necessity of his knowing just the number and 
position of the drops in that vast ocean? Where is 
the necessity of his knowing and holding, in his con- 
sciousness, every seed and branch and leaf that shall 
be floated from vast forests into that ocean? Where is 
the necessity of his knowing the precise number of 
vessels that ever may navigate the wide wastes of 
waters of future seas, or the exact nuinber of sailors 
that will ever furl the sails of innumerable ships yet 
to be, or the infinitely varied thoughts and habits 
and accidents and purposes of each one of all such 
uncounted individuals? 

The mind breaks down amid such bewildering 
amplifications of particulars. And, indeed, if these 
necessities could be demonstrated, the demonstration 
would be the strongest argument ever yet advanced 
in support of Pantheism. To say that God foreknew 
from all eternity just what kind of a world our planet 
should be, would be to place the conceiving and 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 225 


planning, the deliberating and choosing in the divine 
mind relative to this world, away back into the infinite 
depths; it would be to find no point in eternity when 
these things were not. This would prevent any 
conceiving, deliberating, or choosing immediately 
anterior to the creation of the globe. All the in- 
numerable questions relative to creation had been 
settled ages of cycles before—always, in fact. And 
this transfers all the intellectual, emotional, and ra- 
tional activities of Jehovah far back into the dateless 
eternity of the past. This forbids the possibility of 
the infinite being doing or creating any thing that is 
new in conception. This binds in chains his free 
will. His infinite free will has no scope nor opportu- 
nity for its legitimate and normal exercise; it has 
no freedom in the present; all his activities are in 
rigid and unalterable obedience to resolves made long 
before a leaf fluttered or an intellect listened in all 
the universe, to resolves that always were already 
made—which seems to us a contradiction in terms. 
To say that God, from all eternity, knew with abso- 
lute certainty just what he will do in any moment in 
the boundless future, is to exclude deliberation and 
choice and the legitimate action of the divine will. 
This view prevents all those appropriate expe- 
riences in the divine soul which are necessary to the 
successive moments of his eternal life. But it is no 
more appropriate in God to determine what kind of 
a world he would make a million years before he did 
make it than to determine upon it just before he 
did make it. On the other hand, it is much more 
natural for him to conceive, to plan, to choose, and 


226 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


to create in ‘immediate connection the one with 
the other. Such a course would give life, freshness, 
and the momentary delight of putting forth creative 
energies to the successive moments in the existence 
of the infinite mind. That he generally conceived, 
planned, and executed in immediate succession, or at 
near periods in the absence of all proof to the con- 
trary, is certainly the more plausible and probable. 

Let us go back toa time before our world existed. 
Our standards have never taught that matter is eternal. 
And if it is not eternal, then there was a time when 
this world did not exist; and there was a time when — 
it was called into existence by the Creator. There 
was also a time when God was contemplating its 
creation, when he was considering whether or not he 
would make it, and when he was considering what 
kind of a world he would make. He might have made 
a world very different from the one he did make. 
If he could not, then his will was not free. If he 
knew from all eternity what kind of a world he was 
going to make, then he could not have deliberated 
on the subject at any conceivable date prior to the 
act of creation. He had no freedom of choice be- 
tween the varieties of worlds, which arose in count- 
less throngs before his exhaustless conception and 
imagination. He was shut up to the one eternally 
conceived plan. But such painful limitations upon the 
freedom, the nature, and the life of the Creator are 
wholly inconsistent with his revealed perfections, and 
must therefore be incredible. We are driven to be- 
lieve that immediately prior to creation he did delib- 
erate what sort of a world he would make. While he 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 227 


was contemplating the subject he was already omni- 
scient. This omniscience embraced all subjects of > 
knowledge, all knowable things; but it did not em- 
brace a knowledge of the future facts, developments, 
results, and possibilities of a world, the kind or like 
of which he had not thought of making, nor of one 
which he had not determined he would make. All 
such facts, results, developments, and destinies were 
by no means objects of knowledge. They were not 
knowable things, because they had no existence 
whatever. Omniscience could not have embraced a 
knowledge of the future facts, developments, choices, 
and results of such a world as this before it had been 
determined to create it. Why, then, should it be 
thought necessary, in order to maintain the perfec- 
tion of omniscience, that omniscience should embrace 
a knowledge of all such contingent particulars possi- 
ble to a world constituted as he finally determined 
that he would constitute this planet, and that at the 
very moment in which he conceived his purpose and 
contrived his plan for its creation? And why should 
omniscience, in order to maintain its perfection, be 
forced to embrace a knowledge of all future facts, re- 
sults, and choices of the free agents, who should pos- 
sess the power of taking the initiative, of creating 
causal forces, of making moral character, and fixing 
endless destinies? | 
If all such matters were not objects of knowledge 
before he determined what kind of a world he would 
create, what could make them such the moment that 
he determined, in general outline, that he would create 
such a being as man, clothed with the august endow- 


228 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


ments of liberty, and an ability to disappoint his 
desires and expectations and defeat his purposes? 
If a knowledge of all those future free choices was 
not necessary to the perfection of omniscience before 
he finally decided to create man, what could consti- 
tute it necessary, in order to maintain this perfection, 
that omniscience should embrace a perfect knowledge 
of all these varied contingent particulars at the mo- 
ment he said, ‘‘Let us make man in our own image?” 

Indeed, if the foreknowledge of the future choices 
of free spirits be essential to the perfection of omni- 
science, then omniscience could not have been per- 
fect in the absence of a purpose to create free agents 
whose choices could furnish the objects of that fore- 
knowledge. And if the perfection of omniscience 
requires a purpose to create a world of free agents, 
then the creation of the finite is essential to the per- 
fection of the infinite. The perfection, therefore, of 
the infinite is not at all subjective, but objective—a 
conclusion too monstrous for a moment’s tolerance. 
Dr. Fiske (in the Bzbliotheca Sacra for April, 1862) 
says, ‘‘The foreknowledge of future events is not an 
essential attribute of God, for we can conceive of 
him as being perfect without it. For if God had 
not chosen to create a universe he still would have 
been God.”’ 

But was there no time in all eternity past when 
the thoughts, perceptions, purposes,. and plans of 
God, for all eternity to come, were not in the divine 
mind? Either there was such a time or there was 
not. If there was not such a time, then all the 
thoughts, perceptions, purposes, and plans of God 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 229 


were just as eternal as himself. You could no more 
go back to a time when they had not all a definite 
existence in the divine mind than you could go back 
to a time when he himself did not exist. Every 
one of those states and acts of the divine mind, and 
all the developments of a universe of free, unco- 
erced agents, and every star, flower, drop, ray, and 
vapor of unintelligent matter, were just as eternal in 
the divine conception as God himself. If there was 
no point in all eternity past when all the thoughts, 
plans, and purposes of God for all the eternity to 
come were not in his mind, did not stand out clear. 
and definite in his conception, then he could not 
have originated them. He no more originated them 
than he originated such necessary truths as that the 
sum of all the angles of a triangle is equal to two 
right angles. They were no more his creation than 
were time, space, and the mathematical axioms. If 
God did not originate those thoughts, intentions, 
purposes, and plans for the endless future, then there 
hever was any exercise of his free will. For the 
exercise of will is to bring into existence some idea, 
thought, purpose, force, result, or being that previ- 
ously had no existence. And if all such things 
existed in the divine mind from eternity, then there 
could not have been any exercise of his will relative 
to them. They all had a positive existence before 
there was any exercise of the divine will. And if 
they were eternal, they existed from necessity. The 
divine will only wrought according to forms, concep- 
tions, purposes, and plans that were as eternal as him- 


self. And, if this be so, he was just as unfree and 
20 


230 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


coerced relatively to them as he is now relatively to 
mathematical truths. But if there has been no exer- 
cise of the divine will in respect to all the affairs of 
the interminable future, where can we turn to find 
any evidence of the exercise or manifestation of that 
will? Send out imagination on strongest pinion, in 
every direction, in search of instances of its exercise, 
and she returns announcing, ‘‘In all my travels through 
creation I find no evidence that the divine will has 
ever manifested itself; all that I find is the result of 
conceptions and purposes just as eternal as God him- 
self.” But this effectually and summarily expels free 
will and freedom at once and forever from the universe. 
For, if no instance of the exercise of the divine will 
can be discovered, what proof can there be that in the 
nature of God there is such an attribute as free-will? 
If there be no evidence that there is such a faculty in 
God there can be no such faculty in man, for he was 
made in the image and likeness of God. 

But this would at once dismiss freedom, free-will, 
accountability, moral character, and moral distinc- 
tions forever from the world. It would dismiss as 
unsound all thinking which assumes these as data for 
human reasoning and inference. It rejects as un- 
reasonable all the teachings, warnings, threatenings, 
and promises of a supposed divine revelation. It 
rejects as absurd our belief in intuitions and primary 
truths, our reliance on the teachings of conscience, 
and all trust in any asseveration of universal religious 
consciousness. And if this be correct, then necessa- 
rily all things are under the control of a blind, grim 
necessity. All the mental processes of God’s mind, 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 231 


all his feelings, thoughts, conceptions, purposes, and 
plans are irrevocably fated. Under such an hy pothe- 
sis, there can be no law in the universe save that of 
necessity. 

Philosophy never did announce the doctrine that 
God is a free being until it had discovered freedom 
in the depths of human consciousness; but as soon 
as it had made that discovery then forthwith, as 
with the strength, flight, and exultation of an angel, 
it ascended to the throne of God and attributed the 
same endowment to the divine mind as the most 
sublime of his natural attributes, and as essential to 
his sovereignty. Ever since that time all sound 
philosophy has proclaimed God to be a free being, 
and pronounced the system of necessity to be philo- 
sophically false, and practically, in all ways, harmful 
to its devotees. 

And right here breaks upon the Inquiring mind 
the amazing fact, that the dread system of necessity 
is based upon the assumption of universal prescience. 
Admit universal prescience, and nothing can rescue 
us from the cold and cruel embrace of fatalism. All 
God's thoughts, plans, purposes, and feelings roll 
forth from necessity. In them there is no exercise 
of free will, and fatalism binds him this hour in all 
his life and processes and creative acts as firmly as 
gravitation holds the sun in the ecliptic or rules the’ 
waters in seeking their level. God could never do 
any thing different from that which he does do; none 
of his creations, doings, volitions, or thinkings could 
ever vary or be changed in the slightest degree. 


232 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


This would utterly annihilate the divine freedom— 
not, however, because God’s knowledge has any 
influence over the facts, but because the facts existed , 
from eternity, and are absolutely necessary in their 
nature. They would be as necessary as.God him- 
self is a necessary being. And if this be true, God 
is not and can not be a voluntary, self-determining 
being. .He would be a necessary agent, working 
necessities alone from necessity. Far above his will 
would stand the dread monster of fatalistic neces- 
sity. Prayer addressed to him would be an absurdity 
as inexcusable, as would be a supplication addressed 
to a whirlwind. He has no choices to originate, no 
determinations to make now. All his choices were 
originated for him by necessity from all eternity. 
His choices gone and his deliberation gone, then his 
freedom is gone; and with his freedom, his personality 
is gone; and personality gone, Pantheism rises into 
view as the inevitable result. Then the glorious God, 
personal, free, and eternal, vanishes forever from our 
contemplation, amid the bewildering clouds of that 
fatalistic system of religious philosophy. 

We thus see that while absolute divine foreknow- 
ledge makes free agency in man inconsistent and in- 
explicable, it eliminates that indispensable quality 
from God. He has ever been bound, in all that he 
has thought, resolved, and done, toa particular course 
or series of acts, from which it has never been pos- 
sible for him in the slightest to depart. But it is the 
nature of mind ever to originate, under the direction 
of the will, conceptions, thoughts, considerations, 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 2a 


images, inferences, purposes, plans, and systems, all 
requiring the power of free volition for their exist- 
ence. Take from the mind its faculty of free will, 
and it would be but little more significant than a leaf 
on the wave or an insect in the breeze. Willing 
and originating and modifying can not be separated. 

But to affirm that the infinite mind is incapable of 
originating new thoughts, new plans, and new pur- 
poses in his infinite and eterna! activities, is to limit 
irrationally his infinite perfections. To escape Pan- 
theism on the one hand, and stark necessity on the 
other hand, to avoid charging grave imperfections 
upon God and limiting his omnipotence in respect to 
originating new forms, creations, and enterprises, we 
are compelled to admit that there was a time in the 
eternal past, when some thoughts and purposes were 
not before him. God must have the power of freely 
taking the initiative, or there never could have 
been any thing created. ‘‘In the beginning God 
created the heaven and the earth.” Before any 
finite thing existed, he contemplated the widely 
varied forms and ideals of creation that arose in 
diversified beauty and grandeur before him, and 
from this multitude he freely selected some speci- 
mens and willed them into existence. This act 
involved voluntary, causative, and inceptiye action. 
In the various motives or reasons for his selections 
out of the beautiful images and magnificent systems 
that arose before his infinite understanding and imag- 
ination, there was nothing to coerce his free will in 
the exercise of his omnipotent energies. That auto- 
cratic attribute of freedom, of perfect liberty, of 


234 THE FORERNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


untrammeled volitions was here displayed in all its 
regality and: impressiveness.* 

If there had been another infinite intelligence in full 
survey of all the motives and incentives to act, which 
were before the divine mind, and in full survey of all 
the forms from which he would select for creation, 
that infinite intelligence could not have divined which 
forms God would sélect and determine upon. He 
could not have foreknown this, simply because God’s 
will is perfectly free, is coerced by nothing outside of 
itself, and because there is no coerciveness in any of 
the forms of creation or reasons for action that could 
present themselves to the mind of God. His will 
being perfectly free and initiative and causative, fet- 
tered by no law, coerced by no necessity, and bound 
to no uniformity, his final choice and determination 
could not have been foreknown. If you affirm that 
the supposed infinite intelligence could have fore- 
known God’s final determination, I inquire, How 
do you know? Most assuredly there is no data on 
which to posit knowledge as to the future choices of 
God’s free will. A thing that might be or might not 
be, or might be one of a thousand different and equally 
probable things, certainly can not be an object of fore- 
knowledge. But if you say, that knowing Just the 
motives, reasons, influences, and forms of creation 
which would act on the divine mind, that other sup- 


* To bind his free, spontaneous will with the adamantine chains 
of an eternally fixed and established order of futuritions, so limits, 
degrades, and dethrones him, that it is too painful for a moment’s 
tolerance, and any relief from such consequences ought to be 
hailed with gladness and gratitude. 


IMPERFECT VIEW s. 235 


posed infinite intelligences could foresee the choices 
and final determinations of God’s will, I answer: That 
would subject the divine will; would enslave the divine 
will to its surroundings; would degrade it from the 
law of liberty, and subject it to the law of cause and 
effect. It would degrade it from the supernatural 
down to the natural, and from the contingent to the 
inevitable, from the free to the constrained. 

But let us again go back to a period before any 
created thing had an existence. From all eternity 
God existed, infinite in all his perfections. These 
perfections could never be increased or diminished. 
His essential attributes and joys and glory never 
could be added to or subtracted from. The cy- 
cles from eternity to eternity. might have passed 
on in infinite bliss, in glorious meditations, and 
in joyful fellowship between Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. God needed nothing to supplement his 
essential blessedness and greatness. But, at some 
point in the dateless past, he resolved that he would 
create matter and worlds and intelligent, accountable, 
sensitive beings. And as soon as he put this resolve 
into execution, and a bright and breathing and help- 
less universe was created, and myriads of sensitive, 
intelligent beings were crowding around him, all 
hanging on his infinite heart, all sighing for his smile, 
all longing to know more of his nature and glory, all 
weeping if in order to the discipline and testing of 
their loyalty he for a moment hid or shaded his face 
from them, and all trusting in him, then a new state 
of things pervaded the heart of the Infinite Father. 
At once he finds he has a new and vast world of per- 


236 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


sonal existence. At once he is the subject of new 
experiences. At once he is called out of the meas- 
ureless depths of his own infinite, fathomless self. 
New cares, new interests, new enterprises, new hap- 
piness, and new hopes break in upon his infinite mind 
and heart. And then there comes upon that nature 
of boundless sensibility and goodness, for the first 
time during all the eternal ages, a new and a dreadful 
experience, the experience of grief over the failure 
of some of his intelligent creatures to fulfill his grand 
designs to make for themselves a glorious destiny. 
All this care, support, instruction, entreaty, promise, 
and threatening; all this gladness over the triumphs 
of intelligent creatures, and grief over the failure of 
others, constitute, in the I Am, a new and deeply in- 
teresting life, new classes of thoughts and of emo- 
tions and states of the sensibilities. Before all this 
had taken place he lived wholly in himself, purely a 
subjective life. Now, for the first time, he has an 
experience, a life, and an enjoyment in things which 
are distinct and separate from himself, though entirely 
dependent upon him for their continued existence. 
The life of God in himself continued after he had 
performed his acts of creation, the same that it had 
been from eternity. But surely the creation of all the 
worlds that move in space with all their intelligent 
and rejoicing inhabitants gave to the Infinite Father 
the new, joyful, and inexpressible experience of 
fatherhood—all its cares, hopes, fears, and joys. 

It is obvious that as freedom consists in the pos- 
sibility of a choice between two or more. passible 
things, if God is a free being, he must, as we before 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 237 


remarked, have the power of choosing between alter- 
native purposes and plans, preferring some and reject- 
ing others. God’s manifestations of himself, in his 
work of originating worlds, material and intelligent, 
are, and necessarily must be, contingent in their na- 
ture. If they are not contingent they are necessary ; 
and if they are necessary God is controlled by neces- 
sity. But this is absurd. Therefore, in reference to 
God’s creations and enterprises in the far-away cycles 
to come, and their results, we may reverently affirm 
that they can not now be foreknown except as con- 
tingent possibilities. And we may do this without 
casting the least reflection upon God’s omniscience. 

For if God is not able to form to-day a concep- 
tion that he never thought of, then he has never in 
all the eternity past possessed the power to form any 
new conception, and then, consequently, all his con- 
ceptions must be eternal; and if eternal they were 
never originated, and God, therefore, has never been 
able to form a new conception, or to originate and 
determine any one thing. Paul says God hath made 
of one brotherhood all the nations of men, and de- 
termined their bounds. But God could not have 
determined the bounds of the nations of men if those 
bounds had been eternally determined. The fact 
that he determined those bounds proves that he 
originated the resolve to determine them. If he 
originated that resolve he originated the conception 
to determine them; and if he originated that con- 
ception he ‘can originate conceptions now; he can 
now form conceptions of which he has never before 


thought. 
21 


238 Tuk FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Dr. Whedon says, ‘‘Omniscience is self-existent, 
an eternal, fixed, necessary being, an eternal, neces- 
sary, excellent permanence; but God’s holiness is an 
eternal volitional becoming, an eternal, free, alterna- 
tive putting forth of choices for the right, eternally 
and continuously being made.” But if God fore- 
knows all his own. future choices, then they are not 
any more an eternal becoming than his omniscience 
is an eternal becoming. For if he now foreknows 
those choices he foreknows them as future, as antici- 
pated; but when they are actually put forth he will 
then know them as actually occurring. Present 
knowledge, therefore, must contain at least one ele- 
ment not found in foreknowledge; namely, the real- 
ization of that which was anticipated in foreknowledge. 

But if God can not take the initiative now, then 
he never could and never can take the initiative. 
But this would be an imperfection and a limitation 
upon infinite perfection too absurd to merit consid- 
eration. God must, therefore, now possess the power 
of taking the initiative. But if he has power to int- 
tiate he must have power to precede his initiation 
with original thinking. This power of original think- 
ing he must begin to exercise at some point in infi- 
nite duration. If this be not so, then he never did 
have and never could have had an original thought 
or original conception. And if he has no power to 
originate new conceptions he can possess no freedom, 
and must sink into a purely necessary being. Our 
conception of the glorious God then becomes a mere 
conception of a being bound in the chains and fetters 
of a changeless fatality. But this conclusion drives us 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 239 


back with fleet foot to the admission that God does 
now possess, must by the very constitution of his 
being and his Godhead possess, the power to awaken 
new and original thoughts. He must, therefore, pos- 
sess the power to take the initiative and to put forth 
originating thought as he may choose in the untram- 
meled exercise of his absolute freedom. And this 
view invests his character and nature with additional 
perfections, and will forever keep the intelligent uni- 
verse in endless expectation of new unfoldings of his 
infinite resources to instruct, to entertain, and. to 
elevate the beings he has created in his own intel- 
lectual image and moral likeness. 

God is omniscient to-day; but suppose to-morrow 
he for the first time forms a conception and a pur- 
pose of creating a new order of intelligent and ac- 
countable creatures, unlike in many particulars any 
that now exist. If you affirm that he could not on 
the morrow form such an original conception and 
purpose, you limit his power of originality and crea- 
tion. Activity is one of the highest peculiarities of 
intellect. The most thrilling delight of mind is to 
make new discoveries in untraveled ways, and to put 
forth power in conceiving of the new, the unknown, 
and the difficult. And certainly we can not deny to 
God these capacities and gratifications. Then let us 
suppose that he should make this new order of be-— 
ings, and resolve that their choices should be uncon- 
strained, unrestrained, and original with themselves, 
and contingent as to himself. How, then, could it 
limit, or in any way affect, his essential omniscience 
not to foresee what should finally be the uncon- 


240 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


strained choices of those free beings? How could it 
limit omniscience not to foreknow those choices, 
whatever they might eventually happen to be, which 
he had solemnly placed in the category of contin- 
gencies, and not to foresee those results which he 
had set apart and made contingent to the beings 
themselves, and contingent to a witnessing universe, 
and contingent even to himself? And, on the other 
hand, if it be impossible for God to create a free 
agent whose choices and results can not be unforeseen 
by him, would not that be a proof of a serious im- 
perfection in the universe and in the divine adminis- 
tration? Certainly the highest ideal of a universe 
requires the creation of such free agents, and the 
highest ideal of an administration requires capacity 
to govern them. 

That omniscience should not be able to foreknow 
.such contingent results many impressive considera- 
tions and many unanswerable arguments, which meet 
both the theologian and the philosopher at every 
step of their inquiries, unite to demonstrate. And, 
on the other hand, no one probably can adduce the 
slightest imperfection which such an inability could 
necessitate either in the omniscience of God or in 
his moral government of the universe. But an ad- 
mission that omniscience does necessarily embrace a 
knowledge of all the future choices of free beings 
would at once necessitate many grievous imperfec- 
tions in that omniscience. For if the perfection of 
omniscience requires that it foreknow all the future 
choices which those free beings in their freedom will 
elect, it equally requires that omniscience should 


* 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 241 


foreknow all those choices which they will not elect, 
but which they will positively reject. For it has 
the same means of foreknowing the one that it has 
of foreknowing the other. 

It would be imperfection in omniscience not to 
know all that now exists, all causes, all effects, all 
existences, all substances material and immaterial, all 
qualities and potencies; all the past acts of free agents, 
with all their diversified consequences; all the present 
experiences, intentions, motives, hopes and fears and 
doings of all beings accountable or unaccountable in 
the universe; all that omnipotence has done, is now 
doing; all the divine plans and purposes, all that is 
wrapped up in all causes, and all the actual, through- 
out boundless realms. All these vast categories and 
departments evidently come within the range of 
knowledge, and not to have complete knowledge in 
respect to them would be an imperfection in omni- 
science. But these categories seem to us to bound 
the realm of the knowable, and therefore to bound 
omniscience. ‘‘ Nothing,” says Dr. Chalmers, ‘‘so 
contributes to the soundness of one’s philosophy as 
an accurate perception of the limit between the 
knowable and the unknowable. It is the highest 
and most useful achievement of the human mind to 
trace the line of separation between the two regions.” 

We should naturally infer that a being, who man- 
ifests such endless varieties in all the realms of crea- 
tion as God does, would create some beings who 
would be able to produce results which it would be 
impossible even for himself to determine with cer- 
tainty. ‘‘If,” says Dugald Stewart, ‘the prescience 


242 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


of the volitions of moral agents is incompatible 
with the free agency of man, the logical inference 
would be that there are some events the foreknowl- 
edge of which implies an impossibility. And shall 
we venture to affirm that it exceeds the power of 
God to permit such a train of contingent events to 
take place as his own foreknowledge shall not extend 
to? Does not such a proposition detract from the 
omnipotence of God in the same proportion in which 
it aims to exalt his omniscience?”’ 

Nothing that is a subject of knowledge can escape 
omniscience. But the future choices of free agents 
are now contingent, and if contingent they must be 
uncertain; and if uncertain they are not fact; and if 
not fact they are incapable of being so cognized. To 
affirm that God could not create such free beings 
would be to limit his power and wisdom. In the 
depths of eternity past God determined that he 
would make matter in great variety of form, and 
that great classes of events should come to pass by 
necessity, according to the laws of cause and effect. 
He resolved that he would make another large class 
of events, certain to come to pass in the future, 
which should result, not from the workings of neces- 
sary law, but from his own immediate will. He 
resolved that he would make large classes of sentient 
beings which should be controlled by blind instinct. 
He also determined that he would make beings of a 
higher and of a different order, whom he would gov- 
ern in many particulars by instinct, and also that he 
would govern this class of beings in many other 
particulars by the great law of cause and effect. 


—~ IMPERFECT VIEWS. 243 


’ 


‘“How happy it is,” says Dr. Whateley,” for man- 
kind, that in many of the most momentous concerns 
of life their decision is generally formed for them by 
external circumstances, which thus saves them not 
only from the perplexity of doubt and the danger 
of delay, but also from the pain of regret, since we 
acquiesce much more cheerfully in that which is un- 
avoidable. Here the decisions and convictions of 
the intelligence and the states of the sensibility are 
all necessitated by causes over which we see no 
control.”’ ‘There is,’’ says Dr. Bledsoe, ‘a large 
class of voluntary actions which are neither right nor 
wrong; they are simply indifferent.” 

The Creator also resolved that he would control 
these intelligent beings he was about to create, when 
they were acting as the instruments of his providence, 
by the same great law that governs material forces. 
He concluded that he would make our world and 
people it in a certain way; that he would develop 
it in certain orders, and make it various under 
the molding power of climatic, social, ideal,” and 
scenic influences; that he would establish a grand 
organization—his Church—to preserve a knowledge 
of himself on the earth, and educate immortal intel- 
ligences for his more immediate presence and glory 
in an eternal state of existence. And as scaffolding _ 
for that wondrous organization—the Church—he re- 
solved that such and such nations and empires should 
be raised and run their courses (just as human beings 
are born and live); illustrate some truth 1; subserve 
some purpose in the interest of this divine organiza- 
tion, and perhaps also be securative of many designs 


244 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


merely mundane; and then pass away. And count- 
less multitudes of such things he determined upon, 
every particular of which he could foreknow. 

But as endless variety distinguishes the Creator 
in all his creations and modes of operation, what 
would be more natural or more likely than that he 
should also determine that he would bestow such a 
faculty upon man as the power of taking the initia- 
tive, and that he should constitute man—because he 
possessed such endowment—a rewardable being, ca- 
pable in himself of the high and dangerous preroga- 
tives of creating a moral character and fixing the 
endless destiny of his soul, made in the image of 
the divine? 

That the theory that God. foreknows otherwise 
than as contingencies, as possibilities, all the acts 
of free agents, all his own acts, all the choices of his 
infinite will through all the interminable future, is 
untenable, is apparent not only for the reasons al- 
ready given, but also because it detracts from, instead 
of enhancing, the perfections of the divine character. 
For suppose a mind destitute of the principles of 
curiosity and love of novelty, destitute of the sus- 
ceptibilities of surprise and of wonder, would not that 
mind appear avery imperfect one? Could we behold 
such a one without commiseration? We do find 
these and similar endowments in all sound intellects. 
But has God no attraction for what is new? Has he 
no capability of the delightful experiences of wonder 
and surprise and variety? We ought never to lose 
sight of what God has explicitly revealed of himself 
when he declares that we were made in his own 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 245 


image and likeness. But how can the above-named 
features and faculties be in the copy and yet not be 
found in the model? Did not Jesus manifest wonder 
at the faith of the centurion? The contrast between 
the faith of the centurion and the unbelief he usually 
met with filled him with wonder, and what genuine 
surprise must have thrilled the soul of the Son of 
God when he exclaimed, ‘‘I have not found so great 
faith, no not in Israel.”’ 

To deny to the Divine Being delight in nov- 
elty, to deny that Omnipotence takes pleasure in 
unforeseen emergencies, that Omniscience experiences 
joy in inventing new and astonishing expedients for 
sudden catastrophes, that infinite Mercy would be 
gratifed at an unlooked for draught upon its vast 
resources of compassion, is to deny to the Deity 
great sources of happiness and also to inflict grave 
imperfections upon his nature. Such denials neces- 
sitate many imperfections in both the mental and the 
moral natures of God. But if there are no events 
which God can not foreknow in his every-day ex- 
periences, then it is not possible for him to expe- 
rience the varied delights of wonder and surprise. 
All the gratifications which spring from novelties, from 
discoveries, and from calling great energies and per- 
fections into sudden and unexpected exercise are ren-. 
dered forever impossible to him. One of God’s great 
delights in beholding his universe is, as we may well 
suppose, to witness the unknown choices and moral 
developments of free agents, to witness their displays 
of faith and heroism and spiritual valor, and to watch 
the unfoldings of vast and various moral enterprises. 


246 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Is it conceivable in what other way he could be so 
deeply interested? And how it arouses the energies 
and fires the purposes of a probationer to dethrone 
self, to conquer all malign influences, to be assured 
that God is waiting for him to bring out all the spir- 
itual possibilities within him! Nothing intellectually 
delights man more than inventions, discoveries, crea- 
tions, and the mastery over unlooked for contin- 
gencies and combinations. Now, absolute prescience 
cuts away from the divine mind all such enjoyments 
and perfections and noble activities. 

But how such views as attribute to the infinite 
mind the capacities for novelty, surprise, wonder, and 
variety do relieve our conceptions of God from the 
eternal monotony, the endless unvariety which the 
ordinary view of his foreknowledge imposes upon his 
nature and modes of existence! Those limitations 
to which universal prescience would subject God’s 
free, spontaneous, creative spirit, as he ever goes 
forth through the universe to endless creations of 
infinitely varied forms of being, life, and_ intellt- 
gence, are all removed by the simple denial of uni- 
versal, certain divine foreknowledge. About the 
only argument that is ever relied upon for the dogma 
of absolute prescience, is the assumption that it is 
indispensable to the perfection of Deity. But we 
here discover, as at numerous other points, that this 
assumption is not only needless and a constant dis- 
turbing force in all thinkings, but it also necessitates 
positive imperfection in the infinite mind. 

“If God knew not how free agents will act, his 
knowledge is limited, and must be continually increas- 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 247 


ing,” says Dr. Hodge, ‘‘and therefore is inconsistent 
with a true idea of his nature.’’ But surely it is no 
limitation of God’s knowledge not to know an event 
which, if it ever happened, shall be what God deter- 
mined it should be ? 
know a thing that does not now exist, one which 


a pure contingency; nor not to 


may never exist, one whose causes now have no 
existence. Certainly it is no limitation of God’s 
knowledge not to foreknow a thing the knowledge 
of which involves manifest absurdity. That which 
has never been brought into existence, which has 
never been determined upon by any finite intelli- 
gence, that which the infinite being has never deter- 
mined shall come to pass, and that whose causes can 
now have no possible existence, certainly can not be 
foreseen or in any way apprehended. This proposi- 
tion, we should suppose, no one would, for a moment, 
question. But every Arminian must acknowledge 
that a future free volition of a free spirit is such an 
event as that just now described. It does not now 
exist, has never been determined upon by God or any 
finite being, and its causes have now no possible exist- 
ence. The future existence of such an event can 
not now be a subject of knowledge. The non-fore- 
knowledge of it, therefore, can in no way limit God’s 
omniscience. When we speak of God’s knowledge 
as infinite, we can not refer to his knowledge of his 
objective universe, for the very idea of an infinite 
objective knowledge is an impossibility. All the 
objects apprehensible by sense or by consciousness 
constitute the universe. It is conditioned, because 
it depends upon something else for what it is and 


248 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF Gob. 


for what it does. It is limited because it has a 
beginning and a termination. It is finite because 
each of the objects is limited by a portion of space 
and a period of time. It is subjected to all the con- 
ditions of existence and of action which its forces, 
laws, and ends prescribe. The number of objects, 
therefore, in this objective universe can never be 
infinite. A knowledge of them all can never con- 
stitute infinite knowledge. But the learning how a 
free spirit chooses, as his choice is put forth, can not 
be called an increase of knowledge. 

Many conceive of eternity, past and future, as a 
circle, to foreknow the whole of which from beginning 
round to the end would require no effort of omnis- 
cience. But we are not warranted in contemplating 
eternity under the figure of a circle. We must re- 
gard it as one of endless, interminable successions 
and progressions or lines never returning upon them- 
selves. After countless ages are past the successions 
and progressions and unfoldings of this universe will 
still be onward, and yet only in their early infancy. 
Now to crowd upon the divine mind this hour, all 
these successions of creations, developments, sinful 
falls, moral tragedies, and thrilling necessities of all 
endless cycles, is one of the most dreary and appall- 
ing of human conceptions. And to ask a man to 
embrace a view so overwhelming, without presenting 
to him a single consideration demonstrating its neces- 
sity,is enough to awaken impatience, if not resent- 
ment. It is incumbent upon theologians to show 
the necessity of a proposition so profitless and 
depressing. 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 249 


But the mind is forced to embrace this terrible 
view, or to reject the divine prescience of all those 
future choices of free agents on which their eternal 
salvation or ruin depends. The latter alternative is 
not only far easier, but, like the morning light, brings 
with it uncounted blessings and immeasurable glad- 
ness. If God’s knowledge may be increased as_ his 
will originates new plans, new purposes, new resolves, 
new enterprises, the possibility of which, we hope, 
no one will question, why may not his objective 
knowledge of simple facts be also increased, as the 
self originating wills of his accountable creatures orig- 
inate choices and volitions and inaugurate new moral 
forces, ever after to operate for weal or woe in his 
moral universe ?* 

But since God can originate something which he 


* But this foreknowing how a comparatively small number of 
free spirits, acting under the law of liberty, will determine or de- 
cide on the contingent arena of freedom in a period so compara- 
tively brief, and in a world so comparatively minute, is a kind of 
knowledge that is not and can not be in any way essential to the 
divine perfection or an increase to his essential knowledge. ‘The 
strange dream to which thinkers cling so tenaciously that such 
knowledge must be indispensable to the perfection of Deity is one 
of the fancies that necessarily arise from taking such limited views 
of the fathomless‘and numberless processes of the infinite intellect. 
Ignorance of such a limited number of future free determinations can 
no more affect the intellectual perfections of Jehovah or embarrass 
his administration than ignorance whether next month I can solve 
a problem in quaternions could now affect the intellectual ability 
of some one of the great mathematicians. Such ignorance would 
no more necessitate divine imperfection, no more embarrass God in 
his government than Victoria’s present ignorance as to whether one 
of her subjects would or would not next year pay her a five-pound 
note, could disturb her or embarrass her in the management of the 
vast empire of Great Britain. 


250 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


never thought before—as all must confess who are 
not prepared to deny him one of his perfections, and 
one of the most interesting of them all; and since man 
was made in his image, why can not man also orig- 
inate something which God had not certainly fore- 
known? God certainly foreknows all future possi- 
bilities, but it is needless for him: to foreknow all 
future actualities. And that is just what God himself 
affirms: ‘(And they have built the high places of 
Tophet, which is in the valley of the son of Hinnom, 
to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire: 
which I commanded them not, neither came it into 
my heart.” (Jer. vii, 31.) ‘‘ Neither came it into 
my mind that they should do this abomination to 
cause Judah to sin.” (Jer. xxxii, 35. See also Jer. 
xix, 5.) These passages demonstrate the capacity 
of a free will to originate something God had not 
foreknown. | 

If it be impossible for God to foreknow what his 
own free, self-originating volitions and choices and 
creations in the far-off future may be (which we have 
shown to be most highly probable, if not necessary 
to his perfection), how can it be possible for him to 
foreknow what will be the future choices of a free, 
self-originating spirit, made in his own image, and 
endowed with the’ power of finite causation? If 
many of his own future choices can not be fore- 
known by himself, we are authorized to infer that 
the choices of a free, self-originating spirit are equally 
unforeknowable. 

‘‘Volitions,” says Coleridge, ‘‘can not lie within 
the category of cause and effect.’’ Future volitions 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 251 


are caused by free wills acting in the future under the 
law of liberty. 

From effect we trace back to cause, and from that 
cause, as an effect, back to a prior cause, and so on 
and on, till we arrive at a point where two necessi- 
ties break upon our view. One of those necessities 
is to believe that there is an endless succession of 
causes, with no ultimate cause. But we can not 
believe this, because the absurdity of it is forced 
upon us. The profoundest thinkers, headed by Aris- 
totle and Samuel Clarke, all affirm that there can 
not be an infinite series of causes. The other neces- 
sity that breaks upon us is to admit that there is an 
uncaused cause. In this belief there is no absurdity 
whatever. The universe exists; and that it had no 
cause, or that it was caused by an infinite series of 
causes without any uncaused cause, are each equally 
absurd and unthinkable. The only necessity,.then, that 
can be entertained at the end of our a posterior? argu- 
ment for the existence of God is the necessity of an 
uncaused cause. Such a cause must bea free, self-orig- 
inating spirit. Beyond that we can not go, and to that 
we are compelled by reason and logic to go, and from 
that we can not escape. In all this there may be 
much of incomprehensibility, of inexplicable mystery ; 
but there is no absurdity, no self-contradiction. 

Now, just this process is involved in traveling 
back from an outward act to its ultimate origin. 
Back of the act lie nerves and muscle; back of 
nerves and muscle lies volition; back of volition lies 
decision; and .back of decision the self- originating 
spirit. The true source of the mind’s activity is in 


252 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


its own essence, in one of its own primal faculties. 
To this point we are compelled, in our search after 
the origin of an act, to go; beyond it we can not 
eo, and from it we can not escape without damaging 
our accountability and rendering ourselves machines, 
and utterly failing in the construction of either a the- 
ology, or a philosophy, or a theodicy. In accounting 
for creation, the admission of an uncaused cause is a 
necessity that presses strongly upon the mind, so in 
accounting for an act, for which an accountable crea- 
ture is to be rewarded or punished, the admission of 
the existence of an uncaused cause, endowed with 
the power of uncompelled, unconditioned choice, is 
an equal necessity. 

We thus see what intellectual, moral, and govern- 
mental imperfection in the divine nature and char- 
acter, and what inconsistencies and contradictions in 
the mode of the divine existence, the affirmation 
of universal divine foreknowledge logically necessi- 
tates. A negation of absolute prescience will relieve 
us of all these glaring inconsistencies, and that, too, 
without involving a solitary absurdity, or surrender- 
ing a single truth, or abandoning a valuable doctrine 
concerning God or his Word or his wondrous grace. 
But in closing this chapter it may be well to remark 
that the distinction between the subjective and objec- 
tive life of God here presented, as indispensable to 
consistent conceptions of divine foreknowledge in 
particular, and of theology in general, may possibly 
be questioned by some readers. 

But it is manifest if God creates an intelligent, 
immortal creature he must ever after be solicitous for 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 253 


that creature; for if the existence of a spirit depends 
upon the power of an unlimited being, then the con- 
tinuance of his existence and of the existence of his 
faculties must also depend upon that unlimited being. 
And if that being is forever dependent he must al- 
Ways remain limited in his capacities. And if for- 
ever limited in his capacities his complete compre- 
hension of the unlimited must be forever impossible. 
The notion, therefore, that God could create a being 
that could ever be unlimited and independent  in- 
volves manifest absurdity. If God create an immor- . 
tal spirit, then he must forever provide for his 
instruction and numerous and ever-increasing neces- 
sities. But in providing for such a creature the cre- 
ation of an objective universe is indispensable. 
Without some material scaffoldings on which to lean, 
how could a simple, finite spirit photograph into its 
own consciousness any definite conception of its 
creator ? how could it, unseen, unfelt, unvoiced, in 
the silence that pervades a motionless, objectless, 
empty universe, form any definite conception of the 
unknown Infinite? Angels work for us, minister to 
us, encamp about, defend, deliver, and variously 
illumine us, and yet we are never cognizant of their 
presence nor of their influence. How, then, could 
God appoint bounds to the habitations of unbodied 
spirits? How hold them in localities? How set them 
in societies? How form them into empires? How 
rule them by a single Jaw? How arraign them for 
judgment? How punish them for disobedience ? 
How reward them for goodness? And how make 
them mutually influential, without an objective uni- 


22 


254 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


verse to furnish an arena for all such things? These 
are questions which we can ask, but which we never 
can answer. But, certainly, without such a universe 
finite beings could never obtain any correct concep- 
tions of Deity. Without it any form of visible gov- 
ernment over his creatures would be an impossibil- 
‘ity. But through these objective creations the 
attributes, perfections, mental qualities and capaci- 
ties of Deity are revealed and illustrated. These 
objective creations are brilliant lights held up before 
the face of a hitherto invisible infinite spirit. By 
this means God reveals his tenderness, care, wisdom, 
and power, in his special providences, over his sensi+ 
tive offspring. 

But the grand conceptions of God which are 
suggested by his marvelous works include only his 
natural attributes. The final, objective, tangible 
manifestation of: the moral attributes of the incom- 
prehensible Jehovah was in the incarnation of him- 
self in the person of Jesus Christ. By that incarna- 
tion he unfolded, with unspeakable impressiveness, 
to finite intelligences his love of holiness, his devo- 
tion to rectitude, his hatred of sin, his firm alliance 
with the virtuous, and the grandeurs of his moral 
administration. Jesus Christ in an objective form 
incarnated himself in order to reveal throughout the 
universe the sublime moral truths and purposes 
which till then were cognized only by the God- 
head.. These mysteries of the Infinite, these infini- 
tudes of knowledge and wisdom and love and 
power, he held up with a clearness of statement and 
a force of illustration that established and rendered 


itn 2 


.— 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 255 


forever unassailable his high claims to supreme divin- 
ity and to be a divine messenger to man. The 
human soul is itself a magnificent revelationf of God, 
flowing out from the depths of his infinite being and 
imaging in a finite reality the divine perfections. It 
is indeed a glorious reality, sent out from the soul 
of Deity to illustrate the inexpressible glory of its 
origin. 

God does reflect his incomprehensible self in the 
beings whom he creates; and that notion, there- 
fore, which is now so fashionable, that it is impossi- 
ble for the Infinite to project some of his subjective 
perfections forth into objective manifestations, con- 
veying thereby to finite intelligences clear, invaluable 
conceptions of those perfections, is the great phil- 
osophical error of the times. No reasonable man 
will affirm that it is impossible for the Omnipotent 
to reveal in an objective manner some of his mental 
traits, moral qualities, emotional experiences, and 
procedures in government—in a way however partial, 
nevertheless so far forth truthful—to the intent that 
he may be known by all who are amenable to his 
administration. In unnumbered benefactions, vary- 
ing from the minute to the majestic, and extending 
from the insect to the seraph, he has manifested 
himself to his sensitive creatures. 

The distinction between the subjective and res 
objective mode of the divine existence is needful, in- 
deed, to science as well as to theology. I claim for 
the Infinite all, and more than all, the mysterious- 
ness and unknowableness, all the inconceivable per- 
fections, all the infolded but unmanifested elories, 


256 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


which are claimed for him by scientist, rationalist, 
metaphysician, or theologian. And when the skep- 
tical school, represented in Germany by Strauss and 
in England by Herbert Spencer, affirm that God” 
can give mankind no reliable revelation of himself, 
either in his works or through inspiration, we think 
we discover wherein they are both right and wrong. 
For when Mansel, Hamilton, and many of the sci- 
entists declare that the Infinite is unknowable, is an 
inscrutable power, of which the finite can not form a 
conception, and that, should he reveal himself to us, 
still we could not know him, they are unquestionably 
right. And when theologians affirm that truthful 
conceptions of the Infinite can be formed and appre- 
hended by the finite mind, they too are manifestly 
correct; eklinkerss of the first «class: look agai 
Infinite as necessary, immutable, unlimited, all-com- 
prehending, and incomprehensible. They contem- 
plate God as he exists in his subjective and necessary 
state and life. Their error lies in denying that it is 
possible for him to give through objective creations 
any reliable revelation of himself, affording invaluable 
information and truthful concepts to finite beings. 
They err when they affirm that God does not vouch- 
safe to his intelligent offspring important lessons in 
great variety, on printed pages and in_ illustrated 
editions, concerning his boundless, perfect modes of 
life, thought, procedure, and moral government, 
which are not only correct and consistent in them- 
selves, but absolutely indispensable to the growth, 
happiness, and perfection of the immortal spirits of 
which he is the Creator, Governor, and Father. 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 257 


Both of these classes of teachers claim to be phil- 
anthropists aiming to bring back to a disordered race 
improvement, joy, and order. And now do we not 
here discover the line .of light by which opposing 
battalions may be brought to an agreement? Let 
both of these classes of workers for the world’s 
elevation unite in the belief that by far the greater 
part of the divine nature, in its essence, has not been 
and could not be revealed to finite intelligences, and 
that whatever God has not been pleased, or shall not 
be pleased, to reveal of his infinite nature and modes 
of existence is absolutely unknowable, inscrutable, 
inconceivable, and unthinkable by limited beings; but 
that what he has revealed of his nature can be known 
through objective manifestations, and under the inspi- 
ration of the Holy Ghost can be understood, real- 
ized, welcomed, loved, adored, and enjoyed by finite 
man, and that only through belief in these revela- 
tions man can be elevated to the higher forms of 
spiritual culture, strength and blessedness of which 
his nature is so prophetic. 

The denial that God can reveal his infinite nature 
to one that is finite necessitates the darkness of 
atheism. But, however long we may exist, however 
high we may rise or widely we may roam, we never 
can fully comprehend God. To us he will always be 
the inscrutable and unthinkable Infinite. We can 
never know him in any thing save as he reveals his 
attributes in objective forms in beautiful thoughts, 
views, discoveries, and principles suggested by illus- 
trating Providence, and carried into our hearts with 
much assurance by the Holy Ghost. 


258 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Because God has been regarded as absolutely 
immutable, strange theories. and explanations have 
obtained in relation to the divine institution of prayer. 
In its essence the divine nature must be essentially 
immutable. But if God be absolutely unchangeable, 
then he can not sympathize with us when we change 
our moral character. Such a view would rob us of 
all sympathy from our Creator. He must necessarily 
change in his feelings toward us as we change our 
moral character, and are translated into the kingdom 
of righteousness. If this be not so, he is wholly 
indifferent to the moral condition of his accountable 
creatures. But as soon as we conceive of God asa 
person and not as an abstraction full of contradictions ; 
as soon as we conceive of him as having a life and 
experience out of himself and in his works, espe- 
cially in his accountable offspring, we have no diff- 
culty in according to him a modified mutability in 
his experiences. His life and enjoyments out of 
himself must be mutable and non-essential. In his 
subjective existence he needed not to create any 
thing in order to absolute perfection. The failure of 
the human race to fulfill his design or to meet his 
expectation does not affect his essential perfection; 
and while the tolerance of evil deeply affects his 
happiness, it can never invade his subjective joys. 
His emotional experience out of himself must be 
largely dependent on the self-originating choices of 
accountable beings. For, if they are free, they have 
the power of securing or defeating the realization 
of his holy desires and plans. God’s happiness in 
his creatures is something that may be increased or 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 259 


may be diminished by their choices. If the obe- 
dience of his creatures is pleasant to him, then their 
disobedience must be painful to him. To say that 
God is as happy in contemplating the world as it is, 
“lying in the wicked one,” as he would be were- 
there no sin or wrong or injustice or cruelty prac- 
ticed by its inhabitants, would be too unreasonable 
to merit a moment’s refutation. God’s happiness in 
his creatures may, therefore, be increased or dimin- 
ished by the volitions and acts of finite beings. 

His knowledge as to his creatures, also, may be 
increased. And it will be increased just as he delib- 
erates, originates, plans, and purposes, or determines 
which of the forms of creation and of the orders of 
being that are present to imagination he will finally 
select to illustrate his glorious character and _attri- 
butes. To say that God has no ideals other than 
those which are now realized in objective creations 
greatly limits the exhaustlessness of his perfections. 
If he has and can have no ideals but those which 
have existed from all eternity, our conceptions of 
him must necessarily gravitate toward those low 
views entertained by the Brahmins of their imper- 
sonal Brahma. In God’s subjective nature his con- 
sciousness may not be a process of becoming and of 
passing away. This view may be necessary to main- 
tain his subjective absoluteness. But then God must 
have objective life in the vast world of contingencies. 
And in that life there may be in his consciousness a 
becoming and a passing away, without in the least 
affecting his subjective absoluteness. God’s knowl- 
edge of his ideal of the world is not identical with 


260 Tyr FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


his knowledge of the world as it is actually realized 
through the agency of free beings. This: objective 
realization of the divine ideal through such agency, 
though it can not modify the absolute being of God, 
must be regarded as a process of becoming, and 
hence must be an increase in the knowledge of God 
in regard to pure contingencies. 

God’s objective life—that is, his life, experience, 
interest, and enjoyment, as they are projected into 
or are modified by his created universe—must neces- 
sarily be contingent. In his subjective life there is 
no such thing as contingency, failure, or disappoint- 
ment. There every thing is, in every respect, ab- 
solutely perfect, and is just what God desires and 
intends. His subjective life in all its completeness 
and blessedness, high, sacred, changeless, fathomless, 
and eternal, is forever ‘‘past finding out.” Of the 
glories of his subjective life, even archangels can gain 
but glimpses in their sublimest conceptions and most 
searching inquiries. Such the life of the triune God 
has ever been and such it will always remain. But 
his objective life is as contingent as the choices of 
accountable beings are contingent. 

While God is contemplated exclusively in his 
subjective and necessary mode of existence, his 
relations to contingent events and the relations of 
contingent beings to him must forever baffle eluci- 
dation. If there be a contingent universe it can 
be explicable and comprehensible only in the con- 
tingent relations which the Creator sustains to it. 
The overlooking this truth and the consequent failure 
to distinguish necessities in the divine life from contin- 


IMPERFECT VIEWS. 261 


gencies therein, occasion many errors. As God’s ob- 
jective life—that is, his life in contingent objectivity— 
must necessarily be contingent, therefore to rob him 
of the world of contingency is to rob him of that 
ever changing interest, care, effort, and benevolence 
which a constantly expanding universe requires, and 
also of that ineffable enjoyment which an ever varied 
contingency necessitates in the successive life of 
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It is this constant 
binding up necessities with contingencies that forms 
the great source of confusion in theology and philos- 
ophy. How much wiser, therefore, would it be to 
keep these incompatible things separate and distinct 
in all our contemplations of God. This distinction 
between the subjective and objective existences of 
Deity can never fail to illumine the closet with a 
steady light, to invigorate in every devout worshiper 
faith in the fatherhood of God, in his special prov- 
idence, his watchful, loving care, and the reasonable- 
ness and the deep significance of prayer as one of 
the great controlling forces of the moral universe. 
23 


CHAPTER XVII. 


THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, AND THE UNCONDI- 
TIONED IN RELATION TO THE DIVINE 
FOREKNOWLEDGE., 


AD it not been for the assumption of universal 
H prescience, and the logical consequences of 
that assumption, never would the world have been 
harassed with the profitless discussions of Kant, 
Hamilton, and Mansel, on the Infinite, the Abso- 
lute, and the Unconditioned. The perusal of their 
speculations upon these subjects is never attended 
with mental: inspiration or holy impulse. Indeed, 
how could it be otherwise when they so completely 
shut out all trustworthy conceptions and comforting 
knowledge of God? ‘‘The last and highest conse- 


b 


cration of all true religion,” says Sir William Ham- 
ilton, ‘‘must be on an altar to the unknown and 
unknowable God.” 

They all agree that God is a person, but all unite 
in affirming that when he is conceived of as a person 
he can not be known as an absolute being. And 
yet ‘‘we are compelled,” says Mr. Mansel, ‘‘ by the 
very constitution of our minds, to believe in the 
existence of the absolute.” Sir William Hamilton 
says: ‘‘When I deny that the infinite can be known, 
I am far from denying that by us it is and must and 


ought to be believed. This I have anxiously evinced, 
262 


e 
F 
4 


a eo | 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 263 


both by reasoning and authority.” ‘“We must be- 
lieve in the Infinite,” says Kant, ‘‘but we can not 
know him, because our faculties of knowing have 
merely a subjective validity, and hence we can not 
trust their results as being objectively true.” Thus 
they all affirm implicit faith in the divine existence; 
but they do this because, logically, they can not help 
it. They do it because of the intellectual and moral 
necessities which the subject involves. | 

John Locke says, ‘‘Whoever will examine his 
nature can not avoid the notion of an all-wise and 
eternal being. ‘From the facts of the universe,”’ 
says Dr. Mahan, ‘‘the theistic hypothesis is necessa- 
rily intuitive.” The divine existence can not be in- 
ferred deductively, for all deductive reasoning rests 
on intuition or induction. Every deduction implies 
a previous induction. Neither can the divine exist- 
ence be inferred inductively, for that existence must 
be assumed in the process of induction. For induc- 
tion can have no significancy unless we assume the 
uniformity of nature’s laws, and that the universe is 
so constituted as to presuppose an infinite originator 
of its matter, its laws, and its forces. Without the 
intuition of the unconditioned, a science of the con- 
ditioned is an impossibility. For every notion of 
every finite existence implies God, and holds some 
relation to him. These relations, by which the finite . 
is bound to the infinite, must be real, else all our 
knowledge is unreliable and our faculties wholly 


”’ 


untrustworthy. 
It is a fact that the finite can be explained only 
through its relations to the infinite. And by these 


264 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


relations it can be explained fully and most satisfac- 
torily. To explain, therefore, the finite, it is indis- 
pensable that we assume the infinite. Indeed, with- 
out such an assumption the existence of self is just 
as inexplicable as is that of the Infinite himself, 
Never can philosophy explain a finite spirit without 
acknowledging a person as its source. We must 
assume the infinite-in order that thought and science 
and philosophy may be at all possible. So long as 
German philosophers, in their search after the one 
originating principle of all things, tried to construct 
the finite and the infinite out of the mere abstract 
idea of existence they produced the most unsatis- 
factory metaphysics. Descartes having before them 
derived existence from thought, Spinoza identified 
thought and existence, and thus annihilated the dis- 
tinction between Creator and created. Fichte then 
rejected both nature and God, and made self the 
solitary existence. Schelling identified subject and 
object, conceiving all phenomena as proceeding in a 
chain of necessary evolution, and that God attained 
consciousness only in man. Then came Hegel, deny- 
ing the existence of both subject and object, and 
leaving only a universe of relations. With him God 
is not a self-existent reality, but every thing 1s a mere 
process of thought. Then came Strauss, teaching 
that God is merely a process of thought, without an 
individual existence. 

It is only when we candidly accept our intuitions, 
and assume the existence of both the finite and the 
infinite, that philosophy is possible, or meditation 
thereon in any way profitable. Dr. Noah Porter, 


—s 


— a 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 265 


our highest authority, perhaps, in metaphysics, says: 
‘“We do not demonstrate that God is, but that every 
man must assume that he is. We analyze the sev- 
eral processes of knowledge into their underlying 
assumptions, and we find that the assumption which 
underlies them all is a self-existent intelligence, who 
not only can be known by man, but must be known 
by man in order that man may know any thing be- 
sides. In analyzing a psychological process we de- 
velop and demonstrate a metaphysical truth, and that 
is the truth which the unsophisticated intellect of 
child and man requires and accepts, that there is a 
self-existent personal intelligence on whom the uni- 
verse depends for the beings and relations of which 
it consists. We are not alone justified, we are com- 
pelled, to conclude our analysis of the human intel- 
lect with the assertion that its various powers and 
processes suppose and assume that there is an 
uncreated Thinker whose thoughts can be _ inter- 
preted by the human intellect, which is made in 
his image.”’ 

Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel, therefore, were com- 
pelled, with the rest of mankind, to acknowledge the 
force of their intuitive convictions relative to the 
divine existence. They did, however, raise a very 
obscuring metaphysical dust over the ‘‘ Infinite,” the 
‘Absolute,’ and the ‘‘Unconditioned.” In this 
Hamilton and Mansel may have been actuated by a 
desire to keep out of view the irreconcilability of 
modern psychology with the doctrines of election 
and preterition, which are held by many able and 
devout minds. It may, therefore, be well briefly to 


266 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


define and discuss these terms, which have been so 
bewildering to inquirers. 

To condition a thing, these writers say, is to think 
it, to conceive of it, or to know it, as related. The 
conditioned they make equivalent to the conceivable ; 
the cogitable, the related, the unconditioned, there- 
fore, is the inconceivable, the unthinkable, and the 
unrelated. Hamilton and Mansel, says Dr. Noah Por- 
ter, define‘‘ to condition” by ¢o think, and thus make 
it the equivalent of ‘‘to know objects as related, or in 
velation.’’ According to this definition, every object 
which is related to any other is conditioned by that 
object, and the conditioned is equivalent to the re- 
lated. The unconditioned is equivalent to the unre- 
lated, and if the infinite is equivalent to the uncon- 
ditioned then the infinite must be incapable of being 
related. They make the unconditioned a genus, 
including the infinite and the absolute. The absolute 
they make the unconditionally limited, because it is 
finished or complete. The infinite they make the 
unconditionally unlimited, because it can not be 
terminated. 

But for these arbitrary definitions they have neti- 
ther philosophy nor authority. For we say that a 
truth is a conditioned truth whenever we require an- 
other truth as a condition of our assenting to it. 
And when we do not require another truth as a con- 
dition of our assenting to a given truth, we call it 
an unconditioned truth. And so when an existence 
depends for its being on another existence we call it a 
conditioned existence. The conditioned, therefore, is 
that which depends upon something else for what it is 


; 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 267 


and for what it does. The unconditioned, therefore, 
must be that which does not depend upon any thing 
else for what it is and for what it does. It is that 
which exists in itself, is subject to no conditions from 
without, and is not dependent upon any thing besides 
itself for itself, for its being, thought, or action. To 
think a thing, to conceive of a thing, or to know a 
thing is widely different from conditioning that thing. 
Thinking and knowing are subjective processes, while 
things, beings, and their relations are objective exist- 
ences. To define, therefore, the unconditioned as 
the inconceivable, the inevitable, the unrelated, is 
wholly arbitrary and irrational. 

The absolute is that which is complete and per- 
fect, needs nothing beyond itself, and is wholly unde- 
rived. The possibility of contingent relations is not 
thereby precluded. An absolute being may choose 
voluntarily to relate himself to other beings, his 
creatures, by numberless contingent relations. But 
this could in no way affect his subjective absolute- 
ness. Drawing a distinction between the absolute 
and that which is not the absolute certainly can not 
affect the perfection of the absolute. Neither can 
the instituting of comparisons between the absolute 
and the beings whom he has created, under the va- 
rious relations of resemblance, analogy, difference, 
and design, affect that perfection in any way. Indeed, 
it is impossible to know the absolute without know- 
ing him as related. _ 

The term finite is from fimztus, a participle from 
finire, to lint. Ftnttus means limited: limited as to 
quantity, capacity, extent, or duration. The zzfinite, 


268 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


therefore, is simply the zot finite, the not limited. 
In relation to being, the infinite is that which is 
. without limit in power, capacity, and moral ex- 
cellence. ‘‘The Infinite,’’ says Aristotle, ‘‘is that 
which has always something beyond.’ In these few 
sentences the reader obtains definite and clear ideas 
of the infinite, the absolute, and the unconditioned. 
And these sentences may be summarized thus: The 
infinite is the unlimited; the unconditioned is the not 
dependent; and the absolute is that which has unde- 
rived perfection and completeness in itself. 

The objects and beings about us are finite, condi- 
tioned, and unabsolute. The finite, the conditioned, 
and the not complete in itself, intuitively suggest to 
us the ideas of the infinite, the unconditioned, and the 
absolute. In the midst of events our intuitive reason 
compels us to seek for their causes. We are thus led 
on and on, and finally, to seek for the cause of that 
which is most remote from our view. And in pursuing 
this investigation we very soon reach a cause, which 
has none of the marks that characterize an effect. 
And when we find such a cause we intuitively and 
necessarily perceive it to be the one great uncaused 
cause. In regarding that cause as the ultimate, as 
the uncaused, our intuition relative to causation is at 
once fully satisfied. For, we intuitively perceive 
that we have reached a being who is the cause, and, 
as such, is the intelligent author of all the design, or- 
der, and adaptation which are every-where manifest in 
the universe. We know that this being must be a per- 
son, because this design, order, adaptation, uniform- 
ity, and regularity could not arise from unintelligent 


—_- ee 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 269 


matter, nor from any other than a thinking, reason- 
ing, and determining being. The scientist announces 
that he finds the universe formed after particular 
patterns and in the most remarkable order. The 
more minutely he investigates, the farther he ad- 
vances, the more marked is the order and the more 
obvious and wonderful are the evidences of design. 
The entire creation he finds to be an aggregation 
of groups, each after its own pattern, so definite and 
permanent that science finds there a basis of immov- 
able truth on which to build. Certainly a being 
who manifests such pleasure in definite patterns and 
order can not himself be without conscious intelli- 
gence. The order and design seen in the universe 
demonstrate the personality of Jehovah. Our intui- 
tions compel us to recognize this person as the 
author of the moral power within us. He then rises 
before us as the Infinite Being to whom our intuitive 
faith in infinity is ever pointing. For it is only in 
the contemplation of the infinite that our intuitions 
can ever be satisfied; it is only in the glorious con- 
ception of an underived being that our intellectual and 
moral convictions find a resting place. And for this 
underived being our reason requires no conditions. 
We therefore think of him as the unconditioned. 

But notwithstanding all this, the above-named 
metaphysicians teach that God can not be known, 
can not be conceived, can not be thought of without 
contradictions. ‘‘The absolute and the infinite,” 
says Hamilton, ‘‘can only be conceived of as a 
negation of the thinkable. In other words, of the 
absolute and the infinite we have no conceptions at 


270 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


) 


all.”’ .‘“Knowledge,”’ says Mansel, ‘‘is only related 
to ourselves, and of the infinite and the absolute we 
have no knowledge.’ He further says: ‘‘A cause, 
as such, can never be the absolute, and the absolute, 
as -such,..can never be a,.cause,i. AS absolute.andaas 
infinite, God can never be known as a cause, because 
these conceptions are incompatible. The absolute 
must contain within himself the sum of all actual 
and possible modes of being. He can not be iden- 
tified with the universe, nor can he be distinguished 
from the universe. An infinite being must be con- 
ceived of as existing both as finite and infinite. We 
can not conceive of him as simple, nor can we think 
of him as complex. We can not think of him as 
conscious, nor can we think of him as: unconscious. 
For all knowledge implies consciousness, and con- 
sciousness implies a relation between the person con- 
scious and that of which he is conscious. But the 
absolute must exist without relation. We can not 
ascribe to him succession in his consciousness, nor 
simultaneity in his consciousness, for we know nothing 
of the infinite. An object of consciousness can not 
be the absolute, because consciousness depends upon 
the laws of consciousness.” 

Now, it may be said, in reply to all these incom- 
patible statements: It is very manifest that the human 
mind can not conceive of a being in whom all these 
contradictions are united. But because one can not 
conceive of a being to whom such contradictory no- 
tions are ascribed, as parts of his mental and moral 
constitution, is it any bar to his conceiving of the 
absolute as a person, just, wise, free, good, omnipo- 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 271 


tent, omniscient, and omnipresent? The only human 
perception of personality, these philosophers declare, 
is that of limitation. But we affirm that the idea of 
the personality of God is the inevitable result of all 
thorough philosophical inquiries and investigations. 
Schelling prophesied long since that this would be 
the inevitable resuit of sound logical speculation as 
to the absolute. And this prophecy is just now in 
the rapid process of realization. The human spirit 
will remain inexplicable so long as we regard God as 
an essence above or beyond personality. The con- 
ception of God as a person is necessary to the expla- 
nation of finite spirit. And there is nothing at all 
in personality to conflict with absoluteness. God's 
absoluteness is inferred, necessarily, from the many 
necessities which are involved in finite being and 
finite thought. . 

From the a@ postertort argument we _ necessarily 
infer his intelligence, his consciousness, his volunta- 
riness, and his rationality as an infinite person; that 
is, aS a person not finite. It is possible that in God 
there may be millions of ideas, all harmonious and 
consistent with themselves, which have never yet 
been revealed to created minds. When we think of 
him as the absolute, we think of his perfection, com- 
pleteness, underived nature, and independence of all 
necessary relations. But it is impossible to conceive 
of a spiritual being without attributing to him con- 
sciousness, rationality, and liberty. This conception 
of God we are compelled to call personality. How 
then can there be any conflict between the two great 
ideas of God’s absoluteness and his personality? A 


27D THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


person has life in himself, is self-conscious, discerns 
and distinguishes his own faculties, distinguishes 
himself from all other beings, and while recognizing 
his own essential unity, is also conscious of the plu- 
rality of his distinctive attributes, and of possessing 
the power of positive self-determinations. Without 
distinctions in his attributes, there can be no self- 
consciousness. ‘‘God’s personality,” it is said, ‘‘is 
absolute, because the contents of the divine self- 
consciousness form an infinite and wholly self-suffic- 
ing totality.” And it is only by admitting such 
distinctions in the divine essence that a knowledge 
of God is possible. Personality, therefore, is and 
must be the specific characteristic of theism. 

Sir William Hamilton in rejecting, as possible in 
conception, all that is positive in the idea of God, 
simply iterates the old error of Hobbes, who said, ‘‘of 
the Infinite we can form no conception whatever.”’ 
Because the terms infinite and unconditioned are 
negative, Hamilton hastily inferred that the concep- 
tions of the infinite and the unconditioned were nega- 
tive also, and therefore that the human mind can 
form no conceptions of the infinite and the absolute. 
‘‘Our conceptions of the absolute,” he says, ‘‘are 
negative, because they result from an unsuccessful 
attempt to think them. To know the unconditioned 
is to condition the unconditioned. Because God can 
not be conceived of, he can not be known. God 
can not be known under the limitations of human 
thought.”’ Dr. Noah Porter says that ‘‘what Ham- 
ilton teaches is not that the absolute can not be 
known adequately, but that he can not be known at 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 273 


all, because he can not be conceived of.’”’ But we do 
often use negative terms to express things which are 
known, both as to their existence and their qualities. 
To many adjectives we may attach the negative, and 
thus obtain a negative conception, and yet they will - 
remain perfectly definite. In the paucity of our 
language, and in the absence of positive terms, we 
use the negative terms, infinite and unconditioned, to 
express that God is, and that he is not something 
else, but possesses in an unlimited degree the lead- 
ing characteristics which a finite mind possesses in a 
limited degree. It is not because our ideas of the 
infinite, the absolute, and the unconditioned are in- 
definite or insignificant that we employ these terms. 
We use them merely to emphasize the striking con- 
trast in which the things they represent stand to 
what is finite, conditioned, and not complete in itself. 
The unconditioned merely implies the removal of all 
conditions. And we remove all the conditions be- 
cause we come in our mental processes to the con- 
ception of a being as to whom our intuitive reason 
can not any longer insist on conditions. ‘‘ Pursuing 
any one of our native convictions,’’ says Dr. M’Cosh, 
“the cognitive, the moral, the fiducial, or the judi- 
cial, it conducts us up to, and falls back upon, an 
object of whom we have definite and positive con- 
ceptions that he is a being from whom all conditions 
are removed, and that his being and perfections are 
wholly underived.”’ 

The contradictions, therefore, relative to this sub- 
ject, which Sir William Hamilton presents, arise in his 
attempts to illustrate the infinite by the finite. When 


274 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


he says that we must conceive of space as a sphere, 
either bounded or not bounded, he takes the image 
of a sphere, the image of an object existing in space 
and limited by space, to illustrate infinite space itself. 
He thus confounds infinite space with an object or a 
limitation existing in space. In substituting the lim- 
ited for the unlimited, he confounds his image with 
our intuitive and definite conception of infinite space. 
Infinite space can not be cubical or spherical, because 
these are modes of being bounded. But does any 
one suppose that in ranging through space we could 
ever arrive at some region which was not extended, 
of which one part was not outside of another, where, 
though no body intervened, motion would be im- 
possible? In his illustration, therefore, Hamilton 
creates his own difficulties. And so, whenever he 
reasons that ‘‘such conceptions as those of person- 
ality, of self-existence, of the possession of a complex 
nature, and of the creation of another than itself, are 
notions wholly incompatible,’’ his reasoning is based 
upon his fruitless attempts to exemplify fully the 
infinite by the finite. The absence of dependence 
on the finite, and the complete dependence of the 
Infinite on himself, do not by any means imply such 
a simplicity or oneness of being as must be exclusive 
of personality and complexness. 

Sir William Hamilton denies that the human 
mind can know God, but he vehemently insists that 
it must have faith in him. Mr. Mansel insists over 


‘ 


and over that, though ‘‘we can not know the being 
in whom we are, we are compelled, by the constitu- 


tion of our minds, to believe him to exist.’’ How 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. — 275 


very great is his inconsistency in requiring our faith 
in a being of whom he says we can form no concep- 
tions, in demanding of us faith in an irrational con- 
ception! For how can there be faith in a person, 
without some knowledge of him? Faith implies a - 
clear conception, or at least an apprehension, as to 
some particulars. In our apprehension of God there 
are both ideas and beliefs. If we but know that 
God is, we must form some conception of him. 
And this we can do through the relations which he 
sustains to us. If God exist he can relate himself 
to his creatures, and therefore he may be known in 
that relation. He certainly is knowable in that way 
and in that: degree,» if -in- no -other.: ‘If-I-can’ not 
think of God as a cause, then he is not a cause. If 
we affirm any relation of the infinite, we need not 
connect with it all the limitations which pertain to 
similar relations in the finite. Being, action, thought, 
and feeling, are all applicable to the finite, and 
also to the infinite. Between man and God there 
must be some resemblance, or man could not have 
been created in his image. No more did the first 
sinless man bear God’s image in the finite than God 
now bears that image in the infinite. The Scriptures 
insist on our resemblance and relationship to the 
infinite when we are redeemed from sin. They also 
record great and precious promises in order that we 
may be made ‘‘partakers of the divine nature.”’ 
And the possibility of partaking of the ‘‘ divine 
nature’’ demonstrates the likeness between man and 
God. The infinite, then, can be known, and must be 


276 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


known, in some points of resemblance or analogy to 
the finite. 

A person distinguishes himself from his acts, and 
from that which is not himself. While the human 
mind is in itself a unit, it possesses various faculties 
so related that it is capable of thinking. Thinking 
must require this combination of related mental fac- 
ulties. If God’s attributes were not related and 
combined in a particular manner, if he had no defi- 
nite intellectual organization, then he could have no 
thoughts. But the Scriptures speak of God as think- 
ing, speak of his thoughts, and teach us moreover that 
his mental organization is the pattern of our own. 
And the fact that God has thoughts is proof that he 
is an organized spiritual Being, a Person in whom 
related faculties inhere, combined in many respects 
as are our own, though of course possessing infinite 
capacity and power to produce results. The acts of 
a person must necessarily be successive, and hence 
separable and distinguishable in duration. 

It. is true that we can not form adequate, all-com- 
prehensive, and exhaustive conceptions of the Abso- 


lute. God can neither be imagined nor fully com- : 


prehended by any finite intellect, and, doubtless, 
through the eternal ages he will still be to the finite 
intellect, as now, a soundless ‘‘deep profound.” But 
while we can not have a conception of God in the 
form of an image, we can have a conception of him 
in the form of a definite notion. For the mind can 
perceive, intuit, apprehend, and judge, as well as 
imagine. It is possible for us to think and speak of 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED, 255 


the infinite without falling into manifest and perni- 
cious contradictions. It does not follow that we can 
not know God at all because we can not know him 
completely or exhaustively. In the relations through 
which he manifests himself to us we may know him- 
truly, though we can not know him perfectly. Our 
knowledge of no one thing is ever complete and ex- 
haustive. To us the finite is, in this respect, as the 
infinite. Yet, however limited our knowledge of the 
laws of nature and of our fellow-men may be, we do 
know a little concerning them, and we do have clear 
conceptions of that little. That little, however, is not 
only invaluable to us in our present state, but it is 
indispensable. Were we bereft of it we should be at 
great disadvantages in such a world as this. 

How surprising, then, that Hamilton and Mansel 
should persist in affirming that ‘‘man is impotent to 
know God, in consequence of the contradictions 
which are involved in the attempt,’’ when neither of 
them could tell all that is to be known of or about 
any single object or subject in the universe! i They 
might as well pronounce their own mind inconceiva- 
ble, incognoscible, and incogitable, because of their 
inability to form to themselves an image of it, or to 
obtain exhaustive conceptions of its powers, possi- 
bilities, and destiny. Our conceptions of any object 
are real and trustworthy whenever we conceive of it 
by any of the attributes which are sufficient to dis. 
tinguish it from every thing else. Such conceptions 
are sufficient to meet all our necessities relative to 
that object. Where, then, can we find any adequate 


basis for the harmful conclusions of Hamilton and 
24 


278 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Mansel as to our ability to conceive of ‘‘Our Father 
who is in heaven?” If we only conceive of God as 
a person unlimited in all his perfections, underived, 
unconditioned, wholly independent for what he is 
and thinks and does; able to do all things which do 
not involve contradictions; knowing all things that 
are cognizable, though incapable of foreknowing as 
absolutely certain those future events which are ab- 
solutely contingent; perfectly able to maintain his 
moral government over free accountable beings, dis- 
ciplining and rewarding them just as they develop 
character on the arena of probation; and if we per- 
sistently refrain from clothing him with manifest 
contradictions and absurdities, we then shall be 
able to escape all this error and bewilderment and 
confusion over the Infinite, the Absolute, and the 
Unconditioned. 

But especially is the Christian believer's knowl- 
edge of God real and most trustworthy. It meets 
the necessities of his mental and moral nature. This 
alone is capable of making him as perfect and happy 
as he is capable of becoming. The absence of this 
knowledge leaves him undeveloped and enfeebled, 
dark, distressed, depraved, and ever sinking deeper 
in degradation. The Christian man’s conceptions of 
God are not negative; they are by far the most pos- 
itive of all his conceptions. By far the grandest of 
all man’s characteristics are his belief in the exist- 
ence of the infinite, his glorious conceptions of it, and 
aspirations to be like it. To the spiritually minded, 
the true Christian, God is the clearest object of his 
intellection. ‘‘External objects,’ says Leibnitz, ‘‘are 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 279 


known mediately and indirectly, but God is the only 
immediate and outward object of the soul.” The 
Apostle John teaches that the Christian knows God, 
knows ‘‘him that was from the beginning,” knows 
“the Father.’’ (1 John ii, 13, 14.) He knows him as 
a person. He knows him by intuition, by revelation ; 
and also by an inexpressible union with him. He 
knows him with a certainty that excludes all doubt. 
He has, therefore, more definite conceptions of God, 
more abiding knowledge of him than he has of any 
other object in the universe. Moral purity and the 
Holy Spirit are powerful aids to definiteness in our’ 
conceptions of the infinite. 

St. Paul refers his definite conceptions of God to 
special revelation. ‘‘It pleased God to reveal his 
Son inme.”” ‘And being caught up into paradise I 
heard unspeakable words, words not possible for man 
to utter.” ‘I know now in part,” he exclaimed, 
‘but then I shall see face to face, and know even as I 
am known.’’ He also prayed ‘‘that the spirit of wis- 
dom and of revelation in the knowledge of God” 
might fall richly upon the Ephesians. ‘He that 
believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in 
himself.”’ The pure in heart shall see God, and they 
shall be like him, for they shall see him as he js. 
Abraham was so obedient in life and so purified in 
heart that God distinguished him as his special friend. 
And if any philosopher of his time had informed 
him in Hamiltonian phrase, saying, ‘‘The God whom 
you serve is utterly inconceivable, unthinkable, and 
incognoscible,”” he would doubtless have Leplieds “Of 
do have definite conceptions of God, of his character, 


280 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


his nature, his attributes, his perfections, and his re- 
quirements. And when I appealed to him and said, 
‘Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?’ I had 
clear conceptions of his justice. To me God is 
neither inconceivable nor unthinkable nor impersonal, 
nor contradictory nor chaotic. I see him face to 
face and live. I stagger at none of his promises, 
resist none of his illuminations, question none of his 
commandments, and am never oblivious of his pres- 
ence. He is to mea necessity, for no being but him- 
self can know me, or understand me, or commune 
with me, or fully sympathize with me; and without 
clear conceptions of him-and a deep consciousness 
of him, I should be an orphan in the vastness of the 
universe, and it would be better for me had [I never 
had an existence. All the safety my soul can ever 
have is in the Infinite Father, who, in times of 
trouble, hath said to me, ‘Abram, I am thy shield 
Whenever the devout 
soul advancing along the @ posteriorz line of thought, 


and exceeding great reward.’ ” 


finally reaches God, he feels no necessity of going 
beyond, and has no power to go beyond. And, 
what is more important, he has no desire to advance 
any farther, for he has found at last the home of his 
soul, his ‘‘dwelling-place in all generations.”” And 
what a proof this that the soul was made for God! 
But after all our condemnations of the pernicious 
philosophy of Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel as to the 
infinite, the absolute, and the unconditioned, we re- 
cretfully acknowledge that we find abundant excuses, 
if not ample defense, for them in the contradictory 
teachings of some of the ablest theologians relative 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 281 


to the doctrines of the Bible and the modes of the 
divine existence. The errors, the confusion, the 
dim and worthless speculations of those metaphysi- 
Clans were very natural, if not, indeed, inevitable, 
upon the theories of some, yea of many, most ac- 
credited and gifted divines, who teach with all the 
confidence of demonstration and of unquestioned 
authority, that with God there can be neither fore- 
knowledge nor after knowledge: that to him dura- 
tion is not a progression, but merely a ‘‘ zune stans:” 
that an eternal now, a permanent present, is essen- 
tial to his perfections: that relative to him, priority 
and subsequency can have no significance; that we 
must assume the simultaneity of the divine con- 
sciousness: that all God’s infinite and glorious exist- 
ence 1s gathered up and collected and concentrated 
into a single moment: that eternal duration, infi- 
nite space, and the numberless objects, beings, and 
worlds that have ever filled the universe, and all 
truth and knowledge and himself also, are con- 
densed into one infinitesimal point: that the re- 
sources of the Godhead are not sufficient to enable 
him to manage a moral universe without being able 
to foresee all the future choices of free spirits: that 
God sees that to be absolutely certain which is now ab- 
solutely contingent: and that God at the same instant 
actually beholds himself.as thinking, doing, and say- 
ing things which are the most inconsistent, subvers- 
ive, and destructive of his other thinkings, sayings, 
and doings, as making worlds, for example, and de- 
stroying them at the same instant; as lighting up the 
fires in the infinite depths, and then simultaneously 


282 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


blowing them out; as creating free, happy spirits in 
countless millions, offering to them his love, his pro- 
tection, and himself, and yet, at the same instant, 
binding them in everlasting chains; as proclaiming to 
individual souls all the promises of the Gospel, and 
yet, at the same moment, bringing those same indi- 
viduals forth to the resurrection of damnation; as 
publishing with the same breath, ‘‘Come, for all 
things are now ready,” and ‘‘ Depart, ye cursed, into 
everlasting fire.”’ 

It certainly would be difficult, if not impossible, 
for those philosophers, under such presentation of 
the modes of the divine existence, to avoid the inju- 
rious conclusion that God is inconceivable, unthink- 
able, and never thought of without contradictions. 
But these glaring absurdities are all necessarily 
involved in the assumption of the divine foreknowl- 
edge of the future free choices of accountable agents. 
Admit universal prescience, and we can not escape 
any one of them. We must then acknowledge all 
these unthinkables. But if theologians had not in- 
sisted on this doctrine, probably none of these ab- 
surdities would have marred our systems of thought. 

The assumption of divine foreknowledge drove 
Schleiermacher to identify God’s being, willing, work- 
ing, and knowing, and to reduce all the attributes 
and powers thereby implied to an abstract unity and 
bare causality. Mr. Mansel, for example, says, 
‘“We can never so know the divine attributes as will 
entitle us to reject any statement that might be made 
respecting the Deity, on the grounds of its being 
inconsistent with his character. For the infliction 


INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED. 283 


of physical suffering, the permission of moral evil, 
the adversity of the good, the prosperity of the 
wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving the misery 
of the innocent, the tardy appearance and partial 
distribution of moral and religious knowledge in the - 
world, demonstrate that goodness in God must be a 
very different thing from goodness in man.” And 
he insists on the same conclusion in relation to the 
wisdom, justice, benevolence, and mercy of God. 
They all may contain elements incompatible with 
the corresponding qualities in human character. But 
the Bible every-where presupposes that the divine 
attributes are the same in all respects, save as to 
degree, with the best human attributes. And _ to 
affirm that goodness, justice, and benevolence in 
God may be very different in kind from the same 
qualities in man, unsettles all foundations both for 
reasonings and for morals. But none of those diffi- 
culties ever disturb the meditations of him who rejects 
universal prescience. To him all such mysteries are 
susceptible of the most satisfactory explanation. 

Mr. Mansel quotes Augustine as affirming that 
‘““God’s knowledge can not be foreknowledge,” and 
then proceeds to say that this theory is ‘‘just as unten- 
able as is the doctrine of absolute divine foreknowl- 
edge. And, as a means of saving the infinity of God’s 
knowledge consistently with the free agency of man, 
the hypothesis becomes wholly unnécessary the very 
moment we admit that the infinite is not an object of 
human conception at all. If this be once conceded, 
we shall need no hypothesis to reconcile truths which 
we do not now know with absolute certainty to be 


284 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


incompatible, however incompatible they may appear 
to be to us.” Thus he who would teach the world 
the great truths of philosophy leaves us in afflictive 
indefiniteness, incertitude, and suspense. But we 
have, perhaps, quoted sufficient to justify the conclu- 
sion that the greater part of Mr. Mansel’s difficulties 
when seeking for ‘‘the limits of religious thought,” 
and those of Sir William Hamilton when expounding 
‘‘the philosophy of the unconditioned,” have their 
origin in the contradictions and the absurdities which 
are necessarily involved in the assumption of absolute 
divine foreknowledge. No wonder Jacobi exclaimed, 
“As to my feelings I am a Christian, but as to my 
understanding I am a heathen.” ‘‘Contradictories 
relative to God may both be true and trustworthy,”’ 
says Hegel. But such statements leave us wailing 
on the tops of the dark mountains. Let us arise and 
go toward a better light. 


CHAPTER XVIII. 


INTRODUCTION OF MORAL EVIL INTO THE UNIVERSE. 


F the introduction of sin depended upon the moral 
| condition, the previous habits, or the surround- 
ings of any being; or upon any cause operating caus- 
atively upon or in the will, or, back of the will, in the 
free essential essence of that being; or upon any 
thing we can possibly suggest save the free choice of 
this will itself, then sin never could have come into 
existence. Moral evil would then have been forever 
an impossibility; since the moral nature and condi- 
tion, the previous moral habits, and the circum- 
stances of the first spirit that ever violated the divine 
law, were of such a character as to preclude the pos- 
sibility of transgression save through the self-originat- 
ing free will. If there had been any thing in the moral 
condition or in the surroundings of that spirit; if 
there had been any thing in the moral condition or 
surroundings of primeval man that necessitated, pre- 
disposed, or unduly biased him toward disobedience, 
then the responsible ‘cause of his fall must be sought 
for outside of himself. But this would destroy the 
accountability of man, and give direct contradiction 
to universal spiritual consciousness, which declares to 
us that we are accountable, and that we ourselves are 


the responsible causes of our own actions. The. sur- 
25 285 


286 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


roundings, the previous moral habits, the moral con- 
dition, the entire mental and moral structure of the 
first guilty spirit, were perfectly adjusted to all the 
intents and purposes of the required obedience. 
Nevertheless sin did enter the universe with its deso- 
lating tread and horrid emblazonry. All that we can 
do, therefore, is to trace human choices back to the 
action of a free, self-originating, self-determining 
spirit. And we must trace it back, likewise, to this 
free spirit at the identical moment of its originating 
the volition which gave birth to sin. It is very pos- 
sible that had the trial been a moment earlier, or a 
moment later, this spirit might have originated a 
volition diametrically opposite to that which it did 
originate. For the power of liberty is of two kinds, 
the generic and the specific. The generic power of 
liberty is the general power to act according to the 
law of liberty. From this generic power springs the 
specific capacity for volition at the moment the voli- 
tion originates. The specific act of the mind, by 
which it chooses or puts forth a given volition, has no 
existence until the moment the volition is formed. 
Each specific volition is born in the effort to actual- 
ize the possible. And as each volition has no exist- 
ence until the will takes the initiative of causation, 
its future existence is absolutely unforeknowable, ex- 
cept, as already remarked, that existence be provided 
for by the law of cause and effect. There can be 
nothing in the mind previous to the birth of a choice 
that can furnish the slightest data for absolute cer- 
‘tainty as to what that choice will be. If Omniscience 
can foreknow the effects or the choices of an uncaused 


INTRODUCTION OF MORAL EVIL. 287 


cause, then there must be regularity, uniformity, and 
law, in obedience to which that cause operates. But 
this binding of an uncaused cause with the restraints 
of law, regularity, uniformity, and universality, at 
once strips it of its uncaused character and degrades 
it to a caused cause—namely, to a cause which does 
not act freely, but necessarily. And this depriving 
the will of its uncaused character robs it of all its 
freedom and creative power. How deeply seated, 
then, in the necessities of things, is the remark of 
Dr. Jamieson that no free being created or uncreated 
can foreknow his future choices. It was the exer- 
cise of the human will that first suggested to philoso- 
phers the idea of a cause. Our intuition of cause, 
as well as of power, is awakened in the ego, the me, 
in producing volitions. It is the will itself that 
fecundates existing powers, and the human will is 
and must be, during its probation, the womb of an 
uncertain progeny. Any event that happens in 
obedience to some law can be foreseen. It can be 
foreseen by Omniscience because it is bound up in 
its existing causes; and these causes are forces that 
operate necessarily and uniformly. 

If there were two infinite beings in existence, all 
must admit that it would be impossible, in the nature 
of things, that one of them could anticipate and fore- 
tell the future free choices of the other. But the 
same difficulty or impossibility exists as respects the 
foreknowing by an infinite being the future free 
choices of a finite being created in the image and 
likeness of the Infinite.. This must be so if the 
human will is both free and causal in its action. 


288 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


And it must be both free and causal if man is an ac- 
countable and a rewardable being. 

It is certainly safe to assume that an event which 
can not possibly occur in obedience to any known 
law can never be foreknowable. And human voli- 
tions are controlled by no law. The starting-point 
of the efficiency of a natural law is the will of the 
Creator. So the starting-point of a volition is the 
will of an accountable being. As there is nothing 
except the divine will itself that is controlling or 
determinative in respect to a divine volition, so there 
is nothing except the human will that is coercive 
or determinative in respect to a free human volition. 
Such human volitions, therefore, are controlled by no 
law, and they happen in obedience to no law. True, 
the human will has benign commandments given to 
it, for its wise governance, and for securing its con- 
stant harmony with the will of the Creator. But it 
may willfully violate all those rules, and array itself 
in direct and constant opposition to all of them; and, 
on the other hand, it may accept and obey them. 
But if the will has the power in itself of taking the 
initiative, and of achieving for itself a moral or an 
immoral character, it must be perfectly free and un- 
trammeled. If free, its volitions are determined by 
no law—they are without law, and consequently 
there can exist no data from which they can be fore- 
known. How, then, can they be objects of divine 
foreknowledge? An _ uncertain, capricious, unre- 
strained, and unconstrained free will, without any 
conceivable data for a knowledge of its future deci- 
sions, is the cause of free human volitions. ‘‘The 


INTRODUCTION OF MORAL EVIL. 289 


will,” says Dr. Whedon, ‘‘is a self-center capable of 
projecting action which is as incalculable as would 
be the most absolute chance itself. The controlling, 
alternative power baffles prediction.” 

If we suppose that man’s will is under any law 
whatever, consciously or unconsciously, then we must. 
suppose that either he was not created in the divine 
image, or God’s will is likewise under law. But if 
God’s volitions owe their initiative to any law what- 
ever, he is controlled by necessity, and the whole 
universe is bound in the adamantine chains of fatal- 
ism. We must religiously avoid every position that 
would force us into such absurdities. All that is 
possible for us to do in this case, is to trace the 
given volition back to the unantecedented will of the 
free originating spirit. And when we reach that point 
we reach the boundary line of inquiry. We can 
advance no further on those silent and unlit waters. 
And our inability to trace a volition to any source 
but to the will of the free originating spirit, and to 
that spirit at the moment of its originating activity, 
seems to be a sufficing proof that the doctrine of the 
absolute foreknowledge of the future choices of free 
beings is a most tantalizing contradiction. 

All necessitarians affirm that a foreknowledge of 
future contingent events is an utter absurdity. All 
the Arminian advocates of divine foreknowledge de- 
clare that any proof or rationale of such foreknowl- 
edge is an acknowledged zuconcetvabihity. But such 
universal prescience is not merely an inconceivabil- 
ity, it is a bald absurdity. The absurdity consists in 
putting among the knowables a thing that has no 


290 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


existence, that is now confessedly avoidable. A thing 
that may never exist, and in place of which innu- 
merable other and vastly different things may come 
to pass; a thing which depends on no uniform law, 
upon no moral conditions, upon no previous moral 
habits, upon no surroundings, upon nothing in the 
soul back of the will itself, upon nothing that the 
human brain in all its subtle and wondrous workings, 
through six thousand years of cogitations, has ever 
been able to conjure up which would leave the ac- 
countability of a spirit untouched, most surely can 
have no place among the categories of the knowables. 
For what is there in a simple, naked, emotionless will 
to indicate or shadow forth what its choices will be 
ten thousand years hence? Nothing whatever. 

If the will does not operate as a cause which 
itself is not an effect, it would have no power to act 
in opposition to all the affections and susceptibilities 
of the soul. If the will, instead of being a cause, is 
moved as it is acted on ad extra, then no. one can 
ever account for the introduction of moral evil into 
the universe. Then a satisfactory theodicy is impos- 
sible, and all theology must remain a torturing, over- 
whelming mystery—a mystery that will grow darker 
and heavier as man advances in knowledge and re- 
search. To the end of time the assumption of the 
truth of the doctrine of divine foreknowledge must 
perplex our thinkings, torture our hearts, depress 
our spirits, and enfeeble our conduct. But grant 
that the will, through its own freedom, has power to 
act in opposition to its moral state, whatever that 
moral state may be, and we are forced to admit 


INTRODUCTION OF MORAL EVIL. 291 


that its future choices can not with certainty be fore- 
told. But to claim foreknowledge of a choice or act 
where no possible reason can be conceived why that 
act or choice should occur, when its cause, if it ever 
should occur, is a will that is absolutely free and 
causative in its action, is a proposition that mocks 
all logic, that completely perplexes the minds of 
devout inquirers, and introduces confusion and con- 
tradiction into all their systems of theology. 

True, omniscience could foresee the reasons, the 
motives, the considerations, and the possible occa- 
sions that might and would exercise a testing influ- 
ence upon that free will. But, since choice must 
involve ability to do otherwise, by what means would 
it be possible to predetermine the future choices of 
an individual when it was for him to decide between 
opposing influences, opposing alternatives, conflicting 
motives, and contrary reasons? How could there be 
any thing causative, initiative, or spontaneous in the 
activities and endowments of a free agent, if the 
procedures of those activities and endowments could 
be foreknown for ages with absolute certainty? In 
that event the human will would be robbed of its 
regal character. 

Sin exists. God is in no way responsible for its 
existence. No being but a free being can do any 
thing worthy of reward or deserving of punishment. 
Without being tested, the human will can not show. 
its loyalty or-its disloyality to truth and authority. 
Without assaults upon the will, it can not be tested. 
These assaults upon the will can not be made save 
through the reason, the understanding, and the sen- 


292 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


sibilities. But these assaults can never necessitate a 
surrender. Motives can never constrain a free will. 
A free will can not remain such and be coerced by 
necessity. It was designed to inchoate choice and 
action. If it can not inchoate a good or evil volition 
it is incapable cf virtue. From these axioms it fol- 
lows inevitably that the human will possesses the 
power, from its own freedom, to inchoate sin. 

Do we need any other explanation of the long 
discussed mystery of the introduction of moral evil 
into the universe? Should it be inquired, How 
could a question so easy of solution have been the 
occasion of such voluminous discussions? the an- 
swer will readily be found in the uncalled - for adop- 
tion of the doctrines of predestination and universal 
prescience. When these are denied the introduction 
of moral evil becomes conceivable and easy of ex- 
planation; but it is inexplicable so long as they are 
embraced as fundamental truths. 

Incarnation and atonement and redemption are 
momentous, transcendent realities. But their deep 
significance impressively declares the deadly nature 
of moral evil. But sin can only be in some purpose 
or act. No conviction is deeper seated in the human 
understanding than that moral evil had its origin in 
an intelligible act of freedom. Sin is transgression ; 
and it can become a fact only through transgression. 
In its ultimate source it is not incomprehensible. It 
had its origin in a self-asserting independence of the 
Moral Governor of the universe, on the part of an 
accountable being. Moral evil must be possible to 
accountable creatures, and they must be deeply con- 


INTRODUCTION OF MORAL EVIL. 293 


scious of that possibility. Freedom is a principle 
that can not be explained by empirical antecedents. 
‘‘Tt is not a projection from something behind, it is 
a beginning. It is a true origination in the spirit, and 
not an impulse from sense. In this capacity for free 
origination there is a condition for the libration be- 
tween the happiness of gratified wants and the duty 
of secured worth,” while ‘‘necessity,”’ 
‘is the impossibility of a different.” 
The will causes acts, but motives do not cause 


says Whedon, 


the will to cause acts. For the will itself assigns to 
a motive its amount of influence. It is the will alone 
that can set up purposes and designs before it. These 
purposes and designs do not exert a determining, 
controlling influence on the will. The will, being an 
unconditioned cause, produces its effects so freely 
that it might have produced other effects in their 
places. The effects, therefore, which are produced 
by a free will, are not necessary consequences, but 
they are free actions. While effects in nature are 
consequences, effects in liberty must be considered 
as acts. A natural cause can only produce phenom- 
ena identical and in constant repetition. But a cause, 
like the human will, can produce phenomena variant 
and in constant variety. A free will can produce 
results morally unlike the spirit who is the subject 
of that free will. 

Because moral evil is realized by arbitrariness, . 
and arbitrariness is a violation of reason and pru- 
dence, its introduction into the universe has been 
pronounced by most of the world’s great thinkers 
as inconceivable. ‘‘ Moral evil,” says Sir William 


294 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Hamilton, ‘‘is inconceivable, for we can conceive 
only of the determined and the relative.’’ But, nev- 
ertheless, moral evil exists, and it has its being 
only by or through arbitrariness and by usurpa- 
tion, and in the full face of the exclusive claims of 
moral good. It is produced by the will acting under 
the law of liberty. It is produced when motives of 
various kinds are presented as occasions of the will’s 
choice, and when the will accepts the wrong motive. 
Trial is indispensable to rewardability; and virtue 
must have difficulties, and vice attractions, in order 
to the possibility of trial. But virtue, per se, has 
nothing displeasing, and vice, per se, can have no 
attractions. In order to a trial, then, virtue may 
either be made to appear to have displeasing quali- 
ties or results, or vice may be clothed with apparent 
though unreal attractions: things may be made to 
appear more or less desirable, more or less promo- 
tive of happiness or harm, than they really are. 

The mind that is subjected to trial must be put - 
to making moral choices under testing conditions. 
The affections, the conscience, must be subjected to 
a strain, a real and decisive ordeal. Under just what 
conditions this ordeal shall be met and passed— 
whether light shall measurably be withheld from the 
understanding, or a tempter shall blind the intellect 
or fascinate the sensibilities—we need not seek to 
determine. But the ordeal, whatever it be, must be 
scrupulously graduated to the power of endurance 
possessed by the individual will. It must be severe 
enough to furnish an arena for the display of loyalty, 
and to constitute a real, a decisive trial; but, on the 


INTRODUCTION OF MORAL EVIL. : 205 


other hand, it must not be so severe as to destroy 
free agency. All this being undeniable, we unhesi- 
tatingly reject from our philosophy the dogma that 
‘‘moral evil is the inscrutable mystery of the world, 
and must ever remain an impenetrable problem.” 
Kant could not conceive of freedom, and pro-— 
nounced it inconceivable, because he attempted to 
explain it upon natural principles, whereas it can be 
explained only by going beyond the merely natural 
and connecting the natural with the supernatural. 
Others have failed in the same thing, simply because 
they made unsuccessful attempts to define a purely 
simple idea. Freedom is a simple idea, and it is dif- 
ficult to define any ideas save those that are complex. 


CHAPTER XIX. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE ANNIHILATES THE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY. 


HE adjective contingent means possible, but not 
te certain, to occur; dependent on that which is 
unknown or undetermined; or dependent on some- 
thing that may or may not occur. The substantive 
contingent denotes that which is unforeseen, or unde- 
termined; an event that is possible, but not certain, to 
occur. Contingency is the possibility of coming to 
pass; an event that may occur, a possibility, a casu- 
alty; or the quality of being casual, of happening 
without being foreseen or determined. Now, no one 
of these definitions includes or implies a contem- 
plated event, as being either free or necessitated in 
its nature; but all of them refer to the contingent 
quality of that event, as happening without being 
foreknown. The one simple idea expressed by these 
terms is that of a future uncertainty. What justifi- 
cation, therefore, can writers present for the contempt 
they express for those who conceive and assume that 
contingency involves and necessitates uncertainty ? 
‘Those who question foreknowledge identify,” says 
one, ‘‘conceptions that are not identical, and con- 
ceive of contingency as the same as uncertainty.” 
Richard Watson says, ‘‘If contingency meant 


uncertainty, then the dispute would be at an end.” 
296 


CERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY. 297 


This illustrates how the advocates of foreknowledge 
are compelled to unsettle the accepted significations 
of the terms involved in this controversy. A certain 
event will inevitably come to pass, a necessary event 
must come to pass, but a contingent event may or 
may not come to pass. Contingency is an equal 
possibility of being and of not being. 

To blind fate the heathen would ascribe all neces- 
sary events. Christian philosophy rejecting uncon- 
ditional fatality, ascribes necessary events to an intel- 
ligent Creator. And here we must bear in mind 
that there are many necessary laws which are inde- 
pendent of the will of God—such, for example, as 
that only three dimensions are possible in space. 
Though these necessary laws can effect nothing of 
themselves, they can not be annihilated, nor can any 
thing be created contrary to them. These necessary 
laws aid as well.as limit God in his works. They 
come in as necessary conditions when an intelligent. 
being attempts to produce any thing, But the ex- 
istence of matter and its laws depend entirely on the 
will of the Creator. So then he is the author of all 
events that are necessary—that is, all events that are 
preceded by necessary or coercive antecedents. 

If an event be a necessary one it is certain in 
itself, and certain in the mind of God. If foreknowl- 
edge foresees an event as certain, then that event is 
not contingent, but certain in itself, and certain also 
in the mind of God. If foreknowledge foresees that 
a certain human being is to be among the lost, that 
fact is as certain in itself, and as certain in the mind 
of God, as that the earth is now moving in its orbit. 


298 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


God is no more certain of that person’s existence 
than he is of his endless destiny if foreknowledge be 
true. And then, in the mind of God, every thing is 
as certain as if every thing were necessary and 
nothing contingent. 

If there can be no such thing as subjective con- 
tingency there can be no such thing as objective 
contingency. For every reality must correspond 
with God’s foreknowledge of it. A man’s acts must 
be as God foreknows them, or he could not thus 
foreknow them. ‘‘To be or not to be,’’ then, can 
not be predicated of any future event if foreknowledge 
be true. All is bound up in the indissoluble bonds 
of certainty. A thing dependent on the decisions 
of the human will is just as much a certainty as a 
thing dependent on the decisions of the divine will, 
if foreknowledge be absolute. And the moment there 
is no contingency in the mind of God in reference to 
any event, that moment there can be no contingency 
in the coming to pass of that event. That which may 
be or may not be, is the sole idea of contingency. 
But if an event is now certain in the mind of God, 
it is not possible that it shall not occur. If in his 
mind it is certain, it will inevitably come to pass. 

But if you reply, that ‘‘the act of a human free 
agent was contingent in its nature and might have 


’ 


been otherwise,’’ our answer is, ‘‘ Yes; and all God’s 
acts also might have been otherwise.’’ The act of 
God in making the planet Mercury was contingent 
in its nature. Ages before he created that planet, 
whether or not he would hang a little orb between 


the sun and Venus was a contingency. No neces- 


CERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY. 299 


sity whatever controlled him in its creation. Its 
future existence, up to the moment of its creation, 
was a contingency. Up to that moment it might be 
or it might not be. But as soon as the planet was 
made its existence was a certainty, and not a moment 
longer was ita contingency. As to this particular the 
only difference between man’s act and the act of 
God is, that man is the author of one and God is the 
author of the other. Either act in its nature is con- 
tingent. So soon as God created the planet he began 
to predicate of it certain properties and possibilities, 
and to put it under the control of his necessary laws, 
and all its future movements and perturbations be- 
came absolute certainties. And if foreknowledge be 
true, all your future choices, acts, moral character, 
and eternal destiny are now certainties, just as abso- 
lute as are all the movements of the planet Venus. 

President Edwards affirms that a foreknown event 
must necessarily come to pass. He uses the assertion 
as an argument for his doctrine of necessity or of con- 
straint. In this argument he does not, however, refer 
to the nature of the foreknown event—that is, to 
whether it be free or necessitated. Had he assumed 
that the said event was a necessitated event, or that in 
the foreknowledge of it there was any causal necessity 
to produce it, he would have been guilty of the fal- 
lacy of begging the question. He affirms that be- 
tween a future event and the present foreknowledge | 
of it there exists a logical necessity, and then he uses 
this assertion to sustain his general doctrine of 
necessity. 

Dr. Whedon, in his work on the Will (Part I, 


300 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


chapter iii), seems to have a mistaken view of Presi- 
dent Edwards on this point, for he endeavors to 
escape the difficulty in which Edwards entangles him 
by affirming that there is no necessary connection 
between the future act and its present foreknowledge, 
because, forsooth, the free agent might have chosen 
differently. But this ‘‘might have chosen differ- 
ently”? is not the point at issue. The question is, 
The act, the actual choice being that which it is, can 
that choice be different from the present foreknowl- 
edge of it? Any one of a dozen choices might have 
been put forth by the free agent, but if from all eter- 
nity the tenth choice was the foreknown choice, is 
there not a logical necessity that the tenth choice 
should come to pass—that one and no other of the 
twelve? Edwards does not affirm that there is a nec- 
essary connection between present foreknowledge 
and some other future choice, but that there exists a 
necessary connection between present foreknowledge 
and that identical volition which it is now foreseen 
will come to pass. The whole of Dr. Whedon’s argu- 
ment, therefore, in this third chapter, seems to. be 
irrelevant. Indeed, he concedes all that Edwards 
claims in this argument, for he says that ‘‘it is requi- 
site that the future act agree with the present fore- 
knowledge of it.’’ But the word requisite means ‘‘re- 
quired by the nature of things or by circumstances; 
so needful that it can not be dispensed with—neces- 


’ 


sary.”’ There is, therefore, a logical necessity that a 
foreknown event, however free it may be in its na- 
ture, should come to pass. Where, then, is the dis- 


tinction between certainty and contingency? There 


CERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY. 301 


is none, there can be none, if the theory of universal 
foreknowledge be true. In that case, though any fu- 
ture act be free in its nature, yet as to the fact of the 
coming to pass of that act there can be no uncer- 
tainty in the divine mind, and none in fact. We 
must, then, banish all contingencies from theological - 
discussions, for it would not be possible for God to 
predicate of any future event that it may or may not 
come to pass. 

Richard Watson pronounces with much confidence 
that the argument that ‘‘certain prescience destroys 
contingencies’? is a mere sophism, and that ‘‘the 
conclusion is connected with the premise by a con- 
fused use of terms.’’ ‘‘The great fallacy in this 
argument lies,” he says, ‘‘in supposing that contin- 
gency and certainty are the opposites of each other. 
If the: term contingent has any definite meaning at 
all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must 
mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to cer- 
tainty, but to necessity. The question is not about 
the certainty of moral actions—that Is, whether they 
will or will not happen—but about the nature of them, 
whether they be free or constrained. The opponents 
of foreknowledge care not about the certainty of 
actions, whether they will take place or not, but they 
object to certain prescience of moral actions, because 
they think such prescience renders these actions 
necessary.’ : 

And this is the best reply that one of the ablest 
of our theologians can give in answer to the argument 
that certiin prescience destroys contingency. He 


charges ‘‘confusion in the use of terms,” but in his 
26 


302 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


refutation, he himself is full of the same kind of con- 
fusion. His argument is not only a sophism, but it 
is one of the least reputable. It is a plain case of 
irrelevant conclusion. For, when we affirm that cer- 
tain prescience destroys contingency, we are not then 
looking at the nature of the future act, whether it be 
a free or whether it be a necessitated act. A certain 
event isan event that shall come to pass. That event 
may be in its nature either free or necessary. It may 
be the act of the Creator or the act of some one of 
his creatures. In this place, and in proving the 
proposition that prescience annihilates the distinction 
between certainty and contingency, we refer not to the 
nature of the future act nor inquire by whom it shall 
be performed, whether God, angel, man, or demon. 
We are simply looking at it as a certainty. If fore- 
knowledge be true, every future event is now certain 
in the divine mind, and if certain in the divine mind 
it must be certain in itself. For perfect knowledge 
of a thing must correspond to the nature of that 
thing; and the thing must comrespond to the perfect 
knowledge of it. If I have a perfect knowledge of 
a reality, there must be a perfect correspondence 
between the reality and my knowledge of it. 

A contingent event is defined by all authorities 
to be one that may or may not come to pass. Now, 
if God foreknows that such an event will be, how 
can that event ever be different from his present 
knowledge of it? Even granting for the present, 
that the foreknowledge of it does not in the least 
influence the nature, or the being of the thing itself, 
the reality of the fact must correspond to the present 


CERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY. 303 


perfect knowledge of it. And in this perfect cor- 
respondence between the reality and the knowledge 
of it there can be now no possible contingency—no 
‘“‘may or may not be.”’ The future act is now a 
certainty, though the certainty of the act should in 
no way flow or follow from its foreknowledge. The 
question is not (as Mr. Watson affirms) as to the na- 
ture of the act, whether it be a free or necessitated 
act: but the question is, ‘‘Can a reality be different 
from a perfect knowledge of that reality?’ A con- 
tingency is a thing that may or may not be. But 
can there be any ‘‘may or may not be” between 
a perfect knowledge of a thingand that thing itself. 
God can not know any thing contrary to the fact; 
and a fact, when once a matter of certain knowledge, 
is unchangeable by any power, human or divine. 
If the treachery of Judas was foreknown it was cer- 
tain; and if it was certain it could at no period be 
uncertain as to its coming to pass. Thus we see 
that one of the ablest of thinkers can not rescue 
contingency from destruction, if certain prescience 
be maintained. 

And here we must be careful to distinguish be- 
tween contingency as to the nature of an event and 
contingency as to its coming to pass. An event that 
is necessary in its nature may be contingent as to its 
happening. If I take forty grains of morphine my 
death will ensue necessarily. But there is a contin- 
gency as to the happening of my death as the result 
of taking morphine, because there is a contingency as 
to my taking the morphine; that is, my taking the 
morphine is an event that may or may not be. But 


304 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


as soon as my death, as the necessary result of my 
taking the morphine, is foreknown by omniscience, 
there is no longer any contingency as to the hap- 
pening of the latter event, nor as to my death coming 
to pass. An event, therefore, that is necessary in its 
nature may be contingent as to its happening. More- 
over, an event that is contingent in its nature is con- 
tingent also as to its happening. A choice of my 
will is an event that is either free or necessary in its 
nature. We readily admit that the event is free in 
its nature; but the question is as to the happening 
of the event. We have no question as to the con- 
tingent nature of the event should it ever occur. 

If God foresees that A will forge a check to-mor- 
row, while there will be a freedom in the nature of 
the act when it occurs, there is now no contingency 
as to its happening. If that choice of A be now 
foreknown, there is no contingency in the mind of 
God as to its happening. Its happening is a cer- 
tainty to him. Even if the oft-repeated affirmation 
that foreknowledge can have no influence over the 
exercise of our freedom were true, it has not the 
slightest pertinence as to the question now before us, 
Even supposing that that knowledge has no influence 
over, nor any connection with, the freedom of the 
creature, with the free nature of his actions, it has 
all influence over, and a perfect connection with, the 
contingency of the happening of those actions, if 
they are foreknown. If God foreknows our choices, 
there is now no contingency as to their happening. 
The event will be free in its nature, but there can be 
now no contingency as to its coming to pass. 


CERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY. 305 


But if God deal with us on the principle of con- 
tingency, then our future choices ought to be free 
in their nature and contingent as to their happening. 
If our choices ought to be contingent to us, they 
ought to be contingent with God. If they are con- 
tingent to one of the parties of this most solemn 
compact, on which the destinies of eternity are sus- 
pended, then they ought to be contingent as to the 
other. It is not consistent to affirm that God singles 
man out of all the works of his creation, and deals 
with him, not on the low principle of necessity, but 
on the high principle of contingency, that all his 
choices, whenever they are made, shall be contingent 
in their nature, and yet in the same breath to say 
that God foresees with absolute certainty what those 
choices will be, and that there can be no contingency 
in his mind as to their happening or coming to pass, 
though endless misery and degradation result there- 
from. To affirm that our repentance and prayer and 
faith and character can not modify our future would 
seem to make God inconsistent and indefensible in 
his dealings with us. It exposes him to the pro- 
fane charge of trifling with immortal souls. Such a 
course could not fail to obstruct, to render less effi- 
cient, all our moral efforts to assert our self-hood, and 
to determine for ourselves what our endless destiny 
shall be. 

But here we most gratefully quote from Isaiah, 
‘Therefore will the Lord wait, that he may be 
gracious unto you.” This text inspires me with 
confidence that my eternal destiny is now pendent 
upon the strength of my will and the endurance of 


306 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


my faith. The full and required idea of contingency 
is that the future choices of free beings shall be con- 
tingent or free in their nature, and contingent also as 
to their happening. For, evidently, fair and candid 
dealing demands that, if God proposes to deal with 
us on the principle of contingency, our future choices 
ought to be as truly contingent in his mind as they are 
contingent in ours. If in their nature they are con- 
tingent to us, they ought to be with him contingent 
as to their happening or coming to pass. Contin- 
gency ought. to have a Godward side as well as a 
manward side. Such twofold view of contingency is 
indispensable to the perfection of God’s government 
over free agents. 

When, therefore, God proclaims that his admin- 
istration is based on the great principle of contin- 
gency, we have no right so to define and limit con- 
tingency as to take from it one of its essential 
elements, leaving it incomplete, and thereby bringing 
confusion into all theology, doubt and inefficiency 
into practical Christianity, inconsistency into the 
divine dealings, and unfairness into God’s administra- 
tion over accountable creatures. 

Now, for God to know a future thing to be con- 
tingent and certain at the same time involves the 
saine absurdity as for him to know a thing to be 
both black and white at the same moment. This is 
one of the many cases in which the advocates of 
universal prescience have unduly assumed what 
seemed to be to them necessary, and have thereby 
plunged themselves into many contradictions and 
pernicious errors. It would be absurd to say, as all 


CERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY. 307 


will agree, that God can make a triangle with two 
lines, or vertical angles to be unequal, or a free being 
who could not sin, or that he could save a sinner 
from his sins who is not willing thus to be saved. 
But is it not equally absurd to say that an event 
which now stands absolutely fixed in God’s fore-— 
knowledge, fixed as to time and place, may not come 
to pass? If God is determined that a future event 
shall be a certain event, there can be no contingency 
about it. And if he has determined that a future 
event may or may not be, then there can be no cer- 
tainty about it. If there could be any certainty about 
an event that may or may not be, then God could 
make something to be and not to be at the same 
time. Then he could at once make an event con- 
tingent and not contingent, which is contradictory. 
It is manifestly an absurdity to say that God can 
foreknow with certainty that which may or may not 
be, that which is now avoidable, and which may 
never occur. How God can foreknow an event that 
is free and contingent, all the great thinkers agree in 
pronouncing a profound mystery. But if the doctrine 
in question involved only mystery, the writer would 
accept it. Mysteries are the silent prophecies of the 
soul’s everlasting enlargement in comprehension, wor- 
thiness, and happiness. But while he has the largest 
faith and most open heart for the deepest mysteries, 
he can not rest satisfied with manifest contradictions.* 


* Dr. Mahan gives, in substance, the following definitions and 
illustrations of the terms absurdity and mystery: An absurdity is 
the quality of being inconsistent with obvious truth and reason. It 
is that which is contrary to the dictates of common sense. An 


308 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Faith can easily embrace mysteries, but the intellect 
is impatient and resentful over absurdities. Mystery 
is often full of comfort, support, and rest, but an ab- 
surdity tortures the mind, overwhelms the reason, and 
oppresses the heart. If the reader will discriminate 
the distinction between mystery and absurdity, he will 
gladly unite with Cicero in declaring that ‘‘God him- 
self can not foreknow absolutely those things which 
are to happen alone through chance and fortune.” 
Celts esaidy amie Wat§on also tells us, ‘< thea in 
the result of an absolute contingency be certainly 
foreknown, then it can have no other result; it can 
not happen otherwise.” ‘‘ This,” he adds, ‘‘is not 
the true inference. The true inference would be, It 
will not happen otherwise. The objection, observe, 
is, that it is not possible that the action should other- 
wise happen.’”’ His sole reply to the objection is, 
that it might have happened in many different 
ways, or not happened at all. But the question is 
not whether it might have happened otherwise, but 


absurd proposition is one which contradicts primary truths or neces- 
sary intuitions. It is one that is intuitively or demonstrably false, 
such as that an event is both certain and avoidable. If one compre- 
hends a given subject and predicate, in all their elements and rela- 
tions, and his intelligence perceives that they can not agree, then 
the affirmation that they do agree must be pronounced an absurdity. 
A mystery is something that lies beyond human comprehension 
until it is explained. It is a fact that has unquestionably been 
revealed, while the reasons for it are all withheld. If one knows 
some of the elements and relations of a given subject and predicate, 
and of others he is entirely uninformed; and if, in view of the ele- 
ments and relations which he does perceive, this subject and predi- 
cate are pronounced to disagree, and in view of the elements which 
he does not know, they are pronounced to agree, or vce versa, then 
the grounds of this agreement or disagreement would be a mystery. 


CERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY. 309 


the question is, Can it fail to happen as it is now 
foreknown? It is true that it might have happened 
otherwise, for the cause that produced it was ade- 
quate to the production of something else or of no 
production. But it is not true that the said action 
can, in the nature of things, fail to happen, as it has_ 
been from all eternity foreknown. If the foreknowl- 
edge can not be uncertain, then the said action can 
not be uncertain. If the foreknowledge is fixed the 
action is fixed and inevitable. 

Boswell said to Dr. Johnson, ‘‘It is certain that 
you are either to go home to-night or not; but that 
does not prevent your freedom, because the liberty 
of choice between the two is compatible with that 
certainty. But if one of these events be certain 
now, if it be certain that you are to go home to- 
‘There is no pos- 


b) 


night, then you must go home.’ 
sible way of showing,” says Dr. M’Cosh, ‘“‘howa 
man’s deeds can be certain beforehand, while yet he 
may do as he pleases.” How completely universal 
prescience annihilates the boasted distinction between 
certainty and contingency needs no further proof nor 
iteration. It involves, so far as appears to human 
reason, the divine administration in unfairness. It 
eliminates the great principle of contingency out of 
the moral government.of God, and leaves us for- 
ever incapable of constructing a consistent theology. 
God’s moral government is possible only on the . 
ground of moral contingency. And while the ac- 
countability of moral created beings is the great fact 
in that government, no such accountability is possible 


without contingency. 
27 


CHAPTER XX. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN 
FREEDOM. 


R. WHEDON says that ‘‘God can foresee the 

future choices of a free agent, and at the same 
time he can foresee that that agent will possess the 
power to have chosen differently; therefore, the pre- 
science of God is consistent with freedom in the 
agent.’’ But if prescience be true, the future choice 
of a free agent is a fixed knowledge in the divine mind 
and a fixed fact in the history of the universe. Vhings, 
if properly said to be known, must be known as 
they really are; and all facts are necessarily immu- 
table. An event, an act known to be, can not but 
be; 
edge of a foreseen choice of an individual agent 


it can never be known not to be. The knowl- 


enters as truly and as certainly into the mind of God 
and into his plans of government, his purposes of 
mercy, his scheme of education for probationary be- 
ings, his system of rewarding the obedient and of 
forsaking and punishing the incorrigible, as does any 
other truth or fact or knowledge of which we can 
conceive. ; 

If we could suppose that a foreseen choice should 
come to be different from that which it was foreseen 
to be, then we must admit that all the innumerable 


choices of other free beings and all the events con- 
310 


INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREEDOM. 311 


tingent upon that mis-foreseen choice may also be dif- 
ferent in multitudes of particulars. All the subsequent 
doings of God, and all the plans and workings of his 
administration require that identical foreseen choice 
of that identical agent, and will be consistent with 
no other. . Every resolve of a free agent, whether it 
be holy or unholy, must necessarily produce its legiti- 
mate moral results. It must appear among the 
working moral forces of the universe. Every such 
free choice must enter as a factor into the divine 
government, for endless subsequent developments 
and progressions. A million of years from the date 
of that foreseen choice, its influence, as one of the 
pre-arranged factors for the accomplishment of some 
purpose or plan of the Almighty Father, will con- 
tinue. If God determines to bring an accountable 
moral being into existence, his goodness would lead 
him to make some provisions for that being’s moral 
instruction and training. But as God foresees the 
free moral choices of the mother of that being, he ° 
can predicate of them that they shall be one of the 
manifold influences and agencies that shall perform 
their part in that moral education. As God foresees 
what influences the mother’s free choices will exert, he 
foresees also what influences the free choices of that 
person himself will exert over others—for example, 
over each of his brothers; and, therefore, he predicates 
that those future free choices shall enter as a factor into » 
his plan for the moral education of those brothers. 
And so, in like manner, upon this theory all 
future choices are foreknown, and all enter into God’s 
fixed plans—one after another, as anywhere upon the 


212 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOP. 


globe, and down to the close of time they shall come 
into active existence. The whole history of the earth 
in this view crytallizes, in the mind of God, into 
one great comprehensive plan, embracing Adam and 
his posterity down to the last child of his race. 
Equally the whole history of the eternity to come 
is known to and fixed in the divine mind. There 
God sits upon the throne of the universe waiting for 
these grand panoramas: of earth and eternity to unroll 
before him every scene of which he has been gazing 
upon from eternity. On such an arena where can 
we find place for so insignificant a thing as human 
freedom? Fatalism itself could not bind eternity 
with chains more adamantine, nor could it more thor- 
oughly discourage moral agents, nor more completely 
enthrall the moral universe. No one of these choices 
of moral agents may have been necessary in its na- 
ture, but it was absolutely necessary that it should 
come to pass in order to the accomplishment of 
the plans of Jehovah, which have been in his mind 
from eternity awaiting the choices of seemingly free 
spirits. God may have unnumbered purposes, all of 
which must fail if any foreseen act fail to come to 
pass. Every free choice is followed by innumerable 
consequences—as, for example, Cesar’s crossing the 
Rubicon; and of every foreseen choice God makes 
innumerable predications. 

Now all these predications, ail these natural con- 
sequences must come to pass as they are now fore- 
seen. ‘‘It is impossible,’ said Dr. Whedon, ‘‘that 
this plan of God, this pre-record of futuritions should 
ever err or in the slightest particular be changed.”’ 


INCOMPAT:iBLE WITH FREEDOM. 312 


In order that this totality of futuritions may now be 
mirrored on the Omniscient eye, not only must the 
totality of choices of free beings be mirrored there, 
but it must also be present to the divine mind as 
a totality of new-born forces, and each one of the 
countless millions of these forces must be perceived 
as having its specific mission, and producing its spec- 
ified results, which results, after assuming the free 
existence of such force, it was divinely designed to 
accomplish in working out the eternal purposes of 
God. ‘‘The divine foresight anticipating what Judas 
would freely do,” says Dr. Whedon, ‘‘provided for 
it and adopted it into his plan, and for the conduct 
of that plan.” The carrying out God’s plan and 
purposes, therefore, and the bringing about of the 
events which he foresaw would follow consequentially, 
and those which he determined should result from 
that free act of Judas, subsequent to his deed of 
betrayal, necessarily required that betrayal. With- 
out that betrayal all those purposes could not 
have been as it was foreseen that they should be. 
If it was necessary that all the subsequent unfoldings 
of the great world plan of God should be what he 
foresaw they would and should be, then it was equally 
necessary that Judas Iscariot should betray his Divine 
Master. Not that the act of betrayal was a con- 
strained one in its nature, but though free it was 
indispensable to the foreknown unfoldings of all the. 
subsequent plans of God in all their eternal and 
infinite complications and amplifications. Logical 
necessity is the only kind of necessity that is involved 
in thought systems, or doctrinal structures. It is 


314 THE FORERNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


much easier to believe that there was no avozdadzlity 
in the act of betrayal by Judas than to believe that 
the endless future and moral history of the moral 
universe should be or could be different from that 
which from all eternity God foreknew that they 
would be. ; 

The system of Calvin claims that God foreor- 
dained all the future choices of free spirits, embracing, 
of course, those which involve moral character and 
entail endless destiny; therefore, he foreknew them. 
The Calvinism of Dr. Wilbur Fisk says that God fore- 
knows all those future choices that will be, and there- 
fore he foreordains them to be (subsequent to their 
occurrence) evermore working factors in his everlasting 
moral government. He foreordains them to be parts 
and agencies in his great plans and purposes which 
ever after are to unfold before an intelligent and won- 
dering moral universe. ‘‘God is not willing,” says 
a Calvinistic writer, ‘‘that any should perish, but that 
every man should come to a knowledge of the truth 
and be saved, and that every man turn from his evil 
way and live. This is all revealed, for it is all true; and 
in knowing the truth and in accepting the sincere prof- 
fers of life only shall man find his eternal life. There 
is no decree in his way, for he that decreed man’s 
freedom thereby decreed or decided that he should 
be free to choose life or death. And whichever way 
he chooses, that choosing necessitates God’s fore- 
knowledge and predetermination concerning him. 
For the Almighty can not but foresee his final choice, 
and he therefore can not but predetermine his destiny 
in harmony with man’s ultimate choice.” This is 


— 


INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREEDOM. 315 


the Calvinism, I think, of New England; but how 
it differs from the teaching of Dr. Wilbur Fisk, 
earnestly as he warred against it, I can not distin- 
guish. But a consistent Arminianism says (for it 
is compelled by consistency persistently to declare), 
that God neither foreordains nor foreknows those 
future choices of free beings which entail eternal 
destinies. 

Dr. Bledsoe found great gratification in the ‘‘con- 
fession of the Mew Englander that he had taken out 
of the hands of the Calvinists, the necessitarian argu- 
ment founded upon the foreknowledge of God.”’ 
But this wonderful thinker and wide reader, in the 
intensity of his gaze on one side of this question, it 
seems, wholly overlooked the other. The great diff- 
culties of this case are piled up in stern reality on 
the other side of this troublesome problem. ‘‘A 
present thing can not be different from what it Is, 
and a future thing can not be different from what it 
will be.”?. This kind of necessity Dr. Bledsoe termed 
an axiomatic necessity. ‘‘ A future thing can not be 
different from the present foreknowledge of that 
thing, nor can a present thing be different from a 
present knowledge of it.” This he called a logical 
necessity. These two kinds of necessity he clearly 
distinguished from causal necessity, and therefore he 
joyfully concluded that he had disposed of the cele- 
brated difficulty, and demonstrated that absolute fore-. 
knowledge is perfectly consistent with the free agency 
of man. But while he denied the causal necessity | 
of a future choice of a free agent, he could not deny, 
nor could he question, its effectal (not effectual, but 


316 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


namely, that each of the 


effectal) or factal necessity 
uncaused volitions of accountable beings, so soon as it 
is put forth, enters the vast arena as a cause newly 
born, to produce its own legitimate effects in the 
realm of souls, and that every one of these volitions 
of free spirits is employed by the Sovereign Arbiter 
as one of his instrumentalities in carrying forward 
his great plans, either of punishing or rewarding or 
educating free beings and worlds, and in accomplish- 
ing his benevolent purposes in all their numberless 
and everlasting manifestations. 

But no one of all these countless choices can be 
different from that which it was from all eternity 
foreseen to be, without at the same time modifying 
the moral history of the whole universe and of 
all the eternity to come. ‘‘Every event, however 
trivial,’ says Bishop Butler, ‘‘is preceded by and 
also succeeded by an infinite number of links in the 
And if all God’s subsequent inflexi- 
ble plans, purposes, modes, and operations require 
and demand in me a particular volition, where, I 


’) 


endless chain. 


ask, can be found the arena for my freedom and con- 
trary choice? How is it possible for me, as I now 
take my place in the drama of probation, to modify 
any particular of my eternally foreknown future? 
How can my energy, my prayer, my faith, my moral 
heroism, modify in the slightest degree my great 
interests for eternity, or change the eternal fore- 
knowledge of God? All my immortal energies are 
enervated and benumbed at the bare mention of abso- 
lute divine foreknowledge, and the only way I can 
meet my solemn obligations is persistently to exclude 


INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREEDOM. 317 


the subject from my meditations. . And at this hour, 
this is the dernier ressort of millions of devout thinkers. 
For who could resist the gloomy conviction that his 
volition, which is so comparatively infinitesimal and 
insignificant, was prearranged for God’s universal, 
eternal, and crystallized future? Who can gainsay 
the declaration of Theophilus Parsons, that ‘ta free- 
dom which for any reason whatever must result in 
one only conclusion, is not and can not be freedom.” 
For we really can not choose a thing unless we can 
choose not that thing. We can easily perceive, with 
Dr. Whedon, the distinction between God’s foresee- 
ing the future choice of a free being and the fact that 
that choice is in itself perfectly free in its nature 
when considered as an isolated event, as wholly dis- 
connected from any system of influences or purposes 
or plans of Jehovah. But the moment we regard 
that foreknown choice as a fixed fact in the divine 
mind from all eternity past; as a fixed working 
factor which is indispensable to the subsequent un- 
foldings of all the future plans and enterprises of 
God; as necessary to the unerring correctness of an 
endless panorama now infallibly mapped out before 
the omniscient eye as to every particular, from the 
the smallest to the greatest of events, from the insect 
floating among sunbeams up to the loftiest seraph 
flying through the immensities of space; as inter- 
locked and interwoven with all other choices and. 
all events in a scheme reaching from everlasting to 
everlasting, —then we are forced to the conclusion 
that if absolute foreknowledge be true, there is, and 


there can be, no real arena for freedom in the soul 


318 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


of man. No wonder Dr. Whedon exclaims, ‘‘To 
many it seems a matter in which the fearful blends 
too much with the sublime that interests so immense 
should be suspended upon a fiber so slight as the 
free human will.” We shall then be compelled to 
exclaim, with the good Dr. Dick, that ‘‘if our voll- 
tions are foreseen we can no more avoid them than 
we can pluck the sun out of yonder heavens.” 

‘To reconcile,” says Dr. Campbell, of Scotland, 
‘the divine prescience with freedom or contingency, 
and the consequent moral good or ill of human ac- 
tions, is what I have never seen achieved, and what 
I despair of ever seeing.” And Dugald Stewart 
affirms that ‘‘to reconcile the freedom of the human 
will with the foreknowledge of God is beyond the 


) 


reach of the human faculties.’’ ‘‘To reconcile hu- 


man freedom and divine foreknowledge surmounts,”’ 
says Charnock, ‘‘the understanding of man.’’ The 
best Schleiermacher could say was that ‘‘ the propo- 
sition, ‘God wills the free as free,’ is synonymous 
with, God knows the free as free.’’ ‘‘ The question 
is often asked,” says Dr. Wilbur Fisk, ‘‘ Does God’s 
plan imply the necessity of a change on condition 
that his creatures act in this way or in that way?” 
The only answer that ingenuous, able man could 
make to this troublesome question was that God 
could so perfectly arrange his plan as to preclude the 
possibility of any disappointment. But, according 
to this view, God’s plan is all foreknown and immu- 
table. God’s present plan, then, embracing all the 
actions of free spirits, can not be changed by any 
probationer for eternity! 


INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREEDOM. 319 


But which is the easier to accept, so manifest and 
most pernicious an error, or to deny what seems to 
many thoughtful men to be the irrational and need- 
less dogma of universal foreknowledge? This dogma 
has been ever the disturber of the peace. Theolo- 
gians of the largest endowments have ever been 
striving with the energy of Titans to reconcile the two 
incompatible propositions; namely, man’s free agency 
and God’s absolute foreknowledge. The great think- 
ers of all times and lands have, with almost unbroken 
unanimity, pronounced them to be irreconcilable, and 
relegated them to the domain of the incomprehensi- 
ble. ‘(The attempt to reconcile foreknowledge with 
creature freedom,”’ says Dr. M’Cosh, ‘‘has engaged 
the subtlest and perplexed the clearest minds since 
man began to ask the how and the why and the 
wherefore.’’ Now, ought not this great fact, which is 
so prominent in the history of thought, to bear with 
some force adversely to the doctrine of divine pre- 
science? ‘‘ Foreknowledge,”’ thundered Martin Lu- 
ther, ‘‘is a thunder-bolt to dash free will to atoms.” 
This also is the opinion of John Calvin. Dr. Bledsoe 
charges amazing inconsistency upon Martin Luther, 
for affirming so frequently that the doctrine of free 
will falls prostrate before the prescience of God, 
while at the same time maintaining the freedom of 
te divitiecewilly <*HorditsaysubraiBledsoe, “if ‘fore: 
knowledge is incompatible with the existence of free . 
will, the will of God is not free, because all his voli- 
tions are perfectly foreseen.” 

But it has been rendered plausible, if it has not been 
demonstrated, in this discussion, that the perfections 


320 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


of God’s personal character, as well as his perfections 
as a Moral Governor of free accountable beings, most 
strongly indicate as the correct view that very many 
of his volitions are formed and known by him only 
when the demand for them arrives. The only argu- 
ment, therefore, which Dr. Bledsoe adduces to refute 
Martin Luther is, as we see, merely the manifest fal- 
lacy of undue assumption of premise. © ‘‘The effort,” 
says Professor Goldwin Smith, ‘‘to reconcile the man- 
ifest contradiction between freedom and omniscience, 
by distinguishing between foreknowledge and after- 
knowledge, has been utterly unsuccessful.” 

Julius Miiller adds his high authority to sustain 
the same position. He tells us that this solution of 
the difficulty of reconciling freedom with foreknowl- 
edge has been the popular one, from Augustine 
down to our latest theologians. ‘‘They all ad- 
mit,’ he says, ‘‘that the freedom of human action 
would be destroyed if God literally knew beforehand 
what it would be. But they say that God's knowl- 
edge is not, like ours, subject to the conditions of 
time and sequence. For past, present, and future are 
known to God as a complete, ever-present whole.” 
To this Miiller replies that ‘‘past, present, and future 
must not be excluded from the perceptions of God. 
If succession in moments, in time, be something real, 
then the assertion that time does not exist in the 
divine knowledge, that it is not an object of divine 
perception, means nothing less than that God does 
not know the world as it is. But God does know 
things as they are, and they are precisely as he knows 
them. The world, objectively, must be present to 


INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREEDOM. 321 


the mind of God. He therefore does recognize suc- 
cession in time. Human freedom, therefore, can not 
be saved by regarding God’s knowledge as eternal, 
and raised above the limitations of time.” Thou- 
sands of thinkers have frankly admitted that the 
freedom of human action would be destroyed if God _ 
literally knew beforehand what that action would be. 
Their only escape from the difficulty is by denying 
that there is any succession with God. But all the 
philosophers, such as Porter, Mahan, and M’Cosh, 
no longer deny, but boldly affirm, that there is such 
succession. 

But do not these arguments at least render it 
much more probable than otherwise that the divine 
foreknowledge is really incompatible with the free- 
dom of the human will? And does not this accu- 
mulated weight of authority against the possibility 
of the human faculties ever effecting a reconciliation 
between man’s free agency and God’s universal pre- 
science tend to the same conclusion? And if we 
still adhere to the dogma of absolute, universal pre- 
science, is not that to leave the whole subject in such 
incomprehension, incertitude, and suspense as to 
paralyze, to a great degree, the energies of the will, 
and force all thorough and devout students of divin- 
ity to seriously question whether human freedom is 
not, after all, a torturing delusion ? 


CHAPTER XXI. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE ANNIHILATES THE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN FREEDOM AND THE LAW OF 
CAUSE AND EFFECT. 


HE important distinction between the action of a 

free will and the movement of a material force 
is that every event in the domain of the latter has a 
necessary antecedent, whereas a volition has really 
no antecedent. It has precedents, but those prece- 
dents involve nothing coercive or necessary or uni- 
form. There is in them nothing that can indicate 
with certainty a particular choice, nothing that can 
afford omniscience any certainty as to the future pro- 
duction of that volition, of which they are and can 
be nothing more than the occasions. 

The moment we admit that the precedent of a 
volition is of such a nature as to afford omniscience 
eround for absolute certainty as to that volition, that 
moment we annihilate, to all human discrimination, 
the distinction between freedom and the great law of 
cause and effect, and we introduce confusion into our 
thinkings. That instant we logically destroy human 
freedom, accountability, and the possibility of a divine 
moral government. True, the human will requires 
reasons, motives, considerations, and even tempta- 
tions, as the occasions of its rewardable exercise. 


But these are always numerous, various, and unco- 
322 


FREEDOM, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 323 


ercive. There can be nothing coercive in the char- 
acter of the precedents of those choices which en- 
tail endless destiny if a man is a free agent. And 
never being coercive in their character, they can 
not logically be called antecedents. And the same 
can be said of any other ground of certainty as to- 
future free choices which can be conceived by the 
human mind. Between the antecedent of an effect 
and an occasion of a volition there is, and there 
can be, therefore, no element of resemblance or 
oneness. - 

Could there be found in the occasion of a voli- 
tion any thing that is regular or uniform or univer- 
sal or coercive, then that occasion might have the 
nature of an antecedent, and the resulting volition 
might be foreknown. But if we invest the occasion, — 
the reason, the motive, or the sensibility, in view of 
which the will finally decides and acts, with regular- 
ity, uniformity, universality, coercity, we at once 
rob the agent of all his accountability and power of 
taking the incipient initiative. But, you may reply, 
God sees the act as free, but he sees it in and by 
and through that particular influence that is finally 
the occasion of the choice and of the volition. But 
if a foreknowledge of a volition is obtained through 
perceiving the final sensibility which will in fact 
prove to be the occasion of that volition, this does 
not in the least relieve the great difficulty. We do. 
not, and we can not, remove volition from the cate- 
gory of the action of the law of cause and effect. 
This-is manifestly so, because in so doing we remove 
the cause of the determination of the will from the 


324 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


subjective into the objective, and then from the ob- 
jective we estimate the movement of the subjective. 
From looking at the domain of cause and effect we 
judge and reason as to the action of a free spirit. 
If a human being has the power of causation and 
the power of taking the initiative, that power must 
reside in the will, and not in the sensational or ra- 
tional occasion of the action of the will. The sen- 
sibilities act on the will according to the law of 
cause and effect, but the will acts freely, and sov- 
ereignly sends out its volition. If God foresees our 
choices, then, it is only by looking at the will. If he 
seeks for a present knowledge of our future choices 
in the sensational precedents of those choices, he 
seeks the living among the dead. He seeks for a 
responsible cause of action where a responsible cause 
can never be found, and ought never to be found. _ 

If God foresees our choice, it can, we again say, 
only be by looking directly at the will itself, and no- 
where else. But what is there, or can there be, in 
the mere faculty of the will of a free agent to indi- 
cate what its free choices will be? To this question 
no one has ever yet given or even conceived of a 
semblance of an answer. But it is only when the 
foreknowledge of a volition is gained, not through 
some of the many occasions of volition, but through 
the cause of that volition—which cause is the will 
itself — that omniscience can distinguish between 
volition and the action of the great law of cause 
and effect. For every complete cause produces its 
effects uncausedly. But if the actions of an un- 
caused will can be foreknown by the foreknowing its 


; FREEDOM, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 325 


surroundings, its temptations, and the sensibilities in 
view of which it finally elects and decides, nothing 
can save that action from the category of the law of 
cause and effect. 

If prescience is able, as Richard: Watson says it 
is, ‘‘to dart through all the workings of the human 
mind, all its comparisons of things in the judgment, 
all the influences of motives on the affections, all the 
hesitancies and haltings of the will to its final choice,”’ 
and in this way only perceives that choice, then in 
the will there is, and there can be, nothing creative, 
nothing causative, nothing original, nothing independ- 
ent, and therefore nothing rewardable or punishable. 
The law of its action, call it what you will, is simply 
the action of the great law of cause and effect. Bum- 
gartner, following Leibnitz, explains the possibility of 
God’s unerring prescience by his perfect insight into 
the causes which will be adequate to secure those 
choices. But Dr. L. P. Hickok says thata capacity 
for an alternative action (which is purely supernatural), 
or a cause which has an alternative is itself no ground 
for determining which alternative will come to pass. 
The efficiency in sucha case is no ground whatever of 
certainty as to which of the alternatives will result. 
He saw too clearly to locate the absolute prescience 
of future free choices in the conditions of the free 
being and according to the law of cause and effect. 
In order to safeguard absolute prescience he, there- 
fore, betakes himself to the clouds, and affirms that 
“we know that God must possess some form of fore- 


knowing altogether inexplicable to us. The ‘future 
28 


326 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


and the past must be to God’s mode of knowledge 
wholly irrelevant.” 

If two free beings were created precisely alike in 
every particular, and then placed in the same circum- 
stances and assailed by identical temptations, the ques- 
tion arises, Could there be any data by which we 
should be authorized to say with absolute certainty 
that the free choices of both would be the same in 
all instances? If we reply, yes; then we are neces- 
sitarians, and virtually annihilate the distinctions be- 
tween liberty and the law of cause and effect. But 
if we reply to the above inquiry in the negative, we are 
libertarians. And if, while affirming that the choices 
of these two free beings would or might be variant, 
we still adhere to the dogma of absolute divine fore- 
knowledge, we become inconsistent and _ illogical 
Arminians. Consistency requires, and will be logic- 
ally satisfied with nothing less than, a denial of the 
divine previsions of the future choices of free beings. 
For that prevision necessarily annihilates the grand 
distinction between human liberty and the law of 
cause and effect. 

Dr. M’Cosh says: ‘‘None of the Calvinists, even 
those of the highest order, have ever fully developed 
the phenomena of human freedom. They have not 
taken into account the active, and the abiding facul- 
ties of the soul, which are the mazn causes of mental 
states, we say the main causes, or rather the main 
element in any given cause. We hold it to be an in- 
controvertible fact, that the true determining cause of 
every given volition is not a mere anterior incitement, 


FREEDOM, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 22 


but the very soul itself by its inherent power of will. 
Incitement can only become motive when it 1s sanc- 
tioned by the will itself, so that it is not so much the 
incentive that determines the will, as zt zs the well that 
determines the incentive. We has not scanned the full 
phenomena which consciousness discloses who de- 
nies the real- potency of will—a potency above all 
special volitions, and the true power exercised in pro- 
ducing volitions. The pseudo-Calvinists, perverting 
the proper doctrine of philosophical necessity, have 
represented man as having all his thoughts and feel- 
ings determined by an external cause, and hence 
as being a mere creature of circumstances. ”’ 

This is a most remarkable statement, considering 
its source. The psychological perceptions of this 
eminent writer were too clear and too correct not to 
discover the fallacy in the statement that ‘‘man is 
swayed by the strongest motive,”’ and the distinction 
between the law of liberty and the law of: constraint. 
The psychology of his times has required of him 
these concessions. And yet from this clear psycho- 
logical light he falls, staggers back into darkness, 
under the misleading influence of his theology, and 
most inconsistently ‘affirms: ‘‘We hold, and we can 
not but hold, that the principle of cause and effect 
reigns in mind as well as in matter. Yet necessita- 
rians found their doctrine on the circumstance that 
the principle of cause and effect reigns in the domain | 
of mind as well as in the territories of matter. And 
it is on the account of such a connection that we 
anticipate mental states and the future actions of 
men. How can general predictions be uttered as to 


328 THE FORE:KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


voluntary acts, if there be no causes operating upon 
the will. If any one assert that consciousness inti- 
mates that man can not be responsible when his voli- 
tions have a cause, can not be responsible unless the 
acts of the will are uncaused, we simply meet his 
assertion with a direct contradiction.” 

The psychology of Dr. M’Cosh demanded the 
law of liberty in responsible agents; but his theology 
required the law of cause and effect in the same 
responsible agents. And, therefore, he writes one 
way in psychology and quite another in theology. 
If he could have made clear to men’s understand- 
ings the distinction between the action of the law 
of cause and effect which is regnant in material 
forces, and the operations of that law as applicable to 
the responsible actions of accountable beings, most 
eladly would he have done so. And that would 
have been a philosophical achievement which would 
have ranked him forever with him who discovered 
the law of universal gravitation. Kant and Coleridge, 
and the most prominent of modern systems of phi- 
losophy, exclude cause and effect from the sphere of 
spirit and of freedom. But Dr. M’Cosh knew that it 
was impossible for him to formulate this distinction, 
and therefore he says, ‘‘Should it be demanded of 
us that we reconcile the two separate truths advocated 
by us, we answer that we are not bound to offer a 
positive reconciliation.” " 

Is it not surprising that all able thinkers do not 
see the very wide distinction between the action of 
the law of cause and effect and the action of the law 
of freedom? The law of cause and effect, on the one 


FFREEDOM, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 329 


hand, inexorably limits to a single result, and the 
cause is invariably the precise measure of the effect, 
and the effect is the precise measure of its cause. 
The law of cause and effect can never, in any degree, 
produce moral character or moral deserts. Intelli-. 
gence, sensibility, choice, will, are all absolutely 
wanting in that law. The baldest of all absurdities is 
that constraint can evolve rewardability or merito- 
riousness. But, on the other hand, the law of free- 
dom allows one of many results, and necessarily im- 
plies alternatives. These results of the action of the 
law of freedom seldom, if ever, vary with or are in 
proportion to the motives addressed to the will. 
And the action of this law is capable of producing 
moral character and deserts, and nothing else is thus 
capable. No distinction in metaphysics is clearer or 
more fundamental than the one between the action 
of these two laws. If any thing in the universe is 
unconditioned as to what it does, it is the human will. 
And yet it is affirmed that ‘‘the principle of the law 
of cause and effect reigns in the domain of mind as 
well as in the territories of matter.” But Dr. L. P. 
Hickok says, ‘‘A self active being, which has its 
law within it, and not imposed upon it, must go out 
in its activity as no other agency can; its acts are its 
own originations, and not productions from it by an 
outer causality working upon it. That activity which 
can go out to its object, with still an open alternative, 
must possess a constituent being different from an 
activity that goes out to its object with no alternative.” 

Failing to distinguish between the law of liberty 
and the law of cause and effect in responsible agents, 


330 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


Dr. M’Cosh turns upon the advocates of divine fore- 
knowledge and declares that ‘‘all libertarians who 
admit that the prescience of God reaches to the volun- 
tary acts of his creatures are landed in the same diffi- 
culties” with himself. They, too, ‘‘hold truths which 
they can not reconcile. For, if voluntary acts have 
been foreseen, then they must, or at least they cer- 
tainly shall, happen, and there is xo effectual way of 
showing how man’s deeds are certain beforehand while 
yet he may do as he pleases. But in order to ob- 
viate this difficulty it has been alleged that God 
may be regarded as freed from the contemplation of 
events under the relations of time, and that the future 
may be seen by him as present. But this would 
again require that we set aside the fundamental laws 
ef belief. The fundamental laws of belief require us 
to believe in the succession of time as an objective 
reality, and that the future is not now present. The 
rejection or invasion of those intuitive beliefs implies 
that God has given to us intuitions which mislead 
and deceive us, and this would land us in the sub- 
jectivity of Kant and in the idealism of Fichte, with 
all their terrible consequences.” Thus we are forced 
to see that only he who denies absolute prescience 
can redeem the volitions of the human will from the 
necessitating action of the law of cause and effect. 
With increasing confidence therefore, in our argu- 
ment, we affirm that foreknowledge annihilates the 
distinction between human freedom and material 
causation. 

The human will causes the free volition, not by 
the way of necessity, but so that it might not have 


FREEDOM, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 331 


produced it or might have produced something else. 
The will is and must be, if man be accountable, the 
Spontaneous source of its actions.* The attributes 
which constitute God a spontaneous source of action, 
were implanted in man. The normal order of the will’s. 
action, is to choose or to decide in view of, and in ac- 
cordance with, reasonable reasons and justifiable con- 
siderations, and in response to proper and holy appeals 
and solicitations made to our sensibilities. And if 
man be a free being and not mere organized matter, 
if he be a person, then, from the very spontaneity 
of his nature, he must be able to choose or to decide 
in view of, and in accordance with, unreasonable rea- 
sons and unjustifiable considerations, and, in response 
to unholy appeals and solicitations made to his 
susceptibilities of feeling. Now, because the will 
requires, in order to make resolves, decisions, or 
choices, that some sort of reasons, considerations, or 
solicitations be addressed to the understanding and 
the emotional susceptibilities, —multitudes affirm that 
these reasons, considerations, and_ solicitations do 
actually determine the action of the will, and hence 
they place its action under the law of constraint. 
But these facts do not prove that the will is deter- 


*Tt is marvelous that there have been, and continue to be, 
such great difficulties in tracing and comprehending the true phe- 
nomena of liberty. All who look among the motives for the cause 
of the will’s action must place, however much they may strive to 
escape it, the will under the Jaw of constraint. For they seek 
among the motives for that mysterious influence by which choice is 
effected. But the true libertarian view locates the incipiency of the 
will’s action in the will itself. It is the will that assigns to molive 
its degree of influence. 


332 Tur FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


mined by the conditions or occasions of its acting. 
Whatever be the power of a motive over our reason 
or our sensibility, we are conscious of a_ higher 
power behind its influence upon us, by which the 
motive may be arrested, and the spell of its fascina- 
tion broken. If a man presents to my understand- 
ing strong reasons why the welfare of the nation 


requires the death of a certain man, and other rea- 


sons why I ought to be the agent of his execution, 
however plausible those reasons may be, my con- 
sciousness tells me that they can not control me. 
My consciousness ‘informs me that I can yield to 
those considerations or I can reject them. If unholy 
appeals be made to my sensibilities under circum- 
stances favorable for gratification, my consciousness 
testifies that those solicitations can not control me, 
that Iam not under the control of any motive, that 
Iam master, that I can resist them all and maintain 
my integrity. This is the testimony of universal 
consciousness. 

And so, amid all the influences of external agents 
or evil spirits upon us, we are conscious that we can 
originate action from within, and that we can modify 
outward circumstances by voluntary determination. 
“We have within us,” said Sir John Herschel) jaa 
distinct consciousness of causation.” Freedom, in- 
deed, requires that there be a diversity of reasons, 
considerations, and _ solicitations addressed to man. 
These are the conditions of volition. A condition 
‘5 an attendant on a cause without which the cause 
is not conserved as resultant, but with which the 
cause is still conceivably non-resultant. A condi- 


FREEDOM, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 235 


tion enables but does not insure nor decide action. 
Without these conditions the will would not act at 
all. Without them there could be neither volition, 
choice, nor liberty. Without them liberty would 
be a term lacking signification; without them there — 
could be no possible arena for the testing of one’s 
loyalty to truth and authority, or for the formation 
and development of moral character. For neither 
a forced action nor an action without motive can have 
any moral character attached to it. A free agent can 
win approbation and reward only when he rejects a 
bad motive, and acts in view of a good one. He 
can only merit condemnation and punishment when 
he rejects a good motive and acts in view of a bad 
one. Motive is indispensable to the moral quality 
of an action. But motive can never impart that 
mysterious power by which the will itself acts. Ev- 
ery man is conscious that he is the source of orig- 
inal, free action, entirely undetermined by motives. 
Choice implies an effort of will, to which the law of 
cause and effect or the principle of constraint can not 
be applied without ambiguity in the use of terms, 
-and a violation of the necessary laws of thought. 
But absolute prescience subjects the mind to the law 
of cause and effect, and therefore annihilates the dis- 
tinction between freedom and necessity. 
29 


CHAPTER -XAIT. 


ALL THINGS WILL BE AS "THEY WILL BE. 


HE saying that ‘‘all things will be as they will 

be” (whether God knows them or not) is a 
piece of artful sophistry. If it means that all things 
will be as it is now, or at any time, certain that they 
will be, we heartily agree to it. But if it means that 
it is now already certain, either objectively or in the 
mind of God, just what the moral destiny of each 
free moral agent is to be, then we reject it utterly. 
It is simply a covert begging of the whole question. 
The sophism, when stripped of its ambiguity, loses 
every shadow of bearing upon the case. It is not 
true that it is now certain what the future volitions 
of probationary beings, while acting under the law of 
liberty, will be. For the causes of those volitions, as 
yet, have no existence whatever. These causes are 
not found in the present organism or moral char- 
acter of the creature, but they are to be found in the 
will itself. It is the will that makes moral character, 
not moral character the will. A volition is a spon- 
taneity uncaused by any thing objective, or by any 
thing subjective save ‘the originating will, which is a 
beginning, not a projection from something behind. 
A volition caused by any thing but the will itself is 
a contradiction. It is an origination in the spirit. It 


is not, therefore, certain, and can not be certain, that 
334 


WHAT Witt BE WILL BE. 335 


aman will sin until the fact has become certain by 
the sinful volition itself. For a volition takes exist- 
ence, and so takes character, only as it is brought 
into existence. Before the will originated the voll- 
tion it was a nonentity. . 

When a man has made it highly probable that he 
will continue to sin, then his sinning is a renewed, 
but not a new, sinning; his past sins are projecting 
themselves into the present and future by corrupting 
and influencing his volitions through the force of 
depravity and habit. But this bent of sinning, this 
bondage to sin, may be broken by the proffered 
erace of God, which he may still have volitional 
streneth sufficient gratefully to accept. We can, 
therefore, without hesitation, say to the sinner, SPE 
is not now certain that you are going to be lost.” 
The sinner may either defiantly or despairingly look 
into the face of any one holding the doctrine of ab- 
solute prescience, and candidly inquire, * May it not 
be a fact that already God knows to a certainty that 
I am going to be lost forever?” The prescientist 
would be compelled to reply in the affirmative. But 
the believer in the unforeseen free choices of free 
agents can reply to him confidently and emphatically 
in the negative. He can tell him that it is not now 
certain that he will be lost. He can tell him God 
knows his destiny just as it is; namely, as not now 
certain, but as wholly uncertain and undetermined, 
and purely contingent. He can say to him tats 
for yourself to make your calling and election sure. 
Your destiny lies not in God’s power, but in the use 
of your own moral freedom, which in responsible 


336 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


acts God himself can not violate.’ Disbelievers in 
universal prescience can also say to the sinner: ‘‘It 
is not now certain that you are going to be saved. 
God knows that also just as it is; namely, as not 
yet certain, not yet determined, but just as he pur- 
posed it to be, purely contingent. But you can 
make certain your eternal salvation. It is in you, 
and in you only, to do this by your moral freedom.”’ 

God, in creating man, did not endow him with 
the semblance of freedom, but with real freedom. 
Nothing less than this would be moral freedom. 
The bestowment of this freedom involved, on God’s 
part, the putting of man’s fate into his own hands; 
involved the endowing him with the capacity to 
create himself into something new in the universe. 
Into what he would create himself was unforeknow- 
able, for the manifest reason that there existed no 
positive causative connection between his actual state 
of being and the state which he would in the future 
create for himself. We thus see that the phrase, ‘‘All 
things will be as they will be,’ has no signification 
pertinent to the discussion of this matter. 

But some one may say, ‘‘Your future destiny 
must be bright or dark, one or the other, and, which- 
ever it may be, it will be the result of your own free 
choice. Now, what evil could result if God simply 
marks down in his mind the destiny he foresees you 
will of your own free choice finally determine upon? 
Why can he not record a future fact, just as he 
records a past fact, seeing that the future fact will be 
in all points just as though it could not be fore- 
known?” Before answering this question let us ex- 


WHAT WILL BE WILL BE. 227 


amine a statement upon this point made by that 
acute, subtle, and erudite thinker, Dr. Samuel Clarke. 
Let us, however, first premise that a future choice of 
a free being is an event that might not have been. 
No choice at all, or any one of a thousand different 
possible choices might have been in its stead, and to 
call such a future event a certain truth from all eter- 
nity is to disregard every variety of meaning which 
authorities assign to the terms certain and uncertain. 
An event that is contingent in its nature, and contin- 
gent as to its happening, can never be certain until its 
actual occurrence. ‘‘Contingently means avoidably ; 
every university scholar knows that,’’ exclaimed Dr. 
Twisse, prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly. 
But Dr. Samuel Clarke says: ‘‘ Even if we suppose 
that the actions of men can not be foreknown, they 
will still be just as certain as if they had been foreseen 
and absolutely necessary. That is, if an action is per- 
formed to-day, it was a certain truth yesterday and 
from all eternity that this action was an event to be 
performed to-day, as it is now a certain and infallible 
truth that it is performed.” But this statement is 
not tenable; for, if the performance of this act to-day 
was a certain truth from all eternity, where did that 
truth exist? Dr. Clarke admits, in his argument, for 
the moment, that this certain truth had no existence 
in the mind of Deity. This certain truth certainly 
had no existence in the mind of any creature. It 
had no existence in the necessities of things, or as 
bound up in their existing causes, because the said 
act was the act of a free agent acting under the law 
of liberty. How can the term ‘‘certain truth” be 


338 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE-OF GOD. 


applied to any thing outside of necessary or intuitive 
truth and existing facts? How can it be applied to 
that which has no subjective existence in any mind, 
created or uncreated, and no objective existence in 
any causes now in operation, or in any conceivable 
relations or necessities of things? There was not, 
then, from eternity, any certainty about the act, con- 
ceivable or inconceivable. How, then, could the 
occurrence of an act to-day have been a certain 
truth from all eternity? From all eternity it was 
only a contingent possibility. And to affirm that the 
contingent happening of a contingent possibility is a 
certain truth from all eternity can not be any thing 
but a contradiction. Sprinkle from a tower into a 
street a handful of diamonds, and you might better 
affirm that it was a truth from all eternity where and 
in what position each one of the diamonds would 
fall, because it must needs fall somewhere, in obedi- 
ence to some necessity. And yet on such a basis 
as this Dr. Samuel Clarke exclaims: ‘‘ Surely there is 
no contradiction in supposing that every future event 
which, in the nature of things, is now certain may 
now be certainly foreknown by omniscience.”? But 
here he assumes the very point in debate. He 
assumes that the event is certain as to happening, 
when it is absolutely both contingent in its nature 
and contingent as to its coming to pass. And to 
affirm that a future event which is contingent in its 
nature and contingent as to its happening is now 
absolutely certain, involves a manifest contradiction 
which no amount of emphasis and repetition and 
dogmatism and authority can ever obliterate. 


WHAT WILL BE WILL BE. 339 


‘‘God foresees the future actions of free agents,” 
says Dr. Gregory, ‘‘ because they will be.’’ I do 
not ask him to tell how God sees them. That ques- 
tion, as all agree, is insoluble. But I have a right to 
ask where he sees them. He can not now see them 
in his own purpose or desire; nor among necessary 
truths; nor among things needed for the accomplish- 
ment of his divine plans; nor in the mind of any 
created intelligence; nor in any existing causes; nor 
in the future surroundings of that free agent whom 
he proposes to create, for his free will can not act 
under the law of cause and effect in moral actions ; 
nor even in the future free will of that agent, for 
that he has determined shall act supernaturally, self- 
determiningly, unconditionally, and it may decide in 
any of a multitude of ways. But we are weary of the 
constant iteration by the great thinkers of this say-. 
ing, ‘All things will be as they will be, and hence 
they are all now certainties.” A thing to be certain 
must be certain in itself, or certain in the mind of 
some intelligent being. If human future free choices 
are now certainties, then divine future free choices 
are likewise certainties. But if these are now cer- 
tainties, then all past divine free choices were from 
eternity certainties. They were eternal certainties 
before God originated them. But God’s determina- 
tions to express himself in objectivity in myriads of 
ways were not eternal. They had an inception, con- 
ception, andexpression. In his free infinite mental and 
moral energies he originated all the objects and be- 
ings of his universe. They all might have been dif- 
ferent, or not have been at all. Once they had no 


340 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


objective certainty, for God had not yet created 
them. They had no subjective certainty, for they 
had not yet been determined upon, nor had a concept 
of them been formed in the divine mind. Certainty 
can be but one of two kinds, objective or subjective. 
And to call a thing a certainty which is destitute of 
both objective and subjective certainty is a trifling 
application of a term which has a definite significa- 
tion. We thus see that God’s free choices in his 
world of contingencies could not in any sense of the 
word have been certainties from eternity. And what 
is true of divine volitions is equally true of human 
volitions. To say that, because a future free choice 
must eventually be one of many possibles, it is now 
a certainty, known or not, is to rob that choice of its 
inherent character of contingency. 

But let us consider somewhat further this phrase, 
“All things will be as they will be,” in its bearing 
on the main question before us. If we would safe- 
euard divine foreknowledge we must admit, as a 
logical necessity from which there is no escape, that 
every event of the future shall come to pass just as 
it is now foreseen that it will come to pass. For 
if, while maintaining infallible divine foreknowledge, 
any one denies that it is logically necessary for every 
event to come to pass just as it is now foreseen 
that it will come to pass, then he will be compelled 
to admit that it is not a logical necessity that any 
event shall come to pass just as it is now foreseen. 
But to admit that it is not a logical necessity that 
any event, which it is now foreseen will come to 
pass, must occur, and that, though foreseen, it may 


WHAT WILL BE WILL BE. 341 


nevertheless utterly fail to occur, is to surrender the 
doctrine of absolute divine foreknowledge. 

Should the eternal future be different in any par- 
ticular from that which it is now foreseen it will be, 
then the present divine foreknowledge would, in fact, 
prove to be untrue and deceptive. In order then 
that the divine foreknowledge may be eternally true, 
reliable, and infallible, it is a logical necessity that 
every particular that it is now foreseen will be, shall 
be precisely as it is now foreseen; and there is, then, 
no objective avoidability as to any event that is now 
foreseen. For absolute divine foreknowledge makes 
every event of the future just as absolutely certain 
as does the doctrine of unconditional predestination 
which declares there is a causal necessity that every 
event of the future shall come to pass just as it has 
been eternally foreordained. In absolute divine fore- 
knowledge there is a logical necessity that every 
event shall come to pass just as it has been eter- 
nally foreseen. Causal necessity in the system of 
unconditioned predestination is no more essential or 
indispensable than is logical necessity in the sys- 
tem of absolute divine foreknowledge. Every event, 
therefore, that is infallibly foreknown is absolutely an 
objective unavoidability. 

But again, if a free event subjectively will be, 
that is ground sufficient for predicating of it objective 
certainty, and its objective certainty is ground suffi- 
cient for predicating of it unnumbered specific results 
in God’s moral government—such as the utilization 
of every element of its force, if morally good; and 
the assigning to other free and good events the office 


342 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


of counteracting, ‘controlling, and subduing all its 
influences, if morally evil. And such actual and 
unquestioned predication by God of the objectively 
certain free event is ground sufficient for the predi- 
cating of it the logical necessity that such free event 
should come to pass, in order that his now infallibly 
foreknown moral universe should be what it shall 
be, and what it must be. And this logical necessity 
is ground sufficient for predicating of that free event 
an objective unavoidability. Since the moral universe 
shall be and must be just what it is now infallibly fore- 
known that it will be, therefore, the coming to pass of 
that free event is an absolute objective unavoidability. 
But again, if the free choices of free beings be all 
now infallibly foreknown, and the inevitable good 
influences of free holy choices be all assigned to the 
accomplishment of valuable specific results, which 
are designed by God in his government of the moral 
universe; and if the inevitable evil influences of 
free sinful choices be held in check and under control 
by the counter influences of other foreknown free 
holy choices of other free beings, and to the accom- 
plishment of which those other foreknown holy 
choices had been specifically appointed in the coun- 
sels of eternity, then God’s plan for eternity to come 
is not only infallibly foreknown, but it is absolutely 
immutable as to objective fact. That whole plan 
now stands out before him as an absolutely unchange- 
able objective reality. And if this be so, one can 
not even admit that God himself can change this 
now infallibly foreknown plan, and yet, at the same 
time, preserve to him his absolute foreknowledge. 


WHAT Witt BE WILL BE. 343 


Do you say that God might change his now in- 
fallibly foreknown plan if he desired to do so, but 
that he does not and will not desire it? But even 
this supposition does not meet the difficulty. For 
if he should change his foreknown plan, then his 
absolute foreknowledge would prove to be unre- 
liable and deceptive. If then God now foreknows 
that he will not change, in any particular, his now 
foreknown eternal plan, then there is no possibility 
of his changing that eternal plan without an uncon- 
ditional surrender of absolute foreknowledge. The 
eternal future then is, to him, absolutely unavoid- 
able. He has no power nor freedom to make it 
other than what he now foreknows it will be. And 
if he can not change nor infract that plan in one 
iota without a surrender of his foreknowledge, how 
can I, a being utterly and forever dependent, change 
an eternally fixed and immutable plan of the Great 
Jehovah. My future and eternal destiny is now there- 
fore foreknown with infallible certainty, and relative 
to it there is for me no possible objective avoidability. 

After the above was written, it was gratifying to 
find in Dr. Chalmers’s Institutes the following quota- 
tion, so applicable at this point: ‘‘We are aware 
of the argumentations which have been employed to 
reconcile human liberty with divine foreknowledge; 
we mean the liberty that reduces volitions to contin- 
gencies. The knowledge beforehand of what may be, 
or may not be, is the paradox which our opponents 
labor to demonstrate, and thus to show that their 
self-determining power infringes not on the omnis- 
cience of God. The only intelligible constderation 


344 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


which they advance on behalf of this strange affirmation 
is, that the foreknowledge of an event has no more 
influence, no more power to necessitate that event 
than the after knowledge of it, and therefore that 
if we can look back on human volitions, and contem- 
plate them as matters of historical certainty, without 
any inroad on their contingency, why may it not be 
possible to look forward on them as matters of cer- 
tainty, and yet these volitions be free, and that in the 
sense of contingent notwithstanding?” 

To this argument of the Arminian prescientist Dr. 
Chalmers replies, ‘‘It is very true that the knowl- 
edge, whether of a past or future event, does not 
cause the certainty of that event, but it is quite 
enough for our object if it indicate this certainty. 
When we look, in retrospect, to that which is past, 
we can say of any event in that direction that, at its 
time and its place, this event, and no other, did occur; 
and when we look forward into the future, we can say 
of any event in that direction, that at its time and 
place this event, and no other, shall be, and all we 
contend for is that what certainly shall be certainly 
must be. If there be any distinction between these 
it needs a finer discrimination than ours to be able to 
perceive it. What God knows beforehand shall be, 
that, and no other, must be; and, therefore, if instead 
of being certain to be this, it may be either this or 
that, then it lies without the scope of the divine 
foreknowledge. Iam willing to give up the assertion 
that volitions are things of necessity, if it be only 
admitted that they are things of such certainty as 
that they are not things of contingency, but come to 


WHAT WILL BE WILL BE. 345 


pass in the category of cause and effect.’’ Did the 
great man ever write any thing more explicit and 
overwhelming? 

But again, so long as God does not know that a 
future event will happen, so long he can not predi- 
cate any thing of it, either negatively or affirmatively. 
The thing is a mere nonentity. But the moment that 
he knows that an event will come to pass he can 
predicate concerning it as certainly as he can predi- 
cate concerning any truth, fact, or existence in the 
universe. That I might stand on any one of the 
thirty-six square feet contained in a given platform 
on to-morrow is now acontingency. If on to-morrow 
I stand on number sixteen, the act will be a free act; 
thateis “tlhievact=will-befreé) iviits nature. lHditebe 
now unknown to God on which number I shall 
choose to stand to-morrow, my standing on number 
sixteen is now a contingency as to its happening or 
as to its coming to pass; that is, it is now a contin- 
gency with God. God, therefore, could not predicate 
any thing with regard to the place on which I shall 
stand to-morrow. But the moment that God knows 
that on to-morrow I shall freely stand on number 
sixteen—that is, the moment that there is no contin- 
gency in his mind as to my standing there—that 
moment he can predicate that which he thus knows 
with absolute certainty. He can predicate every 
thing as to my future position; he can predicate all 
the relations that I shall sustain to the other thirty- 
five persons who will freely stand on the other 
thirty-five square feet of said platform; he can 
predicate all the influences, acting and reacting, that 


346 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


my free choices will exert over all those persons; and 
he can predicate all the results which those free 
choices will affect, near and remote, present and 
future. 

Good or evil influences necessarily flow forth from 
my free choices of moral good or moral evil upon 
those with whom I am associated, and out over the 
moral universe. And all these moral and immoral 
influences of my acts God can with certainty predi- 
cate. Now, the advocates of absolute foreknowledge 
declare, that with God there is now no contingency 
as to the coming to pass of all the future choices of 
free beings. They assert that God’s foreknowledge 
of the future choices of free beings is absolutely 
infallible. They affirm that God foresees the future 
choice of a free agent, and then incorporates that 
choice into his infallibly foreknown plan. The future 
fact, then, of my standing on number sixteen of said 
platform enters into God’s knowledge, plans, and 
thoughts as a positive reality. No other truth or 
fact known to omniscience is any more certain, inev- 
itable, or positively real or actual with him. This 
positive reality, with all its natural results and influ- 
ences, he arranges into his mapped-out plan with 
reference to all other positive realities which are in 
any way influenced by it. My future choice being 
now foreknown, God arranges for it to accomplish 
the specific results which he contemplates in his ad- 
ministrative plans. And to the accomplishment of 
these results my future free choice is especially and 
unerringly shaped. My freedom being necessarily 
a fountain of sinful or holy influences in a moral 


WHAT WiLL BE WILL BE, 347 


universe, God’s infinite plan, then, for the eternal 
future is now decided upon, fixed, and unalterably 
settled in his mind. Relative to any event of all this 
foreknown plan there can be now no avoidability in, 
the future. And all this—though I might in the exer- 
cise of my liberty have chosen number seventeen, or 
any other number on the platform—because now there 
is no contingency in the mind of God as to the future 
coming to pass of my standing on number sixteen. 
If you grant it is now possible for me to avoid 
standing on number sixteen, you at once surrender 
absolute divine foreknowledge. But so long as you 
maintain absolute divine foreknowledge you will be 
compelled to admit that it is now impossible for me to 
avoid standing on number sixteen. Though I admit 
that God foresees that, at the very time I will freely 
in putting forth a given volition, I shall possess the 
power of putting forth some other volition in its 
place, nevertheless, since he now sees with infallible 
certainty the identical choice that I shall. put forth, 
and actually incorporates that choice, with all its nat- 
ural and necessary influences, into all his subsequent 
plans and purposes; and since, in reference to those 
influences flowing from my free choice, he makes 
numerous predications and assigns them to the ac- 
complishment of various specific results in his subse- 
quent moral administration, either God's great com- 
prehensive plans for the future must fail in many 
particulars, and he must change as to many expedi- 
ents in order to secure their accomplishment, and all 
his infallible foreknowledge of the future effects of 
the choices of free spirits must prove to be un- 


348 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


true and unreliable, or there is no possible avoida- 
bility of my now foreknown destiny. True, I might 
have avoided it; but, that destiny now being infalli- 
bly foreknown by omniscience, it is at this moment 
no longer possible for me to avoid it. My future des- 
tiny, then, is now unavoidable. If you inquire upon 
what fact this absolute unavoidability is grounded, I 
reply : It is grounded upon the logical necessity of a 
thing being that which it is. If you admit that a 
foreknown event is now avoidable you are forced to 
admit that foreknowledge is fallible. 

Thus by various lines of logical thought we reach 
the same conclusion, that an event which is infallibly 
foreknown is thenceforward absolutely unavoidable. 
If now I stand recorded, in the infallibly foreknown, 
settled, fixed, and unchangeable plan of Jehovah, as an 
heir of perdition, there is to me absolutely no avoid- 
ability of that doom. If from eternity I was fore- 
known to be a vessel of wrath, upon whom tribula- 
tion and anguish were eternally to fall, it has been 
always, since my existence began, too late for me to 
readjust eternal destinies, to reconstruct the moral 
universe, to falsify the omniscience of God and 
break up all his settled and unalterable plans, and to 
procure for my name a record on the pages of the 
book of eternal life. My eternal future is now abso- 
lutely unavoidable. But every invitation, every en- 
treaty, every promise, every threatening, and every 
warning contained in the Holy Scriptures, addressed 
to my mind and heart, is based upon the assumption 
of, and thoroughly implies, my present and constant 
avoidability of sin and its awful consequences. 


WHAT WILL BE WILL BE. 349 


Hence, if there is now no contingency in the mind 
of God as to the happening or as to the coming to 
pass of my future free choices which involve moral- 
ity and entail eternal destiny, the Bible must be the 
most confusing and misleading book in all the litera- - 
ture of the world. And God, the Divine Author, in 
assuming and implying every-where and by every 
means my present avoidability of sin and its direful 
consequences, would seem to my _ reverent spirit 
to be most unreasonable, inconsistent, disingenuous 
and cruel. Moreover, this extreme unfairness and 
mockery are not confined to God’s written Word, 
which is addressed to the whole human family, col- 
lectively as well as individually. They extend with. 
at least equal significance to all the pathetic striv- 
ings, wooings, reproofs, expostulations, and illumina- 
tions which the Holy Ghost has addressed directly 
and powerfully to each human soul. That Spirit has 
with amazing mercy and pertinacity convinced me 
individually of sin, of righteousness, of judgment to 
come. All his awakenings and strivings and prompt- 
ings and purifyings, which he has wrought in my 
sinful soul, were produced there upon the clearly 
assumed, undoubted, unquestioned fact of my present 
avoidability of moral evil. He has made me feel 
deeply, in my inmost religious and devout conscious- 
ness, that he himself really thinks that there is for 
me an undoubted avoidability of sin and its eternal 
consequences. He assumes and powerfully impresses 
me that he regards all my future moral choices as 
absolutely free, when at the same time, according to 


the prescient theory, he knows them to be infallibly 
30 


350 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


certain. And he has likewise made all men to feel 
with me an equal depth and strength of impression 
that for every one of them hell is now an avoidability, 
and that he himself thinks so; for the grace that 
hath appeared unto all and the light which enlighten- 
eth every man that cometh into the world are his. 
Now, it is inconceivable that the Holy Ghost should 
approach any individual soul, in any circumstances, 
however unfavorable, as though he came in good 
faith, with respect to his present avoidability of eternal 
death, and entreat him, with inexpressible tenderness 
and pathos, and with exhaustless patience, pity, 
mercy, and long-suffering, not to grieve him, not to 
sin against him, but now, while it is to-day, to choose 
eternal life in the exercise of the freedom he has 
bestowed, when at the same moment he knows with 
infallible certainty that from eternity he has predi- 
cated a thousand different specific results, influences, 
and facts in his moral universe as resulting from the 
infallibly foreknown choice by that person of eternal 
death, no one of which can ever be avoided in the 
slightest degree; and when he also knows that that 
very choice of eternal death is absolutely indispensa- 
ble, in order to keep and to preserve infallible his 
own eternal foreknowledge. 

But the terrible inferences to be drawn from to 
above theory are no more blasphemous than thicy 
are logical and inevitable if that theory be true. 
And from these blasphemies I do not see any refuge 
save in the fearless denial of absolute divine fore- 
knowledge. If the denial of prescience did reflect 
on omniscience, that reflection would be infinitesimal 


WHAT WILL BE WILL BE. 351 


in comparison with that which such a view of the 
agency of the Holy Ghost necessitates upon the uni- 
versal Father. Even if the difficulty in believing 
foreknowledge did resolve itself into one of mere 
feeling, as Mr. Watson says it does, it would be no 
insignificant argument against the doctrine. For, if 
there is a latent, all-persuasive, and ever-manifested 
feeling in the human consciousness that a certain 
dogma can not be true, that fact ought to be care- 
fully considered by the devout seeker of divine truth. 
While the understanding, the comparing faculty, 
mediately infers, the pure reason, the intuitive fac- 
ulty, immediately perceives. The soul is endued 
with a sensitivity that corresponds to the pure reason. 
One perceives the necessary, the infinite, the eter- 
nal, the basis of all certainty; the other feels them. 
But the feeling of the necessary, the infinite, the 
eternal, often precedes their perception. The need 
of God and the immortal, as felt in the soul, pre- 
ceded the perception of them. And so in this case 
the necessity of non-prescience was felt long before 
this doctrine took outline and shape in the mind. 
There is an eternal verity in feeling as it exists in 
the soul’s depths. 


Gra Greate SOLIS 


‘THE RIGHTS OF CREATURE AND CREATOR GERMANE 
TO THE SUBJECT.” 


F an agent is the sole author of his endless destiny, 
I then he ought to be endowed with capacities to 
do things, the certain foreknowledge of which tran- 
scends the sweep of Omniscience. Not thus to 
endow an independent agent would be to exalt and 
degrade him at the same moment. If the sovereign 
has left the momentous question of my eternal des- 
tiny for me to determine, the simplest justice, as well 
as the proprieties, demand that he should await my 
final decision. If he has endued me with such a 
stupendous responsibility and such majesty of en- 
dowments, he ought—in profoundest reverence be it 
said—to leave me free and untrammeled to work out 
my destiny. To make a being responsible for his 
endless welfare, and then to give him no power to 
do any thing that is not foreknown by the. Ruler, 
would be like creating a sun and then quenching his 
light and fire in an interminable eclipse. Reason 
and justice both demand that,- in a matter so mo- 
mentous, there should be a correspondence, a just 
correlation, between the parties so deeply interested 
in its results—between the omnipotent and revered 
party who creates the being and the immortal party 
who decides the eternal destiny of that being. Those 

352 


RIGHTS OF CREATURE AND CREATOR. 353 


volitions which involve my eternal destiny are abso- 
lutely free and self-determined, and therefore they 
must be incapable of certain prefixedness. If they 
ever are to become a fixity, I alone am the be- 
ing to determine that fixity, and God can not justly. 
interfere therewith so long as he holds me alone 
‘responsible. Nor is there, in the nature of things, a 
single consideration to make it logically necessary 
that God should from eternity foreknow that fixity. 
On the other hand, such a divine knowledge would be 
detrimental to me and equally embarrassing to God. 
It would send paralysis over all my spiritual energies 
and creative and causative faculties. And with such 
hinderances and embarrassments I certainly ought not 
to be weighed down and enervated. And, on the 
other hand, if God foreknows my eternal destiny, 
then he too must be embarrassed, and feel the incon- 
sistency of his situation, in his efforts to do with 
appropriate earnestness and in perfect good faith and 
patience all that he ought to do to aid me, his sen- 
sitive and immortal offspring, in a work so inexpress- 
ibly difficult, hazardous, and possibly fatal. Is it 
possible to conceive of God’s putting forth efforts 
with that burning earnestness which the urgent neces- 
sities of the case demand, in order to snatch from 
everlasting death an endangered moral agent when he 
is absolutely certain that that agent is going forward 
to endless perdition? Unless the destiny of his— 
creatures be uncertain to him, it is impossible in the 
necessary relations of things, that he should make 
efforts to save them becomingly vehement, pro- 
tracted, and patiently exhaustive of his resources. 


354 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


If he foreknows that I am to be lost, already my des- 
tiny is inevitable, and if it be inevitable why allow 
longer probation to one who he foresees will cer- 
tainly perish? Probation to those who are inevitably 
to be lost can only be a farce. All the costly agen- 
cies of my redemption, all the instrumentalities of 
my reason and conscience, and all the exhibitions of 
goodness as seen-in the incarnation of the Son of 
God are profitless to me if God foreknows that I 
shall be among the finally lost. But no theory which 
necessitates such misapprehensions respecting God 
can be founded in truth. 

You may reply: Every man must have a chance. 
But what to any one cana chance be worth which is 
only certain to increase the depth and darkness of 
his damnation? What can an opportunity of making 
an eternal fortune signify if the results of that op- 
portunity be now certain and irrevocable? If a soul 
by disobedience dooms itself to eternal perdition, 
the sooner, Judas like, he goes to his appropriate 
place the better. For he only treasures up wrath 
against the day of wrath, after he has fixed his doom 
by sins for which there is no plan of repentance. 
It was, therefore, as soon as the Canaanites had out- 
lawed themselves from the covenant of grace, and 
had lost by transgression the possibility of a future 
life, and had satisfied God that there was no hope in 
their case, that he promptly ordered their destruction 
and removal from a probationary state. 

Yet you may say, every man must develop him- 
self in the eyes of a witnessing moral universe. But 
where is the necessity for that? Could not God pub: 


RIGHTS OF CREATURE AND CREATOR. 355 


lish to intelligent worlds, ‘‘I foresaw what the repro- 
bate would do if permitted to live, and therefore, to 
prevent his baleful exhibitions of wickedness, and to 
lessen his sentence of condemnation, I sent him at 
once into that place to which I foresaw he would. 
inevitably go?” But possibly you might reply, that 
it is necessary that God reveal to me his will and my 
duty, in order to furnish me with an opportunity of 
obeying or disobeying; that it is necessary that the 
alternative of obedience or disobedience be clearly 
proffered to the free subject, in order that his will 
may be actually tested; that invitations and threaten- 
ings by the Ruler must be addressed to him; that 
these indispensable conditions of trial must be fur- 
nished the subject before the results of his testing 
can exist; that the results of his future testing are 
foreknown as the results of actual experience; and 
that the actual prior experience of trial is necessary 
to the existence of the subsequent results. 

There may be some force in this reply so far as 
this, that certain conditions of probation are neces- 
sary to leave the subject wholly without excuse, and 
the justice of God immaculate. But every Christian 
knows that these conditions of trial have been so far 
extended and multiplied in his own case, beyond 
what justice required on the part of divine mercy, 
as to leave him without excuse, and justify his eter- 
nal banishment from heaven. And if God foreknows 
infallibly that he is finally to be lost, why should he 
multiply his benevolent efforts to save him so much 
beyond that which is simply needful to meet all the 
claims of divine justice? If he now knows that I 


356 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


am to be lost, I do desire him to cease his efforts’ to 
save me the moment all has been done for me, all 
opportunities have been afforded me, that justice 
could demand. Every effort and every privilege be- 
yond that is not only uncalled for on the part of God, 
but it contributes to the severity of my condem- 
nation and the depravation of my nature. Justice 
sternly demands that benevolent efforts in my behalf 
should cease the moment I stand without excuse, if 
God now foresees my eternal doom. 

But if God foresaw with certainty that I would 
not obey, why did he not determine on greater and 
more especial efforts, if possible, to influence my 
will? If he could foresee just what degree of mo- 
tive would influence my free will in the right direéc- 
tion, why did he not determine to exert that needed 
degree of motive? His refusal to do so would be an 
act the most unnatural in an infinitely benevolent 
Father. No benevolent parent could lay a command 
upon a child when he knew beforehand that that 
child would certainly disobey him, and thus ruin him- 
self forever. How then could a Being who is inf- 
nitely holy and heppy, and infinitely sufficient in 
himself, bind upon a soul a command when he fore- 
knew that he would not obey it, but would disobey it 
and perish forever? Such a procedure would be so 
indefensible and so at war with all our instincts and 
intuitions as to be entirely unbelievable. 

We believe that men every day do disobey God, 
and go forth to everlasting death; but we also believe 
that the terrible vision is shut out from the eye of 
infinite goodness, until forced upon it by actual 


RIGHTS OF CREATURE ANO CREATOR. 357 


decisions of the will. And if, in the nature of things, 
difficulties or incompatibilities render impossible such 
divine foreknowledge, then the heart of infinite benev- 
olence is rescued from the grief that from all eternity 
must have attended the foreknowing of these depre-. 
cated and dreadful realities as certainties. And as- 
suredly until some semblance of a reason can be 
adduced, showing the necessity of such divine fore- 
sight, the candid and devout questioning thereof 
ought not to be pronounced either detrimental to 
piety or irreverent toward the Creator. 

The absurdity of the doctrine of the divine fore- 
knowledge of free choices is also seen in the contradic- 
tion which it implies—namely, that a being is on trial 
and yet is not on trial at the same time. If choice de- 
termines character, then the character of a moral agent 
ought not to be determined in the mind of God until 
the actual choices of that agent have been exercised. 
But if Omniscience foreknows these choices, my 
character is certainly determined before I have a char- 
acter. He visits me with his divine displeasure, 
aversion, and abhorrence, long before I have wrought 
out a character for myself. And if this be so, God 
virtually sat in judgment over and passed sentence 
of everlasting destruction from his presence upon 
lost millions ages upon ages before they had any 
being. Their weepings and wailings, which are re- 
vealed to us by the Savior himself, have been rever- 
berating through his soul of infinite goodness and 
mercy through all the eternity past. 

From a view so painful to sensitive minds, should 


not any plausible refuge be hailed with inexpressible 
31 


358 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


gratification? And should not he who would point 
to such a refuge be welcomed as a messenger of 
mercy? Who can believe that our merciful and 
loving God, every morning as he visits the numberless 
cradles of earth filled with new-born infants, too 
lovely for mortal words to describe,—infants around 
whom man’s tenderest sympathies cluster, and who 
have been the subjects of uncounted prayers and 
tears and maternal sorrows,—could then deliberately 
label them for either heaven or hell, saying, ‘‘ This 
one is a vessel of mercy and shall dwell in joy for- 
ever with the saved; and ‘‘That one is a vessel 
of wrath, an incorrigible son of perdition, and his des- 
tiny is to be outer darkness, world without end ?” 
But such a distressing performance, such a horrible 
programme, is just what the theory of divine fore- 
knowledge, if true, would compel the Almighty Father 
to go through with, every hour of human probation. 
What should induce any man to embrace a belief so 
unnatural and so monstrous rather than surrender a 
dogma -that is inconceivable in itself, and wholly 
unnecessary in constructing a system of divinity; 
one, too, that is so paralyzing in all its influences, 
and so derogatory to the character of him whose 
name and nature is love, and whose ‘‘tender mercies 
are over all his works?” If liberty and accountability 
be bestowed upon the creature, then his probation 
and destiny ought to be contingent and undeter- 
mined, and unforeknown to the Creator. 


=r 


CHAPTER XXIV. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE MAKES GOD INCONSISTENT. 


HE Bible, rightly understood, is the most con- 
ali sistent, natural, and harmonious book in the 
world. Consider any doctrine of the Bible, and you 
will find arguments, analogies, facts, principles, and 
theories, all in its favor. All Bible teachings com- 
mend themselves to our reason, conscience, and 
common sense. But the hypothesis that God fore- 
sees all the actions of free agents makes his affirma- 
tions, dealings, promises, and threatenings appear 
most inconsistent. Why does he appeal to me witha 
pathos and an eloquence which alone could issue from 
the heart of Deity to obey him and live, if he is 
certain that I am to be eternally lost? Why does 
he persist in efforts to save me, if he knows that all 
those efforts will only increase the weight of my 
condemnation? We are all convinced that God has 
been in profound earnestness to save us from eternal 
‘death. We can not recall a time when we did not 
hear the voice of his Spirit saying to us, ‘‘ This 
is the way, walk ye in it.” Many times we have | 
said, ‘‘Go thy way for. this time; when I have a 
convenient season I will call for thee.” And yet 
for the thousandth time that bright personage has 
stood before us on our highway to ruin, saying, 
‘“‘Repent, repent, for you must stand before the 

359 


360 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


judgment-seat of Christ in order that you may re- 
ceive according to what you have done, whether 
it be good or evil.” 

Now, if during all the time he is making these 
extraordinary efforts for our salvation he knows that 
we shall persist in sin and perish forever, is there not | 
something very unreasonable in all this? Indeed, is 
there not something in it so tantalizing as to furnish 
a reason and a justification for resentment at the 
divine dealings? Does it not afford tenable ground, 
and an adequate reason for criticising the divine 
character and conduct? ‘‘I set before you,” says 
God, ‘‘life and death, a blessing and a curse.” God 
says to every soul, ‘‘Choose, exercise your freedom, 
do as you prefer, make your own selection. The 
initiative is wholly your own. You have power to 
choose the right or to choose the wrong, and | am 
waiting patiently for you to decide.” 

Now, to present God in this attitude before a 
probationer for eternity, and at the same time to 
affirm that he knows what that probationer’s choice 
will be with a certainty as absolute as if it had been 
fixed by necessity, is to make it possible to charge 
upon him inconsistency, if not cruelty. If he fore- 
knew just how the creature will choose, why stand 
before him in such an imploring attitude? Why be- 
seechinely plead with him to give him his confidence 
and love? We shudder at the inconsistencies and 
absurdities, to say the least, which the doctrine of 
universal prescience crowds into every page of divine 
revelation. 

God’s attitude before probationers, his dealings 


MAKES GOD INCONSISTENT. 361 


with them, and his invitations and expostulations 
in many places in the Holy Scriptures, can be re- 
garded as reasonable and proper only on the sup- 
position that he could not foresee with certainty the 
final decisions on which depended their eternal des-. 
tiny. All his solemn earnestness to save is reasona- 
ble upon the hypothesis that the finality necessarily 
lies beyond his vision. ‘‘Men are treated,” says 
Richard Watson, ‘‘with as much intensity of care 
and effort as though the issue of things were entirely 
unknown.” But this, we reply, is simply impossi- 
ble, if prescience be true; for God, like every other 
intelligent being, acts and must act in strict accord- 
ance with absolute knowledge. Julius Miiller says, 
Not even man, much less God, can set for himself to 
accomplish aims which he is perfectly certain he 
never can realize or accomplish. 

But God also requires the Christian to seek out 
the sinner and invite him to the Redeemer, to pray 
for his salvation, to bring him under the preaching 
of the Word of life, to lead him to the communion 
of saints and to the holy sacraments. Moreover, the 
Christian is required to believe in the efficiency of 
these divinely instituted means of grace. He is re- 
quired to pray in strong faith, staggering not through 
unbelief, concerning the success of Christ’s great 
enterprise for saving souls. Now, can it be possible 
that God could impress upon the mind of one of his — 
ministers that it is his instant, imperative duty to pub- 
lish salvation to that sinner whom he knows as lost; 
to go to him with faith that the divinely appointed 
means of saving souls will be made efficacious in 


362 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


his case; to go to him with the full expectation of 
bringing him to a knowledge of the truth, when all 
the time it is certain that no success whatever 
will attend those earnest efforts? Can God do this 
when he knows that the divinely appointed means 
and those immense, self-sacrificing toils will be utterly 
unavailing? Could God require us to believe in the 
success of our earnest efforts to save an individual 
soul, while he knows that that soul will inevitably be 
lost? If God knows that a certain sinner will finally 
be lost, he knows that the means of grace will never 
be effectual in his salvation. Where, then, is the 
propriety of his commanding us to have faith in 
the employment éf means to secure a particular 
end when he knows that, as a matter of fact, those 
means will not be a savor of life unto life? ‘* What- 
soever is not of faith is sin.’”’ Could God pronounce 
my lack of faith in my success in saving a sinful soul 
to be a sin when he knows that I shall not be suc- 
cessful, and that the means will not be effectual 
to save? 

God sends angels to warn us, to strive with us, 
to induce us to accept the overtures of mercy. But 
if he definitely sees that we are to be lost, why make 
such an effort to save us? Why waste the moral 
energy of his servants? Why call them from their 
orbits of brightness to the profitless task of striving 
to save those who he knows will be, after all, incor- 
rigible? No one of us could use means to protract 
his life were he certain that he should die at night- 
fall. No intelligent being can labor to prevent that 
which he knows to be inevitable. Should the angel 


Ss ified — 


MAKES GOD INCONSISTENT. 363 


~Gabriel make efforts vast and protracted, embracing 

plans the grandest, agencies the most efficient, and 
outlays of time, energy, and happiness most amaz- 
ing, in order to prevent that which he sees all the 
time to be absolutely irrevocable, who could defend. 
him from the charge of inconsistency and unwisdom ? 
Why, then, should we believe a proposition that 
would ascribe to God the greater unwisdom and 
inconsistency of laboring to prevent a result which, 
though it might be contingent in its nature, he 
nevertheless knows to be inevitable in fact? His 
solemn earnestness and protracted efforts to save us 
from eternal death can only be protected from the 
charge of inconsistency by the hypothesis that he 
does not certainly foreknow the final destiny of indi- 
vidual souls. | 


CHAPTER XXV. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE WOULD DETRACT FROM DIVINE 
BENEVOLENCE. 


F a benevolent Creator could foresee that certain 

beings would choose the right and preserve their 
integrity, he would be inclined to create them in 
order to exercise his benevolence, and to give such 
beings the opportunity of expanding, rising, and re- 
joicing, to all eternity. But that same feeling of 
innate benevolence would restrain his hand from cre- 
ating those beings who he foresaw would disobey, 
fall, and be forever miserable. The attribute of 
infinite goodness would insist, indeed it could not 
but insist, that a being who the Creator foreknew 
would be disobedient should not be created. No 
consideration whatever could justify infinite goodness 
in creating a soul that God foreknew would be 
wretched and suffer forever. How easy for omnipo- 
tence to prevent the existence of those who, as his 
omniscience foresaw, would choose to be disobedient, 
and consequently would be miserable forever! 

If any benevolent person knew that a certain being 
would be eternally unhappy, nay, wretched even for 
a thousand years, and had it within his power to pre- 
vent his existence, he would rush with fleetest foot to 
prevent his entrance into life. And would not our 
Creator be equally benevolent? If God’s benevolence 

364 


ee ee ey ee eee 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 365 


would incline him to create the beings who he fore 

saw would be obedient and happy, that same dispo- 
sition would morally compel him to prevent the 
existence of those who he foresaw (vould be disobe- 
dient and miserable. This is axiomatic, if the be-. 
nevolence of his nature is infinite, as we conceive or 
apprehend it to be. 

If God foresaw that any individual human being is 
to be eternally lost and unhappy, why did he persist 
in creating him? Why did he not in his infinite 
pity and mercy prevent his existence? If he fore- 
knew absolutely that Adam would fall, and would 
introduce the innumerable and interminable suffer- 
ings that did follow in the train of that fatal step, 
discriminating carefully according to the eternal prin- 
ciple of justice and the innate sense of right with 
which I am _ endowed, and by which alone I am 
to be finally judged and sentenced, I see no way to 
defend him from the blasphemous charge of indiffer- 
ence and unkindness, if not of cruelty. Every man 
feels in the depths of his soul that God is bound 
by every element of his glorious character, by every 
emotion of his infinite benevolence, and by every 
principle of his divine government, to prevent the 
existence of a being who he foresees will be eter- 
nally and increasingly wretched. Every one feels 
that no satisfactory reply can be made to this mo- 
mentous interrogation if God clearly foresaw, as a _ 
certainty, all the terrible destiny that waits to meet a 
disobedient soul at the judgment. The reader may 
insist on divine foreknowledge, but he has not the 
resources to screen the divine throne from this most 


366 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


withering accusation. There is a stain on his attri- 
bute of benevolence, a blemish in the moral charac- 
ter of God, which no subtle reasoning, no reaches of 
information, can satisfactorily explain away on the 
hypothesis that God foreknows all the resolves of 
his free agents. Every theologian who has ever at- 
tempted to reconcile universal prescience with infi- 
nite goodness and benevolence in the Creator has 
felt himself incapable of the great achievement. The 
argument against future and eternal punishment 
founded upon the doctrine of universal prescience 
has never yet been answered to the satisfaction of 
even those who do believe firmly that that doctrine 
is clearly taught in the Holy Scriptures. A vast 
amount of ingenuity, sophistry, and dogmatism has 
been expended in the effort to show that unerring 
prescience is entirely consistent with the endless 
damnation of unborn millions. The writer conceives 
it to be wiser and more in harmony with what God 
has revealed of his nature and administration to deny 
to omniscience all knowledge, the possible mode and 
process of which is an inconceivability, rather than 
thus to discredit his infinite benevelence and sympa- 
thies, and impeach his immaculate moral character, 
by a conclusion so awfully irreverent or by an insin- 
uation so extremely blasphemous. 

Again, suppose a soul that has repented, has been 
converted, and has the divine witness of acceptance. 
Now, it can be demonstrated, if indeed it is not an 
axiomatic truth, that this soul may finally apostatize. 
But if God foresees that he will finally apostatize, 
why does he not remove him at once from the name- 


nt) ne lami, ee 


= Oo ee 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 367 


less evils to come? How can we defend his mercy 
and his goodness from the charge of culpable indif- 
ference, if he shall allow him to live and go back 
from his service and favor into sin, and then sink to 
the abode of the lost, whence the smoke of his tor-. 
ment will ascend forever? Once he deliberately 
made choice of God’s service, embraced in penitence 
the world’s Redeemer, and gratefully sat down at his 
feet, saved and in his right mind. Why, then, allow 
him to remain in jeopardy, or why allow him to live 
if God foresees his final fall? But some one inquires, 
Why allow any one to remain on earth after his 
restoration to the divine favor? The existence of 
the Church is necessary to the salvation of the world. 
Inasmuch as nearly all who are saved are saved 
through the instrumentality of the Church, the 
greater number of those who have thus been saved 
ought to remain for a time on the earth for the sal- 
vation of others—to perpetuate the great work of 
saving men. Redemption would have been a failure 
had Jesus merely died for the world, and left no apos- 
tles to publish the glad tidings of atonement. It 
would make future evangelization impossible to re- 
move souls to heaven as soon as they are converted. 

But could those who do finally apostatize be 
removed from the perils awaiting them, the advan- 
tages to the Church would be great in various ways. 
For when an apostate falls away he generally carries © 
other souls along with him. The evil which such an 
‘individual produces is in general much greater, appar- 
ently, than all the good accomplished by him in his 
previous career. True sympathy and love—for the 


368 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


individual himself and for his associates, for the 
Church, and for the great work of evangelization— 
would demand his removal prior to his apostasy, if 
that apostasy be actually foreknown. The tender 
sympathies and fervent impulses of infinite benevo- 
lence can not, so far as appears, be defended, if to 
Omniscience be ascribed unerring foreknowledge of 
the final fall of that converted soul. Could a father 
foresee that his innocent sons are certain to become 
profane, intemperate, licentious, and abandoned, he 
would plead with God to remove them beyond temp- 
tation and danger, to eternal purity and joy, however 
keenly he might feel their absence. But you say, 
Could we see all that God sees, we should see that 
there is no conflict between prescience and infinite 
benevolence. But the same mode of argumentation 
could reconcile one to believing the most glaring ab- 
surdities. ‘‘Could we see all,”’ says the devout Cath- 
olic, ‘fas God sees it, we could see that the wafer is 
the actual body of our Lord, and therefore you must 
believe it.” 

This mode of argumentation could be allowed in 
admitted mysteries, such as the doctrine of the 
Trinity, or the union and consequent unity of the 
finite and the infinite, the human and the divine, in 
the person of Jesus Christ. But it certainly is ab- 
surd to resort to it in reconciling incompatible propo- 
sitions. John Stuart Mill declared, and Dr. M’Cosh 
says that his theory required him to declare, that 
there may be worlds where two and two make -five, 
where parallel lines meet, where there are effects 
without causes, and where a straight line may inclose 


—es 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 369 


a space. But if our common sense does not lead us 
to reject such unthinkables, there can be neither 
safety nor profit in ever arguing from the known to 
the unknown. 

But there are many who promptly reject such. 
absurdities, and yet embrace others equally and even 
more glaring. They embrace propositions that are in- 
compatible with reason, logic, and facts, on the ground 
that there may be worlds in which what now appears 
incompatible will be found perfectly compatible. But 
no man is justified in believing both of two incompat- 
ible propositions. One of them must be rejected if 
the other be embraced. If two propositions are incom- 
prehensible, they may both be received, because we 
do not have comprehension enough of either to see 
their incompatibility, if such incompatibility exists. 
But the moment we perceive their incompatibility, 
that moment one must be denied, if the other be 
accepted. If we do not do thus, we damage our 
mental constitution, we blind the eye of reason, 
which, in matters unrevealed, must guide us as the 
voice of heaven. The universe is full of mysteries, 
which now transcend the reach of our faculties. But 
all those mysteries, the comprehension of which is 
profitable or is required for our eternal welfare, in 
justice ought to be, and certainly can be, compre- 
hended by us, if we give to them the requisite 
thought and reading, with prayer for divine illumina- 
tion. This is particularly true of the doctrine of 
universal prescience. The moral liberty of man is 
a proposition that can be easily understood. The 
absolute foreknowledge of God is also a proposition 


370 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. ° 


that can be comprehended without difficulty. And 
the more clearly and comprehensively each is under- 
stood, the more their incompatibility is manifest. 
There is another class of persons who, after they 
have examined an opinion, and settled in their minds 
whether the stronger probability is in favor of or is 
against it, immediately drop into a state of indifference 
and unconviction, on the ground that, after all, could 
they but see more and were they in possession of 
some unknown facts and principles, they might see 
that the conclusion they have reached is not true, but 
false and hurtful. Such a habit of mind is destruc- 
tive of comfort, of efficiency, of moral power, and, in- 
deed, of general intellectual soundness.  ‘‘ Proba- 
bility,” says Bishop Butler, ‘‘is the only rule for 
the conduct of life.’ On all subjects which he dis- 
cusses or examines, every man, therefore, should be- 
lieve with positiveness and force that side on which 
lies the stronger probability. He then ought fear- 
lessly to give utterance to his convictions, and wait 
until maturer reflection or larger information furnishes 
erounds for a change in his opinions. It is in this 
way only that a positive and forceful manhood can be 
produced. The force of one’s character will always 
depend upon and vary with the strength of his 
convictions. 
In the examination of the great subject under 
consideration, we should avoid these two very dan- 
gerous errors. As things seem to be to our faculties 
after the most mature study, we should presume that 
they thus appear to the intelligences of all worlds. 
If we find the stronger probability to be on the side 


. ha 
oe” a = we 


Rie em 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 371 


of God’s prescience of all future choices and acts, 
we should embrace it. But if it appears that the 
stronger probability be in opposition to that doctrine, 
then we must reject it, however unpopular it may be 
to do so, until we get better information from deeper. 
thought or from a more complete revelation. 

Wherever the telescope carries us, we find the 
same laws of light and gravitation regnant, and the 
same substances and properties in existence. Wher- 
ever sound logic and reason can carry us within the 
depths of theology, and through all the mysteries of 
the divine nature, procedure, and economy, we shall 
find regnant the same laws of thought and belief that 
hitherto have been found indispensable. 

Let us not be distrustful of human reason. The 
inspired Paul reasoned mightily with the people out 
of the Scriptures, and the prophet Samuel exclaimed 
to Israel, ‘‘Stand still, that I may reason with you be- 
fore the Lord;”’ and God himself proclaims, ‘‘ Come, 
and let us reason together, let us plead together, 
and produce you your cause, put me in remem- 
brance, bring forth your strong reasons and declare 
thou, that thou mayest be justified.’ Now it must 
be manifest to the reason of an unprejudiced and 
philanthropic mind that if God can foreknow all 
the resolves of free agents, it must be inconsistent 
with divine benevolence to permit the existence of 
those whom he foreknew would everlastingly perish. — 
Absolute foreknowledge and divine benevolence ob- 
viously are incompatible propositions. And, in the 
utter absence of all proof to the contrary, we are war- 
ranted in the conclusion that thus also it must appear 


372 THkrE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


to the mind of God. And, therefore, this incoin- 
patibility affords a strong presumption that he does 
not and can not know all the resolves of free agents 
with definite and perfect precision. 

But some may reply, ‘‘When God made the 
world, even admitting that he could not foresee all 
the free choices of individual agents, he must have 
known that there was a possibility, though not a 
probability, that some might fall and perish. And, 
therefore, if you are right in concluding that divine 
benevolence ought to prevent the coming into ex- 
istence of those who Omniscience foresees will be 
lost, then divine benevolence ought likewise to refuse 
to create any beings at all that are accountable and 
in danger of eternal death.’’ But to this it may be 
replied, If a being be susceptible of the highest hap- 
piness which. God can bestow he must have the 
solemn endowment of free agency. And if he be 
free, he must be liable to fall. And if he be liable 
to fall, possibly he may fall. : 

These questions, the gravest of all questions con- 
nected with creation, must have arisen in the mind 
of Jehovah: ‘‘Shall I withhold my creating energy, 
shall I find no arena for the exercise and manifesta- 
tion of my infinite perfections, shall my boundless 
“benevolence refrain from creating a world of devel- 
oping, rejoicing, and immortal intelligences to share 
my bliss and perfections, and to sympathize with me 
therein, simply because there is a possibility that 
some of their number may fall, degrade themselves, 
and become outcasts? Shall I deny a blissful exist- 
ence to all the bright ranks and orders of the obedient 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 373 


and loyal, to all those who might be exalted to 
thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers, be- 
cause some may forfeit my love?” The thoughtful 
mind easily conceives the infinitely holy, just, and 
benevolent one as saying: ‘‘Could I single out the 
individual culprits; did I but know the identical indi- 
viduals who would disobey my laws, with infinite 
gladness I. might check their existence in its incip- 
iency. But justice, as well as benevolence, makes a 
strong demand upon me for the creation of beings 
who can obey me. It behooves me not to refuse to 
create the good with all their glorious possibilities, 
simply because some may sin and perish.”’ 

No one will question that the perfection of the 
universe required the creation of free moral agents. 
Without free moral agents it is scarcely to be sup- 
posed that God would have created any universe at 
all. We can conceive of no adequate ends to be 
sought in the creation of a universe which has, in all 
its wide dominion, no created beings capable of 
moral agency, moral goodness, moral character, moral 
history, or moral heroism—which are, by far, the 
sublimest of all things outside of God. ‘These con- 
stitute the magnificent known quantity, the trust- 
worthy data, by which, lighted by divine revelation, 
we can find ample reason for the creation of the 
universe and the redemption of man through the 
incarnation of the Son of God. Compared with in- | 
flexible integrity and with perfect moral character, 
all other works and wonders of creation are insignifi- 
cant to an eye that sweeps eternity. Free moral 
agents capable of goodness and spirituality are a 

32 


374 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


vastly higher order of creation than matter and phys- 
ical forces. 

Extract from history all its records of moral 
greatness, and very little of value would remain on 
its pages, now so replete with interest, profit, and 
wonder. But all those achievements of moral he- 
roism, that adorn and hallow this world, would have 
been impossible had God created no free moral 
agents. All that is latently involved in faithfulness 
and in moral rectitude we, in our present state, can 
never fully comprehend. We only see it through a 
glass, darkly; we view it but imperfectly and at great 
distance. But even the imperfect vision which we 
have of moral rectitude entrances us beyond any 
object’ of sight or mundane theme of meditation. 
Could the universe, therefore, even at the hazard of 
the introduction of disobedience and of moral evil, be 
wisely or reasonably denied forever these unspeak- 
able excellencies? The perfection of the universe 
required the creation of free moral agents; and if 
they were created free, it was necessary that they 
should be left free, in order that they might achieve 
moral goodness, and thus, by continually adding to 
the great aggregate of moral excellence, meet the 
purposes of their creation and satisfy all the condi- 
tions of a perfect universe. 

How dreadful the alternative that presented itself 
before God in his contemplation of creation! On the 
one hand there was the possible introduction of moral 
evil, and on the other the non-existence of any beings 
in all his vast empire capable of voluntarily loving, 
obeying, and adoring him, or capable of illustrating 


-~ 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 375 


his highest perfections of freedom and causality. 
How unsatisfactory for him to survey and govern a 
universe with not one created being in it bearing the 
impress of his own personality and liberty; with not 
one with whom he might commune and hold fellow- 
ship intimate and constant, and with not a single 
instance of that moral goodness that flows from vol- 
untary obedience to imposed obligations! How grat- 
ifying to him must be every instance of such ineffable 
moral beauty adorning his creation ! 

But some one may say: ‘‘After creating free 
agents, suppose that God had placed them where no 
temptations .or trials of any kind could ever assail or 
deceive them. In that case there could have been 
no liability of doing wrong.”’ But if there were no 
possibility of doing wrong, then there could have 
been no opportunity of achieving moral goodness or 
rewardability for obedience. The achievement of 
moral character can only arise from persistent adher- 
ence to virtue amid solicitations to vice, under trials, 
divinely sent or permitted, to test faith, love, sub- 
mission, and loyalty. 

But suppose that God had placed these free moral 
agents under his own immediate control, to preserve 
them continually by almighty power from defection. 
What then? There could have been neither utility 
nor reason in creating a free moral agent, if the 
Creator proposed to control him in all his decisions | 
and acts in the same manner and on the same prin- 
ciple that he controls all the machinery of his mate- 
rial universe. To coerce a free being, in acts for 
which he is accountable and rewardable or punisha- 


376 _ THE. FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


ble, is excluded by the law of non-self-contradiction. 
It is as possible for God to make A to be and not to 
be at the same time, as to make an agent to be free 
and not free at the same moment. Should God 
coerce the moral volitions of free agents he would 
rob them of all the phenomena of personality, ren- 
der them incapable of praise or blame, virtue or vice, 
and leave them on a level with the rest of his mag- 
nificent but irresponsible machinery. 

The perfection of the universe necessitated, as we 
see, the creation of free moral agents. The exist- 
ence of free agents necessitated trial or temptation. 
Trial necessitated that there be on the part of God 
no controlling interferences with the voluntary choices 
of free agents which involve morality. We thus see 
that the universe which God has created is just the 
one which was needed to secure to it perfection, 
and also to illustrate his own nature and glorious 
attributes. 

The only modes of preventing the introduction 
of sin into the universe which have ever been sug- 
gested or advocated, are the non-creation of moral 
agents, the prohibition of all temptations, and the 
prevention of all defection by continual divine inter- 
position. The first, as we have seen, is utterly incon- 
sistent with the perfection of the universe and the 
glory of God. The second prevents and makes im- 
possible the achievement of moral goodness and 
rewardability. And the third involves so many con- 
tradictions and absurdities, especially to one who has 
followed the great Butler in his meditations upon the 
subject of interpositions, that it merits no refutation 


Tae 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 377 


but silence. ‘“But,”’ says the objector, ‘‘why not an- 
nihilate those who prove to be disloyal?” But if God 
should annihilate the incorrigible he would thereby 
work in multiplied ways much gréater evil to law, to 
government, to all worlds in a state of probation, 
and to his entire intelligent universe. He could not, 
therefore, arbitrarily avert the legitimate consequences 
of violated law. It would be a greater injury to the 
moral universe to allow disobedience to go unpun- 
ished, than it would to provide that the disobedi- 
ent should suffer the natural consequences of their 
free volitions. Benevolence, goodness, and justice 
to unfallen worlds all require that those who are 
disobedient should suffer the penalties naturally an- 
nexed to violated law. To dissolve the connection 
between vice and wretchedness would inevitably re- 
sult in the complete overthrow of God’s universal 
moral government. 

It may be that some one will reply: ‘‘It is just as 
much a stain upon the infinite benevolence of God 
if he, acting without any foreknowledge, punishes to- 
day a soul that now sins, as it would be for him, pos- 
sessing foreknowledge, to punish that soul a thousand 
years from to-day.”’ But the necessity of punishing a 
soul is not by any means a subjective necessity with 
God. It is an objective necessity. Punishment is in- 
flicted in view of its influence over his objective uni- 
verse—to preserve and to maintain order, harmony, — 
law, government, and administrative justice. And if 
God foresees that, one thousand years from to-day, 
a man now hidden from the eyes of the universe-—a 
being now wholly unrecognized by any created intel- 


378 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


ligences——-will be a sinner, then there is no objective 
necessity of his ever allowing that crisis to present 
itself in actual history. But he who in despite of God 
and conscience deliberately refuses obedience to- the 
moral law, and repudiates the principle by which the 
moral universe is bound to the throne of Jehovah, 
has achieved a sinfulness that renders condemnation 
and punishment indispensable to the maintenance of 
moral government and to the illustration of the ex- 
ceeding sinfulness of sin and the imperative necessity 
of holiness. 

It may be said by some objector: ‘‘In these high 
questions which relate to the Deity we see only parts 
of truths, and not enough of them to render them 
consistent to the human understanding in our present 


Me) 


state.’’ This affirmation has force in all those cases 
which do not involve contradictions and necessitate 
troublesome sequences. But it is far wiser to reject 
at once a dogma that is in itself inexplicable, is un- 
necessary in the nature of things, and is not required 
by the perfections of Jehovah, than to resort to a 
doctrinal subterfuge which, if once allowed, would 
furnish excuse for the admission of other proposi- 
tions the most inconsistent and objectionable. Any 
parent who believes in the endless perdition of the 
ungodly, would a thousand times prefer to believe 
that universal foreknowledge of free volitions involves 
a contradiction, than to believe that God now foresees 
that his innocent child will, if he live, be incorrigible 
and perish forever, and yet persistently refuses to re- 
move him from the evil that is certain to come. How 
much more reasonable and natural it is to take the 


| 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 379 


plain Scripture representations on this subject, that 
God created man upright and very good: and that he 
was most grievously disappointed over his sin, revolt, 
and fall. ‘It repented God that he made man, and 
it grieved him at his heart.” 

The commentators generally regard the repent- 
ance here ascribed to God as a mere change in his 
dealings with man. It is very true that man’s fall 
necessitated a complete change in God’s treatment 
of him. But the connection here evidently requires 
that repent be taken in one of its other meanings; 
namely, that of regret or sorrow. God sorrowed that 
he had created man, and he grieved himself (the 
form of the verb being reflexive); he grieved him- 
self over man’s ingratitude and disobedience, and 
therefore immediately devised means for his restora- 
tion, and for limiting, as far as possible, the extent 
and influence of his rebellion. But while God’s grief 
over the fall of man was genuine and deep, incoftceiv- 
ably so to us, we are not by any means to understand 
that he grieved over the introduction of intelligent 
beings into the vast solitude of infinite space. The 
orders and varieties of his accountable creatures are 
doubtless numerous, and, it may be, constantly in- 
creasing. God did not, therefore, grieve over the 
creation of his countless, rejoicing, unfallen worlds; 
but over man his grief was too great for finite 
conception. 

Because the liability of falling is necessarily inci- 
dent to a probationary state, many suppose that the 
disobedience of free agents in a state of trial is so 
highly probable as to be almost inevitable. But. for 


380 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


this supposition there is neither warrant nor reason. 
The probability that a free, sinless world will fall is 
not as one chance in a thousand. On the contrary, 
out of a thousand chances there are nine hundred 
and ninety-nine probabilities of obedience and the 
maintenance of rectitude. Freedom by no means im- 
plies or involves a fall from rectitude. The condition 
of freedom is the possibility of a fall. And doubtless 
it was the intention and the expectation that this pos- 
sibility of fall would soon be done away by the volun- 
tary co-operation of the free agent—by his persistently 
refusing and preventing its realization. The absolute 
exclusion of moral evil would necessitate the exclu- 
sion of all beings capable of self-determination. But 
to permit the possibility of sin is very far from ad- 
mitting the probability of its introduction into the 
universe. The possibility of evil is a mere negative 
condition of rewardability, whereas the probability 
of sf and fall is grounded on a quality inherent in 
the subject, and implies some affinity for evil, or 
some bias to defection, or some lack of moral up- 
rightness in the nature which he received from the 
Creator. ‘‘It is,’”’ says one, ‘‘the immeasurable en- 
ergy and profundity of independence in personality, 
which includes in itself the power of the ego to make 
itself the center of its world.” The confirmed Chris- 
tian who reads these pages knows that, while he is 
liable to apostatize from Christ, while there is a pos- 
sibility of his being eternally lost, there are thousands 
of probabilities to one that he will hold on in the path 
which he has found to be so satisfactory and delight- 
ful, and that through riches of grace he will finally 


4 
Oo 


~ J. ee 


OPPOSED TO GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 381 


reach the ‘‘house of his Father above.’’ Indeed he 
has a presentiment of final triumph, the earnest of 
his heavenly inheritance stirring him with the might 
of an inward must; for he knows whom he has 
believed, and is persuaded that God is well able to- 
keep that which he has committed unto him. But 
the probability of the Christian’s fall and final apostasy 
isa myriad fold greater than is that of the disobedience 
and fall of moral agents, who came forth spotless and 
vigorous from the hand of their Creator, with vast 
possibilities ever springing into view before them, 
and with all the inducements to obedience which are 
furnished by promise, present privilege, the desire of 
noble achievement and of perfect happiness—motives 
stretching onward and upward into the illimitable 
forever. | 

While, therefore, there was a possibility of Adam's 
fall, there were thousands of probabilities to one that 
he would be obedient. Hence, there was just -occa- 
sion for great surprise, disappointment, and unutter- 
able grief over his defection. But if God foreknew— 
foreknew with absolute certainty—the fall of Adam, 
no reason for surprise could have existed, and no ex- 
planation has ever yet illumined the deep shadow 
which that foreknowledge casts upon his infinite 
goodness. Better a thousand times deny absolute 
prescience than to question God’s immaculate holi- 


‘iESS: 
33 


CHAPTER XAXVI. 


FOREKNOWLEDGE WOULD PREVENT PROPER STATES 
OF FEELING IN THE INFINITE MIND. 


OREKNOWLEDGE would render impossible those 

feelings which it would be proper for a ruler to 
entertain towards his subjects. To be our ruler God 
ought to love us when we do right, and to prove to 
us that he does love us. He could not be worthy 
to rule unless he were displeased with us when 
we do wrong, and should also make us sensible of his 
displeasure. 

No reader will question that there is succession 
out of God. No proof to the contrary has ever yet 
been presented. And how can there be succession 
out of God and no succession in God? It is, in fact, 
absurd to affirm that while there is succession out of 
God, there is no succession in God. Our ideas occur 
one after another—that is, they take place at different 
periods. Reflection upon the train of our thoughts 
gives us the idea of succession. The distance be- 
tween any two points of this succession is an interval 
of duration. Succession in our thoughts is the 
occasion of the birth of the idea of duration. ‘‘Du- 
ration,’ says Dr. Dwight, ‘‘is suggested by a suc- 


cession of changes.’’ The succession is not duration, 
but only suggestive of duration. Continuance in 
382 
3} 


‘ 


PREVENTS APPROPRIATE FEELINGS. 383 


being may suggest duration, but certainly it is not 
duration. Duration is not an idea of perception nor 
a notion of consciousness, but it is a fundamental 
law of belief intuitively perceived. It is the neces- 
sary condition of succession, for we can neither 
think, feel, nor act without assuming its existence. 
It is the indispensable condition of things as existing. 
The only conception we have of duration is an unin- 
terrupted ongoing. It implies, necessarily, past, 
present, and future, because it is a perpetual flow. 
Duration is either limited or unlimited. Intervals 
of duration, varying in length, are variously denom- 
inated, for example, seconds, minutes, hours, days, 
weeks, months, years, and centuries. 

The contemplation of things as extended, sug- 
gests the infinity of space which contains all things. 
So the contemplation of intervals of duration suggests 
an unlimited duration which embraces ‘all intervals. 
This unlimited duration we call eternity. Time is 
the interval of duration from the creation of Adam 
down to the death of the last of his race. Both 
time and eternity are duration. Time is duration 
with a beginning and an ending; eternity is duration 
without either. When I say that God exists in eter- 
nity, I mean that he exists in a duration without 
beginning or ending. Duration, as applied to an 
infinite being, is simply an extension of duration as, 


applied to a finite being. Duration does not imply — 


change. It is the same, whether the being be mu- 
table or immutable, whether or not there be any 
being at all. A perfect being neither gains nor loses 
any thing in the extension of duration. Even the 


4 


384 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


qualities of finite natures are not affected or deter- 
mined by their duration. 

But overlooking these obvious truths, some of 
the great philosophers have framed the most far- 
fetched and unsatisfactory definitions of time and 
eternity, definitions which are not only contradictory 
of each other, but even self-contradictory. Aristotle, 
for example, defines time to be motion. Herbert 
says it is the number of change. Gruppe says: 
‘‘Time is not motion, but it is the relation between 
motions.” Emmanuel Kant declared that time is 
not an objective something, but that it is merely a 
subjective conception;. that it is not even a condi- 
tion of intellectual perception, but a condition of 
sense perception, a mere form of an internal sense. 
According to Cudworth, ‘‘time is perfection’’—a 
definition which Richard Watson says would answer 
as well for a definition of the moon. Hegel, how- 
ever, far outstrips Cudworth, for he defines time to 
be ‘‘the existence which, in that it is, is not, and in 
that it is not, it is.’’ Boethius tells us that eternity 
‘‘is the perfect possession of interminable life, and 
of all that life at once.” ‘‘Eternity,” says Thomas 
Aquinas, ‘‘has no succession, but exists altogether.” 
‘‘Kternity,’’ writes Weisse, ‘‘is'the negation offall 
motions.” Other definitions are: ‘‘It is God’s self- 
production” (Julius Miller); ‘‘It is an eternal zow”’ 
(Cowley); ‘‘It is neither a point, nor a possession, 
nor a now, but a causality, the causative power of 
God, conditioning all things” (Schleiermacher) ; “ A 
point without dimension, a center always the same, 
and having an absolute content, which center, accord- 


PREVENTS APPROPRIATE FEELINGS. 385 


ing to the unrestrained will, which holds sway in it 
without being conditioned from without and limited 
in itself, expands or contracts itself.’”’ (Delitzsch.) 
All this seems very much like nonsense. And it is 
marvelous how metaphysicians and theologians have 
wearied themselves and belabored each other to dis- 
cover a distinction or a difference between the stuff 
out of which time is made and the stuff out of which 
eternity is made. 

But it was that most troublesome assumption of 
absolute prescience that coerced them into such ab- 
surdities, and led them to deny to God motion, 
change, succession, or duration. The ideas which we 
gain of time, they affirm ‘‘are not to be admitted or 
allowed in our conceptions of God’s duration, for with 
him eternity is an eternal now.” But the affirmation 
that a permanent now coexists witha perpetually flow- 
ing duration, is self-contradictory. As well might 
one affirm that there is no such thing as duration, 
because he has no clock to measure it. But if God 
is without duration, he is durationless—which, of 
course, is unthinkable. If with God there is no 
past, present, and future, then either he is not eternal 
or the human mind can form no apprehension of 
eternity. If God does not perceive, feel, will, and 
act in time he never does any one of these things. 
For time is only a computable segment of infinite du- 
ration, only a small are of an infinite circle. Time 
is embraced in eternity, just as truly as an arc is 
embraced in the circumference of a circle. God’s 
eternity is duration unlimited; and unlimited dura- 
tion embraces all intervals of duration, and hence if 


386 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


God does not act in time he does not act at all, and, 
consequently, he could not act in eternity. 

If time be an objective reality with me, it must 
be so with God; and if he acts in time he does at 
one time what he does not at another. I call his 
acts past, present, and future, and why should not 
he do the same? God does represent himself as 
doing at one time what he does not at another. We 
hear him say, I do, I will, I shall, and I did. How 
can God sustain and daily feed the universe unless he 
acts in time? How could he hear prayer, morning 
and evening, yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, in 
1850 and in 1880, unless he perceives in time? How 
can it dishonor him to know things as they really 
are? Why should we narrow our conceptions of him 
by assuming that he can not know events as they 
are? If succession be untrue, then God does not 
know the world, nor the human mind, nor human 
activities, as they really are. How can it be an 
imperfection or a limitation in him to look back to 
an epoch from which he is receding, or to look for- 
ward to an epoch to which he is approaching, on the 
line of infinite duration? 

Not to possess, in the present, the actual past and 
the actual future, can not be regarded as an imper- 
fection. To know things as they are, is certainly 
neither a limitation nor an imperfection. I can con- 
template every state answering to the necessities of 
my nature, in all the future, and I can bring all the 
past into the present without detracting from my per- 
fection in the present. Whatever perfection I may 
have consists in my subjective self, and not in the 


eS 


PREVENTS APPROPRIATE FEELINGS. 387 


ongoing of duration. Those who, in their efforts to 
conceive of God’s eternity, reject all the limitations 
of time, must empty the idea of the divine being as 
eternal of all its fullness, and reduce God to an in- 


definite abstraction. Even Charnock says that ‘God. 


was before the beginning of the world.” ‘‘ Without 
the idea of a flowing duration,” says Richard Wat- 
son, ‘‘we could have no measure of the continuance 
of our pleasures, and this would be an abatement of 
our happiness. And what is so obvious an excellency 
in the spirit of man and in angelic natures can never 
be thought an-imperfection in God when joined with 
a nature essentially perfect and immutable.” God's 
commands are of perpetual obligation; but perpetuity 
of obligation implies time or duration. 

That God, in a single moment of duration, does 
all the feeling, thinking, willing, and acting which his 
universe requires from everlasting to everlasting, is 
too incredible for any intelligent being to believe. 
And unless that be admitted, there must be a before 


and an after in the existence of God. If he can not © 


distinguish the past from the present, and the pres- 
ent from the future, his intelligence is less than ours. 
The doctrine of God’s immutability, as conceived 
by many, would take from him all personal life, re- 
solves and experiences, and all availing interest in a 
repenting race and an ever unfolding universe. But 


granting to him the most perfect immutability as to _ 


his natural and moral perfections, what objection can 
be conceived to the supposition that there may be 
changes in his mental states in respect to a changea- 
ble universe? If the mode of the divine existence 


388 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


allows the formation and the execution of an infinite 
number of purposes, why may not it also allow of 
changes in those purposes? Change in thought, 
feeling, purpose, and act, under justifiable circum- 
stances, instead of implying limitation or imperfec- 
tion, 1s an indispensable condition of perfection in the 
divine nature. Indeed, God could not continue to 
remain perfect without such changes after he had 
created a sentient and accountable universe wholly 
dependent upon him for its existence and well-being. 

In creating a being endowed with freedom and 
the power of original, unantecedented causation, the 
capacity of putting forth free volitions and moral or 
immoral forces into the universe of things, God laid 
upon himself the necessity of change the very: mo- 
ment that his voluntary creature disobeyed his com- 
mandments and rebelled against his authority. — Per- 
fection not only demands but necessitates changes in 
the Ruler appropriate to the changes in the moral ac- 
countable subject. Moreover, to affirm that in God 
there can be no change is really to exclude him from 
his government over his accountable universe, or to 
affirm that his government is only a pretense, desti- 
tute of all reality. 

Men in speculation may, like Berkeley, deny ex- 
istence to material objects, but in practical life they 
never fail to recognize and affirm it. And thus in 
theory men may deny the existence of a world of 
pure contingencies, but in practice they can not 
ignore it if they would. All their warnings addressed 
to the wayward, all their anxieties addressed to their 
own hearts, and all their prayers addressed to Deity, 


a  * 


PREVENTS APPROPRIATE FEELINGS. 389 


imply a world of contingency. And, if there be a 
world of contingencies, then there must necessarily 
be a contingent side to God’s thoughts, feelings, 
actions, plans, and purposes. 

An intelligent being must necessarily think ; and,- 
if he thinks, he must have succession of thoughts. 
To affirm that there is no succession in God is to 
affirm not only that God never changes in feeling, 
purpose, or conduct, but also that he has no sequen- 
tial thoughts. But he who makes such denials not 
only disregards all philosophy, but ignores the teach- 
ings of the Holy Scriptures, which represent God as 
theyOneé “‘who was, and is,.and isto come.” And 
that there are motion, change, duration, and succes- 
sion in God, the common sense of theologians and 
philosophers of the first rank is rapidly coercing them 
to admit and fearlessly to proclaim. 

When, therefore, a moral agent does wrong, the 
displeasure of his conscience is the reflex of that of 
him to whom that agent is responsible. Yesterday 
I was wicked, and he ought then to have been dis- 
pleased with me. To-day I am good, and he ought 
now to approve of me. But if all is one eternal 
now, if with him there be no past and no future, if 
with him there be no succession, if he sees all the 
future as he sees the present, then, necessarily, he is 
subject to the most conflicting emotions toward me 
at the same moment of time. Love, hate, approval, 
disapproval, admiration, contempt, and every variety 
of feeling, corresponding to every successive variety 
of my character from birth to death, exist in him at 
the same instant. Isaiah exclaimed, ‘‘ Though thou 


390 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


wast angry with me, thine anger Is turned away, 
and thou comfortedst me.” And what was true of 
Isaiah is true of all the individuals of our race. But 
are the contradictions above noted possible? Is not 
such a supposition absurd? Could we attribute a 
ereater imperfection to God’s character, or do a 
ereater injustice to the equanimities and harmonies 
of his eternally blissful nature, than to suppose that 
he is the subject of such conflicts of emotion and 
such endless contrariety of feeling at the same mo- 


) 


ment toward the same individuals ? 

God’s feelings and perceptions, like our own, 
follow according to the law of cause and effect. 
And however much I may merit his love on account 
of my present obedience, he can not really love me 
if he foresees that I.am to be numbered with the 
incorrigibles, with those who disobey and hate him, 
in outer darkness forever. How could one love an- 
other to-day, however worthy he now is of his love, 
if he were certain that that person on the morrow 
would murder his mother? JI know that I have the 
divine favor now, but if God sees that I will event- 
ually apostatize from the faith, deny the blood that 
bought me, count it an unholy thing, and crucify 
the Son of God afresh, he must shudder at and 
abhor the deep depravity, the fiendish wickedness, 
of my future character. 

Are, then, all his present manifestations of love 
to my soul, all these hallowed communions, and all 
this sweet witness of the Holy Spirit bearing testi- 
mony to my spirit that I am a child of God, mere 
hollow pretenses? Manifestly, then, in guarding with 


re 


PREVENTS APPROPRIATE FEELINGS. 391 


such jealous care the perfection of divine foreknowl- 
edge, theologians overlook the equal necessity for 
perfection, appropriateness, and successiveness in the 
feelings and moral judgments of God respecting his 
intelligent subjects. 

If God be such a being as the Christian really 
contemplates and, adores, then universal prescience 
can not be true; for, as we have seen, that theory 
would compel us to confess to vast imperfections in 
his sensitive states and judgments. It would render 
it impossible for us to discover, to conceive as exist- 
ing in him, the appropriate feelings and purposes to- 
ward the ever varying character of his free account- 
able subjects. But this constant appropriateness of 
feeling and conduct toward the struggling, self-deter- 
mining subject, is one of the indispensable perfections 
of a righteous Ruler, which we must never surrender 
if we would escape distressing contradictions. Surely, 
then, this is another strong presumption, if not a 
proof, that God does not foreknow all the actions of 
accountable creatures. 


CHAPTER XXVIII. 


DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE INTELLECTUAL PERFECTIONS OF GOD. 


HERE are necessary laws of finite thought, in 
a obedience to which we must think would we 
reason with any valuable results. Why, then should 
there not be necessary laws of infinite thought, see- 
ing that we are created in his image? ‘All thought 


d 


is a comparison,” says Sir William Hamilton, ‘‘and 
intelligence acts only by comparison.” Thought 
begins when we distinguish between an object and 
any of its properties, or when we proceed from 
something allowed to something derived from it by 
thinking. According to the necessary laws govern- 
ing finite thought, a knowledge of the future acts 
of free agents is excluded. Such knowledge tran- 
scends all legitimate knowledge or logical inquiry in 
finite thinking. Ifa knowledge of the future resolves 
of free agents be possible by any regular process 
of thinking, it must be a process of which we can 
now form no conception whatever. Such knowledge 
can come to us in the line of no legitimate human 
investigation. There can be no legitimate reasoning 
without a class of admitted truths from which it pro- 
ceeds in the order of thought. But in this case there 
are and there can be no such agmitted truths and 
facts. Neither motives, reasons, influences, moral 


392 


INCONSISTENT WITH GOD'S PERFECTIONS. 393 


forces, laws of mental action, nor any thing of which 
we can conceive, could form a basis for any mental 
process which would conduct the Infinite Thinker to 
a certain knowledge of the future resolves of free 
agents. Hence Richard Watson says that ‘‘the - 
manner in which the Divine Being foreknows the fu- 
ture choices of free agents is incomprehensible even 
to the greatest minds that have ever studied the 
subject.”’ We certainly have good ground for the 
inference that such knowledge can not be obtained 
by any process of legitimate thought, though infinite 
in its range. 

Can the future resolves of free agents be perceived 
by God’s intuitions? Dr. Bushnell dogmatically as- 
serts, without offering any proof, ‘‘that God intuits all 
future events.” But all that human intuition can do 
is to apprehend present existences, primary ideas, 
necessary truths, and the effects of known existing 
causes. If we are created in the image of God, it is 
reasonable and natural to suppose that the intuitions 
of the divine mind would be limited to the same 
classes of concepts. But the human will is not con- 
trolled by the perceptions of the intellect, nor the 
sensibilities of the heart, nor the strongest motives, 
nor the solicitation of evil spirits, nor any outside 
influences whatever. It is free in itself, free in its 
elections, and free in its volitions. It is obviously 
impossible that its free creations can be embraced in 
any class of truths which are grasped by intuition or 
apprehended by the faculty of pure reason. 

Dr. Jonathan Edwards says: ‘‘ Suppose, five thou- 
sand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was 


394 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


no other being but the Divine Being, and then this 
world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once 
starts out of nothing into being and takes on itself a 
particular nature and form, all in absolute contin- 
gence, without any other cause in the matter, with- 
out any manner of ground or reason of its existence, 
or any dependence upon or any coercive connection 
at all with any thing foregoing—I say that if this be 
supposed, then there was no evidence of that event 
beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen 
in the thing itself, for as yet it was not; and then 
there was no evidence of it to be seen in any thing 
else, for evidence in something else is connection 
with something else; but such connection is contrary 
to the supposition.” 

This hypothesis of Dr. Edwards is a striking illus- 
tration of a free volition. A future free volition is 
an event equally impossible of being foreknown. 
There can be no evidence that, when acting under 
the law of liberty, the human mind will perform a 
certain act ten years from to-day. God can not have 
a knowledge of a future volition without getting that 
knowledge from some source. Whence, then, would 
he derive it? That future volition is not like a pri- 
mary truth—self-evident and requiring no proof; for 
a contingency can not be self-evident without ceasing 
to be a contingency. A self-evident contingency isa 
contradiction. Nor can a contingency be self-evident 
as a fact lying before the divine mind; for who put 
it there? There is absolutely nothing now in exist- 
ence which projects it there. If a future volition be 
caused, originated, by the will itself; if it spring 


— 


INCONSISTENT WITH GOD'S PERFECTION. 398 


immediately out of the free causative will; if it spring 
into being and take upon itself nature and form from : 
the causal power of the will itself, ‘‘all in contin- 
gency,” then there is nothing now in existence with 
which the future existence of the contingent event. 
can be connected; and, therefore, there can be no 
evidence beforehand of the future existence of that 
volition. Thus we get from Dr. Edwards himself 
one of the most convincing illustrations of the utter 
impossibility of foreknowing future volitions. And 
this is the view of freedom which modern philosophy 
demands. 

Without the recognition of primary truths, as a 
basis for inference, it.is impossible to reason. And 
so, without an admission that free volitions are unco- 
erced, unnecessitated by any thing outside of the will 
itself, there can be neither a consistent theology nor 
a satisfactory theodicy, nor even an efficient prac- 
tical Christianity. Indeed, without this concession 
there can be no satisfaction in reasoning upon high 
theological themes. But if this be so, there can 
be no conceivable ground or reason for any knowl- 
edge relative to the future choices of free beings. For 
the will, when willing, is conscious of its power to 
control its action entirely, and to will an event 
entirely different from the one it actually speaks 
into existence. 

But some one may say: ‘‘God’s mode of thinking © 
and his intuitions are very different from ours, and 
therefore no comparison between finite and infinite 
modes of thought ought to be instituted.”’ But all 
such unjustifiable shifts ought to be suspected, and 


396 Tt FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


must, in this discussion, be rejected. For if we are 
not permitted to seek after presumptions founded 
upon the many striking analogies that obtain be- 
tween the infinite God and finite minds, then we have 
no basis whatever for our investigation of the doctrine 
of divine prescience. And the same remark holds 
relative to many other doctrines essential to theology. 
If we are denied the right to seek arguments from 
this source—from such comparison between the hu- 
man and the divine intellect—we must relegate this 
whole subject and many others vitally connected with 
Christian faith and experience, back among the undue 
assumptions of human authority, and never be able, 
as we are divinely commanded, to give a reason for 
the hope that is in us. ; 

In the light of all the analogies we can discover, 
we must conclude that theologians, in their zeal to 
claim for Omniscience the power to foresee the future 
resolves of free agents, take a position that necessi- 
tates an imperfection in the modes of thought and 
in the intellectual states of the divine mind, which 
is much greater than any imperfection that could be 
implied by the denial of the dogma of universal 
prescience. If we look at this: subject in any light 
in which it presents itself, analyze completely the 
activities of finite minds, and search all analogies 
between finite and infinite modes of thought, we 
shall still be forced to admit that they all indicate 
that to foreknow the future choices of free agents 
would involve serious imperfection in the faculties 
of the divine mind. The fact that it is not within 
the deductions of the understanding, nor within the 


INCONSISTENT WITH GOD'S PERFECTION. 397 


intuitions of the reason, nor within the scope of log- 
ical investigation, nor within the possibilities of con- 
ception, to reach a certain knowledge of the future 
choices of accountable beings, is certainly a strong 
presumption that such cognition can not lie within 
any of the departments of legitimate knowledge. 
Such events, being unknowable in their nature, can 
not, therefore, be cognized even by Omniscience. 
If God foreknows that I am to be lost, that informa- 
tion must have been brought into his mind by some 
cause or through some agency. It could not have 
entered there wholly uncaused. This knowledge 
could not have been placed there by the operation 
of any causes acting under the divine supervision, 
will, or desire. It could not have been placed there 
by any created being. It is not possible that I could 
have caused it to be placed there ages before I had 
an existence. How, then, came this knowledge in the 
divine mind? No modes of legitimate infinite think- 
ing could ever have introduced it there. 

It is never safe for us upon our own authority, 
or unauthorized by divine revelation, to assume any 
qualities and modes of action in the infinite mind 
which are neither suggested nor supported by any 
analogies discoverable in the intellect of man. If we 
do so, the most unreasonable and pernicious notions 
will soon enter into and vitiate the conceptions we 
form of the character of God. By this mode of 
thinking, many have denied to him both person- 
ality and self-consciousness, under the apprehension 
that thereby they should imply some limitations to 


the infinite. ‘‘Under a professed veneration and 
34 


398 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


great zeal for the honor of God, those things are 
often affirmed of him, which utterly disrobe him of 
every attribute on account of which he can be to 
us an object of real esteem or of veneration.” A 
clear instance of this is the doctrine of universal 
prescience. 


CHAPTER XXVIII. _ 


BELIEF IN DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE DEPRESSES TILE 
ENERGIES OF THE SOUL. 


T 1s only when a probationer believes that his 

future choices are not foreknown, that he is able 
fully to locate and hold the responsibility of his 
choices alone in himself. It is only then that he 
can adequately exert himself, can exercise his will 
up to the full measure of its volitional capacities and 
manifest his selfhood in all its wonderful powers. 

A belief that all things are bound up in the 
chains of necessity has never failed to modify the 
life and to enfeeble the will for the duty of self- 
denial. It has never failed to incline the individual 
to float with the current of his inclinations. And no 
man can heartily believe in the doctrine of predesti- 
nation and feel that pungency of personal accounta- 
bility which he ought to feel, and which he would feel 
if he did not so believe. No man can believe that 
whatever comes to pass has been foreordained from all 
eternity without merging, to a greater or less extent, 
his individual will in the foreordaining will of God. 
And no one can do this without failing to arouse his — 
marvelous powers of volition to that degree of ear- 
nestness which God designed and requires. In this 
judgment we are sustained by the commanding testi- 
mony of Dugald Stewart, who says, ‘‘Not more than 

399 


400 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


one in a hundred of those who embrace the doctrine 
of predestination ever retains his conviction of his 
being a moral and an accountable agent.” And that 
this is the logical result of the theory no candid man 
will deny, who attends to his intellectual processes. 

Whoever, while professing faith in predestination 
and its correlative doctrines, attains to great efficiency 
and power by the exertion of the free energies of his 
soul, becomes a living contradiction of the faith which 
he professes, and his conduct warrants the conclusion 
that his avowed faith is not his real faith, and that, 
instead of believing in a doctrine which uniformly 
enthralls and represses human energy, he really 
entertains, perhaps unconsciously to himself, through 
his intuitions, an esoteric conviction that he is in pos- 
session of personal freedom and of all that freedom 
implies. 

So, also, if you convince a man that all his future 
choices are now certainly foreknown, he can not 
escape the depressing and enervating influences of 
that belief upon all his volitional. processes. He 
never can assert his selfhood with that vigor which 
his duties require. His will naturally yields to the 
suggestions of his own mind or of an evil spirit, that 
he is not the master of himself, that he is only the 
creature of circumstances, that he is the child of 
destiny, and that he can not stem nor guide the cur- 
rent of events, but must necessarily drift on in the 
channel of the inevitable. No thoughtful prescient- 
ist wholly escapes the weakening and benumbing 
influences of his belief upon his volitional energies. 
The human mind can not escape suspense, distress, 


"oa 


DEPRESSES OUR ENERGIES. 401 


and diminution of effort and loss of energy, if it 
believes God foreknows, and that his foreknowledge 
makes all its own future choices certain. Belief in 
prescience always tends to moral insensibility, inac- 
tivity, and indifference. . 

If future choices are all foreknown, if there is a 
certainty as to their .coming to pass, no one can 
avoid regarding those choices as fixed and inevitable; 
and if these are inevitable, a latent conviction will 
seize the soul, that do what it may, it is unable to 
change the ultimate event or to avoid its now fore- 
known destiny. The moment a man believes and 
feels that his future choices are now unerringly 
foreknown, his unmeasured capacities of freedom 
are narrowed, weakened, and often altogether para- 
lyzed. If God foreknows the future choice of a free 
agent, that free agent is sure to come to that choice, 
and as to that choice there can be now no avoida- 
bility. To affirm that the choice is avoidable, de- 
stroys the certainty of the foreknowledge. If that 
choice is certain to come to pass, the mind can not 
avoid regarding it as a fixity—a fixity in regard to 
which God predicates innumerable and important 
things. If the mind regards the choice as a fixity, 
the paralyzing conviction will naturally and inevit- 
ably arise that, do what it may, it is impossible to 
modify the event. Such a conviction represses en- 
ergy and lessens effort. 

. Suppose that I engage in solemn prayer, believ- 
ing that all the future is now definitely foreknown to 
God. The tempter whispers in my ear, ‘‘The future 
will be just as God now foreknows, and where can be 


402 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


the necessity or the utility of your prayer? How 
can you modify the foreknown fixity?’ God can 
not be mistaken, and I have no power to change in 
the least that which he now foreknows to be certain. 
The fate that he now sees for me, whether it be one 
of blessing or of blight, I shall finally meet. That is 
as certain as the law which holds the solar system in — 
harmony. And if this be so, why should I thus 
disturb myself? Why should I war against this 
moral lethargy that so paralyzes me? Why should 
I so fight against all my settled habits? Why rush 
athwart all my strong inclinations? Why make such 
a struggle to deny myself in order to put forth the 
power of my will in efforts to be interested in spir- 
itual blessings, when I believe that all will be as God 
now foresees it; when I believe that all I do and all 
I feel will be but the simple results of precedents, 
which were known and fixed in the divine mind 
millions of years ago? 

But now, suppose I engage in prayer under the 
inspiration of a belief that the foreknowledge of the 
future choices of a free spirit, while acting under the 
law of liberty, involves self-contradiction; that my 
individual destiny is now unknown to Jehovah; that 
my future is as a sheet of white paper, and whatever 
impressions shall be made upon it will depend wholly 
upon myself; that Iam the author of my own des- 
tiny; that I am an originator of moral forces; that 
my will is a fountain of causation; that every choice 
I deliberately make is the beginning of a new series 
of events, and that the free choices of my will are no 
more preceded by coercive antecedents than are the 


DEPRESSES OUR ENERGIES. 403 


free choices of God himself; and especially that what 
I am to be is to be the effect of what I shall do. 
Then I shall be fully aroused to the facts of my 
solemn position; then I shall feel my accountability, 
comprehend my freedom, and perceive my latent. 
capacities for putting forth powerful volitional efforts. 
I then become fully persuaded that no being, no 
outside cause or influence, nothing objective in the 
universe, can determine the future unknown result, 
and that such result, whatever it be, is a matter for 
me.alone to determine. 

Let such thoughts take possession of a man, and 
nothing else could so arouse the energies of his 
deathless spirit. Nothing else could so enable an 
accountable being to realize the significance of all the 
endowments of his sublime personality. And if man 
be truly in danger, through his own choice and free 
volitions, of eternal exclusion from the favor of God 
and the glory of his power, then the only view of his 
solemn capacities of freedom that can at all cor- 
respond to his hazards, requirements, and possibili- 
ties is the one that is here presented, the one that 
is founded upon the incognizability of future free 
choices. All those fatal dreams, speculations, and 
delusions, by which so many succeed in impairing 
their sense of responsibility, would in this way be 
most effectually dissipated. A person under the 
sway and inspiration of such a belief looks confi- | 
dently up to God, and sees him holding in his right 
hand those great blessings which alone can meet his 
many necessities. Not only is he conscious of his 
need of such blessings, but he is convinced that he 


404 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


can obtain them; that, though all his efforts are 
worthless as a purchasing consideration, they are the 
indispensable conditions of receiving what God has 
to bestow. All the conditions requisite for obtaining 
the favors promised him he feels that through im- 
parted grace he is fully enabled to perform. Jehovah, 
not foreknowing what the seeking soul will ask, is 
nevertheless ready to bestow any thing which he has 
promised, as soon as his conditions are complied 
with. To such a worshiper Satan can never whisper 
the paralyzing suggestion: ‘‘God foreknows it all; he 
knows what you are just about to ask for, what he 
intends to bestow, what you will in fact ultimately 
receive, and he has known it from all eternity —all 
this having entered into his crystallized, universal 
plan, which embraces eternity past and eternity to 
come.’ How is it possible for the hearty believer 
in universal prescience reasonably to pray, ‘‘ Lead 
me not into temptation?’ Indeed, how can he rea- 
sonably pray at all? 

But if God does not specifically foreknow the peti- 
tions of his children, how replete with the freshest and 
deepest interest and importance becomes the institu- 
tion of prayer! The comfort and power which this 
view brings to the suppliant are vastly superior to 
those derived from any other. Religion prescribes 
prayer as a duty and a privilege. And the command 
to pray is accompanied with assurances that God will 
hear and answer our supplications. Few subjects 
have been more meditated upon or more discussed 
than this: Wherein consists the real benefit and 
efficiency of prayer? ‘‘The answer to prayer is not 


eo 


got 


eS ae 


Th oh geet poe eye 


Hy 
4 


‘ 
¥: 
b 

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SL oe 


WER Gee re mye y 


DEPRESSES OUR ENERGIES. 405 


the effect of the prayer,” says Dr. Buchanan, in his 
““Modern Atheism,’ ‘“‘but it is the effect of the 
divine will.” Even Dr. M’Cosh questions whether 
there can be any thing like causality in our prayers. 
“We should blush,” says Bishop Warburton, ‘to’ 
be thought so uninstructed in the nature of prayer 
as to fancy it can work any temporary changes in 
the disposition of Deity.”” Mr. Boyle and President 
Edwards both think that ‘‘God answers prayer, 
through the ministry of angels.” _ Dr. Chalmers, de- 
spairing to give any solution to the true efficacy of 
prayer that would be acceptable to common sense, 
merely attempts to neutralize objections brought 
against the institution, by showing that ‘‘the diffi- 
culty in question might possibly be accounted for, 
were our knowledge more extensive and precise.”’ 

A large number of the brightest names in science 
and theology teach that ‘‘God so arranged his prov- 
idence from the beginning as to provide for particu- 
lar events, and especially to provide answers to the 
prayers of his intelligent creatures.”’ This view re- 
gards prayer as an ‘‘element which was taken into 
the account at the original constitution of the world, 
and for which an answer was particularly provided as 
the result of natural laws or of angelic agencies em- 
ployed for this express end by the omniscient fore- 
knowledge of God.”’ To this view the objector urges 
that, ‘‘since science teaches that all events take place 
in strict conformity to the course of nature estab- 
lished from the beginning, our prayers can effect no 


change whatever, unless we pretend to expect that 
35 


406 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


God should continue to be working miracles in com- 
pliance with our prayers.” 

This objection, says the celebrated Euler, has the 
ereater weight from the fact that religion teaches 
the doctrine that God has established the course of 
all events, and that nothing can come to pass but 
what he foresaw from all eternity. ‘‘Is it credible,” 
say the objectors, ‘that God should think of alter: 
ing this settled course of events in compliance with 
any prayers which man might address to him?” 


9 


‘But I reply,” says Euler, ‘‘that when God estab- 
lished the course of the universe, and arranged all 
the events that must come to pass in it, he paid at- 
tention to all the circumstances which should accom- 
pany each event, particularly to the dispositions, 
desires, and prayers of every intelligent being, and 
that the arrangement of all events was disposed with 
perfect harmony with all these circumstances. When, 
therefore, a man addresses a prayer to God worthy to 
be heard, that prayer was already heard from all 
eternity, and the Father of Mercies arranged the 
world especially in favor of that prayer, so that the 
accomplishment should be a consequence of the nat- 


i) 


ural course of events.” ‘‘It is not impossible,” says 
Dr. Wollaston, ‘‘that such laws of nature and such 
a series of causes and effects may be originally de- 
sioned that particular cases may be provided for 
without alterations in the course of nature. It is 
true that this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in 
which all things to come are comprehended under 


one view, estimated and laid together; and thus the 


DEPRESSES OUR. ENERGIES. 407 


prayers which good men offer up to God and the 
neglects of others may find fitting effects already 
forecasted in the course of nature.” 

How utterly unsatisfactory and unnatural and im- 
probable are all such explanations of the efficacy of | 
the sublime institution of prayer! If such views, if 
such answers to the question, ‘‘In what consists the 
benefit of prayer?’ do not tend to lessen the fre- 
quency, the fervency, the efficiency of, and the re- 
spect for, prayer, then no religious belief can exert 
any depressing and demoralizing effect upon the moral 
activities of the soul. All such explanations of the 
wonderful problem before us are unphilosophical, 
and yet they are the best and most ingenious which 
the ablest of the prescientists can offer. They seem 
only a little way removed from the doctrine taught 
by some heathen writers, and referred to by Cicero, 
of which he declared that he was truly ashamed 
namely, that ‘‘the divine energy, which extends 
throughout the universe, really directs the children 
of men in the choice of the victim, by the scrutiny 
of whose entrails they expect to determine and fore- 
know their future fortunes.” 

My friend starts to-day for London, and I pray 
for his safe voyage. I pray that seas may be calm, 
that storms may be hushed, that officers may be 
competent, and that no accident may occur. Nov, 
the theory above stated, concerning the utility of 
my supplication, declares that my prayer was heard 
from all eternity; that from the depths of the eternal 
past God anticipated my prayer and arranged all 
events and circumstances—storms, commanders, ves- 


408 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


sel, and forces—so that my prayer could be answered 
without any interference with any of the natural laws 
of the universe, and without any special interposition, 
on his part, in staying forces and counteracting laws. 
The theory also requires that had not the prayer 
been heard from all eternity it could not have been 
made, and would not have been answered at all. 
Prayer is an exercise in view of which blessings are 
bestowed upon the suppliant which would not have 
been bestowed but for that exercise. But such pres- 
entations of the subject as we have now referred to, 
bring neither comfort, power, light, nor inspiration 
to the suppliant, nor any glory to him who hath 
said, ‘‘Call upon me in the day of trouble, and I 
will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me.”’ When 
God listens toand answers a suppliant’s prayer he 
must limit himself in some particulars. He must 
appear in the likeness of human mutability to adjust 
himself to the variant doings of a mutable agent. 
And this view furnishes an explanation of prayer at 
once reasonable to the mind, moving to the soul, and 
glorifying to God. 


) 


‘“The system of necessity,’ says James Mill, ‘‘is 
very remote from the doctrine of fatalism, for it 
simply teaches that whatever happens could not have 
happened otherwise, unless something had taken 
place which was capable of preventing it. Necessi- 
tarians are, however, fatalists in their feelings, and 
mentally query why they should struggle against 
whatever is to happen. The doctrine of free will, 
on the other hand, by keeping in view the power of 
the mind to co-operate in the formation of its own 


DEPRESSES OUR ENERGIES. 409 


character, has produced a better practical feeling and 
a stronger spirit of self-culture than has ever existed 
in the minds of necessitarians.”’ This testimony, 
coming as it does from one of the ablest of the 
thinkers, is of great value in this discussion. Just 
so, if we embrace absolute foreknowledge. If we 
dwell upon it sufficiently long to perceive its logical 
sequences, however much our reason may repudiate 
the mysterious constraint, the mystic tie linking our 
present choices back to God’s unerring foreknowl- 
edge of those choices, our imagination will still affirm 
that such a connection must somehow exist, and our 
intuitive feelings of liberty will be strongly influenced, 
and our convictions as to our own free activities and 
accountability will be injuriously weakened. 

No fallacy has obtained greater currency than that 
the foreknowledge of God has no influence over the 
future actions of a free agent. This sophism has 
ever been in the mouth of Arminians, and has been 
confidently advanced in every discussion by those 
who oppose Calvinism. A latent conviction of its 
unsoundness, however, has always disturbed the 
equilibrium of those who have used it. Because the 
foreknowledge or fore-perception of an effect follow- 
ing its cause in the material world among material 
forces does exert, and can exert, no influence in pro- 
ducing the said physical effect, theologians and _phil- 
losophers have rashly and strangely inferred that the 
same can be said relatively to the foreknowledge of a 
free choice which is made by a free agent possessing 
the power to originate causes and to make con- 
trary choices. Mr. Watson, for example, says that 


410 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


‘‘Inowledge is in no sense a cause of actions; the 
certainty of an action does not result from a knowl- 
edge of it. The will which gives birth to the action 
is not dependent on the previous knowledge of God. 
The foreknowledge of God, therefore, has no influ- 
ence on the freedom of actions for the plain reason 
that it is knowledge and not influence.” 

But, I reply, there is no analogy, pertinent to this 
discussion, between a necessary event and a free 
event. A necessary event is tied to a certain result, 
and can not produce moral character ; while a free voli- 
tion caz originate moral character, and may select any 
one of many results. One is controlled by necessary 
laws, the other is governed by a free will. One is 
determined by physical forces, the other is intelli- 
gently selfdetermined. One is natural in its action, 
while the other is not natural, but really supernat- 
ural. How, then; can what is observed in the nat- 
ural be so confidently applied to or made to illustrate 
the supernatural? The radical distinction between 
the natural and the supernatural, between the action 
of a material force and the action of a free intelligent 
will, renders the observation to which we are reply- 
ing quite inapplicable, and as an argument abso- 
lutely worthless. Impulses and reasons act upon 
a free spirit entirely different from gravitation upon 
matter. * 

And though the will is not controlled by the 
various influences brought to bear against it—by the 
various appeals made to the innocent susceptibilities 
of the soul, or by the attacks made through its evil 
or abnormal tendencies—nevertheless, all these do 


DEPRESSES OUR ENERGIES. AIt 


come in as occasions of the will’s final self-determi- 
nations. These occasions of the will’s final decision 
and action form the arena of strugele, of moral 
conflict, and of fall or victory for all probationers. 
While it is true that the nature of voluntary action’ 
is unconstrained, uncontrolled, causative, and_ ini- 
tiative, still there could be no testing of the loyalty 
of a probationary spirit, if influences, to a certain 
degree, were not brought to bear against its strength 
of will and tenacity of purpose. If influences of a 
ereater degree of intensity were brought to bear, 
its freedom would be interfered with, and then the 
action of the will could not evolve moral character. 
A moral agent is tried or tested by appeals made to 
his reason or to his sensibilities in favor of some form 
of evil. In any real trial there must be a liability to 
fall, however supernatural may be the action of the 
will, and however sinless the moral agent. The stir- 
ring of the susceptibilities occasions, but does not 
necessitate, this liabity to wrong volition. This is so, 
because the action of the will is subjective in its 
nature, and is independent of, and uncontrolled by, 
any objective influences. Within the limits of that 
degree of intensity which is needed to achieve mo- 
rality and rewardability, and to test the loyalty of a 
free agent to truth, order, and authority, these test- 
ing influences are not controlling over the will, but | 
they merely offer the occasions of its self-determi- 
nations. They are the indispensable conditions of 
achieving character and moral desert. Within this 
divinely surveyed realm of competitive influences 


412 LHE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


the will of the agent is autocrat, causator, creator, 
and initiator. The strength of character achieved 
in trial is in direct proportion to the number and 
strength of the influences struggled against and tri- 
-umphed over. 

But, notwithstanding all this, as we multiply the 
influences brought to bear on the wills of a multitude 
of individuals, we increase, as a general thing, the 
sum of the probabilities that any given person will 
determine in accordance with those influences. This 
general probability, however, let it always be borne 
in mind, can never afford, in any instance, so long as 
the agent retains his freedom, any ground for cer- 
tainty as to his future choices or the absolute fore- 
knowledge thereof. Even Julius Miiller confesses that 
‘‘the behavior of a man may be foretold by a con- 
sideration of his character and his circumstances only 
in so far as freedom—that is, the power of acting 
otherwise—is not really possessed by him.” This rule 
of probability amounts simply to this, that a given 
choice is more likely than not, in the judgments of 
men (not as a quality of the choice itself) to happen 
when you increase through the sensibilities the strain 
on the will power. But this probability is not in- 
volved objectively in the future free event, as one 
of its qualities. It has only a subjective existence in 
us, aiding us in making up needed general judgments 
for the conduct of our life. And this rule is so 
general that it does form some ground of proba- 
bility for a given volition. But it can never produce 
certainty; can never be depended on to furnish uner- 


si haath eee Ut sa heed LR 


Pigiestacsve 8.1 


7 


DEPRESSES OUR ENERGIES. 413 


ring knowledge in any specified instance. For it 
must never be forgotten that the theory of proba- 
bilities or general prevalence has to ‘do only with our 
beliefs. It can not be a law of objective things, but 
is simply an approximate order of subjective thought. . 

That the foreknowledge of God would exert an in- 
fluence over the determinations of the human will is 
apparent from the following considerations. It is 
every-where confessed that belief and knowledge do 
influence or modify the choices of the will in the 
sense that they present some of the occasions of its 
free volitions, and thus increase the general proba- 
bility of a given volition. If, for example, men be- 
lieve Universalism or Fatalism or Atheism or Calvin- 
ism or Arminianism, they are greatly influenced in 
their choices by said beliefs. Such influence is not a 
constant but a wonderfully variable quantity. It 
never acts uniformly, either upon different individuals 
or upon the same individual at different times. It 
can, therefore, never form a basis for certainty in any 
given case. All that it does afford is a general prob- 
ability of prevalence. These are facts known and 
read of all. ‘‘As aman thinketh so is he.”’ 

And, in like manner, if one believes that God 
foreknows all his future choices, that belief is likely 
to become an occasion of diminishing his will power, 
and weakening his efforts to overcome temptations. 
For, one. of the indispensable conditions of perfect 
freedom is a firm conviction, that the future choices 
of a free spirit, while acting under the law of liberty, 
ought to be now unconditionally undetermined, and, 
therefore, unknown. If man is free, his future is 


414 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


contingent or uncertain; and the delusion that some 
influence or some being outside of the will itself is 
the responsible cause of human choices must be dis- 
sipated if the will is to exhaust all its capacities of 
freedom. A belief that future volitions are unknown 
is one of the important conditions of needful energy 
and activity in the human will. A belief that voli- 
tions are foreknown has, as every struggling Chris- 
tian can but attest, a suspense-producing, an agitat- 
ing and «weakening influence, endangering wrong self- 
determinations in the will. ‘‘The nature of a thing,”’ 
said Dr. Olinthus Gregory, ‘‘is not changed by its 
being foreknown.” Very true; if a future choice 
is now known to be a certainty, its foreknowledge 
can not change its nature. But the belief that all 
future choices are now certainties does act pow- 
erfully to affect one’s volitions and to determine what 
those future choices will be. Such a belief practi- 
cally interferes with our moral liberty. 

But, on the other hand, if God foreknows a spe- 
cific act of a free spirit, we do not see how he can, 
in good faith, make becoming and efficient efforts to 
prevent that act from coming to pass, if the act be 
one which he would deprecate. So far as can be 
seen he could, in the nature of things, no more strive 
in good faith and with sincere earnestness, to pre- 
vent the eternal damnation of a human soul, if he 
foreknew that result to be absolutely certain, than he 
could so act to rescue a soul upon whom already 
the sentence of eternal death had been pronounced. 
Who can reasonably question the force of this most 
impressive argunient? 


DEPRESSES OUR ENERGIES. 415 


On the night of the betrayal Jesus said to Judas, 
‘He that dippeth his hand with me in the dish, the 
same shall betray me.’”’ ‘‘ Behold the hand of him 
that betrayeth me is with me on the table.” ‘The 
Son of Man goeth as it is written of him, but woe 
unto that man by whom he is betrayed.” ‘And 
truly the Son of Man goeth as it was determined, 
but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed.” 
And, finally, in the garden he said, ‘‘Betrayest thou 
me with a kiss?’ All these various and impressive 
forms of speech were used by the Savior to prevent, 
if possible, the sin of Judas. If all these super- 
natural efforts were not made in good faith to pre- 
vent the deprecated fall of one chosen to be cn 
apostle, then, it is impossible to conceive Jesus as 
candid and sincere. But they could not have been 
put forth in good faith and thorough honesty, nor 
with sufficient earnestness, if the treachery of Judas 
had been known by him from all eternity, and at that 
moment stood out before him as an event fixed and 
utterly unavoidable. How profound his pity and de- 
sire to rescue Judas from eternal infamy is discov- 
ered in his lamentation, ‘Better for that man had he 
never been born.”’ 

God’s foreknowledge of a certain future action, 
if true, must come in as a certain factor to influence 
and affect in the most marked manner the final choice 
and determination of a free spirit. If any man be- 
lieves that there is a logical necessity forced upon 
his future free choices by divine foreknowledge, that 
those choices must result as now foreseen, that they 
must conform to the present divine foreknowledge 


416 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF Gob. 


of them, this belief can not fail to become one of 
the powerful influences which will tend to secure an 
agreement between present divine foreknowledge and 
his future free choices. No man can properly appre- 
ciate his power to originate forces and initiate results, 
or feel his responsibility therefor, who does not be- 
lieve that contingencies are unforeknowable. 

God’s now foreknowing that a certain person is 
to be eternally lost would have a wonderful influence 
over himself intellectually, emotionally, and volition- 
ally—how wonderful and how various none of the 
finite can ever reveal or even conceive. And in like 
manner a belief that God now foreknows my—to me 
unforeknown—destiny would have great power to 
paralyze my moral and intellectual energies. Thus 
we see that these two most important conditions do 
enter in as influences operating upon the will in its 
final determinations. 

How untrue, then, is the phrase, repeated from 
time immemorial, that knowledge has no influence 
over the choices of free agents. From a perception 
of the natural, the necessary, the constrained, and 
the unintelligent, no logical inferences can ever be 
drawn as to the free, the contingent, the intelligent, 
and the supernatural. The whole analogy is unre- 
liable and delusive. Belief, therefore, in absolute 
prescience does, like fatalism, lessen, depress, and 
discourage the vast powers for free action with which 
the Creator endows the human will. Where there is 
no alternative the choice is inevitable, and no one can 
feel himself responsible for that which is inevitable. 
A belief that the future is now fixed, and is inevit- 


DEPRESSES OUR ENERGIES. 417 


able, robs the soul of its energies—and virtually of 
its freedom. A belief that to me the privilege and 
the duty are given to create for myself my own des- 
tiny, that whatever I fear in the future is evitable 
and whatever I hope for is attainable, at once unfet- - 
ters and stimulates all my moral and intellectual en- 
ergies. A belief, therefore, in absolute prescience is 
in all respects harmful to the soul, while an opposite 
belief is an inspiration to every good word and work. 


CHAPTER XXIX, 


THE DENIAL OF ABSOLUTE FOREKNOWLEDGE 
TENABLE. 


ce HE human understanding,” says Dr. M’Cosh, 

Ap “‘can not reconcile creature freedom with 
divine prescience. The difficulties that encompass 
the subject arise from the connection of the human 
will with the foreknowledge of God, and from the 
fact that voluntary acts do seem to be caused. I 
must think that antecedent circumstances do act 
causally upon the will of man: And it is in the 
peculiar nature of this cause, operating in the will, 
that the means of clearing up the subject and effect- 
ing a reconciliation between these seeming incongru- 
ities are to be found. But I am convinced that man 
can never penetrate this region and determine the 
nature and the mode of the operation of this power 
which sways the will. We can point out the place 
where the means of clearing up this mystery must 
lie, but then we can never reach that place.” 

Of course, the undue assumption of divine fore- 
knowledge and the causal force of antecedents on the 
action of the free will, in those volitions that involve 
_ morality, must forever necessitate not only difficul- 
ties but self-contradictions and absurdities, The 
considerations which led Dr. M’Cosh to attribute “a 


causal influence to antecedent circumstances’”’ are 
AI8 


LTS DENIAL TENABLE: 419 


quite worthy of notice. ‘‘It is the action of the 
will,”’” says Cousin, ‘‘that first suggests to us the 
idea of cause; and the will, being a cause, can not 
be an effect.”” This statement of Cousin Dr. M’Cosh 
rejects. He rejects it in consideration of a fact which . 
he specifies, and of two convictions which he men- 
tions and terms intuitive. He says, ‘‘ When a man 
performs a malevolent deed, do we not look back for 
the cause of that deed into his previous character? 
and when a man is thoroughly just, do we not antic- 
ipate that he will ever do just acts?’ Dr. M’Cosh 
seems to think that only one answer can be given to 
either of these questions. 

But we reply that we are not authorized to look 
for the cause of the malevolent deed back into the 
previous character of the individual. For how often 
are malevolent deeds performed by those whose pre- 
vious character had been of long-established rectitude 
and benevolence? Those motives in view of which 
they had uniformly acted through a protracted period 
have afterwards been entirely disregarded by them. 
This is clearly exemplified in many cases where indi- 
viduals pass through great and varied changes of life 
and pursuits. The worst men have repented and 
brought forth works meet for repentance, and saints 
have fallen after often assuring themselves of heaven. 
The first free agent who ever sinned certainly had no 
previous unholy character to cause an immoral act. 
This sinful act was caused by his will; for his previ- 
ous character was holiness and righteousness. It is 
a simple fact that a being who was and who ever had 
been most thoroughly just and holy did inaugurate 


420 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


wickedness and did introduce moral evil into the 
universe. We have no right or authority or reason, 
therefore, to anticipate with certainty that a being 
who is thoroughly just and good will always during 
his probation perform good deeds, or that the will is 
determined by that character which it had itself orig- 
inated and established. Is it not surprising that the 
eminent philosopher of the intuitions should pro- 
nounce these most obvious errors ‘‘acknowledged 
intuitive convictions?” Instead of being intuitive 
convictions they are manifest errors and unauthorized 
statements, requiring large benevolence to excuse. 

Julius Miiller says: ‘‘ We never can predict, with 
any thing but an approximate probability, what the 
decision of a man of developed character will ee 
even when the web of his inner life in its finest and 
most delicate threads lies clear before us. This is so 
because character in its earthly growth is never so 
fixed and certain as to be unsusceptible of new and 
different determinations from the inexhaustible source 
and depth of free will, which can sever the threads 
in that web and introduce therein new ones. Our 
assured hope of persevering in goodness must ever 
have its dark background,—the conscious possibility 
that in the freedom of our will arbitrariness may at 
any time arise.” | 

But if ‘‘antecedent circumstances do exert a causal 
influence on the human will,” as Dr. M’Cosh affirms, 
how is it that we all feel so clearly and thoroughly, 
at the very moment of committing a malevolent deed, 
that we are free to do it or to refrain from doing it? 
And how is it, subsequently to the perpetration of 


LTS DENIAL TENABLE. 421 


the deed, that we so pungently condemn ourselves 
therefor? And how is it that others join with our own 
hearts so promptly in condemning us? But if ante- 
cedents have a causal influence over the will, then we 
could predict an action of the will with as much cer-. 
tainty and uniformity as we can predict any event in 
nature. But this is acknowledged to be impossible. 
Even Cicero says, ‘‘If the causes of our wills were 
natural and anterior, then nothing at all would be in 
our own power.”’ Dr. M’Cosh in this passage regards 
a volition as the resultant of motives, whereas it is 
not a resultant at all, but is a free choice between 
motives. The fact which Dr. M’Cosh adduces by 
which to prove that the will is not a cause, is that 
the statistics of voluntary actions, such as murders, 
thefts, and letters mailed, can be determined as ac- 
curately as those of birth or mortality. He seems 
to think that the will is bound by some law compell- 
ing the same number of men to commit the same 
number of crimes in equal periods of time. 

But I reply, while we can not affirm with cer- 
tainty, that a thoroughly just man will always per- 
form just deeds, we can judge and estimate that 
the probabilities are more numerous that he will 
perform just deeds than that he will not. This gen- 
eral uniformity of moral nature seems to be a some- 
what fair but by no means a certain basis for the 
calculation of the probabilities in any specified case. — 
It is a consequence of the general effect of habit 
in inducing a fixity of moral character, which is 
gradually but freely formed, the will being by its 


power of free choice the original source of character. 
30 


, 


422 THE LOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


This greater sum of probabilities affords ample bases 
for the formation of opinions, for the determining of 
statistics, and for the striking of averages. But even 
the striking of averages itself implies the absence of 
uniform law in the premises. The general uniformity 
of moral statistics is accounted for by the general 
uniformity of human nature in the specified locality 
and period. But such uniformities of results may 
arise as easily from freedom as from necessity. Al- 
ternativity in the power of human wills does not 
prevent these marked uniformities in their determina- 
tions. For collective uniformity is not inconsistent 
with individual contingency. And even though uni- 
formities in such results might suggest the doctrine 
of necessity, the innumerable deviations from uni- 
formity clearly demonstrate the doctrine of human 
freedom. But these statistics, moreover, do not re- 
veal the moral character, nor the diversified motives 
and circumstances and temptations under the influ- 
ence of which criminals have committed the desig- 
nated crimes. They are, indeed, never perfectly 
uniform—very far from it. They are only approxi- 
matively true, and their lack of perfect conformity 
can only be explained by the supposition that the 
will is itself a cause and not an effect. But really 
few things in the world, so far as I have been able 
to ascertain, falsify so egregiously as tabulated sta- 
tistics. And, besides, it is only on this supposition, 
that the will is a cause itself, that the collection of 
criminal statistics can be of the least moral and social 
value, or can be a means of information. 


But all this difficulty of Dr. M’Cosh is the old 


ITS DENIAL TENABLE. 423 


fallacy of locating the incipiency of moral actions in 
the objective appeals made to the sensitive part 
of our nature, instead of locating it in the will 
itself, where alone it can be found, and where 
alone it ought to be found. As the human will. 
can easily, as before remarked, be made to act con- 
sentingly, according to the law of cause and effect, 
and, indeed, must be made so to act, in order that 
it may be a reliable instrument for the execution of 
‘the purposes of Divine Providence in confounding 
the counsels of the wicked, and in frustrating the 
sinful machinations of evil men, and the moral dis- 
orders which would defeat the operation of provi- 
dential plans; and since it actually does so act 
under constraint in thousands of instances in daily 
experiences, Dr. Jonathan Edwards hastily inferred 
that the law of necessity is the one single mode of 
its activity. From this constrained action of the 
will, so possible, actual, and frequent, he drew the un- 
sound conclusion that it never acts in any other way 
or according to any other law. But had‘he only ob- 
served more widely and thought longer, he probably 
would have discovered that in the kingdom of grace 
the free will could and must act freely, according to the 
law of liberty, and not from constraint or necessity. 
The clear distinction between the kingdom of 
providence and the kingdom of grace, and the essen- 
tial difference in the action of the will which these ~ 
two distinct divine kingdoms sternly necessitate, 
seem not to have suggested themselves to him. He 
did not distinguish between the action of the will as 
it unconsciously acts consentingly under the law of 


424 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


cause and effect, and its free action under the law of 
liberty. Had he perceived these now manifest dis- 
tinctions he would have been saved from the per- 
plexities and sophisms which so distressed himself, 
and which have so confused and worried his followers 
and his opponents in their efforts to defend or to ex- 
pose his now acknowledged errors, both in theology 
and in philosophy. . 

But for the dogma of prescience, Sir William 
Hamilton never would have taught that ‘‘the free 
agency of man is incapable of speculative proof!” 
What better proof could he desire, or could any 
doctrine require, than that which he himself ad- 
duces in favor of free agency? ‘‘The common 
sense as well as the natural convictions of mankind,” 
he affirms, ‘‘testify in favor of a free will and against 
a bond will.’ He quotes Dugald Stewart as saying 
that ‘‘every man has the proof of his own con- 
sciousness that he is a free agent;’”’ and he also says 
that ‘‘however unthinkable free agency may be as to 
the how of it, either it, is true, or the doctrine of 
necessity is true; for they are contradictories, one 
of which must be true.”’ ‘‘But consciousness does 
not give her testimony in favor of necessity.” ‘In 
proof of the doctrine of necessity the necessitarian 
has no appeal whatever to human consciousness.”’ 
But, on the other hand, the libertarian can appeal 
fearlessly to universal consciousness that free agency 
is unquestionably true. And no evidence could be 
more convincing and satisfactory than that of con- 
sciousness, for ‘consciousness is always veracious 
and never spontaneously false.” What better proof 


ITS DENIAL TENABLE. 425 


of free agency could any philosopher or investigator 
demand? What other proof of equal strength and 
cogency could be conceived? Were it written in 
capitals on the vault of heaven it could not be more 
impressive. 

How little could Sir William Hamilton explain 
of the nature of gravitation, cohesion, magnetism, or 
electricity! How very little could he say to explain 
how the constituent gases of the atmosphere are 
intermingled, or how the simple process of evapora- 
tion is carried on! He might as well have pro- 
nounced the communication of motion from one body 
to another as unthinkable, as that freedom is un- 
thinkable. Dr. Gregory says, ‘I challenge the 
wisest philosopher to demonstrate, by just argument 
and from unexceptionable principles, what will be 
the effect of one particle of matter in motion meet- 
ing with another at rest, on the supposition that 
these two particles constituted all the matter in the 
universe.”” Indeed, Hamilton might have thrown 
upon his own mental operations the same incer- 
titude that he has thrown upon his moral liberty. 
Well says the Bzbliotheca Sacra (October, 1877), 

“The mystery of finite thinking is yet unsolved. 
We think, and we know we think, but how we think 
no man has ever yet told. The finite thinker can 
not comprehend his finite work.’’ But freedom is 
written on every fiber of the human soul, and upon 
every pillar of the divine government. 

And had not the doctrine of foreknowledge so 
grievously tormented Hamilton he never would have 
outlawed this fundamental and transcendently im- 


426 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


portant question. He never would have pronounced, 
as he did, that both ‘‘liberty and necessity are in- 
comprehensible and outside the limits of legitimate 
thought, and beyond the solution of the human 
faculties.”” How the fetters that held him in per- 
plexity would have been sundered had he assumed 
the impossibility of absolute prescience! Every 
enactment of law and every institution of society 
assumes that impossibility. Every promise and every 
threatening from above assumes it. Every prayerful 
closet and every Christian pulpit assumes it. Every 
struggling Jacob and every prevailing Israel assumes 
it. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost assume it. Why, 
then, should it not be assumed by all free agents? 
How superlative, then, the unwisdom that could 
induce Sir William Hamilton, rather than surrender 
the needless dogma of universal prescience, to main- 
tain that free agency, which, confessedly, is an in- 
dispensable condition of moral character and moral 
government and of the tremendous retributions of 
eternity, is utterly incapable of any speculative proof 
whatever! ‘‘If the will,” says that» writer, “*be 
the undetermined cause of volition, it is impos- 
sible to conceive of its possibility.”’ John Stuart 
Mill says that Hamilton uses concetve and comprehend 
as synonymous. Our reply is, that the human intel- 
lect acts under the law of cause and effect, while the 
will acts under the law of freedom. And that there 
is a difference of some kind between the movement 
of the sensibilities and the action of the human will, 
all perceive and feel. But if men are conscious, as 
every one is, that in every volition they put forth 


b) 


ITs DENIAL TENABLE. 427 


they feel able to will something different from that 
volition, what greater conceivability of freedom can 
they desire? ‘‘But it is impossible,’ says Hamilton, 
‘“‘to conceive how a cause undetermined by any mo- 
tive can be a rational, moral, accountable creature.” - 
But we reply, it is more impossible to conceive 
how a cause, determined by a motive, could be either 


>) 


rational, moral, or accountable. But we also deny 
that it is inconceivable how a cause which is unde- 
termined by a motive can be rational, moral, or 
accountable. All that the motive is needed for is 
to test the will, to test its loyalty to right, to duty, 
and to authority. But testing the firmness or the 
flexibility of the will is a very different thing from 
determining its action. Hamilton’s preconceived er- 
rors disabled him from analyzing as closely as he 
ought at this point. Surely all can see the differ- 
ence between ¢estemg the character and making the 
character. ‘‘A motiveless volition,’ said Hamilton, 
“would only be a casualism.”” But, we reply, there 
can be no volitions which do not have either ob: 
jective or subjective motives. But the motive is 
only the occasion of the volition, not its cause: will 
itself clothes the motive with its variant attractiveness. 
Motive can not be the cause of it, if the one who wills 
is to be punished for it. It can not be the cause 
of the volition, because there is no constraint in it. 
It has, and it must have, a testing, straining, prov- 
ing, trying force; but it can not have, and ought not 
to have, a controlling, causing power. The plead- 
ings of a beloved friend for a milder sentence upon 
the youthful culprit may test and prove, but they 


428 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


can not control, the firmness of the judge. Sir Will- 
iam Hamilton did not perceive the wide distinction 
there is between fo zufluence and to determine, to test 
and to cause, and hence he declares that ‘‘it is of 
no consequence in the argument whether motives be 
said to zzfluence or to determine a man.’ This state- 
ment betrays his lack of discrimination or his unpar- 
donable haste in the consideration of this subject. 

Manifestly he failed to see that a motive may 
have a testing, without having a controlling, power; 
that a motive may be a test of a man’s will with- 
out coercing his determinations. Motives influence 
to action, but they do not determine to action. 
They do not act, and, more, they can not act, be- 
cause they are simply reasons for acting. There are 
no forces, sensitive or intellectual, in man, and none 
out of man, compelling his will with an irresistible 
necessity. The will alone is lord of its own actions. 
The will can be nothing at all if it have not in itself 
a real, self-originating causality. Self-determination 
of that which is now undetermined is clearly implied 
in free agency. Indeed, without self-determination 
free agency and personality can have neither signifi- 
cance nor existence. From the undetermined I 
determine myself. Personal creations must start 
from what is undetermined, in order, by self-deter- 
mination, to put an end to indeterminateness. The 
human will being a power of selfdetermination, it can 
control all the influences brought to bear upon its 
reason or upon its susceptibilities from within or from 
without in the form of motives. As an independent 
causality, it can determine the degree of influence it 


LTS DENIAL TENABLE. 429 


will allow motives to have in its determinations, or 
it can reject or neutralize that influence altogether. 
This it can do in the exercise of its unquestioned 
prerogative of sovereignty. ‘‘The capacity of will- 
ing,’ says Dr. L. P. Hickok, ‘‘is a power absolute 
in its own arbitrament, and can both act and direct its 
acts in its own naked self-determination. No mat- 
ter what the motives on each side, or if all be on 
one side, the mind is competent to suspend itself zz 
equilibrio, and act for or against the motives from its 
mere determination to do so.”’ It wills solely because 
it will, and no other reason is needed than that of 
itself it determines to do so. This power is so God- 
like that it can nullify, at any point in the process, 
the action of the law of cause and effect. 
Intellectualities and sensibilities act under the law 
of cause and effect, and hence can only act on the will 
according to that same law. And it is according to 
this law of cause and effect that motives addressed 
to the reason and appeals made to the sensibility act 
or operate in the process of testing the human will. 
In this sovereign power of liberty is to be found 
man’s highest resemblance to the Deity. And if 
man does not possess this moral liberty, then his con- 
sciousness of moral law is deceptive in itself, and re- 
quires of him an unjustifiable obedience. This fact 
ought to have satisfied Sir William Hamilton of the 
conceivability of human freedom. The denial of 
universal prescience is not only tenable, but its non- 


existence is provable and proved. 
oF 


CHAPTER XXX. 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 


HE doctrine that God does foresee with absolute 
aP certainty all the future choices of free beings is 
exceedingly depressing and harassing. No other has 
greater power to bring the human faculties into a 
condition of inactivity and indifference. How baf- 
fling and confusing this doctrine has ever been to the 
ministers of Jesus Christ while strugeling beneath the ¢ 
crushing responsibilities of preaching the Gospel of 
Christ to dying men. How discouraging, how in- 
comprehensible and torturing, the difficulties which 
it has originated, and which have defied all efforts to 
solve and to explain. How much doubt, suspense, 
and indecision, and how much waste of time, of en- 
ergy, and of opportunity for the publication of saving 
truth, have been caused by the perpetually obtruding 
inquiry: ‘‘ How can all things be contingent, and yet 
-all things be foreknown and absolutely certain ?”’ 

But if the doctrine that God does not foreknow 
with absolute certainty the specific acts of free spir- 
its which entail endless destiny had always been 
accepted as a verity, how very different this world 
would have been! What different things probation, 
prayer, the Bible, accountability, the capabilities and 
conduct of men would have been! How different 


would have been the preaching of the Gospel and 
430 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 431 


the controversies of men! How vastly different 
would have been the theology of the Church! The 
moment the divine foreknowledge of the future 
choices of free beings is rejected theolozy becomes 
consistent and luminous. Systematic divinity then 
becomes easy of construction and easy of compre- 
hension. Most of its propositions then become well- 
nigh axtomatic. They all commend themselves to 
the intelligent mind as reasonable and true. Neces- 
sity, fate, foreordination, and foreknowledge being 
rejected, every known truth, every demonstrable doc- 
trine, falls naturally into its place, and in order there 
uprises the pyramid of theological science, with its 
apex bathed in the pure sunlight of heaven! 
Compare the simplicity, beauty, and consistency 
of a system of theology constructed on the assumed 
impossibility of divine foreknowledge with that which 
has been constructed on the opposing hypothesis. 
In the examination of the latter the mind is baffled 
at every step. How inexplicable foreknowledge 
makes faith, prayer, free agency, contingency, human 
consciousness, human agency in saving the world, 
and God's inexpressible grief for having created man! 
From such incomprehensible subjects and inconsist- 
encies men can find no relief so long as they accept 
the doctrine of ‘absolute prescience; and therefore 
despairingly they turn away from them, regarding 
them as insoluble mysteries. But it is far other- 
wise with a theology founded on non-prescience. 
Here every legitimate deduction is gratifying to the 
most logical intellect. All those torturing and irrt- 
tating difficulties are swept away in a moment, as 


- 


432 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


with the wand of an enchanter. The dogma of 
foreknowledge not only renders impossible the con- 
struction of a system of divinity consistent and satis- 
factory, but it also beclouds our conceptions of the 
nature and the grandeur of human liberty, 

No one can have a distinct and complete idea of 
freedom who embraces fatalism. And he who be- 
lieves in the predestination of some to everlasting 
life and of some to everlasting death thinks among 
shadows only a little less dark. And in like manner 
he who believes in absolute divine foreknowledge 
apprehends the liberty of the human will but vaguely 
and unstably. True, as he gazes on liberty he seems 
to catch a glimpse of his independence and of his true 
greatness. But as soon as he recurs to the doctrine 
of universal prescience his mental equilibrium is dis. 
turbed, and his thoughts become at once confused 
between the agency of second causes and the occa- 
sions of free choices. But he who calmly denies 
absolute prescience looks upon human liberty with 
confidence in its profound reality, and receives from 
it an inspiration that disenthralls his spirit and gives 
energy to all his faculties. A denial of divine fore- 
knowledge, therefore, is indispensable to a clear, ad- 
equate, constant, and efficient conception of human 
liberty, that supernatural and divine quality in the 
soul of man. There is no possibility of giving a cor- 
rect and intelligible interpretation of the Bible with- 
out conceding the two great principles that the hu- 
man will acts under two distinct laws—under one 
freely, under the other consentingly —and that the 
future choices of free beings, acting under the law 


ux’ ot PRO, F by 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 433 


of liberty, are outside the domain of knowledge ex- 
cept as possible contingencies. These two princi- 
ples pour floods of serenest, soul-vivifying light all 
through the Holy Scriptures and all around sys- 
tematic divinity. . 

A denial of foreknowledge not only frees theology 
from many and great embarrassments, but places it 
on the high vantage ground of harmony with mod- 
ern thought. It puts it in full sympathy with the 
free, inquiring, philosophic spirit, and yet does not 
surrender a single essential of our common Protestant 
Christian doctrines. And what is true of theology, as 
a science, is equally true of practical Christianity. 

A denial of prescience permits a man to see the 
real grandeur of his intellectual and moral capac- 
ities and his lofty mission. It puts him on that high 
basis of freedom and causation upon which his Maker 
originally placed him. It brings to him a heaven- 
born impetus, and stimulates him to the full consecra- 
tion of all his redeemed energies. It gives strength 
to his faith, gladness to his sacrifices, earnestness to 
his closet devotions, scope to his motives, careful- 
ness to his life, and fervency to his aspirations after 
holiness and completeness in Jesus Christ. It breaks 
for him all the illusions with which fatality or semi- 
fatality or unbelief or uncertainty or confusion has 
so overwhelmed him. It hushes for him all siren 
voices, opens his eyes upon the realities of eternity, 
and unstops his ears to hear the minstrelsy of heaven 
and the mandates of Jehovah his Redeemer. It 
brings him where waves of truth and floods of light 
roll in upon his soul. It conduces to a religious life 


434 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF Gob. 


at once fervent, spontaneous, and robust. It awakens 
all the energies of the believer’s soul, and puts them 
all to the fullest tension. No other view of this 
subject can sufficiently impress him with his free- 
dom, his accountability, his work, his mission, the 
solemn interests committed to his keeping, and his 
ability to put forth great spiritual forces and to ac- 
complish vast results in the moral universe. 

Let this doctrine take full possession of a sincere, 
thoughtful probationer, and his character becomes 
more serious, earnest, persistent, and inflexible. His 
own true greatness of nature, his capacities of causa- 
tion, for initiating moral movements and spiritual in- 
fluence in the realm of mind is then, for the first time, 
fully known to him. His own independence as to 
thought, feeling, purpose, effort, and reward comes 
out before him in impressive reality. He then as- 
sumes his divinely intended proportions. He then 
comes into full possession of his own individuality. 
He then puts on the majesty that corresponds to 
his responsibilities. He becomes solemnly inspired 
to care for, to modify, and to control those incalcula- 
ble interests and results which tremble in his hands. 
This view of prescience compacts a man’s strength, 
directs his energies, nerves him for the sternest 
combat, and gives full validity to the teachings 
_ of his inmost consciousness. It puts a scepter in 
the hand of every man and a crown upon his head. 
It asserts his true relationship to Almighty God. 
He who possesses it drops the weakness of vacil- 
lating humanity, and appropriates the needful meas- 
ure of the strength of Omnipotence. ~ Doubt, hes- 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 435 


itation, illusions, obstacles, all. disappear before the 
realities that rise in grandeur before him. To him 
all things are possible. The sublime promises of 
God sound through his soul. Those promises inspire 
him to compass all the ends of his existence by im- 
proving himself, by elevating others, and by con- 
tributing his part to those holy examples, forces, 
and influences which are now operating throughout 
the moral universe. 3 

Any other view of this subject leaves man weak- 
ened by the delusions of his bewildering opinions 
of God and his discouraging conceptions of himself. 
Any other view leaves a man like Elijah cowering 
on Mount Horeb. But this view makes him as 
Elijah when, single-handed, he demanded of the 
people, ‘‘ How long halt ye between two opinions ?” 
and challenged hundreds of prophets in the name 
of the God who answers by fire. ‘‘No belief can 


Le) 


be illusory,’ said the great Isaac Taylor, ‘‘ which ts 
indispensable to the full development of the moral 
and the intellectual powers.’”’ But a belief that the 
certain foreknowledge of contingencies is impossible 
is, we affirm, indispensable to the fullest develop- 
ment of the soul of man. 

Let the conviction that no future choice of a free 
agent, while acting under the law of liberty, can be 
foreknown by Omniscience, that a future contingency 
can not be transformed into a past or present cer- 
tainty, seize the soul, and hold it firmly, and it will 
be inspired to control events and make for itself a 
becoming record amid the unfolding events of its end- 
less future. All its faculties will be summoned into 


436 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GoD. 


activity. No more will it experience the stupor 
which is induced by a belief in universal prescience. 
Such a soul will never take up the despairing wail of 
Shelley to the Father of us all: 
‘©Oh, wherefore hast thou made 
In mockery and wrath this evil earth!” 

That such is the potency of this conviction, all 
who have it will readily attest. A belief, then, that 
the future choices of free agents which entail end- 
less destiny can not be foreknown, is indispensable 
to those efforts which are required of a human soul 
on its probation for eternity. Now, is it possible 
that a doctrine can be false which is so necessary to 
a perfect discharge of imperative duties, to a com- 
plete development of the soul’s capacities, and to a 
full accomplishment of the sublime destiny for which 
it was evidently created? 

Let but the doctrine that God can not foresee 
the future choices of free spirits, while acting under 
the law of liberty, be universally embraced, and its 
cheer would sweep through Christendom like the 
health-giving light of the morning; it would largely si- 
lence dissensions between Christians upon non-essen- 
tials; it would turn attention, with new power and 
interest, to those great spiritual enterprises upon 
which the Church is invited and commanded to (exe) 
forth; it would hasten the grand successes that await 
her achievements,—indeed, it would inaugurate a 
succession of resplendent mornings to a world long 
wrapped in gloomy mists. Did every Christian be- 
lieve his future to be unknown, and did he reflect 
_ thereupon, how soon would he cease to shrink from 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 437 


responsibility and to leave God to do, in his own 
good time and way, works which he has positively 
assigned to man! How soon would he grasp the 
helm of affairs, and feel the pressure of responsibility 
urging him on to bold, heroic action! There is no 
view of this subject that can be presented which 
corresponds to the solemn realities of the soul’s free- 
dom, its accountability at a future tribunal, and its 
danger of everlasting punishment, except this—that 
the prevision of future free choices is an impossibility. 
The incognizability of future choices renders moral 
liberty and the liability to forfeit eternal life and to 
incur endless death as unquestionable as are primary 
truths and as vivid as the lightnings of heaven. In 
sin, redemption, and human freedom there are things 
awfully real. Prescience obscures these realities and 
the consequences now pendent upon free choices. 

Reader, do not employ yourself with delusive 
doubts, but fix your thoughts upon eternal verities. 
Ally yourself to the omnipotence of the Infinite. 
Skepticism has ever been the Circe of the soul. At 
her touch man loses the image of God and puts on 
the image of earthiness. But the truth as it is in 
Christ asserts our kinship to the Almighty, the Uni- 
versal Father. 

The views that have been presented in these 
pages not only remove many and great difficulties, 
and answer objections that can not otherwise be 
answered, but they also sustain most important rela- 
tions to human duties, experiences, and prospects. 
And yet, though no inspired teachings and no serious 
objections: against the positions herein advocated 


* 


438 THE FOREKNCWLEDGE OF GOD. 


have been found by the writer, many such may pos- 
sibly occur to other minds. Should this be the case 
it is to be hoped that such objections will be seri- 
ously and candidly weighed over against the appall- 
ing difficulties which are involved in the theory 
which this book has controverted. Also, let the 
statement of Dr. Whately be kept in mind, that 
“unanswerable arguments may often be adduced 
against propositions which are nevertheless true, and 
which are satisfactorily established by a preponder- 
ance of probabilities.”’ 

The question is not whether the denial of uni- 
versal prescience is not susceptible of some objec- 
tion, but whether the stubborn facts which every- 
where meet the philosopher and the theologian can 
not be more easily and satisfactorily explained upon 
the negation, than they can upon the affirmation, of 
absolute divine foreknowledge. We may meet with 
some facts that may, perhaps, worry our powers of 
comprehension, if we deny such prescience. But 
we shall encounter many more, and those of a most 
harassing and embarrassing character, if we affirm it. 
‘‘We live,” says Gladstone, ‘“‘in a labyrinth of prob- 
lems, and of moral problems, from which there is 
no escape permitted us. The prevalence of pain and 
sin, the limitations of free will, approximating some- 
times to its virtual extinction, the mysterious laws 
of interdependence, the indeterminateness for most 
men of the discipline of life, the cross purposes that 
_ Seem at so many points to traverse the dispensations 
of an Almighty benevolence, can only be encoun- 
tered by a large and almost immeasurable suspense 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 439 


of judgment. Solution for them we have none.” 
Of course, Mr. Gladstone has and can have no solu- 
tions for these great mysteries while embracing 
universal prescience of the illimitable future. But 
rejection of that dogma, with all which that dogma 
implies, permits explanations that are perfectly satis- 
isfactory of all the difficulties he here enumerates. 
The question for all to consider is, Which is the 
more free from difficulties, the affirmation or the 
denial of divine foreknowledge? 

It is not a mere speculative question which is 
here discussed. It is one of the most practical and 
important subjects that has ever enlisted the atten- 
tion of the human mind. The doctrine here accepted 
reveals new perfections of the Almighty, new modes 
of the divine procedure, new views of the divine 
existence, the freedom, the freshness, the fullness, 
and the variety of the divine life and experience. 
As it unfolds, it brings God out of the vast labyrinth 
of the incomprehensibles in which human creeds and 
dogmas have placed and bound him. It brings him 
from the cold, isolated sphere where men have dog- 
matically fixed him, into tender sympathy and fel- 
lowship with all who are seeking spiritual life and 
holiness. No one should controvert from mere love 
of contention or from pride of opinion or for mental 
gymnastics. But all may well inquire what harm to 
the spiritual interests of men, what inconsistency with 
revealed truth, what detriment to the kingdom of 
Christ, or what dishonor to God, the views here pre- 
sented can possibly produce. And let it never be 
forgotten that all our present orthodox theologies 


440 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


were formulated when imperfections in Psychology 
rendered impossible the conception of a consistent 
system of Biblical or systematic divinity. ‘Give 
me a young man in metaphysics, and I care not who 
has him in theology,” was the trenchant remark of 
Dr. Nathaniel Taylor. 

Prescience is not questioned by us because it is 
above reason, but because it seems to be against rea- 
son. The comprehensible is the sphere of logic, and 
through all her realms logic is a safe euide. But mys- 
tery being the domain of faith, faith gladly assents to 
that which is above and beyond reason. Human na- 
ture needs and God commands faith in mysteries and 
in the supernatural, but neither requires a man to out- 
rage his reason by believing absurdities. It is fatal 
to intellectual soundness, as well as to all thought- 
systems, to require faith to embrace any proposition 
that violates the law which reason enacts against self- 
contradictions. 

We question prescience, because it assaults our 
intuitions, our primary ideas, and our fundamental 
laws of belief; because it antagonizes the doctrine 
and law of freedom, and impairs our capacity for the 
high duties and achievements of probation. Its 
assumption brings incertitude and unreality and unac- 
countability into our views of human freedom, moral 
liberty and divine government, and_ lessens the 
force of the teachings of the Word of God, which 
else would be ‘quick and powerful, and sharper than 
any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing 
asunder of soul and spirit.” 

We question prescience, because it is unnecessary 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 441 


in the divine government over free agents, and need- 
less to the establishment of a true and consistent 
theology; because its affirmation necessitates mani- 
fest contradictions in the Scriptures and unworthy 
explanations of the teachings of those Scriptures; 
because its rejection would rescue scholars from 
wasting time and talents in defending and explain- 
ing inconsistencies; because every pulpit in Chris- 
tendom assumes that, as matter of fact, the future, 
in the nature of things, in the plans of the universe, 
and in the mind of Jehovah, is not now a fixity; 
because every Christian assumes that the destiny of 
each sinner whom he seeks to save is not now inevi- 
table; and because the Church, in her every enter- 
prise, assumes that relative to future contingencies 
there can now be no absolute certainty. We ques- 
tion prescience, because it necessitates limitations in 
the divine nature, denies to God motion, change, 
succession, and personality, renders him unable to 
cognize events as they really are, debars him from all 
personal and direct participation in the affairs of the 
human race, robs him of his liberty, and prohibits 
his active co-operation in the history, development, 
and government of his universe. And that it does 
thus so rob him is apparent, for he never can exercise 
any personal liberty relative to events that are inevi- 
table and unchangeably foreknown. Foreknowledge 
imposes upon him a necessity which annihilates his 
freedom. Never could he change, determine, adapt, 
or originate a single event, object, or volition in all 
the future unfoldings and progressions of eternity. 
How much more worthy is such a view of the divine 


442 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


nature and freedom as recognizes God, untrammeled 
by foreknown futuritions, exercising at will, through 
the cycles of eternity past and the eternity to come, 
his free, creative, boundless energies, and interesting 
himself in originating resplendent worlds, which at 
their creation were, it may be, recent in his con- 
ceptions, purposes, and plans. But the denial of 
absolute prescience enables us to see God with sub- 
lime impressiveness, as a person with all the affluence 
and opulence of his perfections in his varied relations 
to, and in his spontaneous Fatherly intercourse with, 
individual men and the entire human fainily. 

We question absolute prescience, because we can 
but deny that an Infinite Being, all sufficient in him- 
self and ineffably happy, could rightfully create an 
individual soul with limited capacities who he fore- 
knows would choose to make itself sinful, degraded, 
and everlastingly wretched. Regard for that part of 
his own eternal happiness which springs from his pa- 
rental relations, regard for the happiness of all holy 
beings in all worlds and cycles, regard for the char- 
acter and welfare of his moral universe, regard for 
the shining attribute of benevolence, and regard for 
the poor foreknown culprit himself, all imperatively 
demand that the coming of such a one into exist- 
ence should be prevented. 

Finally, we question prescience, because its as- 
sumption renders the great problem of the conflict 
between freedom and necessity incapable of solution. 
Against the doctrine of necessity consciousness pro- 
tests with unmistakable vehemence. And if pre- 
science be assumed, then reason protests against the 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: 443 


doctrine of freedom. Nothing but the doctrine that 
prescience of future contingencies involves self-con- 
tradiction, can ever save us from Supralapsarian- 
ism, and from the logic of the adverse thinkers now 
boldly and defiantly bearing down upon us. The 
acceptance of this doctrine makes all serene as 
cloudless skies, but its denial makes the admission 
of fatality simply inevitable. 

Make effort to grasp the interminable years of 
eternity ; count stars, then leaves, then sands, and to 
all these add the countless particles of matter in the 
solar system, and still all this vast aggregation of 
numbers is as nothing in comparison with the ages 
of eternity which are yet to follow. How the mind 
staggers in its effort to conceive of such innumerable 
cycles! And now, if God’s present and eternal plan 
includes every future choice of every free being; if 
his plan requires that choice ever after to operate 
as a working factor; if it requires it as a second 
cause producing forever its legitimate and inevitable 
results; and if it requires it as a reason or motive op- 
erating forever after upon the freedom of other free 
agents, testing their loyalty to truth and authority 
through the endless ramifications incident to the ac- 
complishment of God's manifold purposes; and if 
without it his purposes would fail of accomplish- 
ment—then most assuredly justice as well as good 
sense demand that with the Supralapsarian we over- 
look the seeming contingency that is implied in crea- 
ture freedom and locate the origin of the divine plan, 
embracing all the agencies through which it is to be 
carried on, ad zzfinitum, in the wisdom, intention, will, 


444 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


and decree of the Infinite Sovereign. But how pre- 
posterous the thought that a foreknown free act of 
mine, of which ten thousand times ten thousand 
things are this moment: predicated, and to which as 
many influences upon and in the mental and moral 
realms are this moment definitely assigned in the 
divine purposes, could ever fail to be one of the in- 
dispensable instrumentalities needed in the evolution 
of infinite and eternal plans. It is more reasonable 
to believe that the infinitesimal is constrained, than 
that the infinitesimal in its contingency could infract 
the infinite, the irrevocable, and the eternal. 

And now, in view of all that has been advanced in 
these pages against the dogma of divine foreknow]l- 
edge; and, morover, in view of the little that has 
ever been adduced in its support, save mere dogmatic 
assertion, the question presents itself, Which is the 
more probable, the affirmation or the negation of 
universal absolute prescience? I gladly embrace the 
negative, because it relieves me from calling that 
certain which God determined should be contingent. 
The qualities of a future free choice being possibility 
and contingency, we can not incorporate into it cer- 
tainty without eliminating an essential quality and 
making it something essentially different. A future 
free choice is not a self-evident truth; not a necessary 
truth bound up in the necessities of things; not an 
intuitive truth that can be intuited by any intelli- 
gence; and not a logical truth, for there exist no 
data or premises from which it can be inferred. 
Should that future choice ever come to pass it will be 
a purely contingent event. The cause of that event 


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 445 


can have no possible existence in any antecedent 
causes. Its cause can never exist until the moment 
the free spirit, acting under the law of liberty, causes 
the coming to pass of that event. ‘A contingent 
event,” says Dr. L. P. Hickok, ‘has an alternative, 
and is avoidable. It comes with a touch. It hangs 
in suspense, and a voluntary touch determines it.” 
The free spirit of man, that was created in the image 
of God, also creates its choice of holiness or of sin- 
fulness. If a free accountable spirit can not create 
its choices of moral character, then the sublime at- 
tribute of freedom in the Creator has no repre- 
sentative in man or on earth. That future choice of 
holiness or of sinfulness is, therefore, a thing now 
wholly undetermined, and hence an unknowable 
thing. And being an unknowable thing, its pre- 
science involves an absurdity, and hence ignorance 
thereof necessitates no imperfection in Deity. 

I embrace the negative because it alone safe- 
guards the doctrine of eternal punishment. A denial 
of that revealed truth depletes the Bible of its mean- 
ing and the Church of her sacrifices. If annihilation 
be true, or if the consequences of sin be not eternal, 
the incarnation was an empty pageant. In either case 
the mighty scheme of evangelization would cease to 
task the energies of heaven and earth. No man really 
loves Jesus Christ, no man denies self and follows | 
him with single aim and prime purpose, who does 
not believe eternal penalties follow the violations of 
the divine law. No man will imitate his suffering 


Lord, ascend his cross, and in some way be crucified 
38 


446 THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 


for the world, who does not believe that sin separates 
a soul eternally from its Creator. 

I embrace the negative because it implies no im- 
perfection in omniscience; because it makes possible 
a theology without absurdities; because it affords 
relief from the limitations and contradictions which 
the affirmative imposes upon the divine nature and 
the modes of the divine existence; because it ascribes 
righteousness to my Maker and vindicates him from 
misrepresentation. And, finally, I embrace the neg-- 
ative because a denial of foreknowledge of future 
contingencies is essential to the perfection of the 
nature of God, and to his perfection as a moral gov- 
ernor over accountable creatures; because this denial 
affords us new and glorious conceptions of God’s sub- 
jective and continuous life; and because it is a steady 
luminary, lighting us to a deeper, higher, broader 
acquaintance with him ‘‘whom we can never know 
to perfection, and whose ways are forever past find- 
ing out.” 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 
BERAMAM. covenant with, . /:0 wl Shee NG Saree aoe Bo 


Absurdity, the, of divine prescience of an event as both con- 

fingent and certain, PRE aad oe Badr ete an at 300, 4307 
Absolute, the, defined,. . . . . AY yt. ae ZO 
Accountability, the sense of, Weuceieed % pehete in foreknowl- 

CU ese | bet ls Se aeeias gatas) ko phew AOOLO 
Agassiz, on ene ee Gods Be ee Jeers GaGa hye 
Agents, free, often used in Reema chine God's purposes, 81; 

rights of, 352; infringed by foreknowledge, 353; the ex- 

istence of, necessitates trial, 376; the trial of, necessitated 

the non-interference of God with their free choices,. . . 376 


Aim, the, of the author,. .. . : efi, Si aa ee OO SE 
Alexander, case of, ettrate the re Ar constraining AO 
PMexandewalaeWe, Ons bsalm  xXxiife.)) fk sau, Absa eta 12S 
PCr ean gquoted ng... |. 4. ss 116, i “ele 129, 148 
Ammon, Sem ea Oats te Dee mi: 5Oas 
Analogies, the, iced the adits Ana he Infinite, ae: at. 
ford no data for believing in absolute prescience,. . . 396-7 
Analogy, supposed, between necessary and free events, . . 409, 410 
Andrews, Dr., on the incompatibility of foreknowledge with 
ipeedomeaae «oo. 18 
Angels, fallen, their fall BE auly Hfareseens ie home sent 
fo) persuade*menitorbe saved, .°. . <.. sok 302 
Annihilation, the, of the dieabadient inconsistent arith hai 
lence, 377; inconsistent with the incarnation,. . . . . 445 
ppostasy clinhility to. ofemeod amen, os, ts sky mw ee ROO 


matinas; Licouas, hissdefinition of eternity, 35. f2 0S... . 384 
Argument, the, of Edwards, on necessity of foreknown events, 
POGaOtmny nMedon. iy reply a, aaedy teks shes 300 
Arminians, their view of free will, 18; saint oan: in God’s 
plans, 178; their view of contingencies, 194; their denial 
of influence of foreknowledge on volitions,. . .... . 409 
Aristoule lis wie. ots thea nfinise sti. S GA okies. teks ayes & 5209 


447 


448 INDEX. 


PAGE, 


Atonement, provided for, in view of possibility of fall, 147; 


shows» the’exceeding'sinfulnesstofsiny.. 25. 2°. eee 
Authority, our own, reliance on, unsupported by divine revela- 
tion Jeads to error, } ©: ees, Ms) Coe 
Autology, the, of Hamilton miotenne Pon rae > ates reese 
Avoidability, the, of sin taught in the Word of God and im- 
pliedsin.strivings.ob the; spirit; ,. 20.) By wee, ee 
BARNES, ALBERT, on sin and suffering, 18; on **That it might 
be fulfilled )??-.. .4.0¢ we antes ET IMS ae ee 
Beecher, fetey Winn on daube Ae OU Eee eee 


Belief, ae hcenable to require it without SmAcice, 217; affects 
character, 413; in foreknowledge weakens will power, 


400, 413, 416; diminishes human energy,. . .... 401, 
Benevolence, divine, requirements of, et tS 2a 
Bethsaida and Chorazin, denunciation of, Aas 
Bible, the, Calvinistic in providence, Arminian in grace, 80 ; 

itanslation of Calyinistiesey ti hosel ee 
Bibliotheca Sacra, quoted, . . . . . : ree 
Bledsoe, Dr., his reply to Martin thee: ee on indifferent 

actions, 243; on axiomatic necessity distinguished from 
causal 4, 6. oie RUS i: Dele mie i ee 
Bloomfield, Dr., on ‘that it might be fulfilled,” 120; on Acts 

a OP e eM ae tr) tre Pances 1g eyts, OA Oe Ne ee 
Boethius, his definition af elernity,, . va. ° 4.) 2471. eee 
Boswell; his remarkito Dry Johnsonyh 2) 016) Ge ee 
Buchanan, Dr., on the cause of answers to prayer,. ... . 
Bushnell, Dr., on God’s intuition of future events, . . . : 
Butler, Bishop! on fitness and unfitness in moral action dele 

mining the divine conduct, 200; on endless connections 

of events, 316; on pian tee as a rule for the conduct 

Of glifes stem ae : oS. A BES pain 
CALVIN, JOHN, on enaeuet in God's Godino’ a gL ah pets os 
Calvinism, denies contingencies, 194, 197; the, of Wilbur Fisk, 
Campbell, Dr., on the non-prescience of contingencies, : 
Catholicism, tendency off 20il! Wik sir ee eee 
Causes, no infinite series: Of 7 et. oak ee 


Causation, physical, differs from voluntary action, 32; power 
of resides in the will, 


. . 


Certainty, subjective and objective,. ..... Laeae | are 


Chalmers, Thomas, on evils of non-prescience, ed 182; con- 
cedes impossibility of foreknowledge of free pnaieen 183; 


292 


397 
197 


349 


127 
20 


417 
364 
146 


140 
425 


315 


131 
384 
309 
404 
393 


370 
179 
315 
318, 
83 
251 


324 
340 


———— ee 


—— 


INDEX. 449 


PAGE, 
on the knowable and unknowable, 241; on certainty of 


foreknown events, 344; on difficulties in relation to prayer, 405 
Changes in God’s feelings and purposes, 178; taught by Ar- 
Paaneomndebyesoriphuresys .si-yirte.dcl as tave geet * Ls 
Character, the previous, does not warrant certainty of future vo- _ 
De Rte oe ds eS edie cee 5 nly cquedee ALO 
Charnock, on Peter, 91; on God's foreknowledge of the fall, 
160, 171; on precariousness involved in non-prescience, 
175; on the irreconcilability of freedom with foreknowl- 
Ree ee Lea ole Cac siele Mil fy, 4.79 geen a5, ays vin cde 387 
Choices, alternative, excluded by foreknowledge, 225; God’s, 
unforeknown before determined, 250; contingent to us, 
BECOME NGO (Od See SP hre ain e Conmaie brie ads ig 4 oo ees 305 
Christians, required to work for salvation of all, 361-2; apos- 
tasy of, more probable than the fall, . ‘ iSite 281 
Christ, his death, foreordained after the fall, 101; foretold in 
the Scriptures, 103; instruments of, not foreordained, 105 ; 
their conduct contingent and avoidable, 113; his efforts 
to reclaim Judas, 116, 415; his prophecy of persecutions 
pep ise lise (lesexplaitieds i), ca Scere: boris «ad gm weed 14! 
Church, the, necessary to the salvation of the world,. ... 367 
Cicero, his denial of foreknowledge, 308; quoted, 421; on 
TINE See 2 Ok ae ne eer a 407 
Clarke, Samuel, on difficulty of conceiving how God could 
foreknow, 2143; on certainty of uniform actions, . . . 2875-330 
Clarke, Adam, quoted, 125, 128; on God’s optional non-pre- 
Sprencerors corlngentheventsyiaadcs Qi eg }e Slr e218, 219 
Sale igi e nro Leche yeu Saeiectle ly s-je: Nei we le} vedi acted sda lle Cath 250 
SONY er eel GIvCRI ie LUNA FIC OF FG res x oe,/02- shh oe sap Gu ommaetente® govayehl 42 
CSO ae mPe OMEN GIIION Wiles. op vict . sd taco tfeleeve tar cen | 332 
SCOPE Ce CCOR NE Ole DANI EE Me. fe 6 hon a= Bove afl edna S 27.95' 250 
Connection, necessary, between an event and foreknowledge of it, 300 
Consciousness, the best proof of freedom,. . ....% 6. 424 
Constraint, necessary to execution of purposes of Providence, . 423 
Contingency, definition of, 296; objective implies subjective, 
298; of acts divine and human, 299; incompatible with 
certain prescience, 302, 303; the basis of God’s administra- 
tion over man, 306; a self-evident, a contradiction, . . . 394 
Contingencies, absurdities involved in denial of,. . .. . . 200 
Contradictions, unreconcilability ofc sic. aes sae 368, 360 
Contradiction, involved in an antecedent certainty of contin- 
pets ae. Poe.) Abie a ba es, ee ee 335 


450 INDEX. 


Cousin, on the origin of the idea of cause,. . .....-.+. 410 

Cowley; his definition of eternity, 7 WO) Si. en He ee ae 

Creation, involves new experiences in the aivine hina 236; 
involves obligation to care for, 255; no certainty of in God’s 
mind before his purpose to create, 340; the, of free agents 
necessary to the perfection of the universe, 373, 374; God’s 
regret_of, caused by unforeknown sin, . .. . . . . .°. 379 


Crucifixion, the, not essential to the atonement,. . . . . . 135-8 
Cruelty, the, of creating beings whose eternal misery is fore- 
known, te. Se ie POD) OE Ae OS a Oe 
Cyrus, case of, ‘fueneales the 1a sf constraint,-s 1 29h ye Sige 
DEGREE, the, of influence of motives daterititied hy the will, . 428 
Delitzsch, his definition of eternity,. ... oe Se 


Denial, the, of absolute foreknowledge jenente) tre gives dif- 
ferent and clear views of prayer, probation, theology, and 
freedom, 430-3; Harmonizes theology with true philoso- 
phy, 4333; stimulates exertion, 433-5; gives greater effi- 
cience to character, 435-7; affords more satisfactory expla- 
nation of facts, 438; gives. new and more satisfactory 
views of God, 439; more reasonable than the affirmation, 
444; safeguards doctrine of eternal punishment, 445; con- 
sistent with the perfection of Omniscience, Aa and essen- 


tialkto the divine’ perfeetionsya, 22% ).<'< FPL ea 
Diabolusy iy Fagg) te OP GPR, 5 EN LN LE ELO, ye 
Diapram,.. +. =. : : 3; nee TS eh 34 
DickoDr. atte on “God? s non-prescience sithGat accreted) 198% 

on unavoidability of foreseen volitions,. .. . PT ATS 


Distinction, between venewed sinning and zew sinning, nse be- 
tween the nature and happening of an event, 304; between 
absurdity and mystery, 307, 308; between the action of 
free will and the movement of a material force, 322; be- 
tween true and complete knowledge, 276, 277; between 
causal and factal necessity, 315, 316; between antecedents 
and precedents of a volition, 322-4; testing and making 
character, 427; to influence and to determine,. . .. . 428 

Duration, definitionof sep vee er, LE BORNE) ee ee ae 

Dwight, Dr., on pedals PPE SES SPY WRT ES TS a ee 

ECBATIG; sense sof!" that 2s PR Wer Pipe 

Edwards, Jonathan, on eiungee in God's alias qivelved's in non- 
prescience, 177; on the necessity of decrees to foreknowl- 
edge, 197; hypothesis of, 393; illustrates impossibility of 
foreknowledge, <a 9 SoA eS AMAR on Soa ee 


INDEX. 451 


PAGE. 

Election and reprobation not taught By Bane. AGG ». 23 
Embarrassment of God’s efforts to %ave beds he Pens 

will be lost, A eee aug : eae det 


Eternity, eonceived by many as a ahs 248 ; Begnition Gl. 383 
Euler, on answers to prayer provided for in the course of na- 
PREG EP FDL en hi apa Me ree ees AX ; eh 406 
Events, bound up in existing causes, Preion able. 2873 3 neces- 
sary, are not contingent, 297; contingent, or not certain 
HErOTehands) wto.t Vapi eh, nsA ae weseater. oo, 2 Tn 3 37 
Evil, moral, introduction of, 285 ; fees on moral freedom, 
286; sufficiently explained by causal power of human 
will, 292; not, therefore, an ‘inscrutable Mystery,’ Sea -205 
Evils of non-prescience imaginary and preventable, . . . Pit 184. 


Hixerects Of eAetsris 16)... Nex ; : 129 
Exigencies, God's anne to meet hem es moment they arise, - 
176; the evidence of perfections of his character,. . . 185 


Existence, the, of God, subjective and objective, 2555 Bbiege 
ive necessarily contingent, 260; can not be inferred in- 
ductively nor deductively, . . . . 4.263 
FALLAcY, the, of doctrine that poet ried fs no nainitienee 
vu*volitions, 409; of locating the incipiency of volitions 
inrouyccrverppcotsieat Men eis 25) aoathene Ly oat 423 
Fatalism, prevalence of, paralyzes energy, 170, 172; results 
from universal prescience, 231; belief of, prevents any dis- 
tuct idea of freedom, ...- i. Hat > 432 
Fate, the, of man, in his own hands a mh rcknewebis 336 
Finney, Dr., on ee 197; on ‘‘the eternal now” of God, . 224 
Fiske, Dr., on non-prescience of contingencies, 197; on fore- 
knowledge, a non-essential attribute of God,. . . ... . 228 
Fisk, Dr. Wilbur, on immutability of God’s plans,. .°. . . 318 
Foreknowledge, absolute, the doctrine of, 82; occasions per- 
plexity, 23, 430; encourages infidelity, 23, 25; paralyzes 
energy, 23, 82, 353, 400; retards the Gospel, 23, 85, 430; 
assumed without question or investigation, 25; incompati- 
ble with a tenable theodicy, 24, 25, 365, 366; involves 
constraint of instruments, 73-6; not necessary to the sta- 
bility of divine government, 186, 187, 440; nor to the 
divine perfections, 185-8, 446; nor to faith in fundamental 
doctrines, 189; but detracts from the divine perfections, 
184, 210, 244; by preventing any variety in God’s con- 
sciousness and action, 211%, 213; limits God to one eter- 
nally preconceived place, 225, 226; excludes all contin- 


452 INDEX. 


PAGE. 


gency, 287, 288, 289, 301, 304; incompatible with human 
freedom, 310, 440, 442, 443; involves certainty and una- 

’ voidability of human choices, 340, 341, 342, 343, 348, and 
renders the teachings of God’s Word and spirit mislead- 
ing, 349, 350; conflicts with rights of creature and crea- 
tor, 352-8; makes God inconsistent, 359, 363; detracts 
from the divine benevolence, 364, 442; inconsistent with 
the intellectual perfections of God, 392-8; belief in, de- 
presses the energies of the soul, 399, 4303 is inconsistent 
with availing prayer, 402; involves conflicting emotions in 
mind of God, 389; its influence on Sir William Hamilton, 
426; does violence to our reason and intuitions, 440; is in 
conflict with the Bible, 359, 440, 441; involves belief in 
necessity, 443, 4443; renders impossible a consistent system 
Of theology. ecace sob Bt. Becarites fuse. ae Leae a 

Foreknowledge, the, of God, requires coneiraint of instru- 
ments, 73; and foreordination, 76; Calvinistic views of, 
197; mode of incomprehensible, 214; would prevent ap- 
propriate feelings in mind of God, 


Foreordination, the doctrine of, represses human energy, . 339, 400 


Freedom, definition of, 34, 35; lost by the fall, regained» by 
the atonement, 33; may be lost again by incorrigibility, 
38; necessary to a satisfactory theodicy, 290; involves 
liability to fall, 372; belief in stimulates human effort, 403, 
(GEDHSEMANE, «J+ e: S-. oe cur ae ee oh styl Oe 
Gladstone, Mr., on the ecaieable sees surrounding 


432 


382 


409 
103 


11S, feeruscaryct Welte boaciys Pusenh dat beset ig ea eh aed eet 
Glory, kingdom of, ruled by will of God,. ... ++ ++. 58 
Goulburn, on Peter, 92) «las wens (actis. lousy eee 2) ei ee 
Goodness, in God, the same in kind as in man, . Yeu tek zoe 
Grace, free, kingdom of, ruled by law of liberty, 55; preve- 

nient, consistent with freedom,..... . sxc a4 gt Ole oe 


Gregory, Dr., on the reason of God’s foreknowledge, 3393 
quoted? <3). 06 : Meus Iyeviete A aes 
Grief, the, of God, in erelaine inst misery of the lost, 
HAMILTON, on inconceivability of moral evil, 294; on inability 
to know God, 262, 269, 272; on necessity of believing in 
him, 262; on the Infinite, the absolute, and the uncondi- 
tioned, 266; source of his contradictions, 274; on thought 
as a comparison, 392; on the evidence of the freedom of 
the will, 424; on inconceivability of either necessity or 
freedom;!s <1 *e bam sheers kee oobd Gaul e ee epee 


425 
357 


» 427 


INDEX. 453 


PAGE, 
Happiness, the, of God, may be increased or decreased by his 
PES EE ie, = PON 2.0 ors yong 
Hazael, the case of, considered, 95; his conduct foretold by 
inspiration of Elisha, 96; God’s knowledge of his char- 
acter and opportunities the basis of the prophecy, 2k, 97 
Herschel, Sir John, on human consciousness of causation, . . 332 
Hickok, L. P., quoted, 325, 445; on the capacity of willing, . 429 
Hickok, i. Oe CWO etme y eon ohne hays. . orn teed 
Hodge, Dr., on precariousness involved in non-prescience, 174; 
questions God’s ability to meet emergencies, 175; on con- 
tingency inconsistent with foreknowledge, 198; on in- 
crease of God’s knowledge involved in non-prescience, . 246 
Hume, David, remark of, . . pire Maker gt rig tue” Gre 2 6G 
INCARNATION, of Christ, necessary to the revelation of God, . 254 
Incipiency, the, of free and consenting volitions, 38; the 
former subjective only, 38, 423; the latter objective, . 38, 423 
Infinite, the, definition of, 268; the perfection of, does not re- 
quire the creation of the finite, 228; can reveal himself to 
men, 255, 256; yet incomprehensible, 257; must be as- 
sumed to explain the finite, 264; intuitively suggested by 
the finite, 268; known in some points of resemblance to 
the finite, 275; can not be completely known by men, 
276; but may be truly known, in part, by his relations to 
ee eee ee Pel! of) A Re one 
Influence, the, of motives on ne one anes 9 tae be eeeeaee By 428 
Influences, good or evil, of free choices,. ....... ~ « 346 
Initiation, the, God’s power of, 226, 233, 234, 238, 239, neces- 
sary to creation, 225, 233, 238; the denial of, makes him 
a necessitated being, 228, 230, 231, 232; and limits his 
BIC PRCC CHING, Udy, he peraica ee cl tah Ale On Si ett Ed - 233, 239 
Instincts, theology of, often more sound than theology of intel- 
PC ie ee Sorin. ot MINT see aie” 24 
Instruments, providential, variety of, 63; may be constrained, 73 
Intellect, the human, acts under the law of cause and effect) 426 
Intuitions, our, of God, 268, 269; human limits of, 393; di- 
Baliemclimits | Of aeas 55 ps wake ese octet Ueeees Tata. Vnrad 393 
PERO RU A aAUOted, mike ryt oks. site Ae ghee get yng inilged 284 
Jamieson, Dr., on God’s non-prescience of his own choices, 
Poecnon sameness, of; God's: vOltOns,r. «sand on cadet eke 223 
Me eet Ake R Ut Naty eg Ail sche wigs cn Sep aah allay ci LAO PEOT 
Johnson, Samuel, on theory and experience of freedom, 17; 
on incompatibility of foreknowledge with freedom, . . . 58 


39 


454 INDEX. 


PAGE, 


Judas, chosen in good faith for a good work, 99, 115; chosen 
when his crime was not foreseen, 100; his betrayal of 
Christ not essential to the atonement, 101; nor in the 
original plan, 113; nor alluded to in Old Testament, 132; 
unforeseen until its incipiency in his mind was perceived 
by : Christ 002. Reay2pMracanes Patan, How LA ae 

Kant, ‘*Must believe in, but can not know the Infinites? 2 

Kingdoms, of providence and grace, distinct, 78; of nature 
and providence, distinct,. .. . as ; a A 

Knowledge of God, the Christian’s, red and busta oreayd her 

Knowledge, a, of future free choices of free beings on the part 
of God, antecedent to his determination to create them, 
an impossibility, 227, 247; and an absurdity, 247; there- 
fore, not necessary to the perfection of omniscience, . 228, 

Knowledge, God’s, of the objective can not be infinite, 248; 
may be increased, as he originate new plans, 249; may 
be increased by his creatures,. .. . se eo ht aa 

LANGE, on Psalm xxii, 129; on Acts 1, 16,. . oat 

Laws,4 necessary, 222%. ene Rare AN ae. POOP Ree ae Ea 

Leibnitz, on immediate Vndilalee of: God ashy (22. OF ae 

Liability to sin necessary to the achievement of charac- 
CODNE. Vales HSS A rengere et oes e's DY Fi SRP ae 

Limitations of God, superimposed, 200, 201, 297; self-imposed, 
206, 207, 208, 209; imply no imperfection, 202, 203, 204; 
involved in his creation of man in his own image, 205, 
z06; refusal to acknowledge them prevents any consistent 
sciencerol: Gad; fe 22 Oot ee 

Locke, John, on evidences of God in Fenian nature, sy Se 

Luther, Martin, his denial of foreknowledge of free acts, . . 

MAHAN, Dr., his definition of absurdity and mystery, 307, 
308; on existence of God inferable from nature,... . 

Man, largely under the law of cause and effect,. .°. . ., . 

Mansel, on necessity of believing in the existence of God, 262; 
his views of the Infinite, the absolute and the uncondi- 
tioned, 266; on inability to know the Infinite, 270; his 
inconsistency in requiring faith in an irrational concep- 
tion, 275; his view of the goodness of God arising from 
the dogma of absolute foreknowledge, 282; his denial of 
that: dogma:in-reply"te “Angustine;, WF len 2 6) teas 

Martensen, on eternal necessity implied in forékiowledee’ 

M’Cosh, Dr., on our conception of the unconditioned, 273; on 
incompatibility of certainty and contingency, 309; on the 


114 


aoe 
263 
319 


263 
32 


284 
221 


INDEX. 


455 


PAGE, 


difficulty of reconciling foreknowledge with freedom, 3109, 
418; on the true determining cause of volitions, 326, 327; 
on will as under the law of cause and effect, 327, 328; on 
the incompatibility of these positions, 328; on equally 
irreconcilable views of libertarians, 330; on the causal 
influence of antecedent circumstances, . : 
Mill, James, on theodicy of foreknowledge of endlast pun- 
eitbent 25; on effects of necessity and free will on hu- 
man energy, SURGE APs Mears Hehe ges genes Cae 5 spate 
Mill, J. S., unthinkables ae EAC QName AGS wee! oes SRR ES 
Milton, Johry, MUOLEES AE Meith ACs hes eed ayo hen ri gi, 42a, 
Miracle, a suspension, control, or counteraction of material 
laws, 26; implies the uniformity of law, ru ‘ 
Modes, the, Of preventing the introduction of sin into ine 
world, 
Morse, Professor, Perils We Ph cutee timer ee 
Motives are not causes, 293, 427; never coercive, 323; ieee 
necessary to the moral a of actions, 333; necessary 
tests of loyalty, . 


° ° ° . ° ° e ° . ° 


° 


Miller, Julius, on God’s. recognition a succession in time, 
320; his definition of eternity, 384; on limitation of fore- 
knowledge by freedom, 412; on impossibility of deter- 
mining from previous character what future choices will be, 

MutabilitysthegomGod,ais. a. ° Bw Tia teehee 

NAPOLEON, an instrument at Bic dencss 78 ; een afi 

Nations, God’s providential purposes pa them, 142; 


419 


408 
368 
222 


56 
376 


42 


427 


420 
258 
164 


Metodss Oldispiplinine cthemiyisiieh iy, 40 He. PER V4 4-6 


Nature, kingdom of, governed by uniform ines; at esos st acsterte 
Necessity, universal, based on assumption of universal pre- 
science, 231; doctrine of, false and pernicious, 2313 re- 
presses human energy, 399; source of Edwards’s belief 
OlwA22s slOvicaLeoteaniarexnown) eventerdniic.'. nih 4 
Mecessiy, ene, of, clhiangesnin Gods. Haeisro) eee! ewer 
Nineveh, repentance of, changed God’s purpose,...... 
Nonentity, a, foreknowledge of impossible;. . . . . ..8 .% 
Non-prescience, constantly assumed in the Bible, 28, 29; and 
in God’s treatment of men, 192; of free choices a self- 
imposed, limitationvefyOmniscience, |se'or ei. s8 aks ests 
Novelty, God’s capacity for, and delight in, 244, 245; gives 
endless variety of expression and action, 245, 246; denial 
Gf limitselisi perfectionsy 10).".\y Jesh 2 SRE. 246, 


55 


341 
388 
© fe) 


54 


203 


247 


. 


456 INDEX. 


PAGE, 


Occasions, the, of volition, 410, 411; furnish the arena for 
achievement of moral character, 411; afford no ground for 
Certainty, 290/404 A. neem ate ep nae ee 

Olshausen,’on Matt. xxyitjus eee ee Larva Pee ta. : 

Omnipotence, self-imposed limitation oh 20152202;, rimieed by 
the : possible, » 1s js ciuetehedeh powelis (eater: lan Aaa 

Omnipresence of God incomprehensible ..... sgt 

Omniscience, self-imposed limitations of, 203, 204; jimi teal by 
the uowable, 216, 227; imperfect views of, 223; the per- 
fection of, does not require absolute foreknowledge, 227, 
228; implies a knowledge of all that 7s, 241; can foresee 
tests/of, but not:choices:of free will, 7. Serre) ae ee 

PARSONS, THEOPHILUS, no freedom if acts certain,. .... 

Paralogisms in reasoning, . .. . I Pee ee 

Paul, St., his definite conceptions & God, «fe te be dy Pee 

Barplevinge arising from fallacious reasoning,. ....... 

Personality, the, of God, intuitively perceived, 268, 269; con- 
ception of, necessary to explain existence of the finite, 276; 
essential to theism, 272; proved by the fact that he thinks, 

Peter, his fall foretold by Savior, 86; his defects of character, 
87; needed discipline, 88; subjected to excessive tempta- 
tions, 89; his character less vile than his act,. . ... 

Philosophers, German, their views of the Infinite,. . ... 

Plans of God, the variety of, 242-4; two kinds, namely, sov- 

ereign and contingent, 179; the sovereign, are absolute 

and unchangeable, 179; the contingent are changeable, 

64, 178; results of, uncertain, 65; men may frustrate or 

compel their modification, 66-73; fulfillment of, does not 

require foreknowledge of free choices, 311, 3123 flexibility 
of, necessary to freedom, . .. . P PTSR. yee 

Positiveness, the, of the Christian’s igiowieuiee of God, . 278, 

Possibilities foreknowable only as such, . ... . 2. 1. es 

Possibility versus the probability of the fall,. . . . . . 380, 

Porter, Noah, on necessity of assuming existence of God, 265; 
quoted... 2s 5 ae gee ‘ Mic aa 

Prayer implies non-prescience of fie Bettens 187, 2213 caus- 
ality of, questioned by M’Cosh, 405; definition of, 

Predictions, many, fulfilled by constraint of will, <cteete 

Prescience, universal, absurdity of, 289, 290; eae ees of, 
causes all the perplexity concerning the origin of evil, 
292; denial of makes origin of evil explicable, 295; sub- 
jects the mind to the Jaw of cause and effect, 


° ° e 


412 
127 


216 
214 


90 
264 


316 
279 
250 
381 
272 


408 
151 


333 


INDEX. 


457 


PAGE, 


Prescience, certain, involves deriainty of the event, 309, 316; 
annihilates the distinction between liberty and the law of 
cause and effect, eae the, of an event involves logical 
nécessity, /0% ; SP iva a Pei se ts) S40, 

Probabilities, God’s estimate Te rghit 2 eee 

Probability, the stronger, a ground of helief: ae aon a basis 
of accurate judgment of future conduct in most cases, 
154; but not the basis of absolute prescience, 156, 159, 
412; but man’s estimate of, not to be relied on when large 
interests are involved, ee AYES Rees 

Prophecy, a supersedure of law of fended on 433 ae contin- 
gencies impossible, 50-3; of Moses concerning corruption 
of Jews explained,. . . FON AS 

Providence, kingdom of, cated ie ert = een a 7; object 
of, 56; instruments of, frequently constrained, 59; gen- 
eral, embraces God’s predetermined plans, 190; special, re- 
quired by contingency of human volitions, 190; implies 
that God is equal to unforeseen contingencies, 

Psychology, early imperfections of, . : Reis = 

Punishment, the, of the disobedient an administrative necessity, 

Pep seommyeliteh tec aess. Ofc. 5. fev eo le oe ek 

Redeemer, work of, in relation to the w ill, 

Resurrection, doctrine of, ..... SY thane OSE Set ES vias 

Revelation, impossible without apaates Rais ee bi 

Review, Princeton, on new truths discoverable in Bible, . 

Robinson, Dr. Edward, on ecbatic sense of ‘‘that,” . : 

Rothe, Richard, his place among speculative divines, 220; his 
denial of evalatinseahe Oly frcetactionsfe were aloge 

SATAN, divine use of, in case of Peter, 89; in case e Job, os ; 
in case of Abimelech and men of Shechem, ©3; in case 
of Saul and Absalom, 94; his fall probably unforeseen . 

~amelermacher, 7 pis? definition |of elernity, <<. 4 «| an ae 

Sensibilities, the, under the Jaw of cause and effect,. . ... 

milelley, Quoted sys ant wth <8: Pra ir rkr oem riete) ober tei be 

Sin, origin of, 292; necesien eal Stare bi, | tetipiat 233 

Srenticisis etherCirce of thetsoul. 9.94. Sans 4 ee ‘ 

Smith Hh, Po, Deanof. Catena on Acamethai ee 6 hae 
dom wt foreknowledvey ews ead. giicd) se Sela ees 

Smith, Captain John, impromptu preservation of. . . 

Smith, Goldwin, on God’s calculation of probabilities, 159; 
on futility of effort to reconcile foreknowledge with free- 
Giisns 20s cO Nios UNIS petite, | coke | pee ae a ee ey | ee 


341 
153 


157 


150 


I9I 
440 
378 
371 
33 
30 
26 
189 
122 


221 


154 
384 
429 
436 
285 


437 


18 
177 


194 


458 INDEX. 


PAGE. 
Sophistry of ‘‘all things will be as they will be,” .... +. 344 
Spinoza, Benedict, on unknowableness of future free choices, . 216 
Statistics, moral, based only on probabilities, 422; never per- 
fectly uniform, 422; therefore, no data for certainty, 4223 
only valuable because will is free, 20.2. * 2) ak i a ee 
Stewart, Dugald, on necessity of contingency of nate voli- 
tions, 183; on predestination versus sense of accounta- 
bility, 399; on the non-prescience of free acts,. .. . . 318. 
Stuart, Moses, ons“ thatrit: mipht: berfulflled,” so 7cgai. 120; E2E 
Succession, the, of perceptions in mind of God, . . 224, 321, 385 
Supralapsarianism involved in foreknowledge, ...... 443 
TAPPAN, President, on necessity of contingency of human voll 
CIOS a a Sp a ee eee ae ee ren ee en a 
Taylor, “Dr.y Nathaniel, quoted; sr. ie hag. = sts eae ome 
Taylor, alsaac, <quoted panne (ip tate (2) ian eee, ee 
Telievsensetoth**thatim aaa. AL Sig} ES TOL Mol Reena 
Temptations addressed either to res reason or densities a6. 
291; create liability to sin, 36; necessary to test loyalty, 
291; a certain degree of intensity necessary to the achieve- 
ment of moral character, 36, 38, 411; never necessitate 
sin, é «Eels 0. 1 a 2 ee 
Rests tle.vot crate forebhowaule 2 at aR Oe le 
Theology, source of confusion in,.. . ot") ESS 
Theologians, bewildering errors of, 281 ; sdetiey ‘he conslaaame 
of philosophers that God is inconceivable, unthinkable, 
unknowable, 282; their futile efforts to reconcile fore- 
kiowledpeavath freedom ei Sy Ses Te eee ee 
Theodicy impossible on denial of either contingencies or un- 


certainties, suo te te o's nie ae 
Thomson, Bishop, used BAS A A Ate PN ae 
Thought, finite, necessary laws of, Byehide Maidwinage af future 

freesaCtS. 7.4 te oo AIEEE Fa ee 


Tillotson on difficulty of (overheat contingent;events, V) 2) Serer 
Time, definition of, by the author, 383; and by Aristotle, Her- 
bert, Gruppe, Kant, and Hegel, 384; an eae pre 
totrod,. 6%. trees Pore os on eroetoes 
Trial indispensable to pewardupility) cor Sy 411; must ye 
graduated to the will’s power of endurance, 294, 411; in- 
volves liabilityto? fall, 2293 2A een eres eo 
Truths admitted, necessary to legitimate reasoning . . . . 392, 395 
Twisse, Dr., on meaning of contingently,. ....... + 337 


INDEX. 


459 


PAGE. 


UNAVOIDABILITY, the, of foreknown events, BAT ROAZ FOF 0 

foreknown destiny, SLU ORE ANN Re ee 
Unconditioned, the, definition of, 
Unplkne wables the a.ie ss 


« ° ° . e ° « ° e ° . . ° ° 


Uniformity, the, of moral statistics, tee the basis of proba- 
DR OLE e eer Cali Vs Moxa © ouess Fie ec vd cp atd ai, 
Universe, the objective, necessary to care re creatures, 253; 
and to revelation of.God,.... 
Use of the terms infinite, unconditioned, etc., 
VAGARIES, the, of theologians, . . . 
Volition, a, coerced, has no moral ee 49 ; Priced has no 
freedom, 287; precedents of, not coercive, 322; precedents 
of, no data for Cee ng oak 321; or for absolute 
foreknowledge, 


323 
. ° . . . 3 Po 
Volitions, free, determined eh no ee 288 ; foreltonledee of, 


depends on foreknowledge of their causes, 324, 3253; not 
caused by external excitements, 331; but by the will alone, 
332, 334; not now certain what they will be, 334, 335; not 
the resultants of motives, Pig Ra ee 
WARBURTON, BISHOP, on the auitrnes Nig prayer on God, 
Washington, George, providences in the life of, 
Watson, Richard, on divine prescience of contingencies, 161, 
162, 163, 164, 165; on violence to Messiah implied in 
Isaiah liti, 165; on inconceivability of mode of divine 
foreknowledge, 214, 293; on the meaning of contingency, 
296; on contingency versus necessity, 301, 308; quoted, 
361; on the idea of flowing duration, 387; on the dis- 
tinction between knowledge and influence, . 
Weisse, his definition of eternity, . . . 


° ° e ° ° 


Wesley, John, on foreknowledge of free acts inexplicable pA Ro 
Ong tieseverma enowae ol God, . « . . . 
West, Dr. Nathaniel, on ‘that it iene be fulfilled,’ ier Oe 
DMALELV MDP UOTE a i. 4 Mee conte t ga re ee 
Whedon, Dr., on divine control aii Teer nrients 78; on changes 
in God’s feelings and purposes, 178; on God’s limitation 
of his power, 208; on difficulty of conceiving how God 
foreknows, 214, 217; on Omniscience, 238; on incalcula- 
bility of free volitions, 289; on freedom, 293; on consist- 
ency of prescience with freedom, 310; on immutability of 
God’s plans, 312; on divine foresight of Judas’s treachery, 
Will, the definition of, 33; created free, 33, 289; but may be 
Placed under the law of cause and ‘effect, . . 2 2.1: % 


348 
266 
22" 


422 
254 


273 
281 


324 


421 
405 
4I 


410 
384 


224 


119 
438 


313 


39 


460 INDEX, 


PAGE. 
Will, free, the ultimate cause of all volitions, 225, 288; free, 


has the power of the initiative, 288; free, can not be con- 
strained by motives, 292, 410, 411; free, possesses the 
power to inchoate sin, 292; free, an unconditioned cause, 293 
Wollaston, Dr., on answers to prayer provided for in the 
course Of MALLE, 2.0. ve alests Mee tol pay Clee en 


Woolsey,.Dr:, on) Peter,:913 on Old: Calvinism «¥. >...) . aro 


PASSAGES OF SCRIPTURE 


CITED AND INTERPRETED IN THIS WORK. 


GENESIS. 

CHAPTER. VERSE. 

Bie, 40 ey 4) (12; 
Woks Veg ere st « 6, 
XLV, 75 
Weider ieca ate 20, 
Dee tem 4. te 135 
XVIII, 19, 
Petts he Oa aS 8, 
Mee es cn es ZO mo Ts 
Se ices 225 
EXODUS 

IIT, Co) a a Poem | 19, 
III, 20021; 
DNR eens. 3 vite at 
ELE esata sis A; 
|, he NP Cee 16, 
re re ee eee ie 
DCE MGa Hey ye ok 10, 
21S SA Aan 36, 

DEUTERONOMY. 

Vil, 2, 
VIII, 18, 
ibe sPra.bc 5 fe 22, 
Th re, 30, 
XXXI, 29; 
».O.0.48 275 
JOSHUA. 

SSCL e-ieca. 4.3; 


RE se 4. 18/520; 


—__@——— 
JUDGES. 
PAGE. CHAPTER. VERSE, 
SOIC LV sot oteule ae Ss 
25 ir ViISe Ss 0 oie 
80 
80 I SAMUEL. 
142 | IT, ais oe Os 
TH), Dieser oe ee 8, 
Dae Pie et gee 39; 
200s OV: B*. ar, eae, 10, 
ZOOM GRAV for. ae een de ee II, 
XVI, 14, 
6 XVIII, 10, 
a DUEX Foe eS. 9, 
MG he Ry 2s 
144 ’ 7; 
I44 Il SAMUEL. 
ESTE T a te ee ae 14, 
PSSM Lhe Bo ete 23, 
RW LE 14, 
145 
I KINGS. 
28 xe Le eee ee 
57 5S te le 15, 
145 DG as) ae ee eRe 
145 + GNe 2, 
149 XVIII, 2I; 
150 Il KINGS 
ox. ° I, 5; 6, 
ECR) am oh seb 2) ke 31-33, 
L45 NLL, 11-13; 


462 


I CHRONICLES. 


CHAPTER. VERSE. 
PRONELLL, Upsets Q, “LO, 
EXCL 1 Soe tes Se) cous if 

II CHRONICLES. 
EX es Siete Nie ore 10, 
EZRA 
V; ° e ° 5> 
de mi OP Ae i; 
VILE; Selieleteoa ne £27; 
IX, oe 9; 
JOB. 
XXII 15, 16, 
oO 6 gmap es, Map SF, 
i cede ho wreaks Me 12, 5 
PSALMS 


GIW eects ee ee 40, 


LS Virose tet oe ate ei 22. 
NX Lal, cette tte 3 eye Q; 
Xx XET 16, 18, j 
LXIXx, 25> 
RX eo penis 8, 
LXIX sures 
XXXIV, 19, 20, 


KCK EY Vineet ene een. O, 


CV, pelos aineens 25, 

SVS eee eee 3; 

Tec uhei- 5 se okie 15; A 
PROVERBS. 

XXI, I 

D6 eet ease 275 

Vitis erate oe 21, 


9 
NOddl sce ee, 


ECCLESIASTES. 
PE PP SM ADL aE Sale he Sr 


ISAIAH. 
MLIV SG wed 28 irae 
IAW, ci ee nl tae eas 
XLVI, .9-II, 


SCRIPTURAL INDEX. 


Isaiah Continued. 


CHAPTER, VERSE. PAGE 
POY el a oh 98 
NIsSaee ye O, 510; 120 
XXX, 4 BAe «8350 
DOLL, Date a. (ieee I, 389 
: JEREMIAH. 

DX, «set 25 
XXIX, 10, 45 
XVIII 6-8, . 45 
XXXVI, ey 45 
XXVI, Res se 
LULA Ao 11.132.020,.-— eee 


XAXVITT, 4-175 tee ee 


SM XV ALL, oooh. ee 5) 
er ARIA 20; Soaeeeles 
NE bra urivers 6 23...) reeks 
XVII, 10, (| steele 
ARES pol oy Se 31, . eee 
XOQUMILI, Aa. 335, eee 
DE CU Par ok ot 250 
EZEKIEL. 
SST, oo 3 ee 
DANIEL. 

» Caley Og Meo Beate 13, 20, + ao 
CL Usa aes bs se 277, 1's is ge 
HOSEA 
ait oie My fe ee 
JONAH 
UT eae. Be ieo Fa Pe ih i ta 
TT ese eee ee 5-I0, III 
LN OF Ses tetas ieee 2, ‘5 “<b a 
LV, 2) 5" 10,01 Ui ee oe 
ZECHARIAH. 

Le ~(12;'13,° 1. <a eee 
MATTHEW. 

Le x eevee a1, 146 
2 ee ean 34) . Te 
XXVI, 0030) 54-2, te aa 


SCRIPTURAL INDEX. 


Matthew Continued. 


CHAPTER, VERSE. 
Ov Lomo ee eee 106 
>A I Ve ee 21; 106 
oa ments ity pee O7 
XXVI, ZASe LIO SALTS 
et he eee | es 117 
XXVI, 14-16, . ath 415 
XXVI, S23; : 118 
12 ie) eure sd eet 235 122 
ise #5 ¥4ay05; 122 
> aE AeA 18, 123 
XXVII, Q, 126 
1 eer ulees eae 15, 130 
eer. Wee ese. % 18, 141 
MARK 
XXIV, 27-31, 86 
Rte eS eis ss Nes 103 
PC Ve: ste 2 at, 106 
LEY eee 32-34, 107 
OG eee. chase, Ses 107 
LUKE, 
| Li 0 ae 52, 74 
See L, 315 325 86 
XXIV, on 403 103 
XVIII, oT, 103 
XXII 34, 105 
RNa oe sarecr a. 24 106 
XVIII, 34, 106 
XXIV, 6, 107 
[5 a 45; 107 
el, ita Aye Ost ss 117 
oct E 21,22, 45, aes 415 | 
mls iterate A 167 
JOHN. 
4D) gig een oe vie. 
Dirge cat tn oh) sx 27, 103 
Se « — 36, 103 
Boor ese 18, 109 
VI, 63, 64, 114 
lig Pe ars Ey ies 116 


PAGE. 


John Continued. 


CHAPTER. VERSE. 
MEL eee a teal, 
XII, > 37-49, 
Vg eee. ea Ge 
DAWNED eh 12, 
NaN ae 
SLELS 18, 
4e.e 24, 
VIL; : 28, 
VEL Ts 32; 
2,3 8 ope pa, & a2, 
Lu aver ar ic oe Q, 

ACTS 
XVII, 3, 26, 
Fs 13-18, 
SULT, 27, 29, 
Lv aca 23, 
L Vig 1 eeu eesas 27; 
SVT ear Ss 
Lit: 14, 15, 
Ve ee 30, 
Ae) en oe Als 
bn ae DAseoee 
| ine Ne ater aes 10.20; 
DRG is Decale tae de 18, 
XXLV; aos. 
ROMANS 
>Ahs Pre Wore, as 
EM Vigg gu sine) cones 22 
> Gir Baten hae te 33; 
I CORINTHIANS 
Lis te acces 7s 
LX secs Varo ee oy 27; 
Il CORINTHIANS 
Vice ote ae home 10, 
EPHESIANS 
saat "PHILIPPIANS. - 
Oe ee a 8, 


463 


PAGE. 
118 
121 
123 
125 


ae t25 


124 
128 
137 
137 
137 
192 


68 
104. 
104. 
104. 
105 
106 
135 
135 
140 
115 
129 
148 
359 


130 
362 
446 


135 
140 


360 


147 


137 


464 SCRIPTURAL INDEX. 

I THESSALONIANS. HEBREWS. 
CHAPTER, VERSE. PAGE. CHAPTER. VERSE. 

Il, PSp ges 4 GLOSS VG Roc een bal 

I TIMOTHY. I PETER. 

TTT; LE) eae ee LOt as eee te tee 20, 

Il TIMOTHY. I JOHN. 

III, wages tap te ane fete LlO tiig memes tees) sara 
VW Le is Gorne te aed Oseiee 

TITUS. 

TUS ot venieet. eee 9; we west LO REVELATION. 
Tysons aie BIW ae en tie Ot WLLL, Umeeret, ite wm con vee 


Princeton Theological Sem 


WY ON A 


012 01019 3656 


